Reports
Actions for NSW planning portal
NSW planning portal
What the report is about
The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal).
Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online, including all stages of development applications.
The portal has been developed under three separate business cases in 2013, 2014 and 2020.
In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal.
What we found
Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information, and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online.
Shortcomings in the department's initial planning and management of the program led to a significant time overrun. It has taken the department longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated.
In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program, resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.
The department now has a clear view of the scope necessary to finalise the program, but has not yet published the services it plans to implement in 2022 and 2023.
Mandating the use of the portal for all development applications changed the program's strategic risk environment and required the department to work more closely with a cohort of stakeholders, many of whom did not want to adopt the portal.
Despite this change, the department kept its overall delivery approach the same.
While implementation of the portal has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value.
The Department has only reported benefits since 2019 and has not independently assured the calculation of benefits.
What we recommended
By December 2022, the department should:
- publish a roadmap of the services it expects to release on the portal across 2022 and 2023
- update its ePlanning program assumptions, benefits targets and change management approach to reflect the government's decision to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of a development application
- independently assure and report publicly the correct calculation of ePlanning program benefits.
Fast facts
- 10 years taken to implement the portal when completed
- 3 years longer than initially planned to implement the portal
- $146m capital expenditure on the portal when completed
- $38.5m more spent than planned in the business cases.
The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal, or the planning portal). The department defines the portal as an online environment where community, industry and government can work together to better understand and meet their obligations under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online throughout New South Wales. This includes, but is not limited to:
- applying for and gaining planning approval
- applying for and gaining approval for building works, sub-dividing land and similar activities
- issuing occupancy and other certificates.
The portal has been developed under three separate business cases. The first business case in 2013 led to the creation of a central portal, which made planning information available to view by planning applicants and allowed some planning applications to be lodged and tracked online.
Under a second business case prepared in 2014, the department set out to improve and widen the functions available via the portal. The department prepared a third business case in 2020 to fund further improvements to the portal over the period July 2020 to June 2023. The third business case also extended the portal's functions to support the building and occupation stages of the planning cycle.
In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all stages of development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21 and applied to all councils as well as certifiers and others involved in the planning process.
The objective of this performance audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal. We investigated whether:
- delivery of the NSW planning portal was planned effectively
- sound governance arrangements are in place to ensure effective implementation of the program
- users of the NSW planning portal are supported effectively to adopt and use the system.
Conclusion
Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online. Implementation was initially hindered by deficiencies in planning and it has taken the department significantly longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated. While the portal's implementation has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value. As a result, the department cannot yet demonstrate that the portal has achieved overall financial benefits, relative to its costs.
In the first two years of the ePlanning program, the department delivered a portal that allowed planners, developers, certifiers and the public to view important planning information. However, the department found the delivery of a second, transactional version of the portal in 2017 to be much more challenging. This version was intended to offer more integrated information and allow development applications to be submitted and managed online. The department did not rollout this version after a pilot showed significant weaknesses with the portal's performance. A subsequent review found that this was partly because the department did not have a clear view of the portal’s role or the best way to implement it. In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.
By the time the program reaches its scheduled completion in 2023, it will have taken the department ten years and around $146 million in capital expenditure to implement the portal. This will be significantly longer and more expensive than the department originally expected. This overrun is partly due to an increased scope of services delivered through the portal and an initial under-appreciation of what is involved in creating a standard, central resource such as the portal. The department also experienced some significant implementation difficulties – which saw the transactional portal discontinued after it was found to be not fit for purpose. Following this, the department re-set the program in 2017–18 and re-planned much of the portal's subsequent development.
In November 2019, the New South Wales Government decided to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of development applications by the end of 2020–21. The department had previously planned that the portal would be progressively adopted by all councils and other stakeholders over the five years to 2025. The decision to mandate the portal's use for all development applications brought forward many of the portal's benefits as well as the challenges of its implementation. The department did not change its overall delivery approach in response to the changed risks associated with the government's decision to mandate use of the portal.
The current version of the portal has given the department more timely and comprehensive planning information and has helped New South Wales to provide continuous planning services during COVID-19 lockdowns, which interrupted many other public functions. The portal has also delivered financial benefits, however the department has not independently assured benefits calculations carried out by its consultant, and the reported benefits are overstated. In addition, some stakeholders report that the portal is a net cost to their organisation. This has included some certifiers and some councils which had implemented or had started to implement their own ePlanning reforms when use of the portal was mandated in 2019. The department now needs to address the issues faced by these stakeholders while continuing to deliver the remaining improvements and enhancements to the portal. Over the remaining year of the program, it will be critical that the department focuses on the agreed program scope and carefully evaluates any opportunities to further develop the portal to support future planning reforms.
This part of the report sets out how:
- the ePlanning program has been planned and delivered
- users of the portal have been supported
- the program has been governed.
This part of the report sets out the ePlanning program's:
- expected and reported financial benefits
- calculation of financial benefits.
In 2019, the department increased its expectations for net financial benefits
The department's three ePlanning business cases each forecast substantial financial benefits from the implementation of the planning portal. The department expected that most financial benefits would flow to planning applicants due to a quicker and more consistent planning process. It also expected that government agencies and councils would benefit from the portal.
Business case 1 ($ million) |
Business case 2 ($ million) |
Business case 3 ($ million) |
Total ($ million) |
|
---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits | 90.0 | 44.3 | 270.9 | 405.2 |
Costs | 43.3 | 29.4 | 89.8 | 162.5 |
Net benefits | 46.7 | 15.0 | 181.1 | 242.7 |
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.
In 2019 the department commissioned a review to explore opportunities to better identify, monitor and realise the benefits of the ePlanning program. Using this work, the department updated the expected benefits for business cases 1 and 2 to take account of:
- errors and miscalculations in the original benefits calculations
- slower delivery of the portal and changes to the take-up of portal services by councils
- changes to the services supported by the portal.
Original business case 1 and 2 (combined) ($ million) |
New business case 1 and 2 (combined) ($ million) |
|
---|---|---|
Benefits | 134.3 | 210.6 |
Costs | 72.7 | 96.3 |
Net benefits | 61.7 | 114.3 |
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.
Reported benefits significantly exceed the current targets
In September 2021, the department reported that the program had achieved $334 million of benefits over the three financial years up to June 2021 plus the first two months of 2021–22. These reported benefits were significantly higher than expected.
2018–19 ($ million) |
2019–20 ($ million) |
2020–21 ($ million) |
July to August 2021 ($ million) |
Total ($ million) |
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits | 5.2 | 68.8 | 214.7 | 45.1 | 333.8 |
Target | 2.5 | 14.4 | 56.7 | 19.2 | 92.8 |
Amount and per cent above target | 2.7 108% |
54.4 378% |
158 279% |
25.9 135% |
241 260% |
The department attributes the higher-than-expected financial benefits to the following:
- benefit targets have not been updated to reflect the impact of the 2019 decision to mandate the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision brought forward the expected benefits as well as potential costs of the program. However, the department did not update its third business case which was draft at the time. The business case was subsequently approved in July 2020
- one-off cost savings for agencies not having to develop their own systems
- public exhibitions of planning proposals continuing to be available online during 2020 when some newspapers stopping printing due to COVID-19.
The calculation of benefits is overstated
The department reported $334 million of benefits in September 2021 due to the ePlanning program. This calculation is overstated because:
- a proportion of reported benefits is likely to be due to other planning reforms
- the calculation of the largest single benefit is incorrect
- the reported benefits may not fully account for dis-benefits reported by some stakeholders.
The program’s benefits are calculated primarily from changes in planning performance data, such as the time it takes to determine a planning development application. The department currently attributes the benefits from shorter planning cycles entirely to the effect of the ePlanning program. However, planning cycles are impacted by many other factors such as the complexity of planning regulations and the availability of planning professionals. Planning cycles may also be impacted by other departmental initiatives which are designed to improve the time that it takes for a planning application to be evaluated. The Introduction describes some of these initiatives.
The largest contribution to the department’s September 2021 benefit report was an estimated saving of $151 million for developers due to lower costs associated with holding their investment for a shorter time. However, the department’s calculation of this benefit assumes a high baseline for the time to determine a development application. It also assumes that all development applications except for additions or alterations to existing properties will incur financing costs. However, a small but material number of these applications will be self-financed. The calculation also includes several data errors in spreadsheets.
