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Published

Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) is the State’s primary environmental regulator. The EPA regulates waste and water pollution under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (the Act) through its licensing, monitoring, regulation and enforcement activities. The community should be able to rely on the effectiveness of this regulation to protect the environment and human health. The EPA has regulatory responsibility for more significant and specific activities which can potentially harm the environment.

Activities regulated by the EPA include manufacturing, chemical production, electricity generation, mining, waste management, livestock processing, mineral processing, sewerage treatment, and road construction. For these activities, the operator must have an EPA issued environment protection licence (licence). Licences have conditions attached which may limit the amount and concentrations of substances the activity may produce and discharge into the environment. Conditions also require the licensee to report on its licensed activities.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory response to water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. The findings and recommendations of this review can be reasonably applied to the EPA’s other regulatory functions, as the areas we examined were indicative of how the EPA regulates all pollution types and incidents.

 
Conclusion
There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal which limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework that has elements consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. However, the EPA did not demonstrate that it has established reliable practices to accurately and consistently detect the risk of non compliances by licensees, and apply consistent regulatory actions. This may expose the risk of harm to the environment and human health.
The EPA also could not demonstrate that it has effective governance and oversight of its regulatory operations. The EPA operates in a complex regulatory environment where its regional offices have broad discretions for how they operate. The EPA has not balanced this devolved structure with an effective governance approach that includes appropriate internal controls to monitor the consistency or quality of its regulatory activities. It also does not have an effective performance framework that sets relevant performance expectations and outcome-based key performance indicators (KPIs) for its regional offices. 
These deficiencies mean that the EPA cannot be confident that it conducts compliance and enforcement activities consistently across the State and that licensees are complying with their licence conditions or the Act.
The EPA's reporting on environmental and regulatory outcomes is limited and most of the data it uses is self reported by industry. It has not set outcome-based key result areas to assess performance and trends over time. 
The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal but there are important gaps in implementation that reduce its effectiveness.
Elements of the EPA’s risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal are consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its risk-based approach that limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA could not demonstrate that it effectively regulates licensees because it has not established reliable practices that accurately and consistently detect licence non compliances or breaches of the Act and enforce regulatory actions.
The EPA lacks effective governance arrangements to support its devolved regional structure. The EPA's performance framework has limited and inconclusive reporting on regional performance to the EPA’s Chief Executive Officer or to the EPA Board. The EPA cannot assure that it is conducting its regulatory responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
The EPA does not consistently evaluate its regulatory approach to ensure it is effective and efficient. For example, there are no set requirements for how EPA officers conduct mandatory site inspections, which means that there is a risk that officers are not detecting all breaches or non-compliances. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA cannot rely on the data it collects from these site inspections to understand whether its regulatory response is effective and efficient. In addition, where the EPA identifies instances of non compliance or breaches, it does not apply all available regulatory actions to encourage compliance.
The EPA also does not have a systematic approach to validate self-reported information in licensees’ annual returns, despite the data being used to assess administrative fees payable to the EPA and its regulatory response to non-compliances. 
The EPA does not use performance frameworks to monitor the consistency or quality of work conducted across the State. The EPA has also failed to provide effective guidance for its staff. Many of its policies and procedures are out-dated, inconsistent, hard to access, or not mandated.
Recommendations
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should:
1. implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should:
2. progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application
3. implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. 
The EPA does not apply a consistent approach to setting licence conditions for discharges to water.
The requirements for setting licence conditions for water pollution are complex and require technical and scientific expertise. In August 2016, the EPA approved guidance developed by its technical experts in the Water Technical Advisory Unit to assist its regional staff. However, the EPA did not mandate the use of the guidance until mid-April 2018. Up until then, the EPA had left discretion to regional offices to decide what guidance their staff use. This meant that practices have differed across the organisation. The EPA is yet to conduct training for staff to ensure they consistently apply the 2016 guidance.
The EPA has not implemented any appropriate internal controls or quality assurance process to monitor the consistency or quality of licence conditions set by its officers across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
The triennial 2016 audit of the Sydney drinking water catchment report highlighted that Lake Burragorang has experienced worsening water quality over the past 20 years from increased salinity levels. The salinity levels were nearly twice as high as in other storages in the Sydney drinking water catchment. The report recommended that the source and implication of the increased salinity levels be investigated. The report did not propose which public authority should carry out such an investigation. 
To date, no NSW Government agency has addressed the report's recommendation. There are three public authorities, the EPA, DPE and WaterNSW that are responsible for regulating activities that impact on water quality in the Sydney drinking water catchment, which includes Lake Burragorang. 
Recommendation
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should:
4. (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and
  (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality.
The EPA’s risk-based approach to monitoring compliance of licensees has limited effectiveness. 
The EPA tailors its compliance monitoring approach based on the performance of licensees. This means that licensees that perform better have a lower administrative fee and fewer mandatory site inspections. 
However, this approach relies on information that is not complete or accurate. Sources of information include licensees’ annual returns, EPA site inspections and compliance audits, and pollution reports from the public. 
Licensees report annually to the EPA on their performance, including compliance against their licence conditions. The Act contains significant financial penalties if licensees provide false and misleading information in their annual returns. However, the EPA does not systematically or consistently validate information self-reported by licensees, or consistently apply regulatory actions if it discovers non-compliance. 
Self-reported compliance data is used in part to assess a licensed premises’ overall environmental risk level, which underpins the calculation of the administrative fee, the EPA’s site inspection frequency, and the licensee’s exposure to regulatory actions. It is also used to assess the load-based licence fee that the licensee pays.
The EPA has set minimum mandatory site inspection frequencies for licensed premises based on its assessed overall risk level. This is a key tool to detect non-compliance or breaches of the Act. However, the EPA has not issued a policy or procedures that define what these mandatory inspections should cover and how they are to be conducted. We found variations in how the EPA officers in the offices we visited conducted these inspections. The inconsistent approach means that the EPA does not have complete and accurate information of licensees’ compliance. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA is not effectively identifying all non-compliances for it to consider applying appropriate regulatory actions.
The EPA also receives reports of pollution incidents from the public that may indicate non-compliance. However, the EPA has not set expected time frames within which it expects its officers to investigate pollution incidents. The EPA regional offices decide what to investigate and timeframes. The EPA does not measure regional performance regarding timeframes. 
The few compliance audits the EPA conducts annually are effective in identifying licence non-compliances and breaches of the Act. However, the EPA does not have a policy or required procedures for its regulatory officers to consistently apply appropriate regulatory actions in response to compliance audit findings. 
The EPA has not implemented any effective internal controls or quality assurance process to check the consistency or quality of how its regulatory officers monitor compliance across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
Recommendations
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to:
5. by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns
6. by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions.
 
