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Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Funding enhancements for police technology

Funding enhancements for police technology

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report focuses on how the NSW Police Force managed a $100 million program to acquire new technology. The program invested in technologies intended to make police work safer and quicker. These included body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices, mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices.

The audit found that while the NSW Police Force mostly managed the ‘Policing for Tomorrow’ program effectively, investment decision making could be improved in the future. The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to identify capability gaps and target the acquired technologies to plug these.

The NSW Police Force has processes in place to monitor the benefits of some of the larger technology, but it does not do this consistently for all procured technology. It could not demonstrate that smaller projects are improving the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.

The audit also found that the NSW Police Force does not routinely engage with external stakeholders on the use or impacts of new technology that changes how officers interact with the public, noting that this will not always be possible for particularly sensitive procurements that involve covert technologies or methodologies.

The Auditor-General made three recommendations to guide improvement of NSW Police Force ICT procurement, benefits management and stakeholder engagement processes.

Read full report (PDF)

Ahead of the March 2015 election, the NSW Government announced a $100 million Policing for Tomorrow fund for the NSW Police Force to acquire technology intended to make police work safer and quicker. The announcement committed the NSW Police Force to several investment priorities, including body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices (MobiPOL), mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices. Otherwise, the NSW Police Force was allowed flexibility in identifying and resourcing suitable projects.

This audit assessed whether the Policing for Tomorrow fund was effectively managed to improve policing in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Did the NSW Police Force efficiently and effectively identify, acquire, implement and maintain technology resourced by the fund?
  • Did the NSW Police Force establish effective governance arrangements for administering the fund, and for monitoring expected benefits and unintended consequences?
  • Did technology implemented under the fund improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in New South Wales?

Conclusion

The NSW Police Force's management of the Policing for Tomorrow fund was mostly effective. There are measures in place to assess the impact of the technologies on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in NSW. However, these measures are not in place for all technologies funded by Policing for Tomorrow. A strategic whole-of-organisation approach to identifying and filling technology capability gaps may have assisted in better targeting funds and managing expected benefits.

The NSW Police Force identified, acquired, implemented and maintained a range of technologies resourced by the fund in an efficient and effective way. The election announcement committed the NSW Police Force to four specific projects which made up over three quarters of the fund value. Investment decisions for remaining funds were driven by the availability of funding and individual technology requirements rather than targeting improved policing outcomes and the capability necessary to achieve these.

The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to selecting technology projects for the remainder of the funds where it had discretion. This may have included considering less obvious back office technology or making different investment decisions driven by gaps in the agency's technology capabilities.

The NSW Police Force used effective governance arrangements for administering the Policing for Tomorrow fund, including using its existing ICT Executive Board. The NSW Police Force has adequate processes in place to drive benefits and monitor the impact of technology on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing for the larger projects funded by Policing for Tomorrow. Further work is required to ensure this for smaller projects.

The NSW Police Force tends to consider only impacts on the organisation in managing benefits and identifying unintended consequences. It does not routinely engage proactively with stakeholders, including partner criminal justice agencies and members of the community, on new technology that changes how police interact with the public.

We examined how effectively the NSW Police Force governed the Policing for Tomorrow fund, to ensure that key accountability and decision-making arrangements were in place to direct the $100 million spend to appropriate technologies. We also assessed how the NSW Police Force acquired, implemented and maintained technology funded by Policing for Tomorrow to determine the effectiveness of the relevant asset management.

The Policing for Tomorrow election commitment aimed to invest in technology to ‘make police work safer and quicker – meaning more time on the street combatting crime’. We assessed whether the NSW Police Force ensured that funded technologies have improved policing efficiency and effectiveness. We did not seek to independently assure the benefits or outcomes resulting from the technologies.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Policing for Tomorrow projects and expenditure

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #334 - released 2 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Destination NSW's support for major events

Destination NSW's support for major events

Treasury
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.

The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.

DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.

Read full report (PDF)

Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.

This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
  • DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.

This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.

Conclusion

Destination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions.

DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these.

DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money.

Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Supporting the District Criminal Court

Supporting the District Criminal Court

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on whether the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system.

The audit found that in the provision of data and technology services, the department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The department has insufficient controls in place to ensure that data in the system is always accurate.

The department is also using outdated technology and could improve its delivery of technical support to courts.