The calculation of some benefits relies upon an extrapolation of the benefits experienced by a small number of early-adopter councils, including lower printing and scanning costs, fewer forms and quicker processing times. However, some councils report that their costs have increased following the introduction of the portal, primarily because aspects of the portal duplicate work that they carry out in their own systems. The portal has also required some councils to re-engineer aspects of their own systems, such as the integration of their planning systems with other council systems such as finance or property and rating systems. It has also required councils to create new ways of integrating council information systems with the planning portal.
The department has published information to help councils and certifiers to automatically integrate their systems with the planning portal. This approach uses application programming interfaces (or APIs) which are an industry-standard way for systems to share information. In April and May 2021, the government granted $4.8 million to 96 regional councils to assist with the cost of developing, implementing and maintaining APIs. The maximum amount of funding for each council was $50,000. The department is closely monitoring the implementation of APIs by councils and other portal users. Once they are fully implemented the department expects APIs to reduce costs incurred by stakeholders.
The department has not yet measured stakeholder costs. It was beyond the scope of this audit to validate these costs.
The department has not independently assured the calculation of reported benefits
In 2020 the department appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the ePlanning program. The department advised that it chose to outsource the calculation of benefits because the provider had the required expertise and because it wanted an independent calculation of the benefits. The process involves:
- extraction and verification of planning performance data by the department
- population of data input sheets by the department
- calculation of benefits by the external provider using the data input
- confirmation by the department that the calculation includes all expected benefit sources.
The department does not have access to the benefits calculation model which is owned and operated by the external provider. The department trusts that the provider correctly calculates the benefits and does not verify the reported benefit numbers. However, as the benefits model involves many linked spreadsheets and approximately 300 individual data points, there is a risk that the calculation model contains errors beyond those discussed in this audit.
The reported benefits have only been calculated since 2019
The department originally intended to track benefits from October 2014. However, it only started to track benefits in 2019 when it appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the portal. Any benefits or dis-benefits between the introduction of the portal and 2019 are unknown and not included in the department’s calculation of benefits.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #366 - released 21 June 2022
Actions for State Finances 2021
State Finances 2021
What the report is about
The results of the consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2020–21 GGS and TSS financial statements was unqualified but contained an emphasis of matter. The resolution of significant issues delayed signing until 24 December 2021.
The emphasis of matter draws attention to significant uncertainties associated with key assumptions related to the recognition by the GGS of a $2.4 billion investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).
The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that it intended to issue a qualified audit opinion, but actions by the NSW Government avoided this outcome. All evidence provided prior to 14 December indicated that the GGS’s return on the $2.4 billion cash contributed to TAHE was insufficient to support accounting for it as an investment. Projected returns were below the long term inflation rate and were insufficient to recover:
- TAHE's revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
- an average rate of return of at least 2.5 per cent of equity invested in TAHE.
In these circumstances, the $2.4 billion contributed to TAHE should have been expensed. This could have impacted the GGS’s budget result.
The NSW Government’s actions to avoid a qualified audit opinion included:
- a government decision made on 14 December approving TAHE’s shareholding ministers communicating that their expectation of a return had increased to 2.5 per cent
- reflecting the revised shareholding ministers’ expectations in the 2021–22 ‘NSW Half-Yearly Review’ on 16 December. The NSW Government provided an additional $1.1 billion to fund increased access and license fees to TAHE from the public sector operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains)
- signing a Heads of Agreement (HoA) on 18 December between Transport for NSW (TfNSW),TAHE and the public sector operators. The HoA reflected the parties’ intent to renegotiate contracts to increase TAHE’s licence and access fees by $5.2 billion.
The uncertainty raised in our emphasis of matter relates to:
- TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which remain subject to re-negotiation and must meet or exceed the indicative future access and licence fees set out in the HoA
- continued funding for TAHE's key customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to meet the price increases outlined in the HoA
- the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review', which provides for $1.1 billion of the additional funding over the forward estimates period to 2024–25. A further $4.1 billion is required over the following six years (2026–31), which are outside the forward estimates period
- further significant cash flows required to support the funding model are outside the 10-year contract period. That is, beyond 30 June 2031.
There remains a risk that:
- TAHE will not be able to re-contract with the rail operators for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
- future government's funding to TAHE’s key customers, the rail operators, may not be consistent with the current shareholding ministers’ expectations
- TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.
The audit found a risk of undue reliance on consultants, a need to improve quality controls on materials submitted to audit and an extreme risk finding raised with respect to providing key information on a timely basis.
The GGS Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast budget deficit of $16 billion.
The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth target of 5.6 per cent. In 2020–21, the GGS expenditure grew by 6.9 per cent mainly due to grants and subsidies paid from the COVID-19 stimulus packages received from the Commonwealth.
What we recommended
Significant matters concerning TAHE
We recommend NSW Treasury:
- implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
- establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on its equity injections into public sector entities
- report on the performance of investments in TAHE and all other public sector entities
- ensure the revised commercial agreements between TAHE and NSW rail operators reflect access and licence fees set out in the Heads of Agreement
- with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support returns beyond FY2031
- liaise with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and reconfirm the sector classifications of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains
- with TAHE, monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods
- significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared on a timely basis
- consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.
A number of other non-TAHE related recommendations have been raised in Section 6 ‘Key Audit Findings’.
Fast factsThe Total State Sector comprises the General Government Sector, the Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) Sector and the Public Financial Corporation (PFC) Sector. The 2020–21 consolidated financial statements of the General Government and Total State Sectors provide the financial performance and position of the NSW Government.
|
Pursuant to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I present my report on State Finances 2021. My independent auditor’s opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements, albeit delayed, is unqualified. My independent auditor’s report however, does include an emphasis of matter drawing attention to significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the State’s equity investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).
The 2020–21 year was challenging from many perspectives, not least being the continuing impact of and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, NSW Treasury provided government agencies extensions of time to submit financial statements for audit. Finance staff and management right across government must be congratulated for their responsiveness in meeting their financial reporting obligations in such challenging circumstances.
The General Government’s 2020–21 budget result, reflected within the Total State Sector Accounts, was a deficit of $7.1 billion. This compares with the original budgeted deficit of $16 billion. The factors that contributed to this outcome are presented in this Report to Parliament along with other significant matters related to the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts.
One section of my report is dedicated to issues related to the accounting for TAHE. This year’s audit was significantly delayed by protracted disagreement over the treatment of the government’s cash contribution to TAHE. This matter was further frustrated by the fact that information was withheld and not shared with my Office on a timely basis. This has warranted an extreme risk finding for NSW Treasury to significantly improve governance processes to ensure complete and timely sharing of information. This is key to preserving trust, which is one of the foundations that underpins my Office’s engagement with agencies in the conduct of their audits.
The challenges encountered in completing this year’s audit were extraordinary and tested the constructive partnership between the Audit Office and NSW Treasury. I want to acknowledge the enormous efforts of staff of both agencies to correct material errors and ultimately achieve my unmodified audit opinion. I saw first-hand the professionalism, resilience and dedication of my staff. A commitment to accurate and transparent financial reporting is a key basis upon which confidence in the financial management of New South Wales’ resources can be assured.
Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales
9 February 2022
The Independent Auditor's Report, which includes an emphasis of matter was issued on 24 December 2021
While the audit opinion on the State's 2020–21 financial statements was ultimately unmodified, NSW Treasury delayed signing the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sector's (GGS) investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) during 2020–21.
The Treasurer and NSW Treasury signed the consolidated financial statements on 24 December 2021, eleven weeks later than the 2018–19 pre-pandemic timetable.
The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that the 2020–21 TSSA would be qualified with respect to TAHE
Our review of all evidence received prior to 14 December indicated the GGS's expected returns were below the long-term inflation rate and that there was no expectation it should recover a significant asset revaluation loss. The levels of projected returns did not support the accounting treatment of the GGS's cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE as an equity injection.
The TSSA are prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and particularly AASB 1049 ‘Whole-of-Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting’. This standard requires contributions from owners to comply with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Government Finance Statistics Manual 20151 (GFSM) where it would not conflict with Australian Accounting Standards.
The ABS GFSM states that an equity contribution is recognised unless there is no reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return can be generated by that investment, in which case the transfer is expensed. A realistic rate of return is defined in the ABS GFSM as the intention to earn a rate of return that is sufficient to generate dividends (including income tax equivalents) and holding gains or losses at a later date. Holding losses include the final asset revaluation decrement of $20.3 billion, which TAHE incurred on its property plant and equipment assets when it became a for-profit entity and was required to value its assets on the basis of the cash flows they are expected to generate. The lower the commercial returns (cashflows), the greater the potential valuation losses of a for-profit entity's assets. This $20.3 billion valuation loss is disclosed within notes 1 'Significant Accounting policies - TAHE Reform in 2020–21', Note 11 'Equity Investments in Other Public Sector Entities' and Note 14 'Property, Plant & Equipment of the Total State Sector and GGS' financial statements.
Multiple versions of models estimating the GGS's expected rate of return were submitted to the Audit Office by NSW Treasury attempting to demonstrate the commerciality of the GGS's investment in TAHE. Until 14 December 2021, our review of all calculations indicated the existing access and licence fees set up under commercial arrangements effective 1 July 2021 did not support a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return would be earned on the equity injections to TAHE. The existing revenue arrangements reflected a shareholders' expected rate of return of only 1.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity and did not include recovery of the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion incurred in 2020–21.
Having reviewed all evidence provided, the Audit Office communicated to NSW Treasury that unless corrected, the State's accounts would be qualified as the $2.4 billion transfer made by the GGS to TAHE should have been reported as a grant expense instead of an investment. The GGS's estimated rate of return was not sufficient to cover:
- TAHE's final revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
- a dollar value equal to, or exceeding a 2.5 per cent rate of return on the equity invested in TAHE (ie: at least equal to the long term inflation rate).
Action was required by the NSW Government to avoid a qualified audit opinion
NSW Government actions avoided a qualified audit opinion related to the GGS’s cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE. To support the TAHE structure as a commercial arrangement earning a sufficient rate of return, the NSW Government agreed to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.
Shareholding ministers increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent
On 14 December 2021, a government decision was made resulting in the TAHE shareholding ministers requesting that TAHE re-negotiate the access fees and license fees payable under the Operating Agreements between TAHE and the public operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains). The renegotiation was to target an average return to the GGS of 2.5 per cent on the equity contributed. TAHE's existing ten year agreements with the operators provide a mechanism by which the parties meet annually and consult in order to determine the amount of the access fees and licence fees that will be payable in the following financial year.
The revised shareholder expectations for TAHE were published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' on 16 December 2021. The revised expectations changed the basis of the expected returns on equity from the 10-year Commonwealth bond rate of only 1.5 per cent, to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent. This is consistent with the Reserve Bank's target band and the Commonwealth's Department of Finance's expected return on government investments in other sectors.
The revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement
On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW), TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity. This revised return includes:
- income earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE’s assets
- recovery of the revaluation losses in 2020–21 on TAHE’s property, plant and equipment assets incurred when TAHE commenced operations as a for-profit entity, albeit the recovery of the revaluation loss is projected to take up to 2052.
The HoA reflects an intention between all parties to revise the contractual agreements to increase future access and license fees by $5.2 billion. This included $1.1 billion for the period FY2023–25, which is reflected in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review'. Further detail on the HoA is reported in Section 3 of this report ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’.
NSW Treasury revised its calculations to reflect the increased future returns
Following these changes, NSW Treasury revised its calculations of estimated returns to reflect a cumulative return equivalent to the expected long-term inflation rate, and recovery of the 2021 valuation loss by 2052. The rate of return period is consistent with the weighted average remaining useful life of TAHE's assets. The changes supported the financial reporting treatment of the $2.4 billion transfer from the GGS to TAHE as an investment rather than an expense, even though TAHE is currently heavily reliant on revenues from the public rail operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. If the cash contribution had to be treated as a capital grant expense, it would have reduced the GGS's budget result by $2.4 billion.
The Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE)
Despite the investment in TAHE being better supported, and the independent auditor's opinion being unqualified, the Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter, which draws attention to the significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the GGS’s equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty is associated with key assumptions that support the recognition by the GGS of its $2.4 billion investment in TAHE during 2020–21.
As at the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to judgements around the commerciality of TAHE's operations because:
- TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which are critical to its ability to earn a realistic rate of return, remain subject to re-negotiation and re-signing of the current access agreements. The proposed indicative future access and licence fees, which are set out in the HoA are intended to form the basis of the re-negotiation.
- $1.1 billion in additional funding for TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, was provided in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' consistent with the terms in the HoA. However, this funding only extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2024–25. There is an additional $4.1 billion required over the following six years, which falls outside of the forward estimates period (up to the end of the 10-year contract period). While this has been communicated to the government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be provided for in government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are currently highly dependent on its government customers, it is critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the GGS to support increases in the prices government customers will pay for access to TAHE's assets.
- A further significant portion of the required returns is earned outside of the 10-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031). NSW Treasury has estimated $37.9 billion in returns from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2052, but has not identified the source or means of these returns beyond 2031. Currently, TAHE derives the majority of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW trains, who in turn are both funded by grants to Transport for NSW from the GGS. The projected returns calculated by NSW Treasury beyond 2031 are calculated by assuming a 2.5 per cent growth rate. About 87 per cent of these estimated returns are being earned beyond the ten years, with $32.9 billion estimated over the period 2032–52. There remains risk that:
- TAHE will not be able to re-contract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
- future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
- TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.
Significant accounting issues relating to TAHE are detailed in Section 3 to this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in section 6 to this report titled ‘Key Audit findings’.
Other financial reporting matters
The State extended the date for submission of agency financial statements for audit to provide relief to agencies impacted by the New South Wales' COVID-19 lockdowns
All agencies were given a one-week extension (two weeks in 2019–20) to prepare their financial statements and submit them for audit by 2 August 2021. Further extensions were subsequently approved for the following ten agencies and funds (11 in 2019–20) to submit completed financial statements for audit:
- Department of Communities and Justice (9 August 2021 for disclosures related to cloud computing costs)
- Investment NSW (13 August 2021)
- Jobs for NSW (13 August 2021)
- TCorp IM Funds (19 August 2021)
- Lord Howe Island Board (22 October 2021)
- Department of Customer Service (31 August 2021 for disclosures related to AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors')
- Department of Transport (20 August 2021)
- Sydney Olympic Park Authority (12 August 2021)
- Planning Ministerial Corporation (12 August 2021)
- Transport Asset Holding Entity (16 August 2021).
Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to resolve accounting issues relating to:
- asset valuations
- first time implementation of AASB 1059
- asset transfers and treatment of software as service costs.
The extensions outlined above resulted in a two-week delay submitting the State’s draft consolidated financial statements for audit.
In 2020–21, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 24 errors exceeding $20 million (19 in 2019–20). The total value of these errors was $6.6 billion, a significant increase from the previous year ($1.4 billion in 2019–20)
The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.
The errors resulted from:
- incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury Policies
- incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities
- human error or lack of oversight.
The completion of the 2020–21 Total State Sector Accounts was significantly delayed as material accounting issues were resolved. These issues related to how the General Government Sector’s (GGS)2 investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity was accounted for. The key areas of audit concern, which required considerable effort to satisfactorily resolve, included our assessment of:
- the accounting treatment of funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS, specifically:
- whether funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS should be considered an equity investment or capital grant expense, with the latter having implication to the presentation of the NSW Government Budget positions. Funds are expensed unless, as an investment, there is a reasonable expectation to generate a sufficient rate of return
- forming a view as to what a ‘reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return on investment3’ should be with respect to the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Government Finance Statistics Manual 2015 (GFSM)
- the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment at 30 June 2021
- whether TAHE was correctly classified as a Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entity
- whether, under the agreements in place for the use and price of TAHE's assets, TAHE controlled its property, plant and equipment.
Our assessments were hindered by errors and omissions in information and models provided by NSW Treasury to demonstrate expected returns from TAHE, as well as a lack of timeliness and completeness in their responses to requests for documentation to support NSW Treasury's proposed accounting of government's contributions to TAHE.
Up until 13 December 2021, evidence provided by NSW Treasury to support the treatment of a $2.4 billion equity transfer from the GGS to TAHE did not demonstrate a sufficient rate of return on the State's investment. Instead, the evidence suggested the transfer was of the nature of a capital grant expense, which would impact the GGS budget result. Unless corrected, by either reversing the equity investment to a capital grant expense (impacting the GGS budget result) or providing additional resources to the rail operators to support additional TAHE access and licence fees (adding additional expenses to future GGS budget results), this matter would have caused the State's accounts to have been qualified.
After the Audit Office communicated the likely audit outcome to NSW Treasury, significant changes were made by government from 14 December 2021. Government decisions that avoided qualification of the TSSA included:
- On 14 December, a government decision approved communicating revised shareholders' expectations of rate of return of 2.5 per cent being the long-term inflation rate, and increased grants to Transport for NSW for the rail operators to pay increased access and licence fees to TAHE to support of the new rate of return (previously 1.5 per cent).
