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Actions for Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Planning
Industry
Environment
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Department of Planning and Environment requires mining companies to rehabilitate sites according to conditions set in the mining development approval. The Department holds mining rehabilitation security deposits that are meant to cover the full cost of rehabilitation if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations.

The total value of security deposits held has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites in New South Wales.

While there have been substantial increases in total deposits held, mine rehabilitation security deposits are still not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine's rehabilitation in the event of a default.

This audit was undertaken when the Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development was responsible for ensuring land disturbed by mining activities is rehabilitated in accordance with the relevant development approval, including the administration of mining rehabilitation security deposits. On 1 April 2017, this responsibility was transferred to the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department).  

This audit assessed whether the Department maintains adequate security deposits to cover the liabilities associated with mine closures, including rehabilitation. Companies authorised by the Department to undertake mining activities must provide a security deposit to cover the full costs of rehabilitation in the event of default by the company. Rehabilitation is the treatment of disturbed land or water to establish a safe, stable, non-polluting and sustainable environment.

Mining companies must provide an estimate of rehabilitation costs for each site. The Department provides a Rehabilitation Cost Calculation tool to assist companies calculate the deposit amount. Companies are also required to ensure that the cost estimate is in accordance with the approved Mining Operations Plan (MOP). The MOP is intended to be a mine rehabilitation and closure plan, and forms the basis for the estimation of the security deposit. The Department reviews the estimates and determines the deposit for each site.  

Security deposits are an option of last resort. The Department has other legislative and regulatory tools which it normally uses to promote compliance with rehabilitation requirements before accessing a security deposit. It can direct action by the mining company, issue fines and even have the Minister revoke a mining lease. To date, the Department has never had to access a security deposit for a state significant development mine site.

Conclusion

The Department holds security deposits for mining rehabilitation consistent with the amounts it has requested from mining companies, and it should be able to claim on a deposit if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations. The total value of deposits has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites. The Department’s management of the security deposit process has improved in recent years, and it has well advanced plans for further improvement, including a revised cost calculation tool.

The Department’s policy is that each mine’s security deposit should cover the full costs of rehabilitation for that mine. The security deposits the Department holds are not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine’s rehabilitation in the event of a default. The rates and allowances in the current cost calculation tool have not been updated since 2013 and some activities required for effective rehabilitation are not covered, or not covered adequately.

Security deposits also do not include sufficient contingency given the substantial risks and uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, particularly in the absence of a detailed closure plan. This risk is exacerbated by the limited independent verification of mining company claims about the size of the outstanding rehabilitation task, which remains the case despite recent improvements to monitoring and review procedures and practices.  

There is also no financial assurance held over the risk of significant unexpected environmental degradation in the long-term after a mine is deemed to be rehabilitated and the security deposit is returned. A security deposit is not an appropriate vehicle for covering this risk.

Security deposits are close to calculated value and should be accessible if needed

The value of securities held by the Department aligns with the latest approved rehabilitation cost estimates. This contrasts with the situation found by investigations in Victoria and Queensland, where deposit amounts held fell below the calculated costs.

The security deposits are usually in the form of a bank guarantee or cash. The Department has obtained legal advice indicating that it should be able to claim on these bank guarantees if the need arises. As the guarantee is between the financial institution and the Department, if a mining company goes into liquidation the Department should still be able to access the funds.  

When the latest estimate of rehabilitation costs is higher than the existing deposit, the Department will request additional security. It has experienced extensive delays in obtaining additional security for some sites, increasing the risk that available funds will be insufficient if needed.

Rehabilitation cost estimates are not yet adequate, but improvements are planned

The Department’s policy is for security deposits to cover the full cost of rehabilitation. No discounts are provided to mining companies for past good behaviour or low likelihood of default, unlike in some other states. Discounting could undermine the policy position.  