The EPA cannot assure that its regulatory enforcement approach is fully effective.
The EPA’s compliance policy and prosecution guidelines have a large number of available regulatory actions and factors which should be taken into account when selecting an appropriate regulatory response. The extensive legislation determining the EPA’s regulatory activities, and the devolved regional structure the EPA has adopted in delivering its compliance and regulatory functions, increases the risk of inconsistent compliance decisions and regulatory responses. A good regulatory framework needs a consistent approach to enforcement to incentivise compliance. 
The EPA has not balanced this devolved regional structure with appropriate governance arrangements to give it assurance that its regulatory officers apply a consistent approach to enforcement.
The EPA has not issued standard procedures to ensure consistent non-court enforcement action for breaches of the Act or non-compliance with licence conditions. Given our finding that the EPA does not effectively detect breaches and non-compliances, there is a risk that it is not applying appropriate regulatory actions for many breaches and non-compliances.
A recent EPA compliance audit identified significant non-compliances with incident management plan requirements. However, the EPA has not applied regulatory actions for making false statements on annual returns for those licensees that certified their plans complied with such requirements. The EPA also has not applied available regulatory actions for the non-compliances which led to the false or misleading statements.
Recommendation
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should:
7. Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions.
The EPA has implemented the actions listed in the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16. To date, the EPA has also implemented four of the six recommendations made by the ICAC on EPA's oversight of Regional Illegal Dumping Squads.
The EPA did not achieve the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16 target of a 30 per cent reduction in instances of large scale illegal dumping in Sydney, the Illawarra, Hunter and Central Coast from 2011 levels. 
In the reporting period, the incidences of large scale illegal dumping more than doubled. The EPA advised that this increase may be the result of greater public awareness and reporting rather than increased illegal dumping activity. 
By June 2018, the EPA is due to implement one outstanding recommendation made by the ICAC but has not set a time for the other outstanding recommendation.  

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – List of enforcement tools

Appendix three – The EPA's organisational structure

Appendix four – The EPA's regions and branches

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #304 - released 28 June 2018

Published

Regional Assistance Programs

Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications for regional assistance programs are assessed and recommended for funding. Its contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude whether the objectives of these programs have been achieved as the relevant agencies have not yet measured their benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. 