The audit also assessed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. This reform aims to improve court efficiency by having more cases resolved earlier with a guilty plea in the Local Court. The audit found that the department effectively governed the implementation of the reform but is not measuring achievement of expected benefits, placing the objectives of the reform at risk.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the controls around courts data, reporting on key performance indicators, improving regional technical support and measuring the success of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. 

The District Court is the intermediate court in the New South Wales court system. It hears most serious criminal matters, except murder, treason and piracy. The Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) provides support to the District Court in a variety of ways. For example, it provides security services, library services and front-desk services. This audit examined three forms of support that the Department provides to the District Court:

  • data collection, reporting and analysis - the Department collects data from cases in its case management system, JusticeLink, based on the orders Judges make in court and court papers
  • technology - the Department provides technology to courts across New South Wales, as well as technical support for this technology
  • policy - the Department is responsible for proposing and implementing policy reforms.

Recent years have seen a worsening of District Court efficiency, as measured in the Productivity Commission's Report on Government Services (RoGS). Efficiency in the court system is typically measured through timeliness of case completion. There is evidence that timeliness has worsened. For example, the median time from arrest to finalisation of a case in the District Court increased from 420 days in 2012–13 to 541 days in 2017–18.

As a result, the government has announced a range of measures to improve court performance, particularly in the District Court. These measures included the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform. One of the objectives of EAGP is to improve court efficiency, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve with a guilty plea in the Local Court.

This audit assessed whether the Department of Communities and Justice effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. We assessed this with the following lines of inquiry:

  • Does the Department effectively collect, analyse and report performance information relevant to court efficiency?
  • Does the Department effectively provide technology to support the efficient working of the courts?
  • Does the Department have effective plans, governance and monitoring for the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform?

The audit did not consider other support functions provided by the Department. Further information on the audit, including detailed audit criteria, may be found in Appendix two.

Conclusion
In the provision of data and technology services, the Department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The Department has insufficient controls in place to ensure accurate data in the District Criminal Court system. The Department is also using outdated technology in significant numbers and could improve its delivery of technical support to meet agreed targets.
The Department effectively governed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. However, it is not ensuring that the benefits stated in the business case are being achieved, placing its objectives at risk.
The impact of inaccurate court data can be severe, and the Department does not have sufficient controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate. Recent Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research reviews have identified data inaccuracies, and this demonstrates the Department needs strong controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate.
The Department does not have a policy for data quality and has not formally assigned responsibility for data quality to any individual or branch. The Department also does not have a data dictionary outlining all the fields in its case management system. While the Department validates the highest risk items, such as warrants, to ensure that they are accurate, most data is not validated. The Department has recently commenced setting up a data unit for the Courts, Tribunals and Service Delivery branch. It is proposed that this unit will address most of the identified shortcomings.
The Department did not provide timely technical support to the court system in 2017 and is using outdated technology in significant numbers. The Digital and Technology Services branch of the Department had agreed a Service Level Agreement with the rest of the Department, outlining the expected speed of technical support responses. The branch did not meet response times in 2017. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Critical incidents are particularly important to deal with in a timely manner as they include incidents which may delay a court sitting.
Requests for technical support rose significantly in 2018 compared to 2017, which may be related to the number of outdated pieces of technology. As at April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers outside their warranty period. The Department was also using other outdated technology. Outdated technology is more prone to failure and continuing to use it poses a risk of court delays.
The Department is not measuring all the expected benefits from the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform, placing the objectives of the program at risk. The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas business case outlined nine expected benefits from the reform. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits of a further five business case benefits. Not measuring the impact of the reform means that the Department does not know if it is achieving its objectives and if the reform had the desired impact.

The Department is responsible for providing technology to the courts, which can improve the efficiency of court operations by making them faster and cheaper. The Department is also responsible for providing technical support to courtrooms and registries. It is important that technical support is provided in a timely manner because some technical incidents can delay court sittings and thus impact on court efficiency. A 2013 Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development report emphasised the importance of technology and digitisation for reducing trial length.

While the Department may provide technology to the courts, they are not responsible for deciding when, how or if the technology is used in the courtroom.