Current security deposits are unlikely to cover the full cost of rehabilitation on each mine site. The Department provides a rehabilitation cost calculation tool to help mining companies calculate the cost of rehabilitation and the required deposit amount, but:

  • several activities required to effect closure are not included and others underestimated
  • it does not make provision for industry cost changes over time
  • the rates used in the tool have not been updated since 2013
  • it was not able to provide the basis for the rates and allowances in the tool.

The Department reviews cost estimates provided by mining companies, but its verification of the extent of rehabilitation work on which these estimates are based is limited. It relies instead on section 387C of the Mining Act 1992 which makes it an offence for mining companies to provide false or misleading information. It is not evident how the Department would establish that information provided was false or misleading without more verification work, and six of the 14 cost estimates we reviewed were not signed by the mine manager, making enforcement more difficult.  

The Department has developed a new calculation tool, and recently released it for industry consultation. The new tool should improve rehabilitation estimates. It updates rates and allowances, and includes additional items to better cover required rehabilitation tasks. While a substantial improvement, the new tool could be further improved by providing additional coverage for stakeholder engagement, additional planning approvals, insurance costs, and any additional design, research and verification work required for successful closure.

There is no financial assurance over long-term environmental risks

The Department does not hold any financial assurance to cover the costs associated with mitigating any future environmental degradation once a mine closes and the security deposit is relinquished to the mining company. Security deposits are probably not the appropriate mechanism to cover these long-term risks but the risk of potential post-closure environmental degradation still needs to be costed and covered. A fund to cover the state-wide risk, to which all mines would contribute, is a possible mechanism.

Rehabilitation and closure outcomes are vague, particularly for unplanned closure

Rehabilitation outcomes in the MOPs we reviewed were generally not specific. Any lack of specificity in MOPs translates into uncertainty about rehabilitation work required if a mining company defaults. Part of the problem is that rehabilitation outcomes established in planning approvals are usually not specific and may not address all closure requirements. The Department has recognised there is scope to improve the clarity and specificity of rehabilitation requirements in planning approvals, and has started a review focusing on open-cut mines.

Rehabilitation outcomes are even less specific in the event of an unexpected early closure because they will probably be different from that achievable from a planned closure.  

MOP guidelines do not cover management of some key closure matters, such as the requirements of environment protection licences issued by the Environment Protection Authority and the management of heritage sites during closure.

There were significant variations in quality of MOPs we reviewed and the way closure risks and uncertainties were identified and addressed. The Department plans to improve the quality of rehabilitation programs through enhanced guidance and oversight.

Monitoring is not adequate to effectively gauge rehabilitation progress

The Department was not able to show it has been monitoring operational mine sites effectively to gauge the progress of ongoing site rehabilitation and the management of closure risks. There was no protocol for site inspections and limited evidence of inspections for the sites we reviewed.

The Department receives annual environmental management reports from mining companies, with most describing the areas of disturbance and rehabilitation occurring at each mine site. The Department recently established procedures for reviewing these annual reports, and has developed a risk-based process for prioritising reviews.

Most annual reports we reviewed did not explain environmental changes over time, nor the risks to mine closure and the measures required to mitigate them. For example, analysis of changes to surface water and groundwater quality was limited despite its relevance for assessing future contamination risks.

The Department does not currently have adequate processes in place to effectively verify the reported areas of disturbance and rehabilitation. It is developing geographic information system-based tools to better measure areas of disturbance and rehabilitation, new rehabilitation guidelines, and a procedure for determining whether rehabilitation has been successful. These initiatives should improve the monitoring and reporting of rehabilitation progress at mine sites.

There is no mechanism to prevent a mine being in ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely

The Department does not have a clear policy on the length of time and circumstances under which a mine can remain in ‘care and maintenance’. Indefinite postponement of rehabilitation and closure is therefore possible. 'Care and maintenance' is the period following temporary cessation of operations when infrastructure remains largely intact and the site continues to be managed. There are a range of valid reasons for a mining company to put a mine in ‘care and maintenance’, but it is also reasonable for the community to expect a limit to how long it has to wait for proper rehabilitation.

