Reports
Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)
What the report is about
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.
The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.
What we found
Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.
However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.
Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.
On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.
Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.
The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.
What we recommended
The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.
As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.
During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.
Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.
The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.
Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.
This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.
Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:
- coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
- emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
- operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.
This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:
- The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
- NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
- Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
- The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
- The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.
The audit investigated whether:
- government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
- agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.
While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.
This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022.
This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.
In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
Conclusion
Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.
In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.
However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.
It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.
The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events
The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.
On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.
Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.
Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW
There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.
Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.
There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.
Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.
Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events
Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.
Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.
The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.
The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.
This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.
The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.
NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice
The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.
The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.
The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:
- up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
- up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
- weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
- the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.
On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.
The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.
The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.
Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted
Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.
The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:
- South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
- Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
- Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
- a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.
Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:
- the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
- issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation
- the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery
- issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
- timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
- the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
- timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
- gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
- the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
- compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
- improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
- deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
- the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.
NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:
- governance
- engagement
- innovation and technology
- community impact
- workforce impact
- system impact and performance.
NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.
Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales
In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales.
The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.
Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022
New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout
What the report is about
The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.
This audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine roll out in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over.
What we found
On 16 October 2021, NSW Health, in partnership with the Australian Government's vaccination program, achieved its first objective to fully vaccinate 80% of people in NSW aged 16 and over. Demand for the vaccine reduced in December 2021, and NSW Health did not reach its target of 95% fully vaccinated for people aged 16 and over until June 2022.
Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.
During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available.
NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.
As at 19 October 2022, vaccination rates for Aboriginal peoples and culturally and linguistically diverse people remained below the 95% target.
What we recommended
By June 2023, NSW Health should conduct a comprehensive review of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout and incorporate lessons learned into pandemic response plans.
The first three cases of COVID-19 in New South Wales were diagnosed in January 2020. By 30 June 2021, 128 people were being treated in hospital and one person was in intensive care. By the end of December 2021, 187,504 total cases and 663 deaths were reported in New South Wales. As at 27 October 2022, NSW Health reported more than three million total cases and 5,430 deaths.
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the health sector of New South Wales. The Australian, state, territory, and local governments have directed significant resources towards health responses and economic recovery.
On 13 November 2020, National Cabinet (comprised of the Australian, state, and territory governments) endorsed the Australian COVID-19 Vaccination Policy. Australia's vaccination program was launched on 21 February 2021 with the goal of providing safe and effective vaccines to the people who most needed them as quickly as possible, to support the physical, mental and economic wellbeing of the nation.
The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.
The overall objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NSW Health’s contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout. It is important to note that in New South Wales, primary care providers (GPs and pharmacies) and aged care providers administered the majority of vaccines. Primary care providers and aged care providers are the responsibility of the Australian Government.
The audit had a particular focus on whether NSW Health:
- set clear vaccination targets underpinned and/or guided by evidence
- managed the rollout of the vaccination program effectively and efficiently
- managed demand of vaccines effectively and efficiently.
The audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine rollout in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over. We did not audit the subsequent rollout for ages five to 15, or the booster rollout (third and fourth doses) as these activities mostly occurred outside the date of our review.
This audit also did not assess the Australian Government’s allocation of vaccine supplies to New South Wales because we do not audit the Australian Government's activities. On 17 August 2022, the Australian National Audit Office completed a performance audit which assessed the Australian Department of Health and Aged Care's effectiveness in the planning and implementation of Australia's COVID-19 vaccine rollout.
This audit is one of a series of audits that have been completed or are in progress regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. This includes the planned performance audit ‘Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)’, and financial audit assurance activities focusing on Local Health District processes and controls to manage the receipt, distribution and inventory management of vaccine stock. The Audit Office New South Wales '2022–25 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.
Conclusion
By 12 December 2021, NSW Health had administered two doses of vaccines to one third of eligible people in New South Wales aged 16 and over – contributing significantly to the achievement of the NSW Government vaccination target of 80% fully vaccinated before 31 December 2021. Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.
NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.