- On 16 December, the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' included an increase in expected returns to be derived through higher access and license fees charged by TAHE. To facilitate these returns, an increased allocation of funds of $1.1 billion was made to Transport for NSW (TfNSW) from 1 July 2022 as part of the forward estimates for the period 2022–25. This was to pay for the proposed increased access and licence fees the operators would be required to pay TAHE.
- On 18 December, TfNSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains signed a Heads of Agreement (HoA) forming the basis of negotiations to revise annual operating agreements to facilitate the shareholders’ expected returns of 2.5 per cent of contributed equity. The HoA included indicative access and licence charges to be used as a basis of renegotiation, increasing access fees and licence fees to be paid by Sydney Trains and NSW Trains over the 10-year period from 2022–2031 by a further $5.2 billion. Most of this increase occurs outside the forward estimates. The majority of the additional funding may need to be funded by future governments.
NSW Treasury has projected returns to be earned to 2052 (a period covering the weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets) as sufficient to recover the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion which arose when TAHE revalued its assets under the income approach. These assets were valued on a discounted cash flow basis as at 30 June 2021.
These key decisions and the circumstances leading up to these changes are detailed later in this section.
Background
On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation of New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, was renamed the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) transitioning to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts. TAHE was not a newly created entity, nor was it the result of a change in administrative re-arrangements (such as Machinery of Government change).
Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to TfNSW, a GGS agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result and in the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA).
From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections, even though the business model was yet to be determined. NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets of 1 July 2019.
Contributions paid to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.
The business model eventually adopted was one whereby:
- The GGS invests in TAHE with an expectation of a sufficient rate of return.
- TAHE charges the operators (predominantly Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to use network and rolling stock to deliver services. The operators remain responsible for both the delivery of the services and the maintenance and safe operation of the assets. The operators are primarily funded by TfNSW through grants.
- The GGS grants funds to operators, which allows them to pay access fees to TAHE. The amount of these grants impacts the budget result.
- TAHE pays a return back to GGS by way of dividends and tax equivalents. The return may also include holding gains and losses on the fair value of the net assets of TAHE.
TAHE earns relatively small amounts of income from transactions with the private sector. While the TAHE Board envisages that, over time, they will enhance the commerciality of TAHE’s operations, it is currently highly dependent on revenues from government contracts (over 80 per cent). The circularity in flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below:
The government continues to respond to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. Over 2020–21, the government allocated an additional $5.6 billion to agencies as part of its economic stimulus and pandemic response. Measures included:
- $1.8 billion in health measures including essential medical equipment purchases, vaccine distribution, quarantine, contract tracing and maintaining clinical health capacity (such as intensive care units)
- $508 million in additional cleaning services primarily to the Department of Education and Transport for NSW
- $500 million as part of the ‘Dine & Discovery NSW’ voucher program to the Department of Customer Service
- $350 million in combined land tax relief and small business recovery grants to Department of Customer Service and NSW Treasury respectively.
Around $4.5 billion of this package was spent in 2020–21, leaving $1.1 billion unspent and carried forward into 2021–22. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2021 compared to their target spend.
Deficit of $7.1 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $16 billion
The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.
The General Government Sector, which comprises 204 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.
In addition to the 204 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 98 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly.
The Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $16 billion.
Revenues increased $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion
In 2020–21, the State’s total revenues increased by $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion, 6.5 per cent higher than previous year. A decrease of 0.3 per cent was recorded in 2019–20. The main contributors to the increase in the State's revenues were an increase in taxation revenue of $4.6 billion and an increase in grants and subsidies of $1.4 billion when compared to the prior financial year.
Taxation revenue increased by 15.3 per cent
Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to:
- $2.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by:
- $2.7 billion increase in contracts and conveyance duties (transfer duties) from both higher transaction volumes and strong property price growth during 2020–21
- $200 million increase in motor vehicle registration duty driven by increases in new vehicle sales
- $520 million higher Gambling and Betting Taxes was earned as 2019–20. The previous year's revenues were impacted by club and hotel closures due to COVID-19. The operation of these venues in 2020–21 returned to normal for most of the year resulting in higher club gaming tax revenue of $216 million and hotel gaming taxes of $265 million
- $439 million higher collections of payroll taxes. The previous year's revenues were impacted by tax relief measures implemented by the government in response to COVID-19. Lower payroll tax was collected in 2019–20 as employment levels dropped during the State’s first lock down
- $416 million higher land tax revenues, driven by an average 3.2 per cent increase in valuer general land values, which are the basis for determining land tax values.
Stamp duties of $11.7 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $2.9 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.8 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.
Expenses increased $4.1 billion to $101 billion
The State’s expenses increased 4.3 per cent compared with 2019–20. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, depreciation and amortisation, other operating costs and grants and subsidies expense.
Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 3.6 per cent to $44.1 billion
Salaries and wages increased to $36.3 billion ($34.8 billion in 2019–20). This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and an average increase of approximately three per cent in the cost of NSW's employees across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $511 million and $619 million respectively.
The Health sector employed an additional 4,893 full time staff in 2020–21 (2,763 in 2019–20) and incurred an extra $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 2,418 full time equivalents in 2020–21 (4,866 in 2019–20). This year, the health and education sectors received a 0.3 per cent award increase in pay rates.
The Public Service Commission (PSC) noted in the ‘State of the NSW Public Sector Report, 2021’ that the government sector senior executive headcount increased by 347 to 3,680 (3,333 in 2019–20). The Transport cluster represented the majority of the increase in the government sector's senior executive headcount, with an increase of 182. The PSC report noted the increase was due to the growing portfolio of major transport infrastructure projects.
Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.
Depreciation and amortisation expense increased 7.6 per cent to $10.3 billion
Depreciation and amortisation increased to $10.3 billion in 2020–21 ($9.6 billion in 2019–20). This increase was mainly driven by the depreciation of completed infrastructure projects including the State’s WestConnex M8 and M5 East Motorways, and other road projects such as Woolgoolga to Ballina project. This year also includes twelve months of depreciation relating to the CBD and South-East Light Rail versus six months in the previous financial year.
Furthermore, the first time adoption of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements’ resulted in the State recognising $45.4 billion of service concession assets in its capacity as grantor under arrangements with operators. More than 87 per cent of this balance was recognised by the Transport cluster. These assets are valued at current replacement cost and are depreciated on an annual basis. A service concession arrangement is an arrangement whereby the government as grantor, contracts with an operator to develop (or upgrade), operate and maintain the grantor's public service assets such as roads, bridges or hospitals. The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide using the assets, to whom, and at what price. The grantor also retains any significant residual interest in the assets at the end of the arrangement. Further details about AASB 1059 are included in the ‘Implementation of new accounting standards’ section of this report.
Grants and subsidies increased $1.5 billion to $15.6 billion
The increase in grants and subsidies is due to payments made by the State in supporting businesses and local communities in response to COVID-19. These mainly included $240 million in Dine & Discover voucher payments, $156 million in land tax relief assistance, $160 million increase in grants to non-government schools (including $31 million to support Covid intensive learning support programs), and $109 million relating to small business grant payments.
The State also transferred $592 million in newly constructed assets to local councils. These mainly related to $378 million in assets transferred following completion of WestConnex stage 2 and $180 million from Northern Roads.
Other operating expenses increased two per cent to $27.5 billion
Operating expenses increased to $27.5 billion in 2020–21 ($26.9 billion in 2019–20) due to higher operating activities as agencies responded to the pandemic.
Supplies and Other Services increased by $1.7 billion. This was mainly due to funding of $533 million in hotel quarantine and associated services, and $495 million in medical equipment for the health sector.
Inventories consumed increased by $266 million. This included $217 million in COVID-19 medical equipment that was written off because it had expired or did not meet the TGA regulatory standards. Contractor expenses increased by $306 million because of increased capital works activity, primarily in the Transport sector.
The increase was offset by $1.6 billion in lower insurance claims expense. In 2019–20 financial year, higher claims were made in respect to natural disaster events, including bush fires.
Health costs remain the State’s highest expense
Total expenses of the State were $101 billion ($96.4 billion in 2019–20). In 2020–21, Health remains the highest contributor of expenses for the State with $25.7 billion ($24.2 billion in 2019–20). Education remains the second highest contributor of expenses reporting $18.4 billion in 2020–21 ($17.5 billion in 2019–20).
The following sectors have the highest expenses as a percentage of total State expenses:
- Health – 25.6 per cent (25.1 per cent in 2019–20)
- Education – 18.3 per cent (18.2 per cent in 2019–20)
- Transport – 14.5 per cent (13.3 per cent in 2019–20).
Assets grew by $12.3 billion to $526 billion
The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $12.3 billion to $526 billion. This was a 2.4 per cent increase compared with 2019–20, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.
Valuing the State’s physical assets
State’s physical assets valued at $391 billion
The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $1.7 billion to $391 billion in 2020–21 ($37.9 billion increase in 2019–20). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($172 billion), infrastructure systems ($202 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion).
The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.
Liabilities increased $16.4 billion to $291 billion
The State borrowed additional funds in response to COVID-19
The State’s borrowings rose by $15.8 billion to $134 billion at 30 June 2021. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.
The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $16.8 billion to $114 billion, which largely funded the State's capital expenditure and response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
TCorp bonds are traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.
Over 2020–21, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.
The State’s fiscal objective published in the 2021–22 Budget Papers is to repair the operating position by returning the budget to surplus by 2024–25 and rebuilding balance sheet capacity by bringing net debt down towards seven per cent of Gross State Product (GSP) over the medium-term. The State measures net debt as the sum of deposits held, government securities, loans payable and other borrowings, less the sum of cash and deposits, advances paid and investments, loans receivable and placements.
The chart below shows the actual net debt to GSP for NSW compared to the Commonwealth net debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the past six years. The trend shows an increase in net debt, particularly in the past two years, which is mainly driven by additional borrowings needed to fund stimulus measures when responding to COVID-19 and natural disaster relief.
GSF Act and GSF Regulation
Financial reporting provisions in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) have now commenced
From 1 July 2021, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act) financial reporting provisions were repealed. Agencies prepared their 2020–21 financial statements under Part 7 of the GSF Act. They were audited under the Government Sector Audit Act (GSA Act). The GSF Act requires the timeframe for annual financial statement submission be specified in the Treasurer’s Directions.
Under the GSF Act, all reporting GSF agencies are required to prepare annual financial statements, unless exempt from the definition of a reporting agency under the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018 (GSF Regulation). Those agencies exempt from preparing financial statements include certain small agencies, Crown Land Managers, special purpose staff agencies and retained State interests. These agencies must meet prescribed requirements or thresholds and self-assess each year to determine whether they remain exempt against the criteria in the GSF Regulation.
Most of the financial reporting provisions of the GSF Act have now commenced except for requirements concerning special deposit accounts (SDA) and special purpose financial reports, which are scheduled to commence on 1 July 2023, subject to approval from the Governor.
The GSF Act now includes most of the provisions applicable to GSF agencies, as requirements for appropriations, expenditure, financial services, and other matters were enacted on 1 December 2018 and 1 July 2019.
Once fully commenced, the GSF Act will consolidate and replace reporting provisions of four Acts:
- PF&A Act
- Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987
- Annual Reports (Departments) Act 1985
- Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Act 1984.
GSA Act and GSA Regulation
The PF&A Act was renamed the GSA Act on 1 July 2021 and now only contains provisions relating to the Auditor-General and the Audit Office, the audit of government sector finances and governance of the Public Accounts Committee.
Of note in the renamed GSA Act is that:
- a new principal object was added that specifically provides the Auditor-General is an independent and accountable statutory officer
- the previous financial reporting provisions in the PF&A Act were repealed as the financial reporting provisions are contained in Part 7 of the GSF Act. As a result, there are no longer financial reporting provisions in the GSA Act
- a new section 34 was added, which contains the requirements for the audit of State sector agencies’ financial statements. These were previously contained in two separate sections.
The GSA Regulation commenced on 1 July 2021, replacing the Public Finance and Audit Regulation 2015 (PF & A Regulation). The GSA Regulation contains the list of entities, funds and accounts prescribed for the purpose of audits under the GSA Act.
Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes
There are inconsistencies between key statutory timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General in the GSF Act and GSA Act which has been brought to the attention of NSW Treasury. The inconsistencies identified include:
- Section 34(3)(a) of the GSA Act defines the audit period for the Statements be as soon as practicable after the Auditor-General is given the Statements. This appears to be inconsistent with section 49(3) of the GSA Act, which requires that the Auditor-General, on or before 22 October transmit the Statements and audit report to the Treasurer. Neither provision is a paramount provision.
- Section 49(3) of the GSA Act also appears to be inconsistent with section 52(1) of the GSA Act which provides that the Statements are to be given to the Auditor-General in accordance with section 7.17 of the GSF Act. Section 7.17 of the GSF Act requires that the Statements are to be prepared and given to the Auditor-General by an agreed date to enable the audit of the Statements. Part 7 of the GSF Act is a paramount provision under section 1.8 of the GSF Act, which means the requirements in section 7.17 of the GSF Act prevail.
There are also inconsistencies in key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer under the GSF Act.
The audited Statements are a key accountability mechanism that provides information on the State’s financial performance and position. Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. As noted at the beginning of this report, the delay in issuing the audit report for the 30 June 2021 Statements was due to NSW Treasury’s resolution of accounting issues that were material to the Statements, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sectors investment in TAHE during 2020–21. NSW Treasury's management letter will include a high risk finding with regards to the inconsistencies between the GSF Act and GSA Act.
RecommendationNSW Treasury should seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve the inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to key statutory reporting time frames. |
Appropriations framework
NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority
The GSF Act requires that money not be paid out of the Consolidated Fund except under the authority of an Act, such as the annual Appropriation Act or GSF Act. This means a minister is only authorised to spend out of the Consolidated Fund the amount they have been appropriated by the relevant Act(s).
Generally, money is authorised to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund either through:
- The Annual Appropriation Act - this is an act to appropriate out of the Consolidated Fund sums for the services of the government for the relevant financial year. These appropriations are made to the responsible ministers of principal departments, Special Offices and certain SDAs.
- The GSF Act - this act allows the responsible minister of a GSF agency to be given an appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund, at the time the agency receives or recovers any deemed appropriation money. Deemed appropriation money is defined in section 4.7(3) of the GSF Act.
Ministers can delegate and sub-delegate appropriation expenditure functions to accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies. Any spending by accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies in excess of the amount appropriated to their relevant minister would be made contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act.
The Budget Papers are an additional mechanism by which the government controls the level of expenditure by agencies both at the individual and departmental administrative cluster level. The Budget Papers set an administrative limit imposed by the government. Separately, the Treasurer can issue a Budget control authority under section 5.1 of the GSF Act. A Budget control authority can regulate expenditure of money by GSF agencies in a variety of ways, as set out in section 5.1(2) of the GSF Act.
In July 2021, NSW Treasury advised the Audit Office that it had received advice from the Crown Solicitor's Office, in January 2021, that payments between agencies in different administrative clusters would not meet the definition of a 'deemed appropriation' under the GSF Act by the receiving agency. This applies to money paid and received by two agencies across different administrative clusters that continue to hold the money in the Consolidated Fund. These intra-government receipts increase the amount an agency has available to spend, without there being a corresponding increase in the responsible minister’s appropriated expenditure limits, thus increasing the risk an agency’s expenditure could cause a minister to exceed their appropriated expenditure authority.
After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office worked with NSW Treasury officers to clarify potential implications. The Audit Office also obtained further advice from the Crown Solicitor’s Office to clarify certain aspects of the appropriations framework more broadly. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. The advice also confirmed:
- a deemed appropriation for the services of an agency would ordinarily be available for the services of other agencies, if the officers of the other agencies had a delegation from the minister(s) to expend the deemed appropriation and funds remained available under those deemed appropriations
- that the ‘exhaustion’ of a minister’s appropriation may be precipitated by one agency’s level of expenditure in the financial year, but the effect is that the relevant appropriation is exhausted for all agencies (and their officers) that may otherwise rely on it
- whether expenditure by an agency occurred beyond the scope of its authority would require a progressive examination of the total amounts expended from the minister’s appropriation
- amounts expended from the Consolidated Fund without the authority of an appropriation are spent contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act
- a minister is responsible to Parliament for (i) the manner in which appropriations are expended, and (ii) any ‘overspends’ (that is, expenditure without authority) by agencies for which they are responsible.
Determining whether expenditure has occurred without the authority of an appropriation is complex and it is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority. As noted earlier, there are mechanisms in place to manage agencies' administrative expenditure limits set by the Budget Papers, but there is no mechanism in place to ensure expenditure by agencies does not exceed a minister’s appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and GSF Act.
RecommendationNSW Treasury should ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister’s coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriation Act and the GSF Act. |
In addition, principal departments and agencies that hold money in the Consolidated Fund are required by Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and NSW Treasury Circular TC20/08 'Mandates of options and major policy decisions under Australian Accounting Standards' to prepare a Summary of Compliance in their financial statements. The Summary of Compliance applies to agencies that obtain part or all of their spending authority from a Parliamentary appropriation. It is intended to provide information on the amounts appropriated or authorised for an agency’s use and whether those expenditures were authorised. There remains uncertainty around how the Crown Solicitor’s Office advice received by the Audit Office impacts these disclosures, as the total spending authority given by Parliamentary appropriations and expenditure against these appropriations cannot generally be attributed to an individual agency. Such a scenario is not contemplated by the relevant Australian Accounting Standard. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk findings about improving mechanisms in place to manage agencies administrative expenditure limits, uncertainties related to appropriation spending authority on agencies summary of compliance disclosures.
RecommendationNSW Treasury should assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and agencies' financial statement disclosures. |
Delegations to incur expenditure
Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation
The delegation to incur expenditure is an important accountability mechanism of responsible government.
Last year’s Report on State Finances reported instances where government agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act for deemed appropriations, resulting in some agencies spending deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
This year’s financial audits identified that further agencies: TAFE Commission, Multicultural NSW and the Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner spent money received from an annual Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk issues about improving mechanisms in place to ensure agencies have appropriate delegations in place to spend Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money.
In addition, the audit of the Jobs for NSW Fund (the Fund) special purpose statements identified that five payments from the Fund were authorised by an officer without the necessary delegation from the minister as required by section 14 of the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 and sections 5.5(2) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
RecommendationGiven the continued instances of non-compliance, NSW Treasury needs to promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations. |
Implementation of new accounting standards
This year, the State implemented the requirements of AASB 1059
AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’
AASB 1059 is an Australian Accounting Standard that requires public sector entities (grantors) that enter service concession arrangements with private sector operators for the delivery of public services recognise service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements. The standard was effective from 1 July 2020.
AASB 1059 requires a grantor to:
- recognise an asset provided by the operator as a service concession asset if the grantor controls the asset
- initially measure the service concession asset at current replacement cost (CRC) in accordance with AASB 13 ‘Fair Value Measurement’
- recognise a corresponding liability measured initially at the fair value (CRC) of the service concession asset, adjusted for any consideration between the grantor and the operator
- make sufficient disclosure in the financial statements so that users can understand the nature, amount and timing of assets, liabilities, revenue and cash flows arising from these.
The adoption of AASB 1059 increased the State’s total assets and liabilities by $19.5 billion and $19.6 billion respectively, with net worth reducing by $131 million at 1 July 2019
The State adopted a modified retrospective approach when adopting AASB 1059 and recognised and measured service concession assets and liabilities at the date of initial application of 1 July 2019, with any net adjustments recognised in accumulated funds at that date. This means comparatives were restated to reflect the impact of AASB 1059.
Most of the service concession assets recognised by the State related to Property, Plant & Equipment, in particular infrastructure assets.
Agencies had to devote significant effort to implement AASB 1059 and ensure their 2020–21 financial statements materially complied with the standard's requirements. Last year, the Audit Office highlighted advance preparation was key to ensuring agencies effectively transitioning to this new standard. Despite the new standard being issued well in advance of its commencement date, Sydney Water Corporation, Department of Customer Service, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and TAHE did not prepare sufficiently for their respective implementations.
Whilst most agencies in 2019–20 had commenced assessing their existing commercial arrangements to determine whether they were within the scope of AASB 1059, calculating and posting the accounting entries to support the implementation of this standard was delayed for TfNSW. TfNSW had not finalised its opening balance adjustments in time for the Audit Office’s early close review. Critical assessments of AASB 1059 to identify the accounting implications for the Transport sector, in particular TfNSW and TAHE were still being considered as late as 30 September 2021.
Restart NSW
Restart NSW was established in 2011 to fund the State’s major infrastructure projects
Restart NSW funds Rebuilding NSW, the government’s 10-year plan to invest $23 billion in new infrastructure. Its infrastructure projects, including Sydney Metro West and Parramatta Light Rail, are primarily funded by proceeds from the government’s asset recycling program. The Restart Fund had a balance of $12.4 billion at 30 June 2021 ($15 billion in 2019–20).
The Fund paid $3.8 billion for infrastructure projects in 2020–21 ($4.3 billion in 2020–21). The largest payments were for transport projects, including Sydney Metro West, Parramatta Light Rail, and contributed $319 million of the $2.4 billion equity contribution to the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).
The funds are invested in the NSW Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF), which is allowed under the Restart NSW Fund Act 2011 (Restart Act). The NIFF is an investment vehicle for the fund to help the NSW Government meet its infrastructure objectives and this fund is managed by TCorp. In 2020–21, the fund earned a net return of 7.9 per cent, higher than its annual benchmark return of 4.2 per cent, benefiting from improved returns in financial markets over 2020–21.
The fund directed 30.1 per cent of its payments towards rural and regional infrastructure projects in 2020–21
The Restart Act requires the fund to report on the percentage of payments directed to rural and regional infrastructure projects and whether this represents at least 30 per cent of the total payments from the fund. The Restart NSW Fund Amendment (Rural and Regional Infrastructure Funding) Bill 2020 introduced in Parliament in 2020 would amend the Restart Act by requiring at least 30 per cent of the total payments each financial year and for the life of the Restart NSW Fund be made on infrastructure projects in rural and regional areas.
This year the fund exceeded its target of directing at least 30 per cent of funding towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. However, since the funds’ commencement, only 23 per cent of total payments went towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. Current projections for the life of the fund indicate only 27.5 per cent of funding will be spent on rural and regional projects, which is below the funds target of 30 per cent target for the life of the fund.
Audit Office’s work plan for 2021–22
The Audit Office’s 2021–22 work plan focuses on the State’s response, recovery and impact from the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disaster emergencies
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the public sector of New South Wales. Government continues to assist communities in their recovery from the 2019–20 bushfires and subsequent flooding. The scale of government responses to these events has been significant and has required a wide-ranging response involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.
Significant resources have been directed toward these responses, and in assisting rebuilding and economic recovery. Some systems and processes have changed to reflect the need for quick responses to immediate needs. The increasing and changing risk environment presented by these events has meant that we have recalibrated and focused our efforts on providing assurance on how effectively aspects of these emergency responses have been delivered. This includes financial and governance risks arising from the scale and complexity of government responses to these events.
While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. We will take a phased approach to ensuring that our work addresses the following elements of the emergencies and government responses:
Appendix one – Prescribed entities
Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2021
Planning, Industry and Environment 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.
An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.
The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.
The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.
There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.
Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.
The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.
There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.
What the key issues were
The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.
Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:
- system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
- deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
- the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
- the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
- deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
- lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
- the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.
There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.
The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.
What we recommended
The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.
Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.
The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.
Fast facts
The Planning, Industry and Environment cluster aims to make the lives of people in New South Wales better by developing well-connected communities, preserving the environment, supporting industries and contributing to a strong economy.
There are 54 agencies, 609 State controlled Crown land managers that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land and 120 common trusts in the cluster.
- 42% of the area of NSW is Crown land
- $33.2b water and electricity infrastructure as at 30 June 2021
- 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits
- 7 high-risk management letter findings were identified
- 54 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
- 40% of reported issues were repeat issues
This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.
Section highlights
|
Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Machinery of government changes
Machinery of government changes
What the report is about
The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are organised.
The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. Changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day.
Larger machinery of government changes typically occur after an election or a change of Premier.
This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes.
What we found
The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported.
DPC and NSW Treasury provided principles to guide implementation but did not require departments to collect or report information about the benefits or costs of the changes.
The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled.
Major implementation challenges included negotiation about the allocation of corporate support staff and the integration of complex corporate and ICT systems.
What we recommended
DPC and NSW Treasury should:
- consolidate existing guidance on machinery of government changes into a single document that is available to all departments and agencies
- provide guidance for departments and agencies to use when negotiating corporate services staff transfers as a part of machinery of government changes, including a standard rate for calculating corporate services requirements
- progress work to develop and implement common processes and systems for corporate services in order to support more efficient movement of staff between departments and agencies.
Fast facts
- $23.7m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2019 DPIE changes to date, noting additional ICT costs will be incurred
- $4.0m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2020 DRNSW changes, with an estimated $2.7 million ongoing annual cost
- 40+ NSW Government entities affected by the 2019 machinery of government changes
The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are allocated and structured across government departments and agencies. A machinery of government change is the reorganisation of these structures. This can involve establishing, merging or abolishing departments and agencies and transferring functions and responsibilities from one department or agency to another.
The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. These changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day. Machinery of government changes are formally set out in Administrative Arrangements Orders, which are prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet, as instructed by the Premier, and issued as legislative instruments under the Constitution Act 1902.
The heads of agencies subject to machinery of government changes are responsible for implementing them. For more complex changes, central agencies are also involved in providing guidance and monitoring progress.
The NSW Government announced major machinery of government changes after the 2019 state government election. These changes took place between April and June 2019 and involved abolishing five departments (Industry; Planning and Environment; Family and Community Services; Justice; and Finance, Services and Innovation) and creating three new departments (Planning, Industry and Environment; Communities and Justice; and Customer Service). This also resulted in changes to the 'clusters' associated with departments. The NSW Government uses clusters to group certain agencies and entities with related departments for administrative and financial management. Clusters do not have legal status. Most other departments that were not abolished had some functions added or removed as a part of these machinery of government changes. For example, the functions relating to regional policy and service delivery in the Department of Premier and Cabinet were moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.
Our Report on State Finances 2019, tabled in October 2019, outlined these changes and identified several issues that can arise from machinery of government changes if risks are not identified early and properly managed. These include: challenges measuring the costs and benefits of machinery of government changes; disruption to services due to unclear roles and responsibilities; and disruption to control environments due to staff, system and process changes.
In April 2020, the Department of Regional NSW was created in a separate machinery of government change. This involved moving functions and agencies related to regional policy and service delivery from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment into a standalone department.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes. The audit investigated whether:
- DPIE and DRNSW have integrated new responsibilities and functions in an effective and timely manner
- DPIE and DRNSW can demonstrate the costs of the machinery of government changes
- The machinery of government changes have achieved or are achieving intended outcomes and benefits.
It is unclear whether the benefits of the machinery of government changes that created the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) outweigh the costs. The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of directly attributable benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported. The benefits and costs of the machinery of government changes were not tracked because the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury did not require departments to collect or report this information. The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled. This was achieved despite short timelines and no additional budget allocation for the implementation of the changes.
The rationale for establishing DPIE was not documented at the time of the 2019 machinery of government changes and the anticipated benefits of the change were not defined by the government or the department. For DRNSW, the government’s stated purpose was to provide better representation and support for regional areas, but no prior analysis was conducted to quantify any problems or set targets for improvement. Both departments reported some anecdotal benefits linked to the machinery of government changes. However, improvements in these areas are difficult to attribute because neither department set specific measures or targets to align with these intended benefits. Since the machinery of government changes were completed, limited data has been gathered to allow comparisons of performance before and after the changes.
DPC and NSW Treasury advised that they did not define the purpose and benefits of the machinery of government changes, or request affected departments to do so, because these were decisions of the government and the role of the public service was to implement the decisions.
We have attempted to quantify some of the costs of the DPIE and DRNSW changes based on the information the audited agencies could provide. This information does not capture the full costs of the changes because some costs, such as the impact of disruption on staff, are very difficult to quantify, and the costs of ICT separation and integration work may continue for several more years. Noting these limitations, we estimate the initial costs of these machinery of government changes are at least $23.7 million for DPIE and $4.0 million for DRNSW. For DPIE, this is predominantly made up of ICT costs and redundancy payments made around the time of the machinery of government change. For DRNSW it includes ICT costs and an increase in senior executive costs for a standalone department, which we estimate is an ongoing cost of at least $1.9 million per year.
For the DPIE machinery of government change, there were risks associated with placing functions and agencies that represent potentially competing policy interests within the same 'cluster', such as environment protection and industry. We did not see evidence of plans to manage these issues being considered by DPIE as a part of the machinery of government change process.
The efficiency of machinery of government changes could be improved in several ways. This includes providing additional standardised guidance on the allocation of corporate functions and resources when agencies are being merged or separated, and consolidating guidance on defining, measuring and monitoring the benefits and costs of machinery of government changes.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #359 - released (17 December 2021).
Actions for Members' additional entitlements 2021
Members' additional entitlements 2021
What the report is about
The Auditor-General's review analyses claims made by members of the NSW Parliament during the 2020–21 financial year by testing a sample of transactions. Our sample consisted of 67 claims submitted by 52 of the 137 members.
What we found
While we did not identify any instances of material non-compliance with the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal's Determination, we did identify 31 departures from the Determination, which were of an administrative nature.
What we recommended
The Department of Parliamentary Services (the department) should continue to work with the Presiding Officers, members, the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly to enhance reporting of members' expenditure.
In 2020, we recommended the department work with the Tribunal to provide additional guidance to members to clarify:
- the definition of 'parliamentary duties'
- the activities that meet the definition
- requirements for retaining documents.
The department will work with the Tribunal to clarify these items as part of its submission to the 2022 annual Determination.
Fast facts
- 12 claims were submitted after 60 days
- 7 Sydney allowance reconciliations were submitted late
- 10 annual loyalty scheme declarations were submitted late
- 2 publications had not made the required authorisations and attributions
- $22.5m of additional entitlements were claimed in the 2020–21 financial year. This was 4.2% higher than in the 2019–20 financial year.
The Auditor-General has reviewed the compliance of the members of the NSW Parliament (members) with certain requirements outlined in the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal's Determination (the Determination) for the year ended 30 June 2021.
The Auditor-General's review analyses claims made by members during the 2020–21 financial year by testing a sample of transactions. Our sample consisted of 67 claims submitted by 52 of the 137 members.
Results
Although our review did not identify any instances of material non-compliance with the Determination for the year ended 30 June 2021, we did identify 31 departures from the Determination, which were of an administrative nature. Such departures may help identify areas in the current processes where greater clarity is needed or where training or education for members is needed. These departures were as follows:
- 12 claims were not submitted for payment within 60 days of receipt or occurrence of the expense
- 10 annual loyalty scheme declarations were submitted by members after the due date specified in the guideline
- 7 reconciliations for the Sydney Allowance were submitted after the due date
- 2 publications claimed under the Communications Allowance had not made the required authorisations and attributions on the publication.
Background
The Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal (the Tribunal) determines the salary and additional entitlements of members of the NSW Parliament (members), details of which are set out in the Tribunal's annual Determination. The NSW Parliament, through the Department of Parliamentary Services (the department), administers payments of additional entitlements to members in accordance with the Tribunal's annual Determination. An overview is presented below:
Twelve claims were not submitted for payment within 60 days of receipt or occurrence of the expense
The Determination requires members' expense claims to be submitted to the department within 60 days of when the expense is incurred or receipted. Our audit procedures identified 12 instances where members submitted their claims between six and 248 days late.
Ten annual loyalty/incentive scheme declarations were submitted by members after the due date specified in the guidelines
At the end of each financial year, members must declare they have not used loyalty/incentive scheme benefits accrued from their parliamentary duties for private purposes. The Determination requires current members to complete the declarations at the end of each year (by 27 August 2021 per the department's administrative process). Former members must complete the declarations within 30 days of leaving Parliament. We found ten current members submitted their declarations between three and 18 days late. The declaration is important as it affirms that loyalty benefits accrued using the members' parliamentary allowances and entitlements were not used for private purposes.
Seven reconciliations for the Sydney Allowance reconciliations were submitted after the due date
Open prior period recommendations
Enhanced public reporting
In 2016, the Auditor-General's Report to Parliament recommended the Tribunal consider requiring the department to regularly publish full details of members' expenditure claims on its website in an accessible and searchable format. The Tribunal had developed a plan requiring greater public reporting of members' additional expenditure from 1 July 2019 but does not have the power to require the department to facilitate this.
The Annual Reports of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council, published on the Parliament's website, currently list the total amount claimed during the year by each member for each allowance. However, transparency around members’ claims would be enhanced if information was more extensively and regularly published on the Parliament’s website. The department should continue to work with the Presiding Officers, members, the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly to enhance reporting of members' expenditure.
Clarifying key parameters of the annual Determination
In 2020, the Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament recommended the department work with the Tribunal to provide additional guidance to members to clarify:
- the definition of 'parliamentary duties'
- the activities that meet the definition
- requirements for retaining documents.
To address this recommendation, the department has performed a review of the definitions and activities used by other jurisdictions, in their administration of members' entitlements. The department is also continuing to monitor for changes in the administration of members' entitlements occurring at the Federal level. The department will work with the Tribunal to clarify these items as part of its submission to the 2022 annual Determination.
Resolved prior period recommendations
Recommendations resolved since the 2020 Auditor-General's report
The 2019 Auditor-General's Report recommended the department work with the Tribunal to clarify whether members can claim the cost of travel from their General Travel Allowance when the travel was used to produce communications during the blackout period. Members are not permitted to use their Communications Allowance for the production and distribution of publications that they intended to distribute in a State Election year in the period from 26 January to the election date (the ‘blackout period’).
The 2021 Determination has clarified this matter by stating that during the 'blackout period' travel necessary for parliamentary duties rather than electioneering is acceptable. The 2021 Determination has also included the condition that a member may not use their General Travel Allowance to fund communications that would normally be funded from the Communications Allowance during a 'blackout period'.
Appendix one - Response from Department of Parliamentary Services
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2021
Premier and Cabinet 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Premier and Cabinet cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.
The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.
The Library Council of New South Wales corrected a prior period error of $325 million. In 2017, the council split its collection assets into six asset classes, but not the related asset revaluation reserves. To correct this error, some revaluation decrements previously recognised in asset revaluation reserves were reclassified to accumulated funds.
Eight agencies did not complete all of the mandatory early close procedures.
What the key issues were
The Premier and Cabinet cluster was impacted by three Machinery of Government (MoG) changes during 2020–21.
The changes resulted in the transfer of activities and functions in and out of the cluster and the creation of a new entity - Investment NSW.
The transferor entities continued to provide services to Investment NSW subsequent to 30 June 2021. There were no formal service level agreements in place for the provision of these services.
The New South Wales Electoral Commission (the Commission) and Sydney Opera House Trust obtained letters of financial support from their relevant Minister and/or NSW Treasury in 2020–21. The postponement of local government elections impacted the Commission's operations due to increased planned expenditure to support a COVID-safe election. Sydney Opera House Trust's ability to generate revenue was impacted due to the closure of the Concert Hall partly due to COVID-19 and planned renovations.
The number of repeated audit issues raised with management and those charged with governance increased from 22 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.
There were 47 moderate risk and 28 low risk findings identified. Of the total findings there were 24 repeat issues.
What we recommended
Investment NSW should ensure services received from other agencies are governed by service level agreements.
Fast facts
The Department of Premier and Cabinet supports the Premier and Cabinet to deliver the government's objectives, infrastructure, preparedness for disaster, incident recovery, arts and culture.
- $11.9b of property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
- $4.4b total expenditure incurred in 2020-21
- 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
- 47 moderate risk findings were reported to management
- 38 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020-21
- 32% of all reported issues were repeat issues.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.
Section highlights
|
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy
Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy
What the report is about
This audit assessed nine agencies’ compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) including whether, during the year to 30 June 2020, the participating agencies:
- met their reporting obligations under the CSP
- reported accurate self-assessments of their level of maturity implementing the CSP’s requirements including the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s (ACSC) Essential 8.
What we found
Key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. The CSP is not achieving the objectives of improved cyber governance, controls and culture because:
- the CSP does not specify a minimum level for agencies to achieve in implementing the 'mandatory requirements' or the Essential 8
- the CSP does not require agencies to report their target levels, nor does it require risk acceptance decisions to be documented or formally endorsed
- each participating agency had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements in an ad hoc or inconsistent basis
- none of the participating agencies had implemented all of the Essential 8 controls
- agencies tended to over-assess their cyber security maturity - all nine participating agencies were unable to support all of their self-assessments with evidence
- there is no monitoring of the adequacy or accuracy of agencies' self-assessments.
What we recommended
In this report, we repeat recommendations made in the 2019 and 2020 Central Agencies reports, that Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.
Cyber Security NSW should:
- monitor and report compliance with the CSP
- require agencies to report the target and achieved levels of maturity
- require agencies to justify why it is appropriate to target a low level of maturity
- require the agency head to formally accept the residual risk
- challenge agencies' target maturity levels.
Agencies should resolve discrepancies between their reported level of maturity and the level they are able to support with evidence.
Separately, the agencies we audited requested that we not disclose our audit findings. We reluctantly agreed to anonymise our findings, even though they are more than 12 months old. We are of the view that transparency and accountability to the Parliament of New South Wales are part of the solution, not the problem.
The poor levels of agency cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires leadership and resourcing.
Fast factsThe NSW Cyber Security Policy requires agencies to report their level of maturity implementing the mandatory requirements, which includes the ACSC's Essential 8.
|
This report assesses whether state government agencies are complying with the NSW Cyber Security Policy. The audit was based on the level of compliance reported at 30 June 2020.
Our audit identified non-compliance and significant weaknesses against the government’s policy.
Audited agencies have requested that we not report the findings of this audit to the Parliament of New South Wales, even though the findings are more than 12 months old, believing that the audit report would expose their weaknesses to threat actors.
I have reluctantly agreed to modify my report to anonymise agencies and their specific failings because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remedied. Time, leadership and prioritised action should have been sufficient for agencies to improve their cyber safeguards. I am of the view that transparency and accountability to the Parliament is part of the solution, not the problem.
The poor levels of cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires dedicated leadership and resourcing. To comply with some elements of the government’s policy agencies will have to invest in technical uplift and some measures may take time to implement. However, other elements of the policy do not require any investment in technology. They simply require leadership and management commitment to improve cyber literacy and culture. And they require accountability and transparency. Transparent reporting of performance is a key means to improve performance.
Cyber security is increasingly a focus of governments around Australia. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) is the Australian Government’s lead agency for cyber security and is part of the Australian Signals Directorate, a statutory authority within the Australian Government’s Defence portfolio. The ACSC has advised that government agencies at all levels, as well as individuals and other organisations were increasingly targeted over the 2021 financial year1. The ACSC received over 67,500 cybercrime reports, a 13 per cent increase on the previous year. This equates to one reported cyber attack every eight minutes. They also noted that attacks by cyber criminals and state actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex and that the attacks are increasingly likely to be categorised as ‘substantial’ in impact.
High profile attacks in Australia and overseas have included a sustained malware campaign targeted at the health sector2, a phishing campaign deploying emotet malware, spear phishing campaigns targeting people with administrator or other high-level access, and denial of service attacks. The continuing trend towards digital delivery of government services has increased the vulnerability of organisations to cyber threats.
The COVID-19 pandemic has increased these risks. It has increased Australian dependence on the internet – to work remotely, to access services and information, and to communicate and continue our daily lives. Traditional security policies within an organisation’s perimeter are harder to enforce in networks made up of home and other private networks, and assets the organisation does not manage. This has increased the cyber risks for NSW Government agencies.
In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security incidents in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these cyber breaches resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information contained in these email accounts. These attacks were the subject of the Auditor-General's report on Service NSW's handling of personal information tabled on 18 December 2020.
This audit also follows two significant performance audits. Managing cyber risks, tabled on 13 July 2021 found Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains were not effectively managing their cyber security risks. Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, tabled 7 April 2020 found that although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls.
The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) was issued by Cyber Security NSW, a business unit within the Department of Customer Service, and took effect from 1 February 2019. It applies to all NSW Government departments and public service agencies, including statutory authorities. Of the 104 agencies in the NSW public sector that self-assessed their maturity implementing the mandatory requirements, only five assessed their maturity at level three or above (on the five point maturity scale). This means that, according to their own self-assessments, 99 agencies practiced requirements within the framework in what the CSP’s maturity model describes as an ad hoc manner, or they did not practice the requirement at all. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cybersecurity and resilience as a matter of priority.
This audit looks specifically at the compliance of nine key agencies with the CSP. It looks at their achievement implementing the requirements of the policy, the accuracy of their self-assessments and the attestations they made as to their compliance with the CSP.
The CSP outlines the mandatory requirements to which all NSW Government departments and public service agencies must adhere. It seeks to ensure cyber security risks to agencies’ information and systems are appropriately managed. The key areas of responsibility for agencies are:
- Lead - Agencies must implement cyber security planning and governance and report against the requirements outlined in the CSP and other cyber security measures.
- Prepare - Agencies must build and support a cyber security culture across their agency and NSW Government more broadly.
- Prevent - Agencies must manage cyber security risks to safeguard and secure their information and systems.
- Detect/Respond/Recover - Agencies must improve their resilience including their ability to rapidly detect cyber incidents and respond appropriately.
- Report - Agencies must report against the requirements outlined in the CSP and other cyber security measures.
DCS has only recommended, but not mandated the CSP for state owned corporations, local councils and