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Parliamentary reference - Report number #351 - released (17 June 2021).

18 May 2021

Published

Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Transport

Asset valuation

Compliance

Fraud

Infrastructure

Internal controls and governance

Management and administration

Procurement

Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.

The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.

TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.

The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.

The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

Secretary of Transport for NSW
Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand ¹ space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost.

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m², this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation ². The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot.

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds.

¹ A hardstand space is a large, paved area to store cars, heavy vehicles and machinery.
² Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.

TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.

TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.

Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.

On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.

TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:

Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.

Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.

TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.

TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.

TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:

a property acquisition plan
a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
an independent professional evaluation
external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).

TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.

Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:

an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.

Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.

The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.

The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.

TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.

TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.

TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.

At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.

At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.

TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.

The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.

Copyright Notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

19 November 2020

Published

Government advertising 2018-19 and 2019-20

Whole of Government

Finance

Community Services

Compliance

Management and administration

Procurement

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford found that select advertising campaigns conducted by Service NSW and the NSW Rural Fire Service met most requirements of the Government Advertising Act, regulations, Guidelines and other laws. However, the audit found that Service NSW inappropriately used its post campaign evaluation to measure sentiment towards and confidence in the NSW Government.

While agency analysis shows that the ‘Cost of Living’ (phases 2 and 3) and ‘How Fireproof is Your Plan?’ campaigns achieved most of their objectives, the campaign objectives and targets set by both agencies were not sufficient to measure all aspects of campaign effectiveness.

The report makes two recommendations to the Department of Customer Service. The first is to review its guidance to ensure agencies are not using post campaign evaluations to measure sentiment towards the government. The second, to review its guidance and the new process of peer review to ensure they support agencies to comply with the Act, the regulations and the Guidelines.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 requires the Auditor General to conduct an annual performance audit of one or more government agencies to see whether their advertising activities were carried out in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Government Advertising Act 2011.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies have carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). This audit examined two campaigns run during the 2018–19 and 2019–20 financial years respectively:

the 'Cost of Living' campaign run by Service NSW (phases 2 and 3 delivered in 2018–19)
the 'How Fireproof Is Your Plan?' (Fireproof) campaign run by NSW Rural Fire Service (year two of a three-year campaign delivered in 2019–20).

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

Conclusion

Neither campaign breached the prohibition on political advertising contained in section 6 of the Act. While both campaigns met most requirements of the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Guidelines, we identified some instances of non-compliance. Service NSW inappropriately used its post campaign evaluation to measure sentiment towards and confidence in the NSW Government.

Service NSW used its post-campaign evaluation to measure sentiment towards and confidence in the NSW Government. While neither campaign breached the prohibition on political advertising contained in section 6 of the Act, measuring sentiment towards and confidence in the NSW Government is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation and creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes. This risk is heightened as both phases 2 and 3 of the Cost of Living campaign were run immediately before the NSW state election. We have made this finding previously in our report 'Government advertising 2017–18'.

The campaign objectives and targets set by both agencies were not sufficient to fully measure campaign effectiveness. Service NSW advertised seven rebates in phase 2 of the campaign but only set targets for the awareness and uptake of three of these rebates. NSW Rural Fire Service set objectives and targets to be achieved over the life of the three-year campaign but did not set targets to be achieved for each year of the campaign. While the Fireproof campaign is a three-year campaign, each year of the campaign is subject to a separate approval and peer review process.

Agency analysis shows that both campaigns achieved most of their objectives. There was some overlap in the timing of phases 2 and 3 of the Cost of Living campaign and both phases had similar high-level objectives to increase awareness of rebates, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of each distinct campaign phase. NSW Rural Fire Service conducted a post-campaign evaluation for year two of the Fireproof campaign (2019–20) but although this showed positive results against the overall objectives of the three-year campaign, NSW Rural Fire Service did not set specific targets for year two of the campaign, making it difficult to evaluate effectiveness for that year.

Service NSW was not able to demonstrate that its campaign was economical as it directly negotiated with a single supplier for the creative materials for phase 2. This is contrary to the NSW Government's procurement rules which require agencies to obtain three quotes when using suppliers on a prequalification scheme. Service NSW did not comply with its own procurement policy, which restricts Service NSW employees from entering into discussions with a supplier until the appropriate delegate approves a direct procurement. NSW Rural Fire Service achieved cost efficiencies by re-using creative material developed in the first year of the campaign. NSW Rural Fire Service also received $4 million worth of free advertising time and space.

The cost benefit analyses prepared by both agencies did not fully meet the requirements in the Guidelines. Both agencies identified an alternative to advertising but did not assess the costs and benefits of that alternative. We have made this finding previously in our report 'Government advertising 2017–18' and in our report 'Government advertising 2015–16 and 2016–17'.

In 2018–19, Service NSW delivered phases 2 and 3 of the 'Cost of Living' campaign. The Cost of Living advertising campaign aimed to build awareness of the help available to ease the cost of living for people under financial pressure including awareness of specific rebates that can be claimed. As part of the Cost of Living program, Service NSW developed a webpage designed as a single portal to access more than 40 NSW Government savings, rebates and initiatives (which originated from over 12 different agencies). It also launched the Cost of Living service which includes face to face meetings and phone interviews to help people claim rebates from the NSW Government. Phase 2 of the campaign ran from September 2018 to August 2019. Phase 3 of the campaign ran from January 2019 to July 2019. The budgets for phases 2 and 3 were $4.127 million and $934,800 respectively. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

Service NSW complied with most requirements of the Act, the Regulations and the Guidelines. Campaign materials that we reviewed did not breach the prohibition on political advertising contained in section 6 of the Act. However, Service NSW used its post-campaign evaluation to measure sentiment towards, and confidence in, the NSW Government. This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation and creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes. This risk is heightened as both phases 2 and 3 of the Cost of Living campaign were run immediately before the NSW state election.

The post-campaign evaluation shows that the campaign was effective in achieving most of its objectives. However, in phase 2, Service NSW did not set targets for all of the rebates it advertised. There was some overlap in the timing of phases 2 and 3 of the Cost of Living campaign and both phases had similar high-level objectives to increase awareness of rebates, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of each distinct campaign phase.