Vaccination levels in some vulnerable populations remain below the 95% double dose target currently in place. Access to quality data to regularly measure vaccination rates in some vulnerable populations remains an ongoing challenge for the NSW and Australian Governments. As a result, NSW Health is unable to fully ensure it has delivered on its shared responsibility with the Australian Government to vaccinate vulnerable people.
NSW Health managed challenges regarding the uncertain supply of vaccines from the Australian Government and filled gaps beyond its agreed responsibilities in the National Partnership on COVID-19 Response. During the Delta outbreak of the pandemic, NSW Health sought to achieve the best possible public health outcome from limited vaccine supply by opening up additional vaccination clinics in highly affected areas and redistributing vaccine supplies from areas with fewer cases to highly affected local government areas in south west Sydney.
During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available. Our financial audit report, 'Health 2022', includes additional information on vaccine supply stock held by NSW Health.
NSW Health demonstrated agility by using a range of strategies to promote vaccination, including direct engagement with communities to develop culturally appropriate services such as pop-up clinics. NSW Heath recruited prominent community members, such as faith leaders, elders and sportspeople, to promote vaccination within their communities. However, at the date of this report, there are still vulnerable populations with vaccination rates lower than the current 95% double dose vaccination target. There is also a lack of regularly updated data for some cohorts which prevents NSW Health from accurately monitoring vaccination rates in some populations it has identified as vulnerable.
In March 2021, NSW Health identified that the booking system provided by the Australian Government was an online directory of vaccine clinics and would not manage bookings. To overcome this, NSW Health amended an internal-use system to be publicly facing. This solution was not user-friendly for staff or those seeking to make an appointment. Between June to September 2021, NSW Health progressively resolved booking system related issues, by developing and rolling out a new purpose-built booking solution for NSW Health vaccination clinics.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Australian audits on the vaccine rollouts
Appendix three – Committee members
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #369 - released 7 December 2022
Facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes
What the report is about
The Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act) provides land rights over certain Crown land for Aboriginal Land Councils in NSW.
If a claim is made over Crown land (land owned and managed by government) and meets other criteria under the Act, ownership of that land is to be transferred to the Aboriginal Land Council.
This process is intended to provide compensation for the dispossession of land from Aboriginal people in NSW. It is a different process to the recognition of native title rights under Commonwealth law.
We examined whether relevant agencies are effectively facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes. The relevant agencies are:
- Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC)
- Department of Planning and Environment (DPE)
- NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC).
We consulted with Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) and other Aboriginal community representative groups to hear about their experiences.
What we found
Neither DPC nor DPE have established the resources required for the NSW Government to deliver Aboriginal land claim processes in a coordinated way, and which transparently commits to the requirements and intent of the Act.
Delays in determining land claims result in Aboriginal Land Councils being denied the opportunity to realise their statutory right to certain Crown land. Delays also create risks due to uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land.
DPC has not established governance arrangements to ensure accountability for outcomes under the Act, and effective risk management.
DPE lacks clear performance measures for the timely and transparent delivery of its claim assessment functions. DPE also lacks a well-defined framework for prioritising assessments.
LALCs have concerns about delays, and lack of transparency in the process.
Reviews since at least 2014 have recommended actions to address numerous issues and improve outcomes, but limited progress has been made.
The database used by DPC (Office of the Registrar) for the statutory register of land claims has not been upgraded or fully validated since the 1990s.
In 2020, DPE identified the transfer of claimable Crown land to LALCs to enable economic and cultural outcomes as a strategic priority. DPE has some activities underway to do this, and to improve how it engages with Aboriginal Land Councils – but DPE still lacks a clear, resourced strategy to process over 38,000 undetermined claims within a reasonable time.
What we recommended
In summary:
- DPC should lead strategic governance to oversee a resourced, coordinated program that is accountable for delivering Aboriginal land claim processes
- DPE should implement a resourced, ten-year plan that increases the rate of claim processing, and includes an initial focus on land grants
- DPE and DPC should jointly establish operational arrangements to deliver a coordinated interagency program for land claim processes
- DPC should plan an interagency, land claim spatial information system, and the Office of the Registrar should remediate and upgrade the statutory land claims register
- DPC and NSWALC should implement an education program (for state agencies and the local government sector) about the Act and its operations
- DPE should implement a five-year workforce development strategy for its land claim assessment function
- DPE should finalise updates to its land claim assessment procedures
- DPE should enhance information sharing with Aboriginal Land Councils to inform their claim making
- NSWALC should enhance information sharing and other supports to LALCs to inform their claim making and build capacity.