The Department is using a significant amount of outdated technology, risking court delays

As of April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers out of warranty, 56.0 per cent of the court system's fleet. The court system also had 786 printing devices out of their normal warranty period, 75.1 per cent of all printers in use. The Department also advised that many of its court audio transcription machines are out of date. These machines must be running for the court to sit and thus it is critical that they are maintained to a high degree. The then Department of Justice estimated the cost of aligning its hardware across the whole Department with desired levels at $14.0 million per year for three years. Figures for the court system were not calculated but they are likely to be a significant portion of this figure.

Using outdated technology poses a risk to the court system as older equipment may be more likely to break down, potentially delaying courts or slowing down court services. In the court system throughout 2018, hardware made up 30.8 per cent of all critical incidents reported to technical support and 41.9 per cent of all high priority incidents. In addition, 16.2 per cent of all reported issues related to printing devices or printing.

From 2017 to 2018, technical support incidents from courts or court services increased. There were 4,379 technical support incidents in 2017, which increased significantly to 9,186 in 2018. The Department advised that some outside factors may have contributed to this increase. The Department was rolling out its new incident recording system throughout 2017, meaning that there would be an under‑reporting of incidents in that year. The Department also advised that throughout 2018 there was a greater focus on ensuring that every issue was logged, which had not previously been the case. Despite these factors, the use of outdated technology has likely increased the risk of technology breakages and may have contributed to the increase in requests for technical support.

Refreshing technology on a regular basis would reduce the risk of hardware failures and ensure that equipment is covered by warranty.

The Department did not meet all court technical support targets in 2017 and 2018

The Digital and Technology Services branch (DTS) was responsible for providing technical support to the courts and the Courts and Tribunal Services branch prior to July 2019. DTS provided technical support in line with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Department. In 2017, DTS did not provide this support in a timely manner. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Exhibit 7 outlines DTS' targets under the SLA.

Exhibit 7: Digital and Technology Services' Service Level Agreement
Priority Target resolution time Target percentage in time (%)
1. Critical 4 hours 80
2. High 1 day 80
3. Moderate 3 days 85
4. Low 5 days 85
Source: Department of Communities and Justice, 2019.

Critical incidents are particularly important for the Department to deal with in a timely manner because these include incidents which may delay a court sitting until resolved or incidents which impact on large numbers of staff. Some of the critical incidents raised with DTS specifically stated that they were delaying a court sitting, often due to transcription machines not working. High priority incidents include those where there is some impact on the functions of the business, which may in turn affect the efficiency of the court system. High priority incidents also include those directly impacting on members of the Judiciary. 

This audit examined DTS' performance against its SLA in the 2017 and 2018 calendar years across the whole court system, not just the District Court. The total number of incidents, as well as critical and high priority incidents, can be seen in Exhibit 8.

Exhibit 8: Number of incidents in 2017 and 2018
Priority 2017 2018
All 4,379 9,186
1. Critical 48 91
2. High 128 315
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis of Department of Communities and Justice data, 2019.

The Department's results against its SLA in 2017 and 2018 are shown in Exhibit 9.

The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform consists of five main elements:

  • early disclosure of evidence from NSW Police Force to the prosecution and defence
  • early certification of what the accused is going to be charged with to minimise changes
  • mandatory criminal case conferencing between the prosecutor and accused's representation
  • changes to Local Court case management
  • more structured sentence discounts.

More detailed descriptions of each of these changes can be found in the Introduction. These reform elements are anticipated to have three key effects:

  • accelerate the timing of guilty pleas
  • increase the overall proportion of guilty pleas
  • decrease the average length of contested trials.

Improving District Court efficiency is one of the stated aims of EAGP, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve in the Local Court and having fewer defendants plead guilty on the day of their trial in the District Court. The reform commenced in April 2018 and it is too early to state the impact of this reform on District Court efficiency.

The Department is responsible for delivering EAGP in conjunction with other justice sector agencies. They participated in the Steering Committee and the Working Groups, as well as providing the Project Management Office (PMO).

The Department is not measuring the economic benefits stated in the EAGP business case

The business case for EAGP listed nine quantifiable benefits which were expected to be derived from the achievement of the three key effects listed above. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits for five more, as shown in Exhibit 12.