Service NSW was not able to demonstrate that its campaign was economical as it directly negotiated with a single supplier for the creative materials in phase 2 (total cost $731,480). This is contrary to the NSW Government's procurement rules which require agencies to obtain three quotes when using suppliers on a prequalification scheme where the estimated cost is more than $150,000. Service NSW did not comply with its own procurement policy, which restricts Service NSW employees from entering into discussions with a supplier until the appropriate delegate approves a direct procurement.

The cost benefit analysis for phase 2 did not accurately assess the benefits of the campaign as Service NSW did not know which rebates would be included in the advertisements at the time the cost benefit analysis was developed. The cost benefit analysis for phase 2 did not assess the costs and benefits of alternatives to advertising.

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

The audit team reviewed campaign materials developed as part of the paid advertising campaign including radio transcripts, digital videos and display. The audit team did not review the use of social media outside paid social media content as section four of the Act defines government advertising as the dissemination of information which is funded by or on behalf of a government agency. See Appendix two for examples of campaign materials for this campaign.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

Post-campaign evaluations measured sentiment towards and confidence in the NSW Government

The post-campaign evaluation for phases 2 and 3 measured levels of confidence with the statement ‘the NSW Government has your best interests at heart’, despite the fact this was not a stated objective of the campaign. This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The post-campaign evaluation for phase 3 found that exposure to the campaign improved sentiment towards the government amongst those who did not have confidence in the NSW Government.

Service NSW advised that it was important to measure the sentiment of the advertising including the wording 'best interests' as it did not want the whole of government brand to be detrimental to customer engagement with applying for the rebates.

Following phase 2, Service NSW conducted analysis of media sentiment using the key words 'cost of living' and the names of the Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Customer Service. The analysis presented the level of positive, negative and neutral media sentiment. The Government Advertising Guidelines 2012 list the purposes that government advertising may serve which do not include improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of this analysis in Service NSW's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.

Section 10 of the Act restricts agencies from carrying out a campaign after 26 January in the calendar year before the Legislative Assembly is due to expire and before the election for the Legislative Assembly in that year. Service NSW authorised a media agency to book media in line with the media plans for the campaign. The media plans for the campaign show that Service NSW did not authorise or plan to run any advertisements between 27 January 2019 and 23 March 2019.

Service NSW did not set targets for all rebates advertised in phase 2

Service NSW did not set targets for four of the seven rebates that were advertised as part of phase 2 of the campaign. These rebates were the Family Energy Rebate, Appliance Replacement Offer, National Parks Concession Offer and the Pensioner Travel Voucher. As a result, it was unable to evaluate whether the advertisements for these rebates were effective. Service NSW advised that at the time the campaign went to peer review, when campaign objectives are set, it did not know which rebates would be included in the advertisements.

Service NSW stated in its submission to the Department of Premier and Cabinet that it may change the creative content for phase 2 as it announced new initiatives and rebates. The peer review process should have ensured that Service NSW set targets for any additional rebates or savings it intended to advertise before that advertising commenced to ensure a strategic approach to the campaigns that clearly demonstrated anticipated benefits were in place.

The post-campaign evaluation for phase 2 shows that the advertising campaign met most of its objectives

Service NSW set overall campaign objectives and specific targets for some rebates advertised as part of phase 2 of the campaign. The objectives, targets and results for phase 2 are shown in Exhibit 5. In phase 2, Service NSW established baseline data on levels of awareness of government rebates during the peer review process. The baseline level of awareness for government rebates was 44 per cent. The level of awareness for specific rebates was 46 per cent for the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) green slip refund, and 21 per cent for both Active Kids and Toll Relief.

Post-campaign evaluation reports for phase 2 show that the campaign met its objective to raise awareness of NSW Government rebates, achieving a 16 per cent increase in awareness from 44 per cent to 51 per cent. The campaign did not meet its target to increase awareness of the CTP green slip refund by ten per cent.

Service NSW did not report the results of the uptake of the CTP green slip refund, Active Kids and Toll Relief in its post campaign effectiveness report submitted to the Department of Premier and Cabinet. However, other post-campaign evaluation documentation, which Service NSW advise was submitted to the Department of Premier and Cabinet, show that these targets were met.

Service NSW did not report to the Department of Premier and Cabinet on whether it achieved the target of a ten per cent increase of average monthly visits to the Cost of Living webpage. Service NSW reported that it had achieved an average of 11,753 visitors to the webpage per day during the campaign. These average daily results indicate that the target was met.

Exhibit 5: Phase 2 - campaign objectives, targets and results
Campaign objectives and targets	Does the post-campaign evaluation show that the target was met?
1. a) Increase awareness of rebates from the NSW Government by ten per cent.	Image
b) Increase average monthly visits to the Cost of Living webpage by ten per cent.	Image
2. Increase awareness of rebates and savings by ten per cent for:
CTP green slip refund	Image
Active Kids	Image
Toll Relief.	Image
3. Increase awareness that NSW Government initiatives relating to the cost of living are available via Service NSW by ten per cent.	Image
4. Increase the uptake of rebates and savings for the CTP green slip refund, Active Kids and Toll Relief by ten per cent.	Image

Key

Image

Yes

Image

Not Fully

* Some issues with reporting on target.
Source: Service NSW. Audit Office analysis.

The post-campaign evaluation for phase 3 shows that the advertising campaign met most of its objectives

Service NSW set overall campaign objectives and specific targets for the two rebates advertised as part of phase 3 of the campaign. The objectives, targets and results for phase 3 are shown in Exhibit 6.

In phase 3, Service NSW established baseline data on levels of awareness during the peer review process. The baseline level of awareness for government rebates was 44 per cent. This is the same baseline that was used to measure performance for phase 2 of the campaign. Service NSW did not set baselines for awareness and uptake of Energy Switch and Creative Kids as these were new services.

Post-campaign evaluation reports for phase 3 show that the campaign met its objective to raise awareness of NSW Government rebates by ten per cent, achieving a 30 per cent increase in awareness from 44 per cent to 57 per cent. The overall increase in message take-out was met with 43 per cent agreeing with the message that the NSW Government is taking steps to ease the cost of living. The campaign achieved awareness and uptake targets for the specific rebates included in phase 3, except for awareness of Creative Kids which achieved 28 per cent awareness, falling short of the 30 per cent awareness target.