Mining operations make a significant contribution to the NSW economy, including over $1.3 billion in royalties each year. Around 400 mine sites throughout NSW provide over 40,000 jobs and are a major source of economic activity for many communities. Despite these benefits, it is important to ensure that mining companies fulfil their obligations to rehabilitate land disturbed as a result of mining activity.

We recommend that the Department should, by January 2018:

1. Improve the quality of rehabilitation and closure plans by:

  • ensuring plans submitted by mining companies include robust mine rehabilitation and closure risk assessments
  • clarifying the level of detail required in plans at each stage of a mine’s operation
  • specifying how requirements set under other legislative instruments (e.g. environment protection licences, heritage assets) should be addressed.

2. Improve assurance that security deposits are sufficient by:

  • ensuring its new cost calculation tool adequately covers all works needed for rehabilitation and closure
  • increasing the contingency for uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, at least until the mining company provides a detailed closure plan
  • verifying the cost estimates for a sample of high risk sites annually
  • ensuring that when mining companies are required to provide increased security deposits, they do so with minimal delay.

3. Enhance oversight of mine rehabilitation by:

  • developing a protocol to ensure sufficient and adequate site inspections
  • ensuring mining companies report performance against rehabilitation targets and environmental changes clearly, including an analysis of long-term surface water and groundwater trends in terms of levels, flow and quality
  • improving how it determines the progress and success of mine rehabilitation
  • developing clear policy and procedures for ensuring a mine cannot be put into ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely.

4. Collaborate with relevant agencies to establish a financial assurance mechanism, such as a sinking fund, to cover the risk of long-term environmental degradation after mines are closed and security deposits returned.

Appendix One - Response from the Department

Appendix Two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #285 - released 11 May 2017

Published

Actions for Planning for school infrastructure

Planning for school infrastructure

Education
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Department of Education proposes to fundamentally reform school infrastructure planning and delivery to meet the future demand for student places, and to overcome chronic under-investment for much of the last decade. To do this, it will need to spend much more than it has been receiving to date.

The Department of Education (Department) must provide students with a place in a government school if parents desire it. Over the next 15 years, the student population in NSW Government and non-government schools is projected to grow by 21 per cent to nearly 1.5 million students. Over 80 per cent of this is expected to be in the Sydney metropolitan area.

Improving education outcomes of students is a NSW State Priority. Research shows that well designed and maintained facilities improve student learning outcomes. A strategic objective of the 2014 State Infrastructure Strategy Update is to ‘equip growing urban and regional populations with the modern schools and training infrastructure required to deliver educational service for a competitive, innovative economy’. 

This audit assessed whether the Department has a strategy and implementation model to ensure it has sufficient fit-for-purpose student learning spaces when and where needed.

 

Conclusion

For much of the last decade, there has been chronic under-investment in NSW government school infrastructure and deficiencies in asset planning. Many schools have more students than can be accommodated in existing classrooms, and demountables are widely used for extended periods. The condition of classrooms has been declining due to insufficient maintenance, and many are not configured to support contemporary and desired future learning and teaching methods. At the same time, the government school student population is predicted to grow further, particularly in Sydney.

In response to this challenging situation, the Department has recently developed a School Assets Strategic Plan (Strategic Plan) designed to accommodate the expected student population up to 2031. This is the first such plan for the Department. It is a good plan. It covers the issues we would expect and has benefited from expert input and independent validation of assumptions, proposed solutions, and the likely costs.  

The strategy embodied in the Plan includes elements that may be confronting for the community. To contain costs, the Department proposes several potentially controversial changes to the way schools are planned, designed, built, managed and funded. These include increasing the maximum number of students in new and redeveloped schools; stronger emphasis on redeveloping schools; smaller, more intensely developed sites; changing and enforcing school catchments; increased partnerships with the private sector and more recycling of school assets to deliver better facilities.