Benefit Economic benefit (over ten years) Being measured?
Accelerated timing of guilty pleas $54.6m yellow circle with minus in the center
Increased guilty plea rate $90.7m yellow circle with minus in the center
Decreased average trial length $27.5m yellow circle with minus in the center
A reduction in the delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial N/A check circle mauve
Increase the number of finalised matters per annum N/A check circle mauve
Reduction of the current backlog of criminal trials in the District Court N/A check circle mauve
Reduction in bed pressure on the correction system due to reduced
average time in custody
$13.7m Exclamation circle red
Productivity improvements due to reduction in wasted effort $53.3m yellow circle with minus in the center
Bankable cost savings due to jury empanelment avoided $2.5m yellow circle with minus in the center

 

Exhibit 12: The Department's measurement of quantifiable benefits
Key check circle mauve Measuring yellow circle with minus in the center Not measuring economic benefit Exclamation circle red Not measuring
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis.

While it is too early to comment on the overall impact of EAGP, better practice in benefits realisation involves an ongoing effort to monitor benefits to ensure that the reform is on target and determine whether any corrective action is needed.

The Department is measuring the number of finalised matters per annum and while the Department is not measuring the reduction in the backlog as part of this program, this measure is reported as part of the Department's internal reporting framework. The Department is not monitoring the reduction in delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial directly as part of this reform, but this does form part of the monthly Operational Performance Report which the Department sends to the EAGP Steering Committee.

The Department is not monitoring any of the economic benefits stated in the business case. These economic benefits are a mixture of bankable savings and productivity improvements. This amounts to a total of $242.3 million over ten years which was listed in the business case as potential economic benefits from the implementation of this reform against the total cost of $206.9 million over ten years. The Department is collecting proxy indicators which would assist in these calculations for several indicators, but it is not actively monitoring these savings. For example, the Department is monitoring average trial length, but is not using this information to calculate economic benefits derived from changes in trial length.

The Department is also not collecting information related to the average length of custody as part of this program. This means that it is unable to determine if EAGP is putting less pressure on the correctives system and it is not possible for the Department to calculate the savings from this particular benefit.

While stakeholders are optimistic about the impact of EAGP, not measuring the expected benefits stated in the business case means that the Department does not know if the reform is achieving what it was designed to achieve. Further, the Department does not know if it must take corrective action to ensure that the program achieves the stated benefits. These two things put the overall program benefits at risk.

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit, potentially risking the success of the program

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit stated in the business case. The Department holds the Steering Committee responsible for the realisation of all benefits. Benefits realisation is the process which ensures that the agency reaches benefits as stated in the business case. Assigning responsibility for benefits realisation to the Steering Committee rather than individuals is not in line with good practice.

Good practice benefits realisation involves assigning responsibility for the realisation of each benefit to an individual at the business unit level. This ensures there is a single point of accountability for each part of the program with knowledge of the benefit and the ability to take corrective action if it looks like that benefit will not be realised. This responsibility should sit at the operational level where detailed action can most easily be undertaken. The role of a Steering Committee in benefits realisation is to ensure that responsible parties are monitoring their benefits and taking appropriate corrective action.

The Department advised that it believes the Steering Committee should have responsibility for the realisation of benefits due to the difficulty of attributing the achievement of each benefit to one part of the reform alone. Given the Steering Committee meets only quarterly, it is not well placed to take action in response to variances in performance.

A BOCSAR evaluation is planned, however data errors make some of the information unreliable

BOCSAR are planning to undertake an overall evaluation of EAGP which is planned for release in 2021. Undertaking this evaluation will require high quality data to gain an understanding of the drivers of the reform. However, data captured throughout the first year of EAGP has proven unreliable, which may reduce the usefulness of BOCSAR's evaluation. These data issues were discussed in Exhibit 5 in Chapter 2, above. Access to accurate data is vital for conducting any program evaluation and inaccurate data raises the risk that the BOCSAR evaluation will not be able to provide an accurate evaluation of the impact of EAGP.

In addition to the BOCSAR evaluation, the Department had plans for a series of 'snapshot' evaluations for some of the key elements of the reform to ensure that they were operating effectively. These were initially delayed due to an efficiency dividend which affected EAGP. In August 2019, the Department commissioned a review of the implementation of several key success factors for EAGP.

There was clear governance throughout the implementation of EAGP

The implementation stage of EAGP had clear governance, lines of authority and communication. The Steering Committee, each Working Group and each agency had clear roles and responsibilities, and these were organised through a Project Management Office (PMO) provided by the former Department of Justice. The governance structure throughout the implementation phase can be seen at Exhibit 13.