Exhibit 6: Phase 3 - campaign objectives, targets and results
Campaign objectives and targets	Does the post-campaign evaluation show that the target was met?
1. Increase message takeout that ‘The NSW Government is taking steps to help ease the cost of living in NSW’ by ten per cent for those who can recall the campaign.
2. Increase awareness that the NSW Government has a range of rebates and savings by ten per cent.
3. Generate awareness with NSW residents aged 18+ of:
Energy Switch (15 per cent awareness)
Creative Kids (30 per cent awareness).
4. Create uptake of Energy Switch and Creative Kids (8,356 clicks on the Energy Switch website and 107,938 Creative Kids vouchers downloaded with 70 per cent conversion).

Key

Yes

Not Fully

Source: Service NSW. Audit Office analysis.

The timing of campaign phases meant that it was difficult for Service NSW to evaluate each distinct campaign phase and reduced opportunities to incorporate learnings from previous phases

Service NSW commenced planning for phase 2 of the campaign while phase 1 was still underway. This limited the opportunity for Service NSW to incorporate learnings from phase 1 into phase 2. There was some overlap in the timing of phase 2 and the start of phase 3 of the campaign, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of each distinct campaign phase. Both phases 2 and 3 had the same high-level outcome objective to raise awareness of rebates by ten per cent. The baseline measures that were used to evaluate performance for phase 3 were the same as those used to evaluate phase 2. As a result, Service NSW was not able to separately evaluate these two phases of the campaign. This is important given the budgets for phases 2 and 3 were $4.127million and $934,800 respectively.

Service NSW allocated 7.5 per cent of its media budget to communications with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) and Aboriginal audiences

The NSW Government CALD and Aboriginal Advertising Policy requires that agencies spend at least 7.5 per cent of an advertising campaign media budget on direct communications with CALD and Aboriginal audiences. Service NSW authorised a media company to book media in line with the media plans for the campaign. The media plans for phases 2 and 3 of the campaign indicate that Service NSW met this requirement, with 7.5 per cent of the budget allocated to these audiences in phase 2 and 10.4 per cent in phase 3.

The post campaign evaluation for phases 1 and 2 of the Cost of Living campaign contained a recommendation to look at other opportunities to reach CALD audiences. Effective communication with CALD audiences was particularly important in phase 3 of the campaign, where they made up 30 per cent of the target audience for the Creative Kids advertisement. The post-campaign analysis for phase 3 showed that the campaign performed well with some, but not all CALD audiences. The post-campaign analysis also showed low awareness and uptake with Aboriginal audiences. Pre-campaign focus groups in phase 3 found Aboriginal audiences had a negative reaction to the campaign tag line ‘NSW Government is helping with the cost of living’ however this tagline was still used in some advertisements in phase 3.

The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for phase 2 did not accurately assess the benefits of the campaign and did not assess the costs and benefits of alternatives to advertising

Under the Government Advertising Act 2011, agencies are required to prepare a CBA when the cost of the campaign is likely to exceed $1 million. The CBA conducted by Service NSW for phase 2 includes $8 million in benefits attributed to the advertisements for the Energy Switch tool and $6.9 million in benefits attributed to the advertisements for Creative Kids vouchers. These benefits should not have been included in the CBA for phase 2 as they were not included in this phase of the campaign. The CBA did not estimate the benefits of some other rebates and savings advertised in phase 2 of the campaign. This means that the CBA did not accurately assess the benefits of the campaign. Service NSW advised that at the time the CBA was developed it had not selected the rebates to be included in the campaign.

The Government Advertising Guidelines require agencies to consider options other than advertising to achieve the desired objective including a comparison of costs and benefits. The CBA developed as part of phase 2 identified using existing NSW Government communication channels as an alternative to advertising but did not assess the costs and benefits of this alternative.

This is a repeat finding from two previous government advertising audits. The report ‘Government Advertising: 2015–16 and 2016–17’ found that both agencies subject to the audit did not meet the requirements in the guidelines to consider alternatives to advertising. The report made a recommendation to the Department of Premier and Cabinet to work with Treasury to ensure the requirements of the guidelines are fully reflected in the 'Cost-Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. The report ‘Government advertising 2017–18’ found that one agency subject to the audit did not identify to what extent the benefits could be achieved without advertising, nor did it consider alternatives to advertising which could achieve the same impact as the advertising campaign.

Service NSW negotiated with a single creative agency in phase 2, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money

Agencies are required to obtain three quotes when procuring a creative agency on the prequalification scheme if the estimated cost of the creative content is greater than $150,000. In phase 2 of the campaign, Service NSW extended the contract with the creative agency used for phase 1 of the campaign and did not obtain three quotes despite the cost of the creative content for phase 2 being $731,480. The requirement to obtain three quotes was met in phase 1 when initially selecting this creative agency.

Service NSWs procurement policy details that direct negotiation may be appropriate where there is a compelling reason to renew or rollover a contract beyond temporal or convenience reasons or in the cases of a genuine emergency. In its briefing to the Chief Executive, Service NSW stated that this contract extension was sought due to the time-sensitive nature of the project and that if work was delayed by a tender process, Service NSW may not be able to meet marketing milestones and this could result in limited customer uptake. This reason is not a genuine emergency and is not compelling as it does not explain what consequences would occur if it did not meet the marketing milestones or if there was limited customer uptake.

Service NSW's procurement policy also states that under no circumstances must Service NSW employees enter into discussions with a supplier until the delegate has formally made their decision to enter into direct negotiation. Service NSW briefed the Chief Executive of Service NSW in relation to extending the contract on 5 September 2018. The briefing states that the creative agency had already begun developing creative content for phase 2 and Service NSW had already received quotes from the creative provider for the proposed work prior to 5 September 2018. Procurement sign-offs were not completed until 7 September 2018. The engagement of the creative provider prior to appropriate approvals was contrary to Service NSWs procurement policy.

The economy of the campaign may have been limited by not meeting the procurement requirements in phase 2. It is possible that the creative provider may have offered a more competitive rate if it was aware that Service NSW was seeking quotes from other creative providers. Additionally, it is possible that another creative provider could have provided better value for money.