Fast facts
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The return of land under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act) is intended to provide compensation for the dispossession of land from Aboriginal people in New South Wales. A claim on Crown land1 made by an Aboriginal Land Council that meets criteria under the Act is to be transferred to the claimant council as freehold title. The 2021 statutory review of the Act recognises the spiritual, social, cultural and economic importance of land to Aboriginal people.
The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs administers the Act, with support from Aboriginal Affairs NSW (AANSW) in the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC). AANSW also leads the delivery of Opportunity, Choice, Healing, Responsibility and Empowerment (OCHRE), the NSW Government's plan for Aboriginal affairs, and assists the Minister to implement the National Agreement on Closing the Gap – which includes a target for increasing the area of land covered by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's legal rights or interests.
The Act gives responsibility for registering land claims to an independent statutory officer, the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (the Registrar), whose functions are supported by the Office of the Registrar (ORALRA) which is resourced by AANSW.2
The Land and Environment Court of New South Wales has stated that there is an implied obligation for land claims to be determined within a reasonable time. The Minister administering the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) is responsible for determining land claims. This function is supported by the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE),3 whose staff assess and recommend claims for determination based on the criteria under section 36(1) of the Act. There is also a mechanism under the Act for land claims to be negotiated in good faith through an Aboriginal Land Agreement.
The NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) is a statutory corporation constituted under the Act with a mandate to provide for the development of land rights for Aboriginal people in NSW, in conjunction with the network of 120 Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs). LALCs are constituted over specific areas to represent Aboriginal communities across NSW. Both NSWALC and LALCs can make land claims.
DPC and DPE are responsible for governance and, in partnership with NSWALC, operational and information-sharing activities that are required to coordinate Aboriginal land claim processes. LALCs, statutory officers, government agencies, local councils, and other parties need to be engaged so that these processes are coordinated effectively and managed in a way that is consistent with the intent of the Act, and other legislative requirements.
The first land claim was lodged in 1983. The number of undetermined land claims has increased over time, and at 31 December 2021 DPE data shows 38,257 undetermined claims.
The issue of undetermined land claims has been publicly reported by the Audit Office since 2007. Recommendations to agencies to better facilitate processes and improve how functions are administered have been made in multiple reviews, including two Parliamentary inquiries in 2016.
The objective of this audit was to assess whether relevant agencies are effectively facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- agencies (DPE, DPC (AANSW and ORALRA) and NSWALC) coordinate information and activities to effectively facilitate Aboriginal land claim processes
- agencies (DPE and DPC (ORALRA)) are effectively administering their roles in the Aboriginal land claim process.
We consulted with LALCs to hear about their experiences and priorities with respect to Aboriginal land claim processes and related outcomes. We have aimed to incorporate their insights into our understanding of their expectations of government with respect to delivering requirements, facilitating processes, and identifying opportunities for improved outcomes.
ConclusionThe Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) are not effectively facilitating or administering Aboriginal land claim processes. Neither agency has established the resources required for the NSW Government to operate a coordinated program of activities to deliver land claim processes in a way that transparently commits to the requirements and intent of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act). Arrangements to engage the NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) in these activities have not been clearly defined. There are more than 38,000 undetermined land claims that cover approximately 1.12 million hectares of Crown land. As such, DPE has not been meeting its statutory requirement to determine land claims nor its obligation to do so within a reasonable time. Over 60 per cent of these claims were lodged with the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, for DPE to determine, more than five years ago. DPE’s Aboriginal Outcomes Strategy 2020–23 identifies transferring claimable Crown land to Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) as a priority to enable economic and cultural outcomes. Since mid-2020 DPE has largely focused on supporting LALCs to identify priority land claims for assessment and on negotiating Aboriginal Land Agreements. This work may support the compensatory intent of the Act but is in its early stages and is unlikely to increase the pace at which land claims are determined. Based on current targets, it will take DPE around 22 years to process existing undetermined land claims. Delays in processing land claims result in Aboriginal Land Councils being denied the opportunity to realise their statutory right to certain Crown land in NSW. The intent of the Act to provide compensation to Aboriginal people for the dispossession of land has been significantly constrained over time. Since 2014, numerous reviews have made recommendations to agencies to address systemic issues, improve processes, and enhance outcomes: but DPC and DPE have made limited progress with implementing these. Awareness of the intent and operations of the Act was often poor among staff from some State government agencies and local government representatives we interviewed for the audit. DPC has not established culturally informed, interagency governance to effectively oversee Aboriginal land claim processes – and ensure accountability for outcomes consistent with the intent of the Act, informed by the expectations of the NSWALC and LALCs. Such governance has not existed since at least 2017 (the audited period) and we have not seen evidence earlier. DPE still does not have performance indicators for its land claim assessment function that are based on a clear analysis of resources, that demonstrate alignment to defined outcomes, and which are reported routinely to key stakeholders, including NSWALC and LALCs. LALCs have raised strong concerns during our consultations, describing delays in the land claim process and the number of undetermined land claims as disrespectful. LALCs have also noted a lack of transparency in, and opportunity to engage with, Aboriginal land claim processes. DPE’s role in assessing Aboriginal land claims, and identifying opportunities for Aboriginal Land Agreements, requires specific expertise, evidence gathering and an understanding of the complex interaction between the Act and other legislative frameworks, including the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW). In mid-2020, DPE created an Aboriginal Land Strategy Directorate within its Crown lands division, increased staffing in land claim assessment functions, and set a target to increase the number of land claims to be granted in 2021–22. In the six months to December 2021, DPE granted more land claims (207 claims) than in most years prior. DPE has also assisted some LALCs to identify priority land claims for assessment. But the overall number of claims processed per year remains well below the historical (five-year) average number of claims lodged (2,506 claims). As such, DPE has not yet established an appropriately resourced workforce to assess the large number of undetermined land claims and engage effectively with Aboriginal Land Councils and other parties in the process. There also are notable gaps in DPE’s procedures that impact the transparency of the process, especially with respect to timeframes and the prioritisation of land claims for assessment. DPC (the Office of the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, ORALRA) has not secured or applied resources that would assist the Registrar to use discretionary powers, introduced in 2015, not to refer certain land claims to DPE for assessment (those not on Crown land). This could have improved the efficiency and coordination of end-to-end land claim processes. DPC (ORALRA) is also not effectively managing data and ensuring the functionality of the statutory Register of Aboriginal land claims. This contributes to inefficient coordination with DPE and NSWALC, and creates a risk of inconsistent information sharing with LALCs, government agencies, local councils and other parties. More broadly, responsibilities for sharing information about the location and status of land under claim are not well defined across agencies. These factors contribute to risks to Crown land with an undetermined land claim, which case law has found to establish inchoate property rights for the claimant Aboriginal Land Council.4 It can also lead to uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land, with financial implications for various parties. |
Since 1983, 53,861 Aboriginal land claims have been lodged with the Registrar.25
The Land and Environment Court of New South Wales has stated there is an implied obligation on the Crown Lands Minister to determine land claims within a reasonable time.26
As at 31 December 2021, DPE has processed less than a third (31 per cent) of these land claims: 14,273 were determined by the Crown Lands Minister (that is, granted or refused, in whole or part) and 2,562 were withdrawn. This amounts to 16,835 claims processed, including the negotiated settlement of 15 claims through three Aboriginal Land Agreements. As a result, DPE reports that approximately 163,900 hectares of Crown land has been granted to Aboriginal Land Councils since 1983 up to 31 December 2021.
There are 38,257 land claims awaiting determination, which cover about 1.12 million hectares of Crown land.
The 2017 report on the statutory review of the Act noted that the land claims ‘backlog’ was one of the ‘Top 5’ priorities identified by LALCs during consultations. The importance of this issue is consistent with findings from our consultations with LALCs in 2021 (see Exhibit 7).
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LALCs raised concerns about delays in the Aboriginal land claim process, including waiting decades for claims to be assessed and years for land to be transferred once granted. The large number of undetermined claims has been described by LALCs as disrespectful, and as reflecting under-resourcing by governments. LALCs reported that these delays undermine the compensatory intent of the Act, including by creating uncertainty for their plans to support the social and economic aspirations of their communities. |
Delays in delivering on the statutory requirement to determine land claims, and limited use of other mechanisms to process claims in consultation or agreement with NSWALC and LALCs, undermines the beneficial and remedial intent of Aboriginal land rights under the Act. It also:
- impacts negatively on DPE’s ability to comply with the statutory requirement to determine land claims, because often the older a claim becomes the more difficult it can be to gather the evidence required to assess it
- creates uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land, which can have financial impacts on Aboriginal Land Councils, government agencies, local councils and developers.
Risks that arise in the context of undetermined claims are discussed further in section 3.3.
26 Jerrinja Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [2007] NSWLEC 577 at 125. The Court stated, ‘While a reasonable time may vary on a case-by-case basis, a delay of 15 to 20 years in determining claims does not accord with any idea of reasonableness’.
NSW Treasury describes public sector governance as providing strategic direction, ensuring objectives are achieved, and managing risks and the use of resources responsibly with accountability.
Consistent with the NSW Treasury’s Risk Management Toolkit (TPP-12-03b), governance arrangements for Aboriginal land claim processes should ensure their effective facilitation and administration. That is, arrangements are expected to contribute to and oversee the performance of administrative processes and service delivery towards outcomes, and ensure that legal and policy compliance obligations are met consistent with community expectations of accountability and transparency.
DPC and DPE are responsible for governance and, in partnership with NSWALC, operational and information-sharing activities required to coordinate Aboriginal land claim processes. LALCs, statutory officers, government agencies, local councils, and other parties (such as native title groups and those with an interest in development on Crown land) need to be engaged so that these processes are coordinated effectively with risks managed – consistent with the intent of the Act, and other legislative requirements.
Policy commitments to Aboriginal people and communities made by the NSW Government in the OCHRE Plan and Closing the Gap priority reforms establish an expectation for culturally informed governance.
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LALCs expressed a strong desire to have their voices heard so that outcomes in the Aboriginal land claim process are informed by LALC aspirations and consistent with the intent of the Act. The importance of respect and transparency were consistently raised. The following quotes are from our consultations with LALCs during this audit which illustrate the inherent cultural value of land being returned, as well as the importance of its social and economic value and potential. There’s batches of land in and around town. This land is significant…We want to get the land activated to encourage economic development, and promote the community…our job is to step up to create infrastructure, employment, maintenance and services and lead by example. One of the best things we were able to do is develop a long term 20-year plan and where Crown Land could directly see where land was transferred to us and it was going to things like education, housing, health and other social programs… There has been a claim lodged on a parcel of land that has long lasting cultural significance, a place that is very special to the Aboriginal community members and holds a lot of history. If the claim lodged was successful this land would be used to strengthen the cultural knowledge of the local youth, through placing signage that depicts stories that have been passed down by the Elders, cultural talks and tours and school group visits. This land, although not large in size, has a significant number of cultural trees and artefacts. Aboriginal families and members of the LALC that have lived in our town are very protective of the site and others surrounding it, respecting the importance of the cultural history of the site. There is one, which is a cultural one. We received a land claim that contained a cultural site. This is the high point: we were given back lands that contained rock engravings, carvings. A real diamond for us, especially as an urban based land council. At the heart of the ALRA is the ability to claim Crown Land…The slow determination of claims gets in the way of us doing what we want to do, which is focus on our communities and address our real needs which are about health, wellbeing and culture. If we could realise these rights, we can address all sorts of socio-economic needs. We would become an economic benefit to the state…If it was operating well there could be more caring for Country too. |
Source: Excerpts from NSW Audit Office interviews with LALC representatives, facilitated by Indigenous consultants.
The Crown Lands Minister, supported by DPE, is required to determine whether Aboriginal land claims meet the criteria to be ‘claimable Crown lands’ under section 36(1) of the Act. DPE staff within its Crown Lands division are responsible for assessing land claims and preparing recommendation briefs to the Crown Lands Minister, or their delegate, on determination outcomes. That is, on whether to grant or refuse the claim.38 DPE staff also make decisions about which land claims within the large number of undetermined claims should be processed first.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Banner image used with permission.
Title: Forces of Nature
Artist: Lee Hampton – Koori Kicks Art
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #365 - released 28 April 2022.
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Mobile speed cameras
The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.
Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.
Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.
This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.
The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.
Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.
A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.
There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018
Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing
The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.
In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach.
When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:
- improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour
- create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.
FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are:
to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.
This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.
We examined whether:
- the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
- FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
- there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
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Conclusion
FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security. FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:
When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB.
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #306 - released 10 August 2018
HealthRoster benefits realisation
The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.
The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.
NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.
NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.
- Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
- Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
- Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
- Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.
Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:
- expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
- HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.
The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.
Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.
NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.
In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.
HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.
NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.
NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.
NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.
NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.
NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.
NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.
By September 2018, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
- Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
- Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.
By June 2019, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018
Regional Assistance Programs
Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications for regional assistance programs are assessed and recommended for funding. Its contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude whether the objectives of these programs have been achieved as the relevant agencies have not yet measured their benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
In 2011, the NSW Government established Restart NSW to fund new infrastructure with the proceeds from the sale and lease of government assets. From 2011 to 2017, the NSW Government allocated $1.7 billion from the fund for infrastructure in regional areas, with an additional commitment of $1.3 billion to be allocated by 2021. The NSW Government allocates these funds through regional assistance programs such as Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. NSW councils are the primary recipients of funding provided under these programs.
The NSW Government announced the Resources for Regions program in 2012 with the aim of addressing infrastructure constraints in mining affected communities. Infrastructure NSW administers the program, with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
The NSW Government announced the Fixing Country Roads program in 2014 with the aim of building more efficient road freight networks. Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW jointly administer this program, which funds local councils to deliver projects that help connect local and regional roads to state highways and freight hubs.
This audit assessed whether these two programs (Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads) were being effectively managed and achieved their objectives. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:
- How well are the relevant agencies managing the assessment and recommendation process?
- How do the relevant agencies ensure that funded projects are being delivered?
- Do the funded projects meet program and project objectives?
The audit focussed on four rounds of Resources for Regions funding between 2013–14 to 2015–16, as well as the first two rounds of Fixing Country Roads funding in 2014–15 and 2015–16.
The project selection criteria are consistent with the program objectives set by the NSW Government, and the RIAP applied the criteria consistently. Probity and record keeping practices did not fully comply with the probity plans.
The assessment methodology designed by Infrastructure NSW is consistent with2 the program objectives and criteria. In the rounds that we reviewed, all funded projects met the assessment criteria.
Infrastructure NSW developed probity plans for both programs which provided guidance on the record keeping required to maintain an audit trail, including the use of conflict of interest registers. Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW did not fully comply with these requirements. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.
NSW Procurement Board Directions require agencies to ensure that they do not engage a probity advisor that is engaged elsewhere in the agency. Infrastructure NSW has not fully complied with this requirement. A conflict of interest arose when Infrastructure NSW engaged the same consultancy to act as its internal auditor and probity advisor.
While these infringements of probity arrangements are unlikely to have had a major impact on the assessment process, they weaken the transparency and accountability of the process.
Some councils have identified resourcing and capability issues which impact on their ability to participate in the application process. For both programs, the relevant agencies conducted briefings and webinars with applicants to provide advice on the objectives of the programs and how to improve the quality of their applications. Additionally, Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have developed tools to assist councils to demonstrate the economic impact of their applications.
The relevant agencies provided feedback on unsuccessful applications to councils. Councils reported that the quality of this feedback has improved over time.
Recommendations
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- ensure probity reports address whether all elements of the probity plan have been effectively implemented.
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW should:
- maintain and store all documentation regarding assessment and probity matters according to the State Records Act 1998, the NSW Standard on Records Management and the relevant probity plans
Infrastructure NSW is responsible for overseeing and monitoring projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. Infrastructure NSW effectively manages projects to keep them on track, however it could do more to assure itself that all recipients have complied with funding deeds. Benefits and outcomes should also start to be measured and reported as soon as practicable after projects are completed to inform assessment of future projects.
Infrastructure NSW identifies projects experiencing unreasonable delays or higher than expected expenses as 'at‑risk'. After Infrastructure NSW identifies a project as 'at‑risk', it puts in place processes to resolve issues to bring them back on track. Infrastructure NSW, working with Public Works Advisory regional offices, employs a risk‑based approach to validate payment claims, however this process should be strengthened. Infrastructure NSW would get better assurance by also conducting annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects.
Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. It applies the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework to Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads at a program level. This means that each round of funding (under both programs) is treated as a distinct program for the purposes of benefits realisation. It plans to assess whether benefits have been realised once each project in a funding round is completed. As a result, no benefits realisation assessment has been done for any project funded under either Resources for Regions or Fixing Country Roads. Without project‑level benefits realisation, future decisions are not informed by the lessons from previous investments.
Recommendations
- By December 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- conduct annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads
- publish the circumstances under which unspent funds can be allocated to changes in project scope
- measure benefits delivered by projects that were completed before December 2017
- implement an annual process to measure benefits for projects completed after December 2017
- By December 2018, Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW should:
- incorporate a benefits realisation framework as part of the detailed application.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - Maps of funded projects
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #300 - released 17 May 2018
Grants to non-government schools
The NSW Department of Education could strengthen its management of the $1.2 billion provided to non-government schools annually. This would provide greater accountability for the use of public funds, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
Non‑government schools educate 418,000 school children each year, representing 35 per cent of all students in NSW. The NSW Department of Education administers several grant schemes to support these schools, with the aim of improving student learning outcomes and supporting parent choice. To be eligible for NSW Government funding, non‑government schools must be registered with the NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) and not operate 'for profit' as per section 83C of the NSW Education Act 1990 (the Act). Non‑government schools can either be registered as independent or part of a System Authority.
In 2017–18, non‑government schools in NSW will receive over $1.2 billion from the NSW Government, as well as $3.4 billion from the Australian Government. Recently, the Australian Government has changed the way it funds schools. The NSW Government is assessing how these changes will impact State funding for non‑government schools.
This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently NSW Government grants to non‑government schools are allocated and managed. This audit did not assess the use of NSW Government grants by individual non‑government schools or System Authorities because the Auditor‑General of New South Wales does not have the mandate to assess how government funds are spent by non‑government entities.
Conclusion
The Department of Education effectively and efficiently allocates grants to non‑government schools. Clarifying the objectives of grants, monitoring progress towards these objectives, and improving oversight, would strengthen accountability for the use of public funds by non‑government schools.
We tested a sample of grants provided to non‑government schools under all major schemes, and found that the Department of Education consistently allocates and distributes grants in line with its methodology. The Department has clear processes and procedures to efficiently collect data from schools, calculate the level of funding each school or System should receive, obtain appropriate approvals, and make payments.
We identified three areas where the Department could strengthen its management of grants to provide greater accountability for the use of public funds. First, the Department’s objectives for providing grants to non‑government schools are covered by legislation, intergovernmental agreements and grant guidelines. The Department could consolidate these objectives to allow for more consistent monitoring. Second, the Department relies on schools or System Authorities to engage a registered auditor to certify the accuracy of information on their enrolments and usage of grants. Greater scrutiny of the registration and independence of the auditors would increase confidence in the accuracy of this information. Third, the Department does not monitor how System Authorities reallocate grant funding to their member schools. Further oversight in this area would increase accountability for the use of public funds.
The Department effectively and efficiently allocates grants to non‑government schools. Strengthening its processes would provide greater assurance that the information it collects is accurate.
The Department provides clear guidelines to assist schools to provide the necessary census information to calculate per capita grants. Schools must get an independent external auditor, registered with ASIC, to certify their enrolment figures. The Department checks a sample of the auditors to ensure that they are registered with ASIC. Some other jurisdictions perform additional procedures to increase confidence in the accuracy of the census (for example, independently checking a sample of schools’ census data).
The Department accurately calculates and distributes per capita grants in accordance with its methodology. The previous methodology, used prior to 2018, was not updated frequently enough to reflect changes in schools' circumstances. Over 2014 to 2017, the Department provided additional grants to non‑government schools under the National Education Reform Agreement (NERA), to bring funding more closely in line with the Australian Department of Education and Training's Schooling Resource Standard (SRS). From 2018, the Department has changed the way it calculates per capita grants to more closely align with the Australian Department of Education and Training's approach.
The Department determines eligibility for grants by checking a school's registration status with NESA. However, NESA's approach to monitoring compliance with the registration requirements prioritises student learning and wellbeing requirements over the requirement for policies and procedures for proper governance. Given their importance to the appropriate use of government funding, NESA could increase its monitoring of policies and procedures for proper governance through its program of random inspections. Further, the Department and NESA should enter into a formal agreement to share information to more accurately determine the level of risk of non‑compliance at each school. This may help both agencies more effectively target their monitoring to higher‑risk schools.
By December 2018, the NSW Department of Education should:
- Strengthen its processes to provide greater assurance that the enrolment and expenditure information it collects from non‑government schools is accurate. This should build on the work the Australian Government already does in this area.
- Establish formal information‑sharing arrangements with the NSW Education Standards Authority to more effectively monitor schools' eligibility to receive funding.
By December 2018, the NSW Education Standards Authority should:
- Extend its inspection practices to increase coverage of the registration requirement for policies and procedures for the proper governance of schools.
- Establish formal information‑sharing arrangements with the NSW Department of Education to more effectively monitor schools' continued compliance with the registration requirements.
The Department’s current approach to managing grants to non‑government schools could be improved to provide greater confidence that funds are being spent in line with the objectives of the grant schemes.
The NSW Government provides funding to non‑government schools to improve student learning outcomes, and to support schooling choices by parents, but does not monitor whether these grants are achieving this. In addition, each grant program has specific objectives. The main objectives for the per capita grant program is to increase the rate of students completing Year 12 (or equivalent), and to improve education outcomes for students. While non‑government schools publicly report on some educational measures via the MySchool website, these measures do not address all the objectives. Strengthened monitoring and reporting of progress towards objectives, at a school level, would increase accountability for public funding. This may require the Department to formalise its access to student level information.
The Department has listed five broad categories of acceptable use for per capita grants, however, provides no further guidance on what expenditure would fit into these categories. Clarifying the appropriate use of grants would increase confidence that funding is being used as intended. Schools must engage an independent auditor, registered with ASIC, to certify that the funding has been spent. The Department could strengthen this approach by improving its processes to check the registration of the auditor, and to verify their independence.
The Department has limited oversight of funding provided to System Authorities (Systems). The Department provides grants to Systems for all their member schools. The Systems can distribute the grants to their schools according to their own methodology. Systems are not required to report to the Department how much of their grant was retained for administrative or centralised expenses. Increased oversight over how the Systems distribute this grant could provide increased transparency for the use of public funds by systems.
By December 2018, the NSW Department of Education should:
- Establish and communicate funding conditions that require funded schools to:
- adhere to conditions of funding, such as the acceptable use of grants, and accounting requirements to demonstrate compliance
- report their progress towards the objectives of the scheme or wider Government initiatives
- allow the Department to conduct investigations to verify enrolment and expenditure of funds
- provide the Department with access to existing student level data to inform policy development and analysis.
- Increase its oversight of System Authorities by requiring them to:
- re‑allocate funds across their system on a needs basis, and report to the Department on this
- provide a yearly submission with enough detail to demonstrate that each System school has spent their State funding in line with the Department's requirements.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - NESA's risk-based compliance monitoring
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #299 - released 3 May 2018
Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.
We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.
Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.
This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:
- agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
- information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
- agencies are building risk management capabilities.
The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.
In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:
Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)
In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.
That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.
For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.
Employee perceptions of risk management
Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.
Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making
We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.
Support and guidance to help staff manage risks
Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.
Recommendation
By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:
- Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018