In 2011, the NSW Government established Restart NSW to fund new infrastructure with the proceeds from the sale and lease of government assets. From 2011 to 2017, the NSW Government allocated $1.7 billion from the fund for infrastructure in regional areas, with an additional commitment of $1.3 billion to be allocated by 2021. The NSW Government allocates these funds through regional assistance programs such as Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. NSW councils are the primary recipients of funding provided under these programs.

The NSW Government announced the Resources for Regions program in 2012 with the aim of addressing infrastructure constraints in mining affected communities. Infrastructure NSW administers the program, with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.

The NSW Government announced the Fixing Country Roads program in 2014 with the aim of building more efficient road freight networks. Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW jointly administer this program, which funds local councils to deliver projects that help connect local and regional roads to state highways and freight hubs.

This audit assessed whether these two programs (Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads) were being effectively managed and achieved their objectives. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  • How well are the relevant agencies managing the assessment and recommendation process?
  • How do the relevant agencies ensure that funded projects are being delivered?
  • Do the funded projects meet program and project objectives?

The audit focussed on four rounds of Resources for Regions funding between 2013–14 to 2015–16, as well as the first two rounds of Fixing Country Roads funding in 2014–15 and 2015–16.

Conclusion
Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications are assessed and recommended for funding. Infrastructure NSW’s contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude on whether program objectives are being achieved as Infrastructure NSW has not yet measured program benefits.
While Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW managed the assessment processes effectively overall, they have not fully maintained all required documentation, such as conflict of interest registers. Keeping accurate records is important to support transparency and accountability to the public about funding allocation. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.
For both programs assessed, the relevant agencies have developed good strategies over time to support councils through the application process. These strategies include workshops, briefings and feedback for unsuccessful applicants. Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have implemented effective tools to assist applicants in demonstrating the economic impact of their projects.
Infrastructure NSW is effective in identifying projects that are 'at‑risk' and assists in bringing them back on track. Infrastructure NSW has a risk‑based methodology to verify payment claims, which includes elements of good practice in grants administration. For example, it requires grant recipients to provide photos and engages Public Works Advisory to review progress claims and visit project sites.
Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. Infrastructure NSW intends to assess benefits for both programs once each project in a funding round is completed. To date, no funding round has been completed. As a result, no benefits assessment has been done for any completed project funded in either program.
 

The project selection criteria are consistent with the program objectives set by the NSW Government, and the RIAP applied the criteria consistently. Probity and record keeping practices did not fully comply with the probity plans.

The assessment methodology designed by Infrastructure NSW is consistent with2 the program objectives and criteria. In the rounds that we reviewed, all funded projects met the assessment criteria.

Infrastructure NSW developed probity plans for both programs which provided guidance on the record keeping required to maintain an audit trail, including the use of conflict of interest registers. Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW did not fully comply with these requirements. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.

NSW Procurement Board Directions require agencies to ensure that they do not engage a probity advisor that is engaged elsewhere in the agency. Infrastructure NSW has not fully complied with this requirement. A conflict of interest arose when Infrastructure NSW engaged the same consultancy to act as its internal auditor and probity advisor.

While these infringements of probity arrangements are unlikely to have had a major impact on the assessment process, they weaken the transparency and accountability of the process.

Some councils have identified resourcing and capability issues which impact on their ability to participate in the application process. For both programs, the relevant agencies conducted briefings and webinars with applicants to provide advice on the objectives of the programs and how to improve the quality of their applications. Additionally, Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have developed tools to assist councils to demonstrate the economic impact of their applications.

The relevant agencies provided feedback on unsuccessful applications to councils. Councils reported that the quality of this feedback has improved over time.

Recommendations

  1. By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
    • ensure probity reports address whether all elements of the probity plan have been effectively implemented.
  1. By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW should:
    • maintain and store all documentation regarding assessment and probity matters according to the State Records Act 1998, the NSW Standard on Records Management and the relevant probity plans

Infrastructure NSW is responsible for overseeing and monitoring projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. Infrastructure NSW effectively manages projects to keep them on track, however it could do more to assure itself that all recipients have complied with funding deeds. Benefits and outcomes should also start to be measured and reported as soon as practicable after projects are completed to inform assessment of future projects.

Infrastructure NSW identifies projects experiencing unreasonable delays or higher than expected expenses as 'at‑risk'. After Infrastructure NSW identifies a project as 'at‑risk', it puts in place processes to resolve issues to bring them back on track. Infrastructure NSW, working with Public Works Advisory regional offices, employs a risk‑based approach to validate payment claims, however this process should be strengthened. Infrastructure NSW would get better assurance by also conducting annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects.

Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. It applies the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework to Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads at a program level. This means that each round of funding (under both programs) is treated as a distinct program for the purposes of benefits realisation. It plans to assess whether benefits have been realised once each project in a funding round is completed. As a result, no benefits realisation assessment has been done for any project funded under either Resources for Regions or Fixing Country Roads. Without project‑level benefits realisation, future decisions are not informed by the lessons from previous investments.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
    • conduct annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads
    • publish the circumstances under which unspent funds can be allocated to changes in project scope
    • measure benefits delivered by projects that were completed before December 2017
    • implement an annual process to measure benefits for projects completed after December 2017
  1. By December 2018, Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW should:
    • incorporate a benefits realisation framework as part of the detailed application.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - Maps of funded projects

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #300 - released 17 May 2018

Published

Energy rebates for low income households

Planning
Industry
Compliance
Fraud
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The Department of Planning and Environment provides more than $245 million in energy rebates to around 27 percent of NSW households. This report highlights that the department is not monitoring the rebate schemes to understand whether they are delivering the best outcomes.

Most rebates are ongoing payments applied directly to energy bills reducing the amount payable by the householder. The structure of these rebates is complex and can be inequitable. Some households are eligible for four different rebates, each with its own eligibility criteria.  Also, some households in very similar circumstances receive different levels of support depending on what type of energy is used in their home or which adult in the house is the energy account holder. For example, a household using both electricity and gas receives more assistance than a household with electricity alone even if total energy bills are the same. 

The Department of Planning and Environment (Department) administers five energy rebate schemes targeted to low-income households. The five rebates are of two key types:

1. Ongoing support to pay energy bills
2. Crisis Support  

More than one million rebates are paid each year to over 800,000, or around 27 per cent, of NSW households. Households learn about rebates from a variety of sources including: Service NSW, government and energy retailer websites, energy retailer welcome packs, Department marketing efforts, information on energy bills, and Centrelink.  

The budget for energy rebates is increasing every year and in 2017–18 is more than $245 million. The Department delivers most rebates through a network of partnership arrangements with:

  • energy retailers, who apply rebates directly onto energy bills
  • more than 340 charities and other NGOs who assess households' eligibility for crisis support and distribute support through the Energy Accounts Payment Assistance scheme (EAPA)
  • Service NSW, who informs NSW households about rebates through their call centre.

The energy rebates budget is substantial and the distribution arrangements are complex. The objective of the audit was to assess whether the current design and distribution of energy rebates schemes is effective.

Conclusion
The Department administers the rebate schemes using partners to ensure funds are directed towards energy bills as intended. Ongoing support schemes provide assistance to low-income households as intended, but have no measurable objectives or outcome measures and therefore can't be assessed for their effectiveness. Crisis support (EAPA) has a clear objective, to keep households experiencing financial crisis connected to energy services, but the Department does not monitor the performance of EAPA against this objective.  

The structure of rebates providing ongoing support is complex and can be inequitable for some households. Reducing the number of separate schemes and simplifying eligibility requirements offers the most scope for improving effectiveness of ongoing support schemes.  

The growth of embedded networks1 represents a future administrative risk to the Department.

Partnering with energy retailers, charities and NGOs delivers advantages, but stronger oversight is required over partner organisations.

The Department and partner organisations administer the rebate schemes as designed

The Department oversees a complex package of rebate schemes in partnership with 25 retailers and around 340 charities and NGOs. The partnership arrangements ensure that funds are distributed directly to energy bills as intended. The schemes provide support to recipients and are administered in line with government decisions about eligibility.  

Communication about rebates does not reach all eligible households

Households learn about rebate schemes through a mix of communication channels including retailer websites and call centres, Department websites, Centrelink, financial counsellors, EAPA Providers, the Energy and Water Ombudsman and Service NSW. Some low-income groups, such as those with poor English language skills, do not find out about energy rebates.

Scheme objectives are not measurable

Rebate schemes that provide ongoing support do not have measurable objectives or outcome measures. Without clear and measurable objectives, the Department cannot report to government on whether the schemes are achieving the intended policy outcomes, nor recommend improvements to ensure the schemes deliver the greatest benefit to the most financially vulnerable households.

The EAPA crisis support scheme has a clearer objective in that it aims to keep households experiencing financial crisis connected to energy services. However, the Department does not measure outcomes from providing this type of support, and does not know if the crisis support achieves this objective.  

The structure of rebate schemes for ongoing support is complex

The Low Income Household Rebate accounts for 80 per cent of the budget for ongoing support rebates. The remaining 20 per cent of the budget is administered through four separate schemes: Gas Rebate, Medical Energy Rebate, Family Energy Rebate and Life Support Rebate.

Each of these rebates has its own eligibility criteria and some require separate application processes. The Family Energy Rebate is complex to access and apply for, and around one third of households do not reapply each year. Eligible households that receive energy through embedded networks apply directly to the Department for rebates, which are paid by the Department into bank accounts. Embedded networks are energy supply arrangements where the manager of a residential facility such as a caravan park, retirement village or apartment block, buys energy in bulk and then on-sells it to residents. The Department is yet to develop strategies to address a forecast increase in such households.

The design of the rebate schemes creates some inequities

Households in similar circumstances can receive different levels of assistance depending on which adult in the house is the energy account holder, the mix of energy types used in the home, or the EAPA Provider they turn to when in financial crisis.

Households with both gas and electricity connections receive more assistance than those with only electricity. Households in rural and regional areas receive the same value rebate as households closer to Sydney, despite higher distribution charges. Family Energy Rebate is a two-tier payment, with a higher amount available to families with greater means. Lower-income families receive a much smaller Family Energy Rebate on the assumption that they already receive Low Income Household Rebate. Charities and NGOs distributing EAPA crisis support apply inconsistent standards when assessing household need, which leads to inequitable levels of assistance.

Departmental oversight of energy retailers and EAPA Providers is not strong enough

While partnering with energy retailers and EAPA Providers delivers advantages, stronger management is needed to ensure that partners follow Departmental guidelines and to minimise the potential for fraud. The Department's accreditation process for potential EAPA Providers does not consider the applicant's financial governance standards and the most recent audit of EAPA Providers was 2013.

[1] Embedded networks are energy supply arrangements where the manager of a residential facility such as a caravan park, retirement village or apartment block, buys energy in bulk and then on-sells it to residents.

By September 2018, the Department of Planning and Environment should:

  1. Ensure effective strategies are in place to make information about rebates available to all eligible, low-income households
     
  2. Evaluate alternative models and develop advice for government to reduce complexity and improve equity of ongoing rebates
     
  3. Establish measurable objectives for schemes that provide ongoing support, and monitor and measure performance of all schemes against objectives and outcome measures
     
  4. Assess the impacts of the forecast increase in embedded networks and develop strategies to manage any increased administrative risk
     
  5. Strengthen assurance that EAPA is being provided in accordance with its objectives and guidelines by implementing accreditation and compliance programs
     
  6. Ensure those eligible for EAPA financial support are not disadvantaged by inflexible payments, inconsistent provider practices, or inability to access an EAPA provider in a timely manner. Options include:
    • moving from a fixed-value voucher to a flexible payment based on need irrespective of energy type
    • establishing a ‘Provider of Last Resort’ facility for households that cannot access an EAPA Provider.

Appendix one - Response from the Agency

Appendix two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #292 - released 19 September 2017 

Published

Office of Strategic Lands

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Procurement

The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes. 

OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region. 

This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives. 

Conclusion:

OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.

OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.

OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017. 

OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy. 

Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula. 

OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.

OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW

NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.

OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.

OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability

OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.

While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.

OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures

OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.

Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.

With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.

OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability

OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.

Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.

OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.

OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.

OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders

To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.

NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.

The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.

More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
 

The Department of Planning and Environment (Office of Strategic Lands) should:

By December 2017:  

  1. clarify and document its long-term purpose, role and goals in line with its mandate. This includes:
    • finalising and implementing a business plan with outcome-based performance measures that support the achievement of its goals
    • establishing and implementing a business and financial model, including resourcing, that supports its long-term strategy
    • exploring options for expanding the operation of OSL to other areas of NSW.

By July 2018:

2. develop and implement an approach for working with NSW Government agencies to improve its efficacy in strategic land identification, acquisition and management.

On an ongoing basis:

3. improve the transparency of its operations, and its communication and engagement with all stakeholders. This includes developing engagement strategies appropriate for different stakeholder groups.

Appendix one - Response from Department of Planning and Environment (Office of Strategic Lands)

Appendix two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #290 - released 10 August 2017 

Published

Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Planning
Industry
Environment
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Department of Planning and Environment requires mining companies to rehabilitate sites according to conditions set in the mining development approval. The Department holds mining rehabilitation security deposits that are meant to cover the full cost of rehabilitation if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations.

The total value of security deposits held has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites in New South Wales.

While there have been substantial increases in total deposits held, mine rehabilitation security deposits are still not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine's rehabilitation in the event of a default.

This audit was undertaken when the Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development was responsible for ensuring land disturbed by mining activities is rehabilitated in accordance with the relevant development approval, including the administration of mining rehabilitation security deposits. On 1 April 2017, this responsibility was transferred to the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department).  

This audit assessed whether the Department maintains adequate security deposits to cover the liabilities associated with mine closures, including rehabilitation. Companies authorised by the Department to undertake mining activities must provide a security deposit to cover the full costs of rehabilitation in the event of default by the company. Rehabilitation is the treatment of disturbed land or water to establish a safe, stable, non-polluting and sustainable environment.

Mining companies must provide an estimate of rehabilitation costs for each site. The Department provides a Rehabilitation Cost Calculation tool to assist companies calculate the deposit amount. Companies are also required to ensure that the cost estimate is in accordance with the approved Mining Operations Plan (MOP). The MOP is intended to be a mine rehabilitation and closure plan, and forms the basis for the estimation of the security deposit. The Department reviews the estimates and determines the deposit for each site.  

Security deposits are an option of last resort. The Department has other legislative and regulatory tools which it normally uses to promote compliance with rehabilitation requirements before accessing a security deposit. It can direct action by the mining company, issue fines and even have the Minister revoke a mining lease. To date, the Department has never had to access a security deposit for a state significant development mine site.

Conclusion

The Department holds security deposits for mining rehabilitation consistent with the amounts it has requested from mining companies, and it should be able to claim on a deposit if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations. The total value of deposits has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites. The Department’s management of the security deposit process has improved in recent years, and it has well advanced plans for further improvement, including a revised cost calculation tool.

The Department’s policy is that each mine’s security deposit should cover the full costs of rehabilitation for that mine. The security deposits the Department holds are not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine’s rehabilitation in the event of a default. The rates and allowances in the current cost calculation tool have not been updated since 2013 and some activities required for effective rehabilitation are not covered, or not covered adequately.

Security deposits also do not include sufficient contingency given the substantial risks and uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, particularly in the absence of a detailed closure plan. This risk is exacerbated by the limited independent verification of mining company claims about the size of the outstanding rehabilitation task, which remains the case despite recent improvements to monitoring and review procedures and practices.  

There is also no financial assurance held over the risk of significant unexpected environmental degradation in the long-term after a mine is deemed to be rehabilitated and the security deposit is returned. A security deposit is not an appropriate vehicle for covering this risk.

Security deposits are close to calculated value and should be accessible if needed

The value of securities held by the Department aligns with the latest approved rehabilitation cost estimates. This contrasts with the situation found by investigations in Victoria and Queensland, where deposit amounts held fell below the calculated costs.

The security deposits are usually in the form of a bank guarantee or cash. The Department has obtained legal advice indicating that it should be able to claim on these bank guarantees if the need arises. As the guarantee is between the financial institution and the Department, if a mining company goes into liquidation the Department should still be able to access the funds.  

When the latest estimate of rehabilitation costs is higher than the existing deposit, the Department will request additional security. It has experienced extensive delays in obtaining additional security for some sites, increasing the risk that available funds will be insufficient if needed.

Rehabilitation cost estimates are not yet adequate, but improvements are planned

The Department’s policy is for security deposits to cover the full cost of rehabilitation. No discounts are provided to mining companies for past good behaviour or low likelihood of default, unlike in some other states. Discounting could undermine the policy position.  

Current security deposits are unlikely to cover the full cost of rehabilitation on each mine site. The Department provides a rehabilitation cost calculation tool to help mining companies calculate the cost of rehabilitation and the required deposit amount, but:

  • several activities required to effect closure are not included and others underestimated
  • it does not make provision for industry cost changes over time
  • the rates used in the tool have not been updated since 2013
  • it was not able to provide the basis for the rates and allowances in the tool.

The Department reviews cost estimates provided by mining companies, but its verification of the extent of rehabilitation work on which these estimates are based is limited. It relies instead on section 387C of the Mining Act 1992 which makes it an offence for mining companies to provide false or misleading information. It is not evident how the Department would establish that information provided was false or misleading without more verification work, and six of the 14 cost estimates we reviewed were not signed by the mine manager, making enforcement more difficult.  

The Department has developed a new calculation tool, and recently released it for industry consultation. The new tool should improve rehabilitation estimates. It updates rates and allowances, and includes additional items to better cover required rehabilitation tasks. While a substantial improvement, the new tool could be further improved by providing additional coverage for stakeholder engagement, additional planning approvals, insurance costs, and any additional design, research and verification work required for successful closure.

There is no financial assurance over long-term environmental risks

The Department does not hold any financial assurance to cover the costs associated with mitigating any future environmental degradation once a mine closes and the security deposit is relinquished to the mining company. Security deposits are probably not the appropriate mechanism to cover these long-term risks but the risk of potential post-closure environmental degradation still needs to be costed and covered. A fund to cover the state-wide risk, to which all mines would contribute, is a possible mechanism.

Rehabilitation and closure outcomes are vague, particularly for unplanned closure

Rehabilitation outcomes in the MOPs we reviewed were generally not specific. Any lack of specificity in MOPs translates into uncertainty about rehabilitation work required if a mining company defaults. Part of the problem is that rehabilitation outcomes established in planning approvals are usually not specific and may not address all closure requirements. The Department has recognised there is scope to improve the clarity and specificity of rehabilitation requirements in planning approvals, and has started a review focusing on open-cut mines.

Rehabilitation outcomes are even less specific in the event of an unexpected early closure because they will probably be different from that achievable from a planned closure.  

MOP guidelines do not cover management of some key closure matters, such as the requirements of environment protection licences issued by the Environment Protection Authority and the management of heritage sites during closure.

There were significant variations in quality of MOPs we reviewed and the way closure risks and uncertainties were identified and addressed. The Department plans to improve the quality of rehabilitation programs through enhanced guidance and oversight.

Monitoring is not adequate to effectively gauge rehabilitation progress

The Department was not able to show it has been monitoring operational mine sites effectively to gauge the progress of ongoing site rehabilitation and the management of closure risks. There was no protocol for site inspections and limited evidence of inspections for the sites we reviewed.

The Department receives annual environmental management reports from mining companies, with most describing the areas of disturbance and rehabilitation occurring at each mine site. The Department recently established procedures for reviewing these annual reports, and has developed a risk-based process for prioritising reviews.

Most annual reports we reviewed did not explain environmental changes over time, nor the risks to mine closure and the measures required to mitigate them. For example, analysis of changes to surface water and groundwater quality was limited despite its relevance for assessing future contamination risks.

The Department does not currently have adequate processes in place to effectively verify the reported areas of disturbance and rehabilitation. It is developing geographic information system-based tools to better measure areas of disturbance and rehabilitation, new rehabilitation guidelines, and a procedure for determining whether rehabilitation has been successful. These initiatives should improve the monitoring and reporting of rehabilitation progress at mine sites.

There is no mechanism to prevent a mine being in ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely

The Department does not have a clear policy on the length of time and circumstances under which a mine can remain in ‘care and maintenance’. Indefinite postponement of rehabilitation and closure is therefore possible. 'Care and maintenance' is the period following temporary cessation of operations when infrastructure remains largely intact and the site continues to be managed. There are a range of valid reasons for a mining company to put a mine in ‘care and maintenance’, but it is also reasonable for the community to expect a limit to how long it has to wait for proper rehabilitation.

Mining operations make a significant contribution to the NSW economy, including over $1.3 billion in royalties each year. Around 400 mine sites throughout NSW provide over 40,000 jobs and are a major source of economic activity for many communities. Despite these benefits, it is important to ensure that mining companies fulfil their obligations to rehabilitate land disturbed as a result of mining activity.

We recommend that the Department should, by January 2018:

1. Improve the quality of rehabilitation and closure plans by:

  • ensuring plans submitted by mining companies include robust mine rehabilitation and closure risk assessments
  • clarifying the level of detail required in plans at each stage of a mine’s operation
  • specifying how requirements set under other legislative instruments (e.g. environment protection licences, heritage assets) should be addressed.

2. Improve assurance that security deposits are sufficient by:

  • ensuring its new cost calculation tool adequately covers all works needed for rehabilitation and closure
  • increasing the contingency for uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, at least until the mining company provides a detailed closure plan
  • verifying the cost estimates for a sample of high risk sites annually
  • ensuring that when mining companies are required to provide increased security deposits, they do so with minimal delay.

3. Enhance oversight of mine rehabilitation by:

  • developing a protocol to ensure sufficient and adequate site inspections
  • ensuring mining companies report performance against rehabilitation targets and environmental changes clearly, including an analysis of long-term surface water and groundwater trends in terms of levels, flow and quality
  • improving how it determines the progress and success of mine rehabilitation
  • developing clear policy and procedures for ensuring a mine cannot be put into ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely.

4. Collaborate with relevant agencies to establish a financial assurance mechanism, such as a sinking fund, to cover the risk of long-term environmental degradation after mines are closed and security deposits returned.

Appendix One - Response from the Department

Appendix Two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #285 - released 11 May 2017

Published

Assessing major development applications

Planning
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.

The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.

These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.

The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.

This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:

  • has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
  • ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.

Conclusion

Over the last two years, the Commission has improved its decision-making process. It has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

However, there are still some vital issues to be addressed to ensure it makes decisions in a consistent and transparent manner. Most importantly, the Commission was not able to show in every decision we reviewed how it met its statutory obligation to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Despite improved probity measures put in place by the Commission, there is a perception among some stakeholders that it is not independent of the Department. The reasons for some of these concerns are outside of the Commission’s control. For example, the Commission becomes involved after the Department has prepared an assessment report which recommends whether a development should proceed. This creates the perception that the Commission is acting on the recommendation of the Department. The Department’s assessment report should state whether an application meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, but not recommend whether a development should be approved or not.

More can also be done to improve transparency in decision-making and the public’s perception of the independence of Commissioners. The Commission should continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions and also publish on its website a summary of Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application.

Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed

Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.

As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.

We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.

The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.

Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial

The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:

  • has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
  • has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
  • publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.

Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.

The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.

While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.

Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.

To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.

Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.

The Planning Assessment Commission

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.

The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.

The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:

  • more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
  • the local council objects to the proposal
  • the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.

These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.

Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:

  • any relevant environmental and planning instruments
  • likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
  • suitability of the site for the development
  • submissions received about the application
  • the public interest.

In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.

Process for approving major development applications

The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.

The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:

  • two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
  • three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
  • six weeks when a public meeting is required.

The Planning Assessment Commission should:

By July 2017:

  1. improve transparency by publishing on its website a summary of the Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application referred to the Commission for determination, and how any conflicts were handled
     
  2. keep better records of how it considers each matter under section 79C of the EP&A Act for all decisions it makes on major development applications
     
  3. improve the public’s involvement in public meetings by:
    1. identifying and implementing additional mechanisms to notify the community of public meetings to ensure as many interested parties are advised as possible
    2. allowing the chair of decision-making panels discretion to extend the time allowed for individual speakers beyond five minutes
  1. continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions to the public by:
    1. including a summary in its reports of the issues raised during the consultation process and how they were considered by the Commission
    2. clearly outlining in its reports how any conditions placed on a development will address the issues raised
    3. detailing in its reports how section 79C of the EP&A Act has been addressed
    4. issuing fact sheets to accompany its reports for all decisions where public meetings were held
  1. work with the Department of Planning and Environment to:
    1. develop an agreed approach to presenting the Department’s views in its assessment reports on whether the project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, reflecting the Commission’s status as an independent decision-maker
    2. refer applications to the Commission earlier in the process to ensure the Department’s assessment report covers matters that Commissioners consider important when assessing projects under section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Appendix one -  Response from the Planning Assessment Commission

Appendix two - Other jurisdictions’ approaches to assessing major development applications

Appendix three -  About the audit

 

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #279 - released 19 January 2017 

Published

Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Environment
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016

Published

Realising the benefits of the Service NSW initiative

Whole of Government
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

The current benefits realisation approach for Service NSW needs to improve so benefits and savings can be effectively measured, reported and realised, according to a report released today by the NSW Acting Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield.

Customers are finding that Service NSW provides a convenient and practical way to access all government transaction services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #266 - released 17 February 2016

Published

Public sector management reforms

Finance
Industry
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Whole of Government
Environment
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

The Public Service Commission is making good progress with leading the implementation of public sector management reforms, according to a report released today by the Acting New South Wales Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield.

'The Commission developed a sound evidence base for the reforms and gained wide public sector support by engaging with agency heads and using public sector working groups to develop options', said the Acting Auditor-General. 'They developed good guidance for government agencies and have improved the senior executive structure in the NSW public sector', he added.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #264 - released 28 January 2016

Published

Identifying productivity in the public sector

Health
Education
Community Services
Transport
Justice
Treasury
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

This report examines selected areas of government activity to see if sufficient information was available to identify and assess changes in productivity. The areas examined were primary and secondary school public education, acute inpatient care in NSW public hospitals, CityRail, the NSW Police Force, and the NSW Local Court.

Productivity is commonly defined as the amount of output per unit of input.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #256 - released 16 July 2015

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