In phase 3 of the campaign, the estimated cost of the creative exceeded $150,000 however Service NSW chose to contract two different creative agencies, and the cost for each agency fell below the threshold to obtain three quotes. Agencies are permitted to obtain one quote when using a creative provider on the prequalification scheme if the cost is between $50,000 to $150,000. Service NSW advised that it contracted two creative providers as two different project teams were responsible for the rebates, each with separate marketing budgets.

Service NSW allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement

During the peer review process, the Department of Premier and Cabinet advised agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, the Department of Premier and Cabinet advised that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.

Service NSW allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. Service NSW signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider with sufficient time to achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.

The campaign may have been misleading for some people who were not eligible for rebates

Advertisements we reviewed focused on the amount of savings that could be obtained from rebates, for example ‘Save up to $285’, and ended with a statement ‘To save, visit service.nsw.gov.au. This directed viewers to the Cost of Living website which contains eligibility information. However, the advertisements in phases 2 and 3 we reviewed did not contain any details on the eligibility for these rebates and not all advertisements stated that eligibility criteria apply. Service NSW advised that the eligibility criteria for each rebate is extensive and that it was not possible to include this in the creative material.

Post-campaign evaluations in phase 3 recommended that advertisements for Creative Kids should indicate eligibility (e.g. age criteria) as statements on savings have the potential to be misleading when not all viewers will be eligible for rebates. Social media analysis conducted following phase 2 showed ineligibility or inability to claim rebates or refunds caused anger for some respondents.

Some advertisements in phase 2 stated ‘we've got something for everyone’. However, as rebates were subject to eligibility criteria, it is possible that some residents in NSW would not be eligible for any rebates as part of the Cost of Living initiative. As such, this statement has the potential to be misleading.

The campaign included statements that underestimated the savings that some customers could obtain

The Guidelines require accuracy in the presentation of all facts, statistics, comparisons and other arguments. The Guidelines also require that all claims of fact included in government advertising campaigns must be able to be substantiated.

In phase 2, the possible savings customers could obtain for two rebates or savings exceeded the amounts stated in the advertising campaign. Exhibit 7 shows some advertisements in phase 2 which stated, ‘My Green Slip Saving Save up to $60’. However, the State Insurance Regulatory Authority website shows that savings for some types of motor vehicles under the 2017 CTP scheme exceed $60. The State Insurance Regulatory Authority website states that the average saving under this scheme has been $129. Service NSW advised that these advertisements were designed for regional markets and that it used different advertisements for metropolitan areas which contained different amounts of savings.

Some advertisements in phase 2 stated, ‘My Toll Relief save up to $700’. The Service NSW website states that drivers can obtain free vehicle registration if they have spent $1,352 or more in tolls in the previous financial year. The cost of registration for some vehicles exceeds $700. This means the savings detailed in the advertisement were lower than what some customers could actually save.

NSW Rural Fire Service conducted the 'How FireProof Is Your Plan?' (Fireproof) campaign. The Fireproof campaign is a three-year campaign which ran in 2018–19 (year one), 2019–20 (year two) and is planned for 2020–21 (year three). This audit examined year two of the campaign (2019–20).

The Fireproof campaign is a public safety campaign encouraging people to plan and prepare for bush fires across the summer period. The campaign aims to improve the quality of bush fire planning and preparation in the community and decrease the impact of fires on the community when they occur.

The Fireproof campaign (year two) complied with most requirements of the Act, the Regulations and the Guidelines. The campaign materials that we reviewed did not breach the prohibition on political advertising contained in section 6 of the Act. NSW Rural Fire Service set objectives and targets to be achieved over the life of the three-year Fireproof campaign. Post-campaign evaluation shows that the Fireproof campaign was effective in achieving increases against its three-year objectives during year two. However, NSW Rural Fire Service did not set targets to be achieved for each year of the campaign, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of year two of the campaign. NSW Rural Fire Service achieved cost efficiencies by re-using creative material developed in the first year of the campaign. NSW Rural Fire Service received $4 million worth of free advertising time and space. The cost benefit analysis for the Fireproof campaign did not assess the costs and benefits of alternatives to advertising.

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

The audit team reviewed campaign materials developed as part of the paid advertising campaign for example radio advertisements, television commercials and digital displays. The audit team did not review the use of social media outside paid social media content as section four of the Act defines government advertising as the dissemination of information which is funded by or on behalf of a government agency. Examples of campaign materials are shown in Appendix two.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

NSW Rural Fire Service did not set targets for the second year of the campaign

The second year of the Fireproof campaign (2019–20) had the same objectives as the first year of the campaign (2018–19), however no specific targets were set for the second year. The advertising submission for the first year of the campaign (2018–19) details the targets for each objective as an increase of ten per cent against the baseline data to be achieved by March 2021, at the end of the three-year campaign.

The second year of the Fireproof campaign (2019–20) was one of the first campaigns approved under the new budget and peer review processes introduced by the Department of Customer Service in 2019–20. The new process for peer review introduced a new template for campaign submissions. The former template for campaign submissions contained more prompts for agencies to ensure the submission contained sufficient detail of campaign objectives, baseline measures, targets, dates for measurement and detail on how they would measure objectives. Despite this, the peer review process should have identified that NSW Rural Fire Service did not set targets for the second year of the campaign.

The 2016 Guidelines for Implementing NSW Government Evaluation Framework for Advertising and Communications requires campaign objectives to be SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timed). NSW Rural Fire Service did not meet this requirement for year two of the Fireproof campaign.

Post-campaign evaluations showed increases against four out of five objectives, however there were no specific targets

NSW Rural Fire Service set three campaign objectives at the time it submitted the second year of the campaign (2019–20) to the Department of Customer Service for peer review. However, the post-campaign effectiveness report submitted to the Department of Customer Service measured campaign effectiveness against five campaign objectives. The objectives in the post-campaign effectiveness report were the same objectives set for the first year of the campaign, which is appropriate as this was a repeat campaign.

NSW Rural Fire Service achieved increases against four of their five objectives. However, as noted above there were no specific targets (such as percentage increases) against which performance of the 2019–20 campaign could be measured. Despite this, at the end of the second year, the Fireproof campaign had already achieved some of the targets that NSW Rural Fire Service had set for the end of the third year of the campaign. The post-campaign research showed that both audience recall and exposure to the campaign increased significantly from the prior year. The campaign objectives and results are shown in Exhibit 8.