Even with these reforms, the estimated cost of infrastructure needed up to 2031 is significantly more than the Department has been receiving to date. Without the proposed reforms, the Department will need much more again. The Department’s funding estimates are conservative due to the scale of proposed reform, the radical change it represents, and the risks to implementation. At the time of the audit, the government had not committed to make available the funding needed to implement the Plan.

Even if the Department obtains additional funding, implementing such a major reform will be challenging. It will require effective collaboration between, and the support of, school communities, local government, potential private sector partners, the non-government schools sector and government agencies. Many risks will need to be mitigated, any of which could undermine the strategy and drive up costs.  

Further savings beyond those already identified would be possible through changing operational policies on matters such as class sizes, operating hours, and single-sex, selective, sports and performing arts schools. Any changes to such policies have implications beyond just infrastructure cost and are likely to be even more controversial.

Asset planning and investment for much of the last decade has been deficient

Over the last decade, there has been chronic under-investment in NSW Government school infrastructure. This has affected both new works and maintenance of existing assets. Until recently, the Department did not have a high-level, long-term school asset strategic plan. The Department had limited understanding of the funds needed over the long term to provide the necessary school infrastructure to meet educational needs of students economically. It had no robust method to determine whether priorities were correct and assess whether the funding split between building, upgrading and maintaining was appropriate.  

Permanent classrooms in 37 per cent of government schools are fully utilised, and 180 schools are operating beyond their permanent classroom capacity. The utilisation rates vary between regions and districts. Demountables are being used for extended periods to cater for permanent student population growth. A significant increase in the number of demountables at some schools decreased student access to amenities and open play spaces. 

The Department now has a Plan to meet future needs

The Department recently developed a Strategic Plan designed to ensure that there are sufficient fit-for-purpose places for students where and when required up to 2031. The Strategic Plan outlines the:

  • predicted demand for future learning spaces
  • condition of existing infrastructure and additional infrastructure and maintenance required
  • proposed new initiatives to deliver the required infrastructure economically
  • proposed new cluster planning model to determine priorities and initiatives to be implemented at the school level
  • funding needed to provide appropriate learning spaces where and when needed.

The Strategic Plan has been developed with the benefit of expert advice and has been reviewed extensively within the Department, by other key government agencies and experts. The review process examined the Strategic Plan’s assumptions, data quality, proposals and cost estimation approach. This process has increased assurance and improved the Strategic Plan, but has delayed implementation by approximately a year so far.

Many more learning spaces will be needed

The Strategic Plan identifies that over the next 15 years the student population in government schools will increase by 21 per cent and that the Department will need:

  • 7,200 additional classrooms and to upgrade many existing classrooms to meet future teaching and learning needs
  • to undertake much more planned maintenance, otherwise 40 per cent of existing government school buildings will be in such poor condition that learning outcomes could be compromised.

The Department proposes a new approach designed to minimise costs

Given the need for substantial additional infrastructure and maintenance, and underfunding over the last decade, the Department has sought to minimise costs while maintaining quality.

Initiatives proposed include an increase in the maximum number of students in new and redeveloped schools; a stronger emphasis on redeveloping existing schools; smaller, more intensely developed school sites; strengthening partnerships with the private sector to improve school assets; and school consolidation and sale of surplus land to reinvest in better facilities. We did not identify any additional options that could be proposed to make further cost saving under current operational policy settings.

The proposed new cluster planning model will assess schools in a region or district to identify the best way to deliver school assets to a cluster as a whole rather than individual schools. It will identify the most effective and efficient asset solution within a cluster of five to 15 schools.

It represents an improvement over the previous model which addressed infrastructure needs on a school-by-school basis. The initial focus of school cluster planning will be on areas of highest student growth.

The proposed new cluster planning model has potential to create efficiencies and economies of scale if implemented well. Cluster planning will determine which of the various initiatives should be implemented in the schools in the cluster. It recognises that solving enrolment trends in one school requires consideration of surrounding schools and seeks the optimum asset solution for identified schools.

Implementation will be a major challenge

Effective implementation will require good collaboration with other government agencies, non-government schools, the private sector and the community. The Department has been improving its consultation with other government agencies and the non-government school sector, and has developed models for collaborating with the community and private sector. The Strategic Plan proposes open access to information, which will be important for effective collaboration and partnerships.  

There are many risks to effective implementation, which could drive up costs. These include opposition from school communities, a reduction in the proportion of students educated in non-government schools, unexpected increases in land and construction costs, failure to sufficiently streamline the planning approval system or a blow-out in renovation costs in older schools.  

To provide and maintain the infrastructure needed up until 2031, the Department estimates it will need significantly more money than it receives now even if it implements its initiatives and cluster planning effectively. It would require much more again if it was to retain its current approach to planning and delivering school infrastructure.  

The current school infrastructure funding arrangement does not support effective long-term planning. A four-year commitment to education infrastructure funding does not provide the flexibility needed for the Department to manage its allocations and respond to changes in priorities or emerging challenges. The Health and Transport clusters receive a ten-year funding commitment, known as a capital planning limit.

Changing operational policies could increase school utilisation

Further significant cost savings are only likely if the Department changes some operational policies. Class size is a key determinant of the number of classrooms needed. Choice in school enrolment and the existence of single-sex, selective, sports or creative and performing arts schools all can lead to underutilisation of schools and classrooms because they are not accessible to all students.  

The Department of Education should:

1. regularly revisit and evaluate the Strategic Plan to keep it contemporary, refine it based on learnings, update cost estimates to reflect actual results, and respond to available funding

2. work with NSW Treasury to develop a framework for partnering with the private sector

3. align Total Asset Management plans with cluster plans as they are developed

4. closely consult and collaborate with communities on implementation of the Strategic Plan

5. continue to collaborate with key government agencies, local government, the non-government school sector and the private sector on implementation of the Strategic Plan

6. publish detailed information on the status of assets, current and projected enrolments, and planned school projects to support effective consultation and collaboration

7. seek a ten-year capital planning limit from NSW Treasury

8. advise the government on options to change operational policies and practices to reduce infrastructure requirements.

Published

Actions for Assessing major development applications

Assessing major development applications

Planning
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.

The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.

These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.

The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.

This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:

  • has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
  • ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.

Conclusion

Over the last two years, the Commission has improved its decision-making process. It has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

However, there are still some vital issues to be addressed to ensure it makes decisions in a consistent and transparent manner. Most importantly, the Commission was not able to show in every decision we reviewed how it met its statutory obligation to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Despite improved probity measures put in place by the Commission, there is a perception among some stakeholders that it is not independent of the Department. The reasons for some of these concerns are outside of the Commission’s control. For example, the Commission becomes involved after the Department has prepared an assessment report which recommends whether a development should proceed. This creates the perception that the Commission is acting on the recommendation of the Department. The Department’s assessment report should state whether an application meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, but not recommend whether a development should be approved or not.

More can also be done to improve transparency in decision-making and the public’s perception of the independence of Commissioners. The Commission should continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions and also publish on its website a summary of Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application.

Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed

Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.

As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.

We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.

The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.

Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial

The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:

  • has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
  • has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
  • publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.

Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.

The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.

While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.

Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.

To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.

Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.

The Planning Assessment Commission

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.

The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.

The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:

  • more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
  • the local council objects to the proposal
  • the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.

These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.

Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:

  • any relevant environmental and planning instruments
  • likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
  • suitability of the site for the development
  • submissions received about the application
  • the public interest.

In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.

Process for approving major development applications

The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.

The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:

  • two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
  • three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
  • six weeks when a public meeting is required.

The Planning Assessment Commission should:

By July 2017:

  1. improve transparency by publishing on its website a summary of the Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application referred to the Commission for determination, and how any conflicts were handled
     
  2. keep better records of how it considers each matter under section 79C of the EP&A Act for all decisions it makes on major development applications
     
  3. improve the public’s involvement in public meetings by:
    1. identifying and implementing additional mechanisms to notify the community of public meetings to ensure as many interested parties are advised as possible
    2. allowing the chair of decision-making panels discretion to extend the time allowed for individual speakers beyond five minutes
  1. continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions to the public by:
    1. including a summary in its reports of the issues raised during the consultation process and how they were considered by the Commission
    2. clearly outlining in its reports how any conditions placed on a development will address the issues raised
    3. detailing in its reports how section 79C of the EP&A Act has been addressed
    4. issuing fact sheets to accompany its reports for all decisions where public meetings were held
  1. work with the Department of Planning and Environment to:
    1. develop an agreed approach to presenting the Department’s views in its assessment reports on whether the project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, reflecting the Commission’s status as an independent decision-maker
    2. refer applications to the Commission earlier in the process to ensure the Department’s assessment report covers matters that Commissioners consider important when assessing projects under section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Published

Actions for Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Environment
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016

Published

Actions for Early childhood education

Early childhood education

Education
Compliance
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Enrolments in quality early childhood education programs in New South Wales are increasing but are below the national benchmark, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Ninety-five per cent of children should be enrolled in at least 600 hours in the year before school, but according to the latest NSW figures 77 per cent of children were enrolled in quality early childhood education programs. This 2015 figure is below the benchmark, but is a significant improvement on 2013 when 59 per cent were enrolled.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #271 - released 26 May 2016

Published

Actions for Supporting students with disability in NSW public schools

Supporting students with disability in NSW public schools

Education
Information technology
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Education is doing a reasonable job in managing how well students with disability transition to a new school and supporting teachers to improve these students’ educational outcomes, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

The level of support provided to students with disability can vary between schools. This is partly due to cultural resistance in some schools and teachers not always having the necessary skills to support children with disability.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #270 - released 12 May 2016

Published

Actions for Public sector management reforms

Public sector management reforms

Finance
Industry
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Whole of Government
Environment
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

The Public Service Commission is making good progress with leading the implementation of public sector management reforms, according to a report released today by the Acting New South Wales Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield.

'The Commission developed a sound evidence base for the reforms and gained wide public sector support by engaging with agency heads and using public sector working groups to develop options', said the Acting Auditor-General. 'They developed good guidance for government agencies and have improved the senior executive structure in the NSW public sector', he added.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #264 - released 28 January 2016

Published

Actions for Identifying productivity in the public sector

Identifying productivity in the public sector

Health
Education
Community Services
Transport
Justice
Treasury
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

This report examines selected areas of government activity to see if sufficient information was available to identify and assess changes in productivity. The areas examined were primary and secondary school public education, acute inpatient care in NSW public hospitals, CityRail, the NSW Police Force, and the NSW Local Court.

Productivity is commonly defined as the amount of output per unit of input.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #256 - released 16 July 2015

Published

Actions for Implementing performance audit recommendations

Implementing performance audit recommendations

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Whole of Government
Health
Education
Community Services
Transport
Justice
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

NSW Government agencies have sound processes for implementing performance audit recommendations in Auditor-General’s Reports to Parliament. There are many cases of good practice. For example, some agencies formed a steering committee and developed a detailed plan to implement recommendations. Another incorporated the implementation of recommendations into both its business plan and the work plans of individual officers who were managing projects. Most agencies also used their Audit and Risk Committees to monitor recommendations.
 
We found some cases where agencies can improve how they coordinate actions to address recommendations. Most agencies were not revisiting these actions to determine whether they remain appropriate.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #254 - released 24 June 2015

Published

Actions for Government advertising 2015

Government advertising 2015

Premier and Cabinet
Environment
Whole of Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management

The Government Advertising Act 2011 requires the Auditor-General to conduct an annual performance audit to check NSW Government agency compliance with the Act.

This audit focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet’s (DPC) role in monitoring government agencies compliance with government advertising requirements, and examined advertising campaigns run by Destination NSW and the Sydney Opera House.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #253 - released 22 June 2015