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Published

Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Environment
Industry
Local Government
Planning
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.

The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.

The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.

There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.

Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.

There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.

What the key issues were

The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.

Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:

  • system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
  • deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
  • the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
  • deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
  • the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.

There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.

The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.

What we recommended

The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.

The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

Fast facts

The Planning, Industry and Environment cluster aims to make the lives of people in New South Wales better by developing well-connected communities, preserving the environment, supporting industries and contributing to a strong economy.

There are 54 agencies, 609 State controlled Crown land managers that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land and 120 common trusts in the cluster.

  • 42% of the area of NSW is Crown land
  • $33.2b water and electricity infrastructure as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits
  • 7 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 54 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission’s (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. From 2020–21, the IPC is required to prepare financial statements under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018.
  • The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements were incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. These audits are currently underway, and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.
  • The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21. All 120 common trusts have never submitted their financial statements for audit. The department needs to do more to ensure that the CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 20 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include the revaluation of property, plant and equipment, documenting all significant management judgments and assumptions, and the implementation of new and updated accounting standards.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management has increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, and 40 per cent were repeat issues.
  • Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, and three high-risk findings were repeat issues.
  • There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2021

Stronger Communities 2021

Justice
Community Services
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Stronger Communities cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies.

Eleven of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadline. Five agencies did not perform all mandatory procedures.

The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the Department of Communities and Justice's (the department) 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively (relating to three correctional centres with private sector operators).

The department was, this year for the first time, able to reliably measure Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. The department recorded a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021. Liabilities for Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim continue to be not recorded on the basis they are unable to be reliably measured.

The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit of the financial statements for the cluster increased from 61 in 2019–20 to 72 in 2020–21.

What the key issues were

The number of issues reported to management decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21. However, 45 per cent were repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.

Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year. High risk issues related to deficiencies in IT access controls at Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust; a lack of a formal agreement between the Office of Sport and Planning Ministerial Corporation over the management of a sporting venue; asset revaluations at both Fire and Rescue NSW and the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building; and three issues related to revenue recognition control deficiencies at New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and two of its subsidiaries.

What we recommended

Cluster agencies should ensure all applicable mandatory early close procedures are completed and the outcomes provided to the audit team in accordance with the deadlines set by NSW Treasury.

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

Fast facts

The Stronger Communities cluster, consisting of 28 agencies, aims to deliver community services that support a safe and just New South Wales.

  • $14.0b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021 
  • $20.9b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 7 high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 72 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 45% of reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies including the acquittal and compliance audits for the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and Crown Solicitor's Office.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included within the Multicultural NSW and Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner’s Independent Auditor's Report. While the paragraph did not modify the audit opinion, it noted the agencies did not have a signed instrument of delegation from their responsible Minister(s) to incur expenditure for the 2020–21 financial year and therefore were non‑compliant with section 5.5 of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 .
  • 11 of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and all other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. The agencies cited changes in key staff, delays in finalising actuarial and valuation work and the timing of Audit and Risk Committee meetings as the main reasons for not meeting the deadlines. Five agencies did not complete all mandatory procedures.
  • The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) was, for the first time, able to reliably measure and record a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021 for Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim liabilities continue to be not recorded on the basis they are still unable to be reliably measured.
  • The International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretations Committee released an agenda decision on 'Configuration or customisation costs in a cloud computing arrangement' (the IFRIC agenda decision). The department treated the financial impacts of the IFRIC agenda decision as a change in accounting policy and retrospectively recorded prepaid assets and expenses of $52.3 million and $90.5 million respectively relating to intangible assets they had previously capitalised.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the department's 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively in relation to three correctional centres with private sector operators.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of issues reported to management has decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21, and 45 per cent were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.
  • Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year.
  • The two high risk issues identified in 2019–20 relating to New South Wales Institute of Sport were resolved.

Findings reported to management

The overall number of findings has decreased, but the level of repeat issues increased

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 172 findings raised across the cluster (191 in 2019–20). 45 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (32 per cent in 2019–20).

Repeat issues largely related to weaknesses in controls over information technology (IT), governance and oversight.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision‑making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

2020–21 audits identified seven high risk findings

High risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies. Two high risk findings reported in 2019–20 were resolved.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (new finding) * The audit of Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust's IT access controls identified:
  • activity (audit) logs of privileged access within iPOS (purchasing system) and Microsoft Dynamics (sales system) are not maintained and periodically reviewed by an independent officer
  • the review of privileged activity logs of booking system Event Business Management Software (EBMS) is not formally documented
  • 8 generic super user accounts are being shared across four IT systems including iPOS, Microsoft Dynamics, EBMS and SUN (accounting system).
The matter has been included as a high risk finding in the management letter as there is an increased risk of:
  • unauthorised transactions and changes to financial data
  • unauthorised users gaining access to financial systems
  • data breaches or financial loss.
Fire and Rescue NSW (new finding) Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) completed a comprehensive revaluation of its fire appliances in 2020–21. The audit of the revaluation found there was inadequate analysis and quality control by management over the valuation process prior to the outcomes being included in the financial statements.
FRNSW had 57 fleet assets that have not been revalued due to problems with data supplied by the valuer. The written down value:
  • did not agree to the valuer's calculations for 28 assets
  • was provided by the valuer for 29 assets, but there were no supporting calculations.
These assets have been left at their previous book values of $3.0 million. The accounting standards require the entire class of assets to be revalued when a revaluation is performed.
The review also found:
  • inconsistent valuation of vehicles of the same make, model, age and specifications
  • errors had been made when the previous valuation was uploaded into the fixed asset register
  • the valuer incorrectly included additional equipment in the replacement cost estimate for vehicles that did not have that equipment.
The matter has been included as a high risk finding as it resulted in monetary misstatements and caused delays to the overall timeframes for the audit.
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) (new finding) The audit of NSWALC's revenue identified there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Employment and Training Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Employment and Training Limited's revenue found:
  • there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • the financial statements' preparation did not include updated accounting policies reflecting the requirements of AASB 15 'Revenue from Contracts with Customers' (AASB 15) and AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' (AASB 1058).
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Housing Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Housing Limited's revenue identified it:
  • did not perform formal assessments of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • deferred revenue recognition for funding received from NSWALC  (the parent entity). There are no sufficiently specific performance obligations in the funding letter, hence revenue should be recognised on receipt of the funding
  • recognised rental income from managing properties from the Aboriginal Housing Office (AHO) without considering the agreement, which requires remittance of profit to the AHO
  • the financial statements did not include updated accounting policies according to the requirements of AASB 15 and AASB 1058.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
Office of Sport (new finding)

The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Dissolution Act 2002 transferred the assets, rights and liabilities relating to the Sydney International Regatta Centre (SIRC) to the Planning Ministerial Corporation (the Corporation) effective from 1 July 2002. The Corporation recognised the related land assets but did not recognise any of the built assets at the time of transfer. The total value of the land and built assets at 30 June 2021 was
$13.8 million and $11.2 million (written down value) respectively.

The SIRC has been managed by the Office of Sport (the Office) for many years in accordance with a not yet executed management agreement.

It appears there was a clear intention in 2005 that the control of SIRC built assets was to be transferred from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation (a predecessor of the Office), through the exchange of letters between the relevant Ministers and an Administrative Order (the Order). The Order transferred the SIRC staff from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. However, it was silent on whether the relevant built assets were transferred.

Currently, the Office recognises the SIRC built assets in the financial statements whilst the Corporation recognises the land assets as the legal owner of the property.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as the lack of a formal management agreement casts doubt over the accounting treatment of SIRC property.

The Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building (new finding)

The audit of the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building's property, plant and equipment identified:

  • the fixed assets register for plant and equipment had not previously included sufficient detail about the individual assets to which costs related to reconcile it to the work performed by management's valuation expert
  • the financial statements did not meet the requirement of AASB 108 ‘Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors’  to disclose the nature and reason why it corrected a prior period error of $778,000.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to property, plant and equipment.


*         The finding related to the former Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (based on the completion audit for the period 1 March 2020 to 30 November 2020). This agency was dissolved and transferred to Venues NSW on 1 December 2020.
 

Recommendation (repeat issue)

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

The table below describes issues commonly identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues with:

  • user access administration
  • cyber security including governance arrangements, monitoring of third-party system access and patch management
  • password security and policy parameters
  • development, review and testing of disaster recovery plans.

Moderate2
8 new,
22 repeat

Low1
5 new,
6 repeat
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across the following key business processes: 

  • expenditure, including the approval of purchase requisitions and review of open purchase orders
  • supplier and employee masterfile maintenance
  • segregation of duties.

Moderate2
6 new,
3 repeat

 Low1
23 new,
7 repeat

Financial reporting

High3
4 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in financial reporting processes, including:

  • fully depreciated assets still in use, indicating the need to perform more frequent assessments of useful lives of assets
  • robustness of property, plant and equipment asset revaluations
  • incomplete or inaccurate recording of balances in the financial statements.

Moderate2
9 new,
1 repeat

Low1
11 new,
5 repeat

Governance and oversight
High3
1 new

The financial audits identified areas where agencies could strengthen governance and oversight processes, including:

  • review and update of policies and procedures
  • formalising existing key business arrangements
  • records management practices.
Moderate2
5 new,
11 repeat
Low1
12 new,
8 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
7 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve their compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies, including:

  • management of excessive annual leave balances
  • existence of and compliance with financial delegations
  • related party transactions disclosures from key management personnel.
Low1
2 new,
8 repeat

4 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year

Seventy‑eight moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 22 per cent decrease from 2019–20. Of these, 43 were repeat findings, and 35 were new issues.

Moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21 include:

  • weaknesses in governance arrangements, including outdated policies and procedures and arrangements that do not align with NSW Government guidelines, such as the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework and NSW Cyber Security Policy
  • weaknesses in user access administration including:
    • user access reviews
    • monitoring of privileged user access and activities
    • password policy configuration
  • cyber security improvements including:
    • implementation and update of governance arrangements
    • monitoring of third‑party system access
    • patch management improvement
  • outdated instruments of financial delegation and non‑compliance with established financial delegations
  • weaknesses in supplier and employee masterfile maintenance.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Planning
Industry
Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report examines the effectiveness of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, administered by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) between April 2020 and October 2020. 

The program aimed to support the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis by accelerating the final assessment stages for planning proposals and development applications. 

DPIE selected projects and planning proposals for fast tracked assessment that demonstrated the potential to:

  • deliver jobs
  • progress to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

The audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls.

What we found

Through tranches three to six of the program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE reported that 89 per cent of these proceeded to the next stage of development within six months.

Assessment of projects and planning proposals was compliant with legislation and other requirements. However, the audit found gaps in DPIE's management of conflicts of interest.

DPIE has not evaluated or costed the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which it provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19. 

Aspects of the program have been incorporated into longer term reforms to create a new level of transparency over the progress and status of planning assessments. 

What we recommended

DPIE should:

  • strengthen controls over conflicts of interest 
  • evaluate the Fast-tracked Assessment Program.

Fast facts

Construction industry support 
  • The program aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis
59 fast-tracked projects 
  • 59 projects and 42 planning proposals projects were assessed in six tranches
89% of all fast-tracked assessments in tranches three to six progressed to the next stage of the planning process within six months of determination

In April 2020, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) introduced programs aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis. One of these was the Fast-tracked Assessment Program. This program identified planning proposals and development applications (DAs), across six tranches, that were partially-assessed and could be accelerated to determination.

In accordance with the program objectives, the planning proposals and DAs selected for fast-tracked assessment had to:

  • deliver jobs – particularly in the construction industry
  • be capable of progressing to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

At the same time, the Fast-tracked Assessment Program was to lay a foundation for future reform of the planning system by piloting changes in the assessment process that could be adopted in the medium to long term.

This audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls. The audit focused on tranches three to six of the program, which were determined between July 2020 and October 2020. The rationale for focusing on these four tranches was that the program design had been slightly modified after the first two tranches to address identified risks.

Conclusion

Through tranches three to six of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 31 DAs and 16 planning proposals selected in these tranches proceeded to the next stage of development within six months of determination. DPIE achieved this while also successfully managing the risk of non-compliance with planning controls arising from the accelerated process. While DPIE has incorporated components of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program into other longer-term reforms, it has not evaluated the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which the program provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.

Between April and October 2020, DPIE adopted a case management approach to accelerate the final stages of assessment for 42 planning proposals and 59 DAs in six tranches. Tranches three to six were the focus of this audit and included 22 planning proposals and 31 DAs. Applicants involved in the program were expected to progress their projects to the next stage of development within six months of determination. While DPIE had no way of compelling applicants to do this and relied on non-binding commitments obtained from applicants, DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 47 of the 53 applicants selected in tranches three to six honoured this commitment.

Fast-tracked assessment only applied to the final stages of assessment and required DPIE staff and other stakeholders to work towards a determination deadline. DPIE effectively used a case management approach to manage the risk that the accelerated timeframe could result in planning controls not being fully compliant with legislation. There is some room for improvement in the process, as four of 28 staff assessing planning proposals and DAs had not lodged current conflict of interest declarations.

Based on the results of and learnings from the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE has incorporated some elements of the program into other longer-term reforms. There is now increased transparency about when applicants can expect to receive a planning determination and DPIE has also introduced a case management approach for strategic and high priority planning applications. Applicants benefiting from case-managed assessment are now required to commit to a formal service charter that specifies the obligations of both DPIE and the applicant.

DPIE has not evaluated the Fast-tracked Assessment Program to understand the costs and benefits of the program, nor which aspects of the program were most effective as a basis for future reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Planning determination pathways

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #354 - released (27 July 2021).

Published

Actions for Responses to homelessness

Responses to homelessness

Community Services
Justice
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

What the report is about

The report assessed how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice is responding to homelessness through the NSW Government’s Homelessness Strategy.

It also assessed the effectiveness of the department’s efforts to address street homelessness in its COVID-19 response.

What we found

The strategy was designed to build evidence to inform future state-wide action rather than to end homelessness.

The department received significantly less funding than it sought for the strategy.

Actions delivered under the strategy have a narrow reach in terms of locations and number of people targeted for assistance.

The strategy will have limited short-term impact on homelessness across NSW, but it is building evidence on what works to prevent and reduce homelessness.

The department effectively implemented a crisis response to assist over 4,350 people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during the pandemic.

While there was an effective crisis response to assist people sleeping rough during the pandemic, more will need to be done to ensure a sustainable response which prevents people returning to homelessness.

What we recommend

The department should:

  • provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
  • commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s 10-year plan for social housing and 20-year housing strategy
  • enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people, and people with lived experience of homelessness
  • partner with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities to design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
  • evaluate the homelessness response to COVID-19, integrate the lessons learned into future practice, and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies or disasters
  • regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.

Fast facts

Homelessness Strategy
  • $169m total additional and existing funding allocated to the strategy.
  • 22% of the number of people in NSW experiencing homelessness in 2016 may be supported by strategy actions.
COVID-19 response 1 April 2020 to 31 January 2021
  • 400 people sleeping rough in temporary accommodation were assisted with two year rentals and wrap around support packages.
  • 72% of people sleeping rough provided with temporary accommodation were estimated to have left with unknown housing outcomes.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

Homelessness exists when a person does not have suitable accommodation alternatives. A person is considered to be experiencing homelessness if their current living arrangement:

  • is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or
  • has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or
  • does not allow them to have control of, and access to space for social relations.

The number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales increased by 37 per cent between the last two censuses, from 27,479 in 2011, to 37,715 in 2016. New South Wales recorded the largest increase of all the states and territories in both the number of people experiencing homelessness and in the homeless rate (from 40.8 to 50.4 persons per 10,000).

The NSW Government's primary service response to homelessness is crisis, temporary and transitional accommodation, and support services, funded at more than $1.0 billion over four years from 2018–19. These are ‘commissioned services’ delivered by non‑government organisations under contracts with the Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) and out of scope for this audit. We assessed how the Department manages contracts for specialist homelessness services in our 2019 audit 'Contracting non‑government organisations'.

The policy framework for the NSW Government's response to homelessness is the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23 (the Strategy), which is examined in this audit. The Department is responsible for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy. The Strategy comprises 21 actions, ten of which directly target people at risk of, or already experiencing, homelessness through measures such as:

  • screening high school students for the risk of homelessness and providing supports
  • assisting vulnerable people to maintain their tenancies in social housing or the private rental market
  • providing purpose‑built social housing.

These ten actions comprise $160 million of the Strategy's $169 million funding.

In December 2019, the first evidence of the COVID‑19 virus emerged. People sleeping without shelter or in public places (sleeping rough) typically live in communal arrangements, with some having limited access to basic hygiene supplies or showering facilities. These factors may increase the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 amongst this population.

In response to the pandemic, the NSW Government provided additional funding for the Department to institute a range of actions aimed at preventing vulnerable people from becoming homeless, and people sleeping rough from contracting or transmitting the virus. These were informed by, but separate to, actions under the Homelessness Strategy.

This audit focused on the temporary accommodation provided to individuals experiencing street homelessness during the pandemic, and the new 'Together Home' program established in 2020 to transition people with experience or history sleeping rough from temporary accommodation into more sustainable longer‑term housing.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department is implementing the Homelessness Strategy and addressing street homelessness in its COVID‑19 response. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department:

  • has effectively developed an evidence‑based Strategy and established supporting arrangements to implement it
  • is ensuring the Strategy is achieving its objectives and outcomes
  • is effectively supporting people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during COVID‑19 and to transition into more sustainable longer‑term housing.

Conclusion

The $169 million Homelessness Strategy will have a limited short‑term impact on homelessness across New South Wales.

The Department designed the Strategy to build evidence to inform future state‑wide action rather than to end homelessness. The Department also received significantly less funding than it sought, and as a result, the Strategy's actions have a narrow reach in terms of the locations and the number of people targeted for assistance.

The Department has clearly communicated its aims to intervene early to prevent people from experiencing homelessness; to provide effective supports to people experiencing homelessness; and to create an integrated person‑centred system. While these objectives are clear, they are not being pursued state‑wide.

The Department recognised in its advice to government on Strategy resourcing that growing demand could not be met within current funding and housing supply, and that there was limited proof on effective preventative and early interventions in the available evidence base. Given the evidence threshold for new funding, the Department designed the Strategy to pilot approaches which help to identify the best prevention and early intervention measures for state‑wide roll out after the Strategy's five‑year term, subject to budget approval.

The Department received significantly less funding than it sought for the Strategy. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. While seeking to demonstrate what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier, the Department directed 95 per cent of the final Strategy funding to concrete actions supporting people at risk of, or experiencing, homelessness.

The Department has put in place governance and operational arrangements which are supporting the implementation and evaluation of the Strategy, and it is broadly on track with reaching the target number of clients expected. The Department’s data shows that more than 4,100 people have received direct supports under Strategy actions. However, the reach of the Strategy remains constrained. Once fully implemented, most Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's local government areas, supporting around 8,200 people ‑ what equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales at the last census in 2016.

There is a risk that future funding will not be secured – and Strategy actions not continued or scaled up – if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt.

The Department effectively planned and implemented a crisis response to assist people sleeping on the streets during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The Department will need to do more to ensure a sustainable longer‑term response which prevents people returning to street homelessness.

The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group. Of the approximately 32,500 people provided with temporary accommodation between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, 4,355 were sleeping rough. As at 13 May 2021, only one case of COVID‑19 had been detected to date among the individuals who received assistance. The Department advises that around one‑quarter of all those placed in temporary accommodation were assisted into social housing or private rental accommodation.

Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a dedicated team and contracted provider to connect people sleeping rough placed in hotels with support services, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing. The Department’s data suggests that almost 38 per cent of the approximately 1,800 people who received this support were able to move to social housing or private rental accommodation. However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who were not engaged with housing or funded support services.

The Department offers supports to people in temporary accommodation to assist them in finding longer term housing, and it has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services.

The Department cannot precisely identify how many people sleeping rough assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people sleeping rough assisted with temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 who exited left with an unknown housing outcome. The Department intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance.

The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches.

The Department extended an existing initiative for community housing providers to head lease properties in the private rental market and ensure support services for people who were sleeping rough before being assisted into enhanced temporary accommodation. As at April 2021, the Together Home program has assisted 400 people to obtain accommodation and supports for two years. However, the number of Together Home places is significantly less than what is required to provide housing for the more than 4,350 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation.

The Department advises it is using a combination of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation where Together Home places are not available, including social and affordable housing and supported transitional accommodation. It also intends to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year support ends. But it is not clear how it will overcome longstanding housing challenges to do so, given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing in New South Wales.

1. Key findings: the Homelessness Strategy

The Strategy's geographical and client reach is limited because it is building the evidence base on what works

The Department's objectives to intervene early, provide effective supports and create an integrated person‑centred system to address homelessness are clear, but are not being pursued state‑wide.

There were existing gaps in the available evidence which made it difficult for the Department to develop a holistic, state‑wide, long‑term solution to homelessness. Some of the actions under the Strategy have a degree of supporting evidence. Other actions are intended to generate evidence through pilots and by evaluating existing programs more robustly.

At least one Strategy action is available in each of the Department's 16 districts, and there are examples of the Department rolling out practice changes from Strategy pilots across the state. However, progress towards the Strategy aims is confined to pockets where actions are being trialled.

Once fully implemented, Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's 128 local government areas and will support approximately 8,200 people ‑ which equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people who were experiencing homelessness at the time of the last census in New South Wales in 2016 more than 37,000 people. This does not include the number of people at risk of homelessness.

A key gap in Strategy actions is addressing Aboriginal homelessness.

The Department received significantly less funding than sought and designed the Strategy to build the evidence base rather than eliminate homelessness

The Department could not meet the evidence threshold for a cost benefit analysis required by a Treasury business case, given the limited evidence available locally and internationally on what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier. The Department sought new, targeted investment to extend a small number of initiatives with proven effect, and to build the evidence base about other measures that work, rather than the quantum of funding required to end homelessness in New South Wales.

Even so, approved funding was significantly less than that sought by the Department. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. It directed 95 per cent of the total Strategy funding to supports and accommodation for people at risk of or experiencing homelessness.

The Department intends to use the gathered data from implementation of the Strategy to expand effective prevention and early intervention measures after it concludes, subject to budget approval. It expects that, over time, these initiatives will reduce the demand for crisis services.

Actions may not be scaled up at the end of the Strategy's term, perpetuating the Strategy's limited reach and narrow impact on homelessness

The Department's approach of testing interventions and building the evidence base through the Strategy was well described and provided a clear rationale in its original advice to government. An evaluation framework has been designed to generate sufficient evidence on the overall Strategy and its individual actions for a cost benefit analysis to support a future budget bid.

The Department intends to use the findings from interim evaluation reports, due by September 2021, to determine the programs and pilots with promising evidence that should continue to the end of the Strategy term. It expects this to enable more qualitative and quantitative data to be available to the evaluations, as well as to support service continuity.

However, delays in delivery of some actions under the Strategy, and the time taken for outcomes to be achieved and show up in the data, will impact on the strength of the evidence available at the mid‑term and final Strategy evaluation points. This raises a risk that future funding for a comprehensive Strategy will not be secured ‑ and prevention and early intervention activities not continued or scaled up beyond pilot sites ‑ if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes.

Given its limited reach, even if the existing Strategy actions were retained, and no expansion occurred, it would continue to have a narrow impact on homelessness in New South Wales. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt.

2. Key findings: the COVID‑19 response to homelessness

The Department effectively planned and implemented its homelessness response to the pandemic and reduced the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 for people sleeping rough

The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group.

The Department engaged with the specialist homelessness services sector from mid‑March 2020 to modify service delivery, advise on infection control and plan extra supports. It explored options with temporary accommodation providers to support self‑isolation for clients, and scaled up its assertive outreach patrols by staff, specialist caseworkers and health professionals to support people sleeping rough into crisis or temporary accommodation for safety.

The Minister directed the Department to address street homelessness in the COVID‑19 response using the Government’s second stage of stimulus funding. The Department procured hotel, motel or serviced apartment accommodation for 400 people who were sleeping rough, or unable to physically distance in large crisis accommodation centres, within a week of the ministerial direction, building on existing programs. The Department provided advice to the Minister on the need to adjust existing policy settings to meet the forecast demand for temporary accommodation services.

The Department secured additional temporary accommodation when and where it was required, to accommodate the number of people sleeping rough who wanted support. Between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, the Department provided temporary accommodation to 32,158 individuals, of which 4,355 people were sleeping rough, totalling more than 70,000 nights of temporary accommodation and services.

The Department met regularly with NSW homelessness peak organisations and established a Taskforce involving other government agencies, peak organisations, and service providers, to assist in quickly executing the measure and resolving issues arising. The Taskforce built on existing collaborative arrangements in place to support cross‑sectoral coordination, enabling it to respond quickly to COVID‑19.

The Department worked with NSW Health and health providers to ensure its COVID‑19 response to homelessness was in line with health guidelines. As of May 2021, just one participant in the Department's enhanced temporary accommodation program had contracted COVID‑19.

The Department does not know how many people sleeping rough who were assisted with enhanced temporary accommodation have returned to homelessness

Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a specialist housing team, and contracted a non‑government provider, to connect people placed in hotels with support services, provide tailored support, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing.

The Department’s data indicates that between May 2020 and 31 January 2021, over 1,800 people who had previously been sleeping rough had been engaged in this program, more than four times the expected client numbers. Almost half moved into further accommodation when they left the program, including people supported with longer‑term housing such as social housing, community leasing under the Together Home program, and private rental arrangements.

However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who disengaged from services. The Department advises that this would have required additional resourcing to do so.

The Department offers assistance to people in temporary accommodation to find longer term options, and has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. It intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance from the Department.

The Department cannot identify precisely how many people sleeping rough who were assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people formerly sleeping rough who left temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 left with an unknown housing outcome. This includes people who were not eligible for social housing, were stranded due to border closures, or who disengaged from the Department or funded support services.

The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches.

The Together Home program was established quickly to assist people into more permanent accommodation but will not meet demand as a standalone response

The Department established the Together Home program in September 2020 to provide longer‑term accommodation to people who were sleeping rough during the pandemic. Community housing providers head‑lease properties in the private rental market for two years and sub‑lease these to clients, while ensuring they receive additional support, such as health services, to help them maintain the lease.

Under the initial tranche of funding, the Together Home program aimed to support 400 people sleeping rough. This target was met by April 2021. Due to increased rental demand in many areas of the state, there were some delays in securing properties in certain areas. In addition, people on temporary visas, or with existing public housing debt, are ineligible for this program.

A further $29.0 million was provided to this program through the 2020–21 NSW Budget, creating 400 additional program places. However, the total number of 800 Together Home places will not be sufficient to provide housing for the more than 4,000 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation.

The Department advises it is using a range of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation outside of the Together Home program. These options include social housing, supported transitional accommodation, subsidised private rental, boarding houses, and referral to mental health and substance addiction rehabilitation facilities.

The Department’s latest annual state‑wide street count suggested that the number of people sleeping rough across New South Wales decreased by 13 per cent between February 2020 and February 2021. The Department has acknowledged that it could do more to monitor and support the housing outcomes for people in temporary accommodation after they exit.

The Department has plans to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year program, through commissioned community housing and private rental assistance. However, it is not clear how this will overcome existing housing challenges given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing.

3. Recommendations

By July 2022, the Department of Communities and Justice should:

  1. use data and analysis identified through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 and provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports

  2. use the evidence obtained through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 to commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s ten‑year plan for social housing and 20‑year housing strategy

  3. establish and sustain governance arrangements that enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people and people with lived experience of homelessness

  4. in partnership with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities, design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services

  5. evaluate the homelessness response to COVID‑19 and integrate the lessons learned into future practice; and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies/disasters

  6. establish and sustain a means to regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback; and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.

This chapter considers how effectively the NSW Homelessness Strategy was developed and is currently being implemented by the Department of Communities and Justice.

This chapter examines how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice addressed homelessness in its response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, and how well it is applying lessons learned from the pandemic to future policy and service development.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Actions within the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23

Appendix three – Reported progress on Homelessness Strategy actions to date (unaudited)

Appendix four – Key homelessness data collections

Appendix five – Temporary accommodation for people sleeping rough standard practice vs COVID 19 response

Appendix six – Key measures in the COVID 19 response to homelessness

Appendix seven – About the audit

Appendix eight – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #350 - released (4 June 2021).

Published

Actions for Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies

Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies

Community Services
Justice
Environment
Internal controls and governance

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining how effectively NSW emergency response agencies address public inquiry recommendations.

The audit found that agencies’ governance arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps. 

The agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had implemented accepted recommendations as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This creates a risk that issues with disaster prevention or responses highlighted by public inquiries are not addressed in a complete or timely way and may persist or recur in the future. 

The audit also found that agencies did not always nominate milestone dates or priority rankings for accepted recommendations, and so could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.

The audit examined how five emergency response agencies – Fire and Rescue NSW, National Parks and Wildlife Service, NSW Rural Fire Service, NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW – have addressed accepted recommendations from public inquiries over the last ten years. The audit assessed the effectiveness of governance arrangements to track recommendation implementation.

The report makes six recommendations to improve disaster response agency arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations.  

While the focus of this audit was agencies that responded to natural disasters, the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.

Major disasters and emergencies often trigger public post-event inquiries and reviews. The purpose of these reviews is to identify the causes of disaster or emergency events and areas for future improvement in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Areas identified for future improvement are then the subject of recommendations to government or government agencies and, when accepted, become public commitments to action.

Responses to the bushfires of 2019–20 followed this pattern, producing both NSW and Australian Government commissioned inquiries: the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both highlighted the significant volume of inquiries in recent years. Both asked whether agency responses to previous inquiries were improving Australia's capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters. The inquiries reflected on the difficulty of answering this question due to insufficient clarity and transparency on whether the improvements and risks that inquiries identified have been addressed in practice.

This audit stems from similar questions about how effectively government agencies in NSW are delivering on public inquiry recommendations. It assessed how five emergency response agencies have addressed accepted recommendations from 17 public inquiries over the last ten years. For this audit, we considered inquiries and reviews that affected agencies' operational capacity to respond to and recover from bushfire, floods and storms. The in scope public inquiries for this audit relate to:

  • the 2013–14, the 2016–17 and the 2017–18 bushfire seasons
  • severe storms and floods in 2015, 2016 and 2017
  • workforce issues affecting the ability of agencies to respond to natural disasters.

The public inquiries we reviewed included coronial inquiries and inquests, parliamentary inquiries, independent reports and reviews, performance audits and recovery coordinator reports. In total, we looked at the processes that agencies used to implement 191 recommendations from these 17 public inquiries.

The objective of this audit was to determine how effective emergency response agencies are in addressing accepted recommendations from public inquiries. To answer our audit objective, we asked two questions:

  • Do agencies have effective governance arrangements in place to respond to, monitor and implement accepted recommendations from public reviews and inquiries?
  • Do agencies provide timely and accurate information on the implementation of accepted inquiry recommendations to senior decision makers and the public?

The agencies reviewed were:

  • Fire and Rescue NSW
  • NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (now a division of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment)
  • NSW Rural Fire Service
  • NSW State Emergency Service
  • Resilience NSW (formerly the Ministry for Police and Emergency Services; and the Office of Emergency Management).

While the focus of this audit was agencies that respond to natural disasters (flood, bushfire and storms), the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.

Conclusion

The arrangements used by NSW emergency response agencies to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps.

For two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit, the agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had been implemented as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This exposes risks that gaps in disaster responses are not addressed in a complete or timely way and persist or recur in the future.

Two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit had also not been allocated milestone dates or priority rankings, and as such the audited agencies are less accountable and could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.

None of the agencies publicly report the status of actions taken to address public inquiry recommendations, limiting accountability and transparency.

The agencies subject to this audit all address accepted recommendations from public inquiries with varying degrees of formality and transparency. No agency maintained a central and comprehensive approach – such as a register – to track recommendations for all public inquiries.

The agencies do not consistently review evidence that recommendations have been implemented effectively, and in line with the intention of the inquiry. The agencies also often failed to set milestone dates or test that recommendations had been actioned as committed. This increases the risk that recommendations are overlooked or not addressed in line with the intent, priority and risk of the recommendation. In turn, this raises the possibility that gaps and issues identified by public inquiries are not adequately resolved and could persist or recur in future disasters.

None of the audited agencies published a summary of progress made in implementing accepted recommendations to update the public. There are transparency and accountability benefits in doing so. This echoes the findings of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both inquiries noted that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine the implementation status for many recommendations by publicly available information.

One factor hindering agencies from publishing this information is the lack of a consistent means of tracking public inquiry recommendation implementation. Adopting a consistent approach, within and across agencies, should help to overcome this barrier in the future. 

This chapter reviews the way agencies have responded to, monitored and ensured they have implemented accepted recommendations from public inquiries.

This chapter reviews how agencies provided information to senior decision makers, agency Audit and Risk Committees and the public on the implementation of accepted recommendations from public inquiries.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Identifying in scope inquiries

Appendix three – In scope inquiries

Appendix four – Recommendations reported by agencies as still in progress (detail)

Appendix five – Agency reported recommendation implementation status (unaudited) 

Appendix six – About the audit 

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #348 - released (22 April 2021).

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2020

Stronger Communities 2020

Justice
Community Services
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Stronger Communities cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Quality of financial reporting Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements.
Compliance with financial reporting requirements

The Treasury extended the statutory deadline for the submission of the 2019–20 financial statements. For agencies subject to Treasurer's Directions, Treasury required agencies to submit their 30 June 2020 financial statements by 5 August 2020. For other agencies, the deadline was extended to 31 October 2020. All agencies in the cluster met the revised statutory deadlines.

Cluster agencies substantially completed the mandatory early close procedures set by NSW Treasury. However, nine agencies including the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) did not complete one or more mandatory requirements, such as assessing the impact of new and updated accounting standards.

Financial implications of recent emergencies

Emergency events significantly impacted cluster agencies in 2019–20. Our review of seven cluster agencies most affected highlighted some had incurred additional expenditure because of the bushfires and floods. Others lost revenue due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the year these agencies collectively received additional funding of $1.1 billion from the State to respond to:

  • increased demand for homeless people seeking temporary accommodation
  • additional cleaning requirements
  • bushfire recovery efforts
  • emergency support for eligible small businesses.

The Sydney Cricket Ground Trust, Venues NSW and Office of Sport lodged insurance claims of $51.3 million with the Treasury Managed Fund with respect to lost revenues from the pandemic. The losses were mainly due to event cancellations and covered various periods ranging from mid-March to 31 December 2020.

The change in economic conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the NSW Government cancelling the refurbishment of Stadium Australia it had previously approved in August 2019. Venues NSW wrote off $16.8 million of redevelopment costs during 2019–20.

Restatement of the Sydney Cricket Ground valuation The valuation of the Sydney Cricket Ground (the Stadium) included costs of $28.6 million which were not eligible for capitalisation. The financial statements were restated to reflect the reduction in the value of the Stadium and the asset revaluation reserve.
Unresolved data quality issues in the VS Connect system

The department continues to address significant data quality issues resulting from its implementation of the VS Connect system (the System) in 2019. The issues relate to the completeness and accuracy of the data transferred from the legacy system. The System is used by the department to manage its Victims Support Services (VSS) and for financial reporting purposes.

An independent actuary helps the department estimate its liability for VSS claims. The actuary's valuation at 30 June 2020 was again impacted by the data quality issues. Consequently, the actuary adopted a revised valuation methodology compared to previous years.

Recommendation (repeat issue):

The department should resolve the data quality issues in the VS Connect System before 31 March 2021.

AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position

Cluster agencies implemented three new accounting standards for the first time in 2019–20. Adoption of AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in cluster agencies collectively recognising right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $1.7 billion and $1.1 billion respectively on 1 July 2019.

Significant misstatements in how lease related balances had been calculated were found in 17 of the 29 cluster agencies. The cluster outsources the management of most of its owned and leased property portfolio to Property NSW, but cluster agencies remain responsible for any deliverables under that arrangement. The misstatements were mainly caused by late revisions of key assumptions and issues with the accuracy and completeness of Property NSW's lease information.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

Our 2019–20 financial audits identified 191 internal control issues. Of these, two were high risk and almost one-third were repeat findings from previous audits. While repeat findings reduced by 5.7 percentage points in 2019–20, the number remains high.

Recommendation (repeat issue):

Cluster agencies should action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

Agencies response to recent emergencies

The severity of the recent bushfires and floods meant natural disaster expenses incurred by emergency services agencies rose from $67.4 million in 2018–19 to $497 million in 2019–20.

The COVID-19 pandemic presented unprecedented challenges for the cluster. Social distancing and other infection control measures disrupted the traditional means of delivering services. Agencies established committees or response teams to respond to these challenges.

The department introduced measures to minimise the risk of the spread of COVID-19 amongst inmates in custodial settings.

Managing excess annual leave

Managing excess annual leave was a challenge for cluster agencies directly involved in the government's response to the emergency events. Employees in frontline cluster agencies deferred leave plans and many have taken little or no annual leave during the reporting period.

Annual leave liabilities rose at the department, NSW Police Force, Fire and Rescue NSW, Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service, the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The combined liabilities increased from $620 million to $692 million or 11.6 per cent between 30 June 2019 and 30 June 2020.

Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes

Administrative Arrangement Orders effective from 1 July 2019, created the department of Communities and Justice and transferred functions and staff, together with associated assets and liabilities into the department from the former departments of Justice and Family and Community Services.

The department continues to establish its governance arrangements following the MoG changes.

Recommendation:

The department should finalise appropriate governance arrangements for its new organisational structure as soon as possible. This includes:

  • harmonising policies and procedures to ensure a unified approach across the department
  • finalising risk management and monitoring processes across the department
  • updating its delegation instruments to reflect the current organisational structure, delegation limits and roles and responsibilities.
Delivery of the Prison Bed Capacity Program

The department continued to expand prison system capacity through the NSW Government's $3.8 billion Prison Bed Capacity Program. The department reported it spent $480 million on the Program in 2019–20. Six prison expansion projects were completed during the year, which added 1,660 new and 395 refurbished beds to the NSW prison system.

Data from the department shows the number of adult inmates in the NSW prison system reached a maximum of 14,165 during the year. Operational capacity was 16,096 beds on 19 August 2020.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

Agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster were significantly impacted by the bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019–20. Our 2019–20 financial audits of the seven cluster agencies most significantly impacted by the recent emergency events considered:

  • the financial implications of the emergency events
  • changes to agencies' operating models and control environments
  • delivery of new or expanded projects, programs or services at short notice.

Our findings on these seven agencies' responses to the recent emergencies are included throughout this report. These agencies are:

  • Department of Communities and Justice
  • Fire and Rescue NSW
  • NSW Police Force
  • Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service
  • Office of the NSW State Emergency Service
  • Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust
  • Venues NSW.

The Department of Communities and Justice is the principal agency of the cluster. The names of all agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster are included in Appendix one.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements. All agencies met the revised statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting their financial statements.
  • Emergency events significantly impacted cluster agencies in 2019–20. Agencies received additional funding of $1.1 billion to respond to the emergencies.
  • Cluster agencies implemented three new accounting standards in 2019–20. Adoption of AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies
  • review of how the cluster agencies managed the increased risks associated with new programs aimed at stemming the spread of COVID-19 and stimulating the economy.

Section highlights

  • Almost one-third of internal control issues reported were repeat findings. Cluster agencies should address these issues more promptly.
  • The severity of the recent bushfires and floods meant natural disaster expenses incurred by emergency services agencies increased by $430 million in 2019–20.
  • The department continues to establish its governance arrangements following Machinery of Government changes effective 1 July 2019.

 

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency

Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency

Appendix three – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix four – Status of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix five – Selected agencies for review of response to emergency events 

Appendix six – Financial data 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2020

Planning, Industry and Environment 2020

Planning
Environment
Industry
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Audit opinions

There are 45 separate entities in the cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 38 cluster agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements audits. Four financial statements audits are still ongoing, and three agencies were not subject to audit due to NSW Treasury reporting exemptions.

Timeliness of financial reporting

The majority of cluster agencies subject to statutory reporting deadlines met the revised timeline for submitting financial statements. Twenty‑four of the 26 cluster agencies required to submit early close financial statements met the revised timeframe.

Due to issues identified during the audit, 13 financial statements audits were not completed and audit opinions not issued by the statutory deadline.

Implementation of AASB 16 'Leases'

Significant deficiencies were identified in Property NSW's lease data maintenance and lease calculations.

Recommendation (partially repeat):

Property NSW should:

  • review and document the accounting implications for each lease
  • ensure the accuracy and validity of lease data used for the lease calculations
  • review user access to the leasing system, including privileged users.

Our audits of the cluster agencies identified there was a lack of thorough quality assurance over the accuracy of lease information provided by Property NSW.

Recommendation:

The Department and cluster agencies should:

  • quality assure and validate the information provided by Property NSW
  • ensure changes made by Property NSW on lease data are supported and that assumptions and judgements applied are appropriate
  • document their review of the data supplied.

Unprocessed Aboriginal land claims continued to increase

In 2019–20, the Department resolved an additional 468 Aboriginal land claims compared to the prior year. However, the total number of unprocessed Aboriginal land claims increased by 914 to 36,769 at 30 June 2020. The number of claims remaining unprocessed for more than ten years after lodgement increased by 10.9 per cent from last year. Until claims are resolved, there is an uncertainty over who is entitled to the land and the uses and activities that can be carried out on the land.

Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament since 2007 have recommended action to address the increasing number of unprocessed claims. To date, the Department has not been able to resolve this issue.

During 2020–21, a performance audit will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration of Aboriginal land claims.

Financial reporting of Crown land managers

The Department will need to provide additional support and guidance to help Crown land managers (CLMs) meet their financial reporting obligations.

Recommendation:

The Department should:

  • in consultation with NSW Treasury, develop an appropriate statutory reporting framework for CLMs
  • ensure sufficient resources are available to help CLMs meet their reporting obligations.

During 2019–20, NSW Treasury established the reporting exemption criteria for the CLMs. Based on available information, the Department determined 31 CLMs would not meet the exemption criteria and therefore are required to prepare annual financial statements.

2. Audit observations

Internal controls

Six high‑risk issues were identified across the cluster in 2019–20:

  • 5 of those were related to financial reporting issues identified in Property NSW, Wentworth Park Sporting Complex Land Manager, Lord Howe Island Board, Planning Ministerial Corporation and Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation
  • 1 issue was related to Lord Howe Island Board's outdated business continuity plan.

One in three internal control issues identified and reported to management in 2019–20 were repeat issues.

Recommendation:

Management letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing high‑risk and repeat issues.

Agencies response to recent emergencies

The unprecedented bushfires and COVID‑19 pandemic presented challenges for the cluster. Agencies established taskforces or response teams to respond to these emergencies.

With more staff working from home, agencies implemented protocols and procedures to manage risks associated with the remote working arrangements, and also needed to address certain technology issues.

The Department is responsible for the new Planning System Acceleration Program, which aims to fast‑track planning assessments, boost the State's economy and keep people in jobs during COVID‑19 pandemic. Between April and October 2020, the Department announced and determined 101 major projects and planning proposals.

Recognition of Crown land

Crown land is an important asset of the State. Management and recognition of Crown land assets is weakened when there is confusion over who is responsible for a particular Crown land parcel.

Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament since 2017 have recommended that the Department should ensure the database of Crown land is complete and accurate. Whilst the Department has commenced actions to improve the database, this remained an issue in 2019–20.

Recommendation (repeat issue):

The Department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This allows state agencies and local councils to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes

Since its creation on 1 July 2019, the Department has largely established its governance arrangements, including setting up the Audit and Risk Committee and internal audit function for the Department and relevant cluster agencies.

The Department still operated three main financial reporting systems in 2019–20, and has commenced the process to consolidate some of the systems.

The recent Regional NSW MoG change led to the transfer of $446 million net assets and $284 million 2019–20 budget from the Department to the newly created Department of Regional NSW on 2 April 2020.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

The COVID‑19 Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures–Treasurer) Act 2020 amended legislation administered by the Treasurer to implement further emergency measures as a result of the COVID‑19 pandemic. These amendments:

  • allowed the Treasurer to authorise payments from the Consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget – impacting the going concern assessments of cluster agencies
  • revised budgetary, financial and annual reporting time frames – impacting the timeliness of financial reporting
  • exempted certain statutory bodies and departments from preparing financial statements.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2020 financial statements audits. Timeliness of financial reporting remains an issue for 13 agencies.
  • Significant deficiencies were identified in Property NSW's lease data maintenance and lease calculations. Cluster agencies can also improve their management of lease information provided by Property NSW.
  • The number of unprocessed Aboriginal land claims continued to increase. During 2020–21, a performance audit will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration of Aboriginal land claims.

The Department has not yet developed a statutory reporting framework for Crown land managers and will need to provide additional resources to help Crown land managers meet their financial reporting obligations.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies
  • review of how the cluster agencies managed the increased risks associated with new programs aimed at stemming the spread of COVID-19 and stimulating the economy.

Cluster agencies experienced a range of control and governance related issues in recent years. An increased number of high risk issues and greater proportion of repeat issues were identified as part of our audits. It is important for cluster agencies to promptly address these issues.

Section highlights

  • Six high risk issues were identified during 2019–20 audits. One in three issues identified and reported to management in 2019–20 were repeat issues.
  • The Department has fast tracked the assessment and determination of 101 projects as a part of the Planning System Acceleration Program.
  • There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The Department should ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.

Published

Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.  

The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014. 

Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure. 

The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.

 

Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.

The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.

The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.

One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.

Conclusion

The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.

Waste levy

The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.

Grants for waste infrastructure

All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.

The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.

Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:

  • Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
  • Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.

A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.

Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:

  • Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
  • Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
  • Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
  • Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020

Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2020

Internal controls and governance 2020

Education
Environment
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Compliance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford today released her report on the findings and recommendations from the 2019–20 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector.

The bushfire and flood emergencies and the COVID‑19 pandemic continue to have a significant impact on the people and public sector of New South Wales. The scale of the government response to these events has been significant. The report focuses on the effectiveness of internal controls and governance processes, including relevant agencies’ response to the emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on:

  • financial and information technology controls
  • business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements
  • procurement, including emergency procurement
  • delegations that support timely and effective decision-making.

Due to the ongoing impact of COVID‑19 agencies have not yet returned to a business‑as‑usual environment. ‘Agencies will need to assess their response to the recent emergencies and update their business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to reflect the lessons learnt from these events’ the Auditor-General said.

The report noted that special procurement provisions were put in place to allow agencies to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Auditor-General recommended agencies update their procurement policies to reflect the current requirements of the NSW Procurement Framework and the emergency procurement requirements.

Read the PDF report

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2020. These 40 agencies constitute an estimated 85 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

1. Internal control trends
New, repeat and high risk findings

Internal control deficiencies increased by 13 per cent compared to last year. This is predominately due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies and 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. There were ten high risk findings compared to four last year.

The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

Agencies should:

  • prioritise addressing high-risk findings
  • address repeat internal control deficiencies by re-setting action plans and timeframes and monitoring the implementation status of recommendations.
Common findings

A number of findings remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years, including:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers.
2. Information technology controls
IT general controls

We found deficiencies in information security controls over key financial systems including:

  • user access administration deficiencies relating to inadequate oversight of the granting, review and removal of user access at 53 per cent of agencies
  • privileged users were not appropriately monitored at 43 per cent of agencies
  • deficient password controls that did not align to the agency's own password policies at 25 per cent of agencies.

The deficiencies above increase the risk of non-compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy, which requires agencies to have processes in place to manage user access, including privileged user access to sensitive information or systems and remove that access once it is not required or employment is terminated.

3. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
Assessing risks to business continuity and Scenario testing

The response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic has encompassed a wide range of activities, including policy setting, on-going service delivery, safety and availability of staff, availability of IT and other systems and financial management. Agencies were required to activate their business continuity plans in response, and with the continued impact of COVID-19 have not yet returned to a business-as-usual environment.

Our audits focused on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities. Agencies can also improve the content of their BIA. For example, ten per cent of agencies' BIAs did not include recovery time objectives and six per cent of agencies did not identify key IT systems that support critical business functions. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled, but 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. There were also opportunities to improve the effectiveness of scenario testing exercises by:

  • involving key dependent or inter-dependent third parties who support or deliver critical business functions
  • testing one or more high impact scenarios identified in their business continuity plan
  • preparing a formalpost-exercise report documenting the outcome of their scenario testing.

Agencies have responded to the recent emergencies but addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

Responding to disruptions

We found agencies' governance functions could have been better informed about responses to disruptive incidents that had activated a business continuity or disaster recovery response between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. For instance:

in 89 per cent of instances where a business continuity response was activated, a post-incident review had been performed. In 82 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance or executive management committee

in 95 per cent of instances where a disaster recovery response was activated, a post incident review had been performed. In 86 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance committee or executive management committee.

Examples of recorded incidents included extensive air quality issues and power outages due to bushfires, system and network outages, and infected and hijacked servers.

Agencies should assess their response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic and update business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to incorporate lessons learned. Agencies should report to those charged with governance on the results and planned actions.

Management review and oversight Eighty-two per cent and 86 per cent of agencies report to their audit and risk committees (ARC) on their business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements, respectively. Only 18 per cent and five per cent of ARCs are briefed on the results of respective scenario testing. Briefing ARCs on the results of scenario testing exercises helps inform their decisions about whether sound and effective business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements have been established.
4. Procurement, including emergency procurement
Policy framework

Agency procurement policies did not capture the requirements of several key NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions), increasing the risk of non-compliance with the Directions. We noted: 

  • 67 per cent of agencies did specify that procurement above $650,000 must be open to market unless exempt or procured through an existing Whole of Government Scheme or contract
  • 36 per cent of agencies did specify that procurements above $500,000 payable in foreign currencies must be hedged
  • 69 per cent of agencies' policies did specify that the agency head or cluster CFO must authorise the engagement of consultants where the engagement of the supplier does not comply with the standard commercial framework.

Recommendation: Agencies should review their procurement policies and guidelines to ensure they capture the key requirements of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, including NSW Procurement Board Directions.

Managing contracts

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies maintain a central contract register to record all details of contracts above $150,000, which is a requirement of GIPA legislation. Of the agencies that maintained registers, 13 per cent did not capture all contracts and eight per cent did not include all relevant contract details.

Sixteen per cent of agencies did not periodically review their contract register. Timely review increases compliance with GIPA legislation, and enhances the effectiveness with which procurement business units monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement.

Training and support

Ninety-three per cent of agencies provide training to staff involved in procurement processes, and a further 77 per cent of agencies provide this training on an on-going basis. Of the seven per cent of agencies that had not provided training to staff, we noted gaps in aspects of their procurement activity, including:

  • not conducting value for money assessments prior to renewing or extending the contract with their existing supplier
  • not obtaining approval from a delegated authority to commence the procurement process
  • procurement documentation not specifying certain key details such as the conditions for participation including any financial guarantees and dates for the delivery of goods or supply of services.

Training on procurement activities ensures there is effective management of procurement processes to support operational requirements, and compliance with procurement directions.

Procurement activities While agencies had implemented controls for tender activities above $650,000, 43 per cent of unaccredited agencies did not comply with the NSW Procurement Policy Framework because they had not had their procurement endorsed by an accredited agency within the cluster or by NSW Procurement. This endorsement aims to ensure the procurement is properly planned to deliver a value for money outcome before it commences.
Emergency procurement

As at 30 June 2020, agencies within the scope of this report reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485. Emergency procurement activities included the purchase of COVID-19 cleaning and hygiene supplies.

The government, through NSW Procurement released the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure', which relaxed procurement requirements to allow agencies to make COVID-19 emergency procurements. Our review against the emergency procurement measures found most agencies complied with requirements. For example:

  • 95 per cent of agencies documented an assessment of the need for the emergency procurement for the good and/or service
  • 86 per cent of agencies obtained authorisation of the emergency procurement by the agency head or the nominated employee under Public Works and Procurement Regulation 2019
  • 76 per cent of agencies reported the emergency procurement to the NSW Procurement Board.

Complying with the procedure helps to ensure government resources are being efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law.

Recommendation: Agency procurement frameworks should be reviewed and updated so they can respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise in the future. This includes:

  • updating procurement policies and guidelines to define an emergency situation, specify who can approve emergency procurement and capture other key requirements
  • using standard templates and documentation to prompt users to capture key requirements, such as needs analysis, supplier selection criteria, price assessment criteria, licence and insurance checks
  • having processes for reporting on emergency procurements to those charged with governance and NSW Procurement.
5. Delegations
Instruments of delegation

We found that agencies have established financial and human resources delegations, but some had not revisited their delegation manuals following the legislative and machinery of government changes. For those agencies impacted by machinery of government changes we noted:

  • 16 per cent of agencies had not updated their financial delegations to reflect the changes
  • 16 per cent of agencies did not update their human resources delegations to reflect the changes.

Delegations manuals are not always complete; 16 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off bad debts and 26 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off capital assets.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their financial and human resources delegation manuals contain regular set review dates and are updated to reflect the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, machinery of government changes and their current organisational structure and roles and responsibilities.

Compliance with delegations

Agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act), resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Further detail on this issue will be included in our Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament on Central Agencies, Education, Health and Stronger Communities, which will be tabled throughout December 2020.

Recommendation: Agencies should review financial and human resources delegations to ensure they capture all key functions of laws and regulations, and clearly specify the relevant power or function being conferred on the officer.

6. Status of 2019 recommendations
Progress implementing last year's recommendations

Recommendations were made last year to improve transparency over reporting on gifts and benefits and improve the visibility management and those charged with governance had over actions taken to address conflicts of interest that may arise. This year, we continue to note:

  • 38 per cent of agencies have not updated their gifts and benefits register to include all the key fields required under the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission
  • 56 per cent of agencies have not provided training to staff and 63 per cent of agencies have not implemented an annual attestation process for senior management
  • 97 per cent of agencies have not published their gifts and benefits register on their website and 41 per cent of agencies are not reporting on trends in the gifts and benefits register to those charged with governance.

While we acknowledge the significance of the recent emergencies, which have consumed agency time and resources, we note limited progress has been made implementing these recommendations. Further detail on the status of implementing all recommendations is in Appendix 2.

Recommendation: Agencies should re-visit the recommendations made in last year's report on internal controls and governance and action these recommendations.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Section highlights

We identified ten high risk findings, compared to four last year with two findings repeated from the previous year. There was an overall increase of 13 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies, and a 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

We identified a number of findings that remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years. Some of these findings related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers, or gaps in these registers.

Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse.

IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems.

Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements.

Section highlights

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements and opportunities for agencies to enhance their business continuity management and disaster recovery planning arrangements. This will better prepare them to respond to a disruption to their critical functions, resulting from an emergency or other serious event. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities and 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled.

This section focusses on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While agencies have responded to the recent emergencies, proactively addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of procurement agency procurement policies and procurement activity.

Section highlights

We found agencies have procurement policies in place to manage procurement activity, but the content of these policies was not sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions). The Directions aim to ensure procurement activity achieves value for money and meets the principles of probity and fairness.

Agencies have generally implemented controls over their procurement process. In relation to emergency procurement activity, agencies reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485 up to 30 June 2020. Our review of emergency procurement activity conducted during 2019–20 identified areas where some agencies did not fully comply with the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure'.

We also found not all agencies are maintaining complete and accurate contract registers. This not only increases the risk of non-compliance with GIPA legislation, but also limits the effectiveness of procurement business units to monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement in a timely manner. We noted instances where agencies renewed or extended contracts without going through a competitive tender process during the year.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency compliance with financial and human resources delegations.

Section highlights
We found that agencies are not always regularly reviewing and updating their financial and human resources delegations when there are changes to legislation or other organisational changes within the agency or from machinery of government changes. For example, agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act, resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
In order for agencies to operate efficiently, make necessary expenditure and human resource decisions quickly and lawfully, particularly in emergency situations, it is important that delegations are kept up to date, provide clear authority to decision makers and are widely communicated.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix three – Cluster agencies

 

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