For those people who already have a bush fire plan, the campaign aimed to increase the number of those plans which have included two or more elements from the Guide to Making a Bush Fire Survival Plan. Elements from the Guide to Making A Bush Fire Survival Plan include actions such as deciding what to take with you if you leave, ensuring you have the right equipment for defending your home and allocating responsibilities to members of a household. The post-campaign evaluation showed that the campaign did not achieve an increase against this objective for people who planned to stay and defend their property rather than leave.

Exhibit 8: Campaign objectives and results
Campaign objectives	Does the post-campaign evaluation show increases against the objective?
1. Continue to increase the number of people that have discussed and/or written a plan with regards to what they will do in the event of a fire.
2. Of those who indicate they have a plan, increase the number of people who have included two or more elements from the Guide to Making a Bush Fire Survival Plan:
for those who plan to leave
for those who plan to stay and defend.
3. Increase the frequency in completing preparation activities around a person’s property.
4. Increase the number of people who correctly assess it is their responsibility to complete preparation activities and enact their plan without direct intervention from emergency services.
5. Visits to MyFirePlan website.

Key

Yes

Source: NSW Rural Fire Service. Audit Office analysis.

NSW Rural Fire Service achieved cost efficiencies by reusing creative content developed in the first year of the campaign

Total creative and production costs incurred in year one of the campaign were $1.08 million. Rather than commissioning new creative materials, NSW Rural Fire Service re-used the same creative content in year two of the campaign. NSW Rural Fire Service incurred $100,000 in creative and production costs in year two of the campaign and achieved cost-efficiencies by reusing the same creative developed in the prior year.

NSW Rural Fire Service allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement and received free media placements

The Department of Customer Service advises agencies to work with media contacts to book media in advance to ensure a cost-efficient placement. Prior to 2019–20, the Department of Premier and Cabinet provided suggested timeframes for agencies to book media as part of the peer review process. For example, it advised agencies to book television six to 12 weeks in advance and book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance. NSW Rural Fire Service allowed sufficient time for a cost-efficient media placement.

NSW Rural Fire Service received $4 million of free advertising time and space donated by media companies due to the extent and impact of the 2019–20 fire season.

The cost benefit analysis (CBA) did not assess the costs and benefits of alternatives to advertising

Under the Government Advertising Act 2011, agencies are required to prepare a CBA when the cost of the campaign is likely to exceed $1 million. As part of the CBA, the Government Advertising Guidelines require agencies to consider options other than advertising to achieve the desired objective including a comparison of costs and benefits.

The CBA for the Fireproof campaign (year two) notes that the proposed campaign is one component of a broader community engagement strategy which has been developed over time and is based on research and evaluation. The CBA considers two options to achieve the objectives of the campaign. The first option is community engagement activities without an advertising campaign and the second option is community engagement activities alongside an advertising campaign. The CBA does not identify and assess the costs and benefits of both of the options in order to assess the most cost-efficient option.

Appendix two – About the campaigns

Appendix three – About the audit

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #342 - released 19 November 2020

24 September 2020

Published

Support for regional town water infrastructure

Industry

Environment

Local Government

Infrastructure

Management and administration

Regulation

Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.

The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.

The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.

Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.

The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.

Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.

The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.

Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.

The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.

This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning in regional NSW since at least 2014. It has also lacked a strategic, evidence-based approach to target investments in town water infrastructure.

A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and work with Local Water Utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.

The department has had limited impact on facilitating Local Water Utilities’ (LWU) strategic town water planning. Its lack of internal procedures, records and data mean that the department cannot demonstrate it has effectively engaged, guided or supported the LWU sector in Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning over the past six years. Today, less than ten per cent of the 92 LWUs have an IWCM strategy approved by the department.

The department did not design or implement a strategic approach for targeting town water infrastructure investment through its $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP). Most projects in the program were reviewed by a technical panel but there was limited evidence available about regional and local priorities to inform strategic project assessments. About a third of funded SSWP projects were recommended via various alternative processes that were not transparent. The department also lacks systems for integrated project monitoring and program evaluation to determine the contribution of its investments to improved town water outcomes for communities. The department has recently developed a risk-based framework to inform future town water infrastructure funding priorities.

The department does not have strategic water plans in place at state and regional levels: a key objective of these is to improve town water for regional communities. The department started a program of regional water planning in 2018, following the NSW Government’s commitment to this in 2014. It also started developing a state water strategy in 2020, as part of an integrated water planning framework to align local, regional and state priorities. One of 12 regional water strategies has been completed and the remaining strategies are being developed to an accelerated timeframe: this has limited the department’s engagement with some LWUs on town water risks and priorities.

Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.

We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.

We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix two – Key terms

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020

12 August 2020

Published

Health capital works

Health

Compliance

Infrastructure

Procurement

Project management

This report examines whether NSW Health effectively planned and delivered major capital works to meet the demand for health services in New South Wales.

The report found that NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, the program was driven by Local Health District priorities without assessment of the State’s broader and future‑focussed health requirements.

The report found that unclear decision making roles and responsibilities between Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health limited the ability of NSW Health to effectively test and analyse investment options.

Project delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

The Auditor‑General recommends that NSW Health ensure its capital projects offer the greatest value to New South Wales by establishing effective policy guidance and enhancing project governance and management systems.

Since 2011–12, NSW Health has aimed to improve its facilities and build 'future focused' infrastructure. The NSW Government’s 2015–16 election commitments established a four-year $5.0 billion capital program for NSW Health to build and upgrade more than 60 hospitals and health services. The 2019–20 State Budget committed a further $10.1 billion over four years for another 29 projects. This is the largest investment to date on health capital works in New South Wales.

Recent reviews of infrastructure have recognised that population and demographic growth will require a change in the delivery and composition of health infrastructure, including considering greater use of non-traditional, non-capital health service options and assets.

To ensure that expenditure on capital works represents the best value for money, NSW Health's business cases need to be robust and supported by evidence that demonstrates they are worthy investments. The NSW Process of Facility Planning has been the main framework guiding the detailed planning and development of NSW Health's capital works proposals. This framework was developed by the then NSW Department of Health in 2010. Its aim is to ensure investment proposals are supported by rigorous planning processes that address health service needs and provide value for money.