The Steering Committee was established in December 2016 and met regularly from March 2017. It comprised senior members of key government agencies, as well as the Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate for most of the duration of the implementation period. The Steering Committee met at least monthly throughout the life of the program. The Steering Committee was responsible for overseeing the delivery of EAGP and making key decisions relating to implementation, including spending decisions. The Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate abstained from financial decisions. The Steering Committee updated the governance and membership of the Steering Committee as appropriate throughout the life of the reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #329 - released 18 December 2019

Published

Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Health
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report examined whether HealthShare NSW, a part of NSW Health, has the required contract management capability to effectively manage goods and services contracts valued over $250,000. 

The report found that HealthShare has a procurement framework that should support effective contract management, but it is not applying it consistently. In particular, the audit found that HealthShare was not applying key contract management elements to over 80 per cent of the high-value contracts it manages. The audit also found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.

'Effective contract management is essential to ensure the contracts HealthShare enters into are delivering as expected and ensuring value for money,' said the Auditor-General. 'Without this, the value for money or savings HealthShare achieves when it negotiates these contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of the contract.'

The report recommends that NSW Health develop a performance improvement plan to ensure HealthShare is fully compliant with procurement policies and that NSW Health meets its obligations under the Government's Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement.

HealthShare is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

NSW Government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, agencies achieve value for money, and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability (such as staff knowledge, skills and experience) as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for overseeing the Government's procurement system, setting policy and ensuring compliance. It has accredited the Health Administration Corporation (HAC) to procure goods and services with no upper financial limit. Under the terms of this accreditation, the Secretary, NSW Health (as head of HAC) has delegated the procurement of high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts within NSW Health to only the Ministry of Health and HealthShare NSW (HealthShare).

HealthShare NSW (HealthShare) is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high-value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

HealthShare’s Contract Management Guide states that, without rigorous contract management, 75 per cent of projected sourcing savings can disappear within 18 months of the contract starting.

This audit examined whether HealthShare has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts. Contracts we examined included critical items such as food services in hospitals, patient transport services, intravenous equipment and kidney dialysis services, where risks include patient safety as well as value for money. We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We also did not examine HealthShare’s sourcing processes, including identifying business needs, tendering and contract award.

We assessed HealthShare against the following criteria:

  1. HealthShare's systems, policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. HealthShare has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

We included the NSW Public Service Commission and NSW Treasury, through NSW Procurement, as auditees because they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability. These include:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework
  • Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement
  • the NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

NSW Procurement was transferred to NSW Treasury from the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements.

Conclusion
HealthShare is not applying the capability needed to effectively manage high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts. HealthShare's procurement framework includes elements that should support effective contract management, and it has a systematic approach to managing staff contract management capability. That said, HealthShare is not implementing key contract management elements of its own framework. As such, the value for money or savings it achieves when it negotiates contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of these contracts.
Effective contract management is essential for HealthShare to ensure contracts it enters into are delivering the goods and services expected and achieving value for money, safety and quality. The Ministry of Health and HealthShare have invested in developing and implementing systems and tools to support effective contract management. In line with its obligations under the Agency Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement (accreditation program), the Ministry of Health mandates the use of contract management plans for high-value contracts. The Ministry of Health also requires that all health entities use the PROcure contract management system for ongoing management of contracts with a value over $150,000. HealthShare is not complying with these directions for over 80 per cent of the contracts it manages.
In the absence of HealthShare following its framework, and the Ministry of Health’s directions, we looked for other evidence that HealthShare was effectively managing high-value contracts. We found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.
When Local Health Districts (LHDs) need to procure high-value goods and services, the Ministry of Health’s procurement policy requires that they use HealthShare to source and manage the procurement. This is to manage risk and provide oversight of procurement and contracts across the NSW health system. Despite this policy, HealthShare was only managing the sourcing stage of the procurement and transferring responsibility for contract management to the relevant LHD.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Contract performance management summary

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #328 - released 31 October 2019

Published

Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Health
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.

Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1 

Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2 

In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.

The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.

The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:

  • hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
  • inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
  • mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
  • custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.

The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions: 

  1. Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
  2. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
  3. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
Conclusion

NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.

There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.

NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.

NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.

In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.


1 Australian Burden of Disease Study: Impact and causes of illness and death in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 2011 (unaudited).
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.

In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:

  • culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
  • person centred and focussed on individual needs
  • delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
  • holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
  • delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
  • welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures. 

The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.

Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people

The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.

Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.

Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons. 

A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:

  • emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
  • community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
  • Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
  • community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.

The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing native vegetation

Managing native vegetation

Environment
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Service delivery

The report found the clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed. The processes supporting the regulatory framework are weak and there is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is carried out in accordance with approvals. 

In 2014 an expert panel completed a review of biodiversity legislation in NSW. The panel’s recommendations included repealing the Native Vegetation Act 2003, proposing a new Act with the goal of maintaining a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest wellbeing of the community, and recommending that management of native vegetation in the context of existing agricultural management would be assisted and supervised by Local Land Services (LLS).

Following the panel report, the NSW Government undertook major biodiversity conservation and land management reforms which saw the introduction of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW) and the Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016 (NSW). The reforms commenced in August 2017. The Native Vegetation Act 2003, the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, the Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001, and parts of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 were repealed.

Under the legislative reforms, the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 and Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016, which amended the Local Land Services Act 2013, aim to ensure a balanced approach to land management and biodiversity conservation in NSW.

A core objective of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 is to conserve biodiversity at bioregional and state scales. A core objective of the Local Land Service Act 2013 is to ensure the proper management of natural resources in the social, economic and environmental interests of the state, consistently with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.

The integrated package of reforms included:

  • new arrangements that allow land owners to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks
  • new ways to assess and manage the biodiversity impacts of development
  • a new state Environmental Planning Policy for managing impacts on native vegetation in urban areas
  • significant investment in conservation of private land
  • a risk-based system for regulating human and business interactions with native plants and animals
  • streamlined approvals and dedicated resources to help reduce the regulatory burden.

Transition to this land management framework began on 25 August 2017 with the commencement of the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code.

The overall objectives of the reforms are:

  • to arrest and ultimately reverse the current decline in the state’s biodiversity while facilitating ecologically sustainable development, in particular efficient and sustainable agricultural development
  • enable landholders to improve the efficiency of their agricultural systems and take a more active role in providing incentive and supporting landholders to improve the condition and function of their ecological systems. 

The objective of this audit is to assess whether the clearing of native vegetation in rural areas is effectively regulated and managed by the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) and LLS under these legislative frameworks. The audit also examined the progress of the Biodiversity Conservation Trust in implementing the Biodiversity Conservation Investment Strategy as a counterbalance to rural land clearing. 

At the time of this audit OEH was responsible for preparing the Native Vegetation Regulatory map and for compliance enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. For the purposes of this audit we will continue to refer to it as OEH. 

Conclusion
The clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed because the processes in place to support the regulatory framework are weak. There is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is being carried out in accordance with approvals. Responses to incidents of unlawful clearing are slow, with few tangible outcomes. Enforcement action is rarely taken against landholders who unlawfully clear native vegetation. 

There are processes in place for approving land clearing but there is limited follow-up to ensure approvals are complied with.
Procedures and systems are in place for assessing applications and issuing approvals for land clearing. Approvals contain conditions for managing clearing and setting aside land for conservation as a counterbalance to permitted clearing. 
There is limited follow-up or capacity to gauge whether landholders are complying with the conditions of approvals and effectively managing areas of their land that have been set aside for conservation (i.e. 'set asides'). 
Certificate assessments are used to grant landholders permission to clear. All assessments we reviewed generally complied with the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018 (the Code). 
The rules around land clearing may not be responding adequately to environmental risks.
The Code, which contains conditions under which the thinning or clearing of native vegetation can be approved on regulated land, is intended to allow landholders to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks. That said, it may not be achieving this balance. For example, the Code allows some native species to be treated as ‘invasive’ when they may not be invading an area, provides little protection for groundcover and limited management requirements for set asides. There is also limited ability under the Code to reject applications for higher risk clearing proposals.
The release of the Native Vegetation Regulatory (NVR) map has been delayed, limiting landholders' ability to determine if their plans for clearing are lawful.
OEH has applied significant effort in developing a native vegetation regulatory map to guide landholders on which land they can and can’t clear without approval. However, in November 2016 the then Minister for Primary Industries advised Parliament that the two largest land categories of the NVR map will not come into effect until the relevant Ministers are satisfied stakeholders have sufficient confidence in the maps’ accuracy. Not releasing the map has made it harder for landholders to identify the portions of their land that are regulated and ensure they comply with land clearing rules. It has also limited OEH’s ability to consult on and improve the accuracy of the map.
There are significant delays in identifying unlawful clearing and few penalties imposed.
Unexplained land clearing can take over two years to identify and analyse, making it difficult to minimise environmental harm or gather evidence to prosecute unlawful clearing. Despite around 1,000 instances of unexplained clearing identified by OEH and over 500 reports to the environmental hotline each year, with around 300 investigations in progress at any one time, there are only two to three prosecutions, three to five remediation orders and around ten penalty notices issued each year for unlawful clearing. Further, OEH is yet to commence any prosecutions under the current legislation which commenced in August 2017.
Land clearing and private land conservation investment have both increased.
Clearing of native vegetation has increased in recent years. At the same time, the government is also investing in properties with high environmental value with a focus on improving the mix of endangered ecological communities conserved in perpetuity. Processes are in place for identifying and prioritising areas of land for investment but the funding provided to each region is not always consistent with these priorities. 

Local Land Services (LLS) is responsible for processing notifications and issuing certificates to landholders for managing the thinning or clearing of native vegetation on rural land through the ‘Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018’ (the Code). This work includes monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Code, including the establishment and management of set asides.

OEH is responsible for compliance and enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. It is also responsible for producing the NVR map, designed to show landholders where land clearing can occur without approval, where approval is required, and where land clearing is not permitted. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - Authorisations for thinning and clearing, and restoration initiatives under the Native Vegetation Act 2003

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #324 - released 27 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Biosecurity risk management

Biosecurity risk management

Industry
Risk

The report focuses on the Department of Primary Industries’ (DPI) as the lead agency for biosecurity in New South Wales. It examines how well the department responds to biosecurity emergencies and manages compliance activities. DPI’s state partners include NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority, Local Land Services, and Local Control Authorities to manage biosecurity risks in New South Wales.

Biosecurity is the protection of the economy, environment, and community from the negative impacts of pests, diseases, weeds, and contaminants.

National and State governments have defined roles and responsibilities for biosecurity in Australia, reflecting the allocation of powers in the Australian Constitution. The Australian Government has direct responsibility for biosecurity (quarantine) at the international border, and works jointly with the states and territories to set the legislative framework and policy direction for managing biosecurity nationally. It also works with state and territory governments to ensure there is a national approach to biosecurity. State governments manage their biosecurity activities within the national framework.

The Department of Primary Industries (DPI), within the Department of Industry, is the lead agency for biosecurity in NSW. This audit was conducted with the Department of Industry as the auditee. On 2 April 2019 the NSW Government announced it will abolish the Department of Industry. From 1 July 2019 the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, will have responsibility for biosecurity activities described in this report.

The NSW Biosecurity Strategy 2013–2021 (the Strategy) articulates the NSW Government’s responsibilities for biosecurity within the national legislative framework. Achieving the outcomes of the strategy relies on DPI fulfilling two key responsibilities. Firstly, undertaking direct actions, such as implementing strong regulatory compliance and licensing activities, and managing biosecurity emergency responses. Secondly, leading the response to biosecurity risks by fostering effective collaboration with stakeholders across government, industry, and the wider community.

In NSW, 11 regional Local Land Services (LLS) are the key partners for DPI in meeting its biosecurity responsibilities. Each LLS develops and implements strategies to manage invasive pests and diseases within their regions. They also investigate new reports of pests or diseases in their regions and staff local emergency control centres when an emergency response is triggered.

Local Control Authorities (LCAs) also have a role in biosecurity management. LCAs include local councils and a small number of specialist regional agencies. Their role focuses on strategies to manage weeds within their local areas.

This audit assessed the effectiveness and economy of DPI’s biosecurity emergency response and prevention activities. It looks at DPI’s emergency response practice and its compliance program as a key prevention activity for which DPI has primary responsibility. DPI sets policy and procedural compliance standards for management of biosecurity risks in NSW and also conducts an annual program of property inspections and investigations that ensure that its compliance policies and procedures are being applied effectively.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - Location of selected biosecurity emergency responses

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #321 - released 18 June 2019

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