Infrastructure projects of the complexity and scale being delivered by NSW Health carry inherent risks. For example, unplanned cost escalations can potentially impact on the State’s finances. Unforeseen delays can also reduce the intended benefits. The growth in the State’s health capital spend and project profile, means its exposure to such risks has increased over time.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of major capital works to meet demand for health services in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:

the Ministry of Health has effective procedures for planning and prioritising investments in major health capital works
Health Infrastructure develops robust business cases for initiated major capital works that reliably inform government decision making
Health Infrastructure has effective project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit focused on the Ministry of Health and Health Infrastructure – being the lead agencies within NSW Health responsible for prioritising, planning and delivering major health capital works across the State. The audit examined 13 business cases for eight discrete projects over a ten-year period.

Conclusion

NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, its planning and prioritisation processes were not assessed against a long-term statewide health infrastructure plan and lacked rigorous assessment against non-capital options creating a risk that they do not maximise value for New South Wales.

The scale of NSW Health's capital investment is significant and has grown substantially in recent years. The NSW Government’s election commitments in 2015–16 and 2019–20 collectively set out a $15.0 billion capital program to build and upgrade 89 hospitals and health services. NSW Health developed this infrastructure program in the absence of a statewide health infrastructure strategy and investment framework to focus its planning and decisions on the types of capital investments required to meet the long-term needs of the NSW health system.

Consequently, locally focused priorities of the State’s 17 Local Health Districts have been the primary drivers of NSW Health’s capital investments since 2015–16. Local Health District investment proposals for hospitals were developed without consideration of alternative health options such as community health service models, technology-driven eHealth care, or private sector options. Without rigorous assessment against a range of potential health service options, there is a risk that selected projects do not maximise value for New South Wales.

In recognition of the need for a statewide approach to infrastructure planning, the Ministry of Health recently developed a 20-year Health Infrastructure Strategy and prioritisation framework in 2019. The strategy was approved by the NSW Government in April 2020.

NSW Health's ability to effectively test and analyse its capital investment options has been compromised by unclear decision-making roles and responsibilities between its Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health agencies.

While both Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have responsibilities for the assessment of business cases for proposed infrastructure projects, confusion about the roles of each agency at key steps compromised the efficacy of the process. Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have differing views about which agency is responsible for testing business case inputs and conducting comprehensive options appraisals.

As a result of this confusion, Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health did not rigorously test Local Health District capital investment proposals against defined statewide health infrastructure investment priorities. The NSW Process of Facility Planning does not clarify the responsibilities of all parties in validating and prioritising Local Health District's Clinical Service Plans and progressing them to business cases.

NSW Health's infrastructure priorities are not sufficiently supported by transparent documentation of selection methodology and the rationale for decisions. Consequently, there is a risk that recommended options, whilst having some economic and health service merit, do not represent the greatest value.

Substantial delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

Health Infrastructure did not fully comply with NSW Government guidelines for developing business cases and making economic appraisals for proposed capital investments. These weaknesses, along with delays and budget overruns on some projects, demonstrate a need for Health Infrastructure to strengthen its project governance, management and quality control systems.

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

NSW Health's Process of Facility Planning similarly highlights the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by Health Infrastructure that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of health infrastructure projects greater than $10.0 million.

Project challenges indicate opportunities for strengthening governance and project management

The three major hospital redevelopments examined in metropolitan, regional and rural areas had a combined Estimated Total Cost of more than $1.2 billion and comprised eight discrete projects and 13 separate business cases.

Almost all these projects experienced delivery challenges which impacted achievement of their original objectives and intended benefits. This is expected in complex and large-scale health infrastructure programs. However, in some projects the impacts were significant and resulted in substantial delays, unforeseen costs, and diversion of resources from other priority areas.

Our review of the selected case studies highlighted opportunities for enhancing governance and project management. Specifically, it indicates a need for improving transparency in the management of contingencies, risk management and assessments particularly relating to adverse site conditions and the selection of contractors. There is also a need to strengthen forward planning for options to address unfunded priorities within business cases that risk complicating the delivery of future project stages resulting in unforeseen costs and potentially avoidable budget overruns.

Need for increased transparency and accountability in the management of contingency funds

In February 2017, the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group approved the use of surplus funds of $13.76 million from Stage 1 of the Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment for new works deemed needed to support Stage 2. Following this decision, Health Infrastructure finalised and submitted a business case addendum for Stage 1 to the Ministry in March 2017, addressing the new works comprising a two-storey building for medical imaging and paediatric floors. The business case addendum also addressed options to fit out and procure major medical imaging equipment. The Ministry approved the Stage 1 business case in July 2017, noting the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group had already approved the use of remaining Stage 1 funds to deliver the new works.

Stage 1 was completed in 2015, almost two years before the Stage 1 business case addendum was prepared in February 2017.

The Ministry's decision to approve the new works using $13.76 million of surplus Stage 1 funds did not comply with the NSW Treasury Circular TC 12/20. This policy establishes the Treasurer's approval must be sought and received before a new capital project with an Estimated Total Cost of $5.0 million or more can be approved by NSW Health. The Ministry therefore exceeded its delegated authority in making this decision, as it was not evident it had sought and received the Treasurer's approval prior to doing so.

Consequently, the surplus Stage 1 funds should not have been used by the Ministry to deliver new works in the circumstances. Instead, they should have been released from the Stage 1 project in accordance with established NSW Health procedures, and the Stage 1 Estimated Total Cost revised down accordingly. This did not occur, and NSW Health ultimately directed $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds to the new works.

These circumstances indicate a need to strengthen transparency and accountability within NSW Health for the approval of new projects, and how contingency funds are used in the management of major health capital works. They also demonstrate the impact of weaknesses with options appraisal as the initial Stage 1 business case did not consider alternative options for addressing the initially unfunded works later covered by the Stage 1 business case addendum and ultimately funded from the Stage 1 contingency provision.

Weaknesses in service delivery planning resulted in unaccounted-for costs

In addition to proposing the above-noted new works, the 2017 Stage 1 Business Case Addendum for the Hornsby-Ku-ring-gai development sought to retrospectively address the estimated funding gap of around $14.0 million for the internal fit out, supply of major medical imaging equipment, and cost to operate the medical imaging service at Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital also not addressed in the originally Stage 1 business case.

The Stage 1 business case addendum considered various procurement options to purchase and run the medical imaging services ranging from State operation purchase options to private operation purchase options.

It recommended outsourcing the operation and provision of equipment to the private sector based on estimated savings to the public sector initially of around $650,000 per annum reducing over time to $270,000. The Ministry endorsed this option in June 2017, but it did not ultimately proceed.

A July 2018 report to the Executive Steering Committee on the project shows NSW Health later decided to deliver operation of the medical imaging unit 'traditionally' with an updated estimate of the cost at approximately $16.4 million. The report also shows the Ministry supported the costs now being met by the Northern Sydney Local Health District.

This means the funding gap previously identified in the Stage 1 business case addendum for fitting out the medical imaging building and supply of major medical equipment would need to be met fully by the State, representing a $16.4 million cost overrun for the project.

Examined reports to the Executive Steering Committee show this was largely funded by the Northern Sydney Local Health District via the disposal of land realising approximately $15.0 million in proceeds.

This initially unforeseen cost, along with the additional $11.0 million for the new works approved under the Stage 1 business case addendum, were ultimately merged with the Stage 2 project initially approved in 2017–18 with an Estimated Total Cost of $200 million.

The extent of budget variation on the Hornsby Kur-ring-gai development has not been transparent

The 2019–20 State Budget provided an additional $65.0 million for a further Stage 2A to deliver additional built capacity to support outpatient services, enhanced allied health services, re-housed community health services and the delivery of prioritised clinical services unfunded as part of Stage 2. The funds were approved based on an Investment Decision Template (IDT) that examined two options in addition to the base case representing scoping alternatives to the preferred master planned capital solution.

However, we found the IDT showed around 23 per cent of the $65.0 million sought (i.e. $15.0 million) was to be allocated to fund the deficit in Stage 2, which had arisen as a result of project delays due to adverse site conditions. This was not discussed in the IDT.

The February 2020 report to the Executive Steering Committee shows a combined Stage 2 and 2A final forecast cost of $292.6 million against a potential budget of $290.7 million representing an overall deficit for the project of around 0.6 per cent.

However, this favourable final budget position does not transparently show the funding challenges experienced over the project's implementation to-date. The three major budget issues include:

inappropriate use of around $11.0 million in Stage 1 contingency for originally unfunded works contrary to Treasury policy
the additional $16.4 million cost unforeseen in the Stage 1 business case for delivering medical imaging services mostly funded through the sale of land
an additional $15.0 million from Stage 2A to cover the budget overrun in Stage 2 due to adverse site conditions.

The cumulative impact of these events is that Stages 1 and 2 of the Hornsby project cost approximately $42.4 million than it should have in the circumstances around 14 per cent more than what the revised combined Estimated Total Cost for both stages should have been after releasing the $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds, with Stage 2 delayed by around 14 months.

Opportunity for strengthening risk management for adverse site conditions

Major construction projects often experience adverse site conditions which can be difficult to fully detect in advance. However, we found this was a common occurrence in the projects we examined sometimes with significant time and/or budget impacts indicating scope to enhance related risk and cost assessments. Specifically:

Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions during demolition works resulted in an 11-month delay for delivering the medical imaging unit and 14-month delay completing Stage 2 main works including need for additional $15.0 million in funds to cover the resultant budget deficit for the project.
Blacktown Mt Druitt Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions combined with project complexity delayed completion of the early works by approximately five months. This contributed to the delay in completing the main construction works which occurred around nine months later than planned in the business case.
Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment Stages 3 and 4: Health Infrastructure advised adverse site conditions including asbestos containing materials and ground conditions delayed works for the main building with completion forecast for March 2021, around 21 months later than planned in the final business case. This resulted in the need for additional $13.5 million to cover increased construction costs and risks, increasing the Stage 3 and 4 forecast final cost from $150 million to $163.5 million as at February 2020.

These examples indicate a risk the cumulative impact of adverse site conditions may be substantial when measured across both time and Health Infrastructure's full delivery program. They also point to potential for Health Infrastructure to achieve efficiencies and improved outcomes from strengthening its approach to assessing and mitigating the risks from adverse site conditions.

Limited due diligence with prospective contractors risks avoidable delays and costs

Main construction works on Stage 1 of the Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment were completed in October 2015, approximately 13 months later than planned in the final business case. Delays were mainly due to insolvency of the early works contractor resulting in their departure from the project. The ensuing 11-month delay in completing the early works significantly impacted the overall schedule and delivery of main construction works.

The insolvency event was significant as it affected nine separate Health Infrastructure projects – three of which had yet to reach practical completion. It also affected state-funded projects in other sectors. It resulted in the need for additional funding of $11.5 million that was provided in the 2014–15 State Budget increasing the total Stage 1 and 2 budget from $79.8 million to $91.3 million.

Health Infrastructure’s analysis of lessons learned shows it worked actively to mitigate the impacts of the insolvency event across all affected projects. However, it also indicates a risk the lessons were mainly focused on mitigating the impacts after an insolvency event occurred rather than on prevention.

Although Health Infrastructure initially commissioned a financial assessment of the now insolvent early works contractor before engagement, it did not detect any risks of the impending insolvency and instead concluded the contractor was in a strong financial position. However, the contractor became insolvent shortly after commencement approximately seven months later. This indicates a risk of weaknesses in the assessment performed that was not explicitly addressed by the lessons learned.

Delivery of the main construction works were further impacted by disputes with the main works contractor over the scope of works for the renal unit resulting in Health Infrastructure terminating the contract in November 2016 following lengthy negotiations over several months.

The scope of works relating to the renal unit were ultimately transferred to Stages 3 and 4 and were delivered in December 2019, around five years later than originally planned in the business case.

Health Infrastructure advised the delay was ultimately beneficial to the project because the refurbishment works for the renal unit, initially scheduled for Stages 1 and 2, would have been demolished to accommodate the new Western Cancer Centre proposed after Stages 1 and 2 and currently being delivered in parallel with Stages 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the actual cost of Stages 1 and 2 was $84.7 million against the budget of $91.3 million. The residual $6.6 million relates to the renal works not delivered during Stage 1 and 2 and transferred to Stage 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the contractual provisions for mitigating insolvency events 'in-flight' are limited highlighting the importance of proactive and effective due diligence prior to engaging contractors for significant construction projects.

Need for a quality framework linked to staff training and capability development

Health Infrastructure's 2017-20 Corporate Plan identifies the development of a quality framework to support delivery of future-focused outcomes as a key organisational priority. Related initiatives within the Corporate Plan describe a framework underpinned by a Quality Committee providing advice on:

records management, to meet the requirements of the State Records Act 1998
project assurance, to ensure future focused outcomes and enhance Health Infrastructure's Standards, Policies, Procedures and Guidelines, Templates and Design Guidance Notes
knowledge management and library services, to promote and leverage from project learnings.

Although Health Infrastructure has some elements of a quality framework it is not yet fully in place. Health Infrastructure advised it had yet to establish the quality framework and related committee described in its Corporate Plan due in part to its focus on responding to the growth of its capital program.

Health Infrastructure's Development and Innovation team has been active in supporting continuous improvement in knowledge and project management including development of business cases. Although useful, these initiatives have relied heavily on leveraging and disseminating insights from Gateway reviews and have not formed part of a systematic quality and continuous improvement framework.

The limited focus on the quality of business cases is reflected in internal performance monitoring and reporting which focuses mainly on tracking the delivery of projects against internal benchmarks, often revised from the baselines in the business case, and expenditure against cashflow targets. There is no evident internal monitoring and/or reporting to the Chief Executive and Board on defined quality metrics linked to business case development and staff capability.

Performance reporting on balanced scorecard metrics has similarly focused mainly on process rather than quality and has been inconsistent in recent years.

Appendix four – Ministry of Health planning tools and guidelines

Appendix five – Streamlined investment decision process for Health Capital Projects

Appendix six – Timeline of business cases and relevant policy guidelines

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #338 - released 12 August 2020

23 June 2020

Published

Water conservation in Greater Sydney

Environment

Industry

Infrastructure

Internal controls and governance

Management and administration

Regulation

Risk

This report examines whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, and Sydney Water have effectively progressed water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The report found that the department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney. The agencies have not met key requirements of the current Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

The Auditor-General recommends the department develop a clear policy and regulatory position on water conservation options, improve governance and funding for water conservation, and work with Sydney Water to assess the viability of water conservation initiatives. The report also recommends improvements to Sydney Water’s planning for and reporting on water conservation, including the transparency of this information.

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Support for regional town water infrastructure’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

The current, 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

Water conservation refers to water recycling, leakage management and programs to enhance water efficiency. Water recycling refers to both harvesting stormwater for beneficial use and reusing wastewater.

This audit examined whether water conservation initiatives for the Greater Sydney Metropolitan area are effectively investigated, implemented and supported. We audited the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the Department) and the Sydney Water Corporation (Sydney Water), with a focus on activities since 2016.

The Department is responsible for the integrated and sustainable management of the state’s water resources under the Water Management Act 2000, which includes encouraging ‘best practice in the management and use of water’ as an objective. The Department is also responsible for strategic water policy and planning for Greater Sydney, including implementing the Metropolitan Water Plan.

Sydney Water is a state-owned corporation and the supplier of water, wastewater, recycled water and some stormwater services to more than five million people in Greater Sydney. It is regulated by an operating licence that is issued by the Governor on the recommendation of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). The Tribunal determines Sydney Water’s maximum prices, reviews its operating licence and monitors compliance. Sydney Water's operating licence and reporting manual set out requirements for its planning, implementing and reporting of water conservation.

From 2007 to 2012, the Climate Change Fund was a source of funds for water conservation activities to be undertaken by the Department and Sydney Water. The Climate Change Fund was established under the Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987. Four of its six objectives relate to water savings. Water distributors such as Sydney Water can be issued with orders to contribute funds for water-related programs. The Fund is administered by the Department.

In 2016, Sydney Water developed a method for determining whether and how much to invest in water conservation. Known as the ‘Economic Level of Water Conservation’ (ELWC), the method identifies whether it costs less to implement a water conservation initiative than the value of the water saved, in which case the initiative should be implemented.

Conclusion

The Department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The agencies have not met key requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Department has not undertaken an annual assessment of Sydney Water’s level of investment in water conservation against water security risks and the capacity to respond when drought conditions return, as required by the Metropolitan Water Plan. It did not complete identified research and planning activities to support the plan, such as developing and using a framework for assessing the potential for water conservation initiatives for Greater Sydney, and developing a long-term strategy for water conservation and water recycling. It also did not finalise a monitoring, evaluation, reporting and improvement strategy to support the plan.

Sydney Water has been ineffective in driving water conservation initiatives, delivering detailed planning and resourcing for ongoing initiatives, and in increasing its investment in water conservation during drought. These were requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan. Sydney Water's reporting on water conservation has not met all its operating licence requirements and lacked transparency with limited information on key aspects such as planning for leakage management, how the viability of potential initiatives were assessed, and how adopted initiatives are tracking.

The Department and Sydney Water did not put in place sufficient governance arrangements, including clarifying and agreeing responsibilities for key water conservation planning, delivery and reporting activities. There has also been limited collaboration, capacity building and community engagement to support water conservation, particularly outside times of drought.

Appendix three – Glossary

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #336 - released 23 June 2020

11 June 2020

Published

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport

Infrastructure

Internal controls and governance

Management and administration

Procurement

Project management

Risk

Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

30 April 2020

Published

Train station crowding

Transport

Management and administration

Risk

Service delivery

Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
service disruptions
special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

9 April 2020

Published

Destination NSW's support for major events

Treasury

Financial reporting

Management and administration

Procurement

Project management

Service delivery

This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.

The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.

DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.

Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW

Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.

This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.

This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.

Conclusion

Destination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions.

DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these.

DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money.

Copyright Notice

Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.

7 April 2020

Published

Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register

Justice

Premier and Cabinet

Whole of Government

Cyber security

Fraud

Information technology

Internal controls and governance

Management and administration

This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.

The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.

The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.

The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.

The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.

BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.

This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:

Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?

Conclusion

BD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register.

BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required.

BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected.

BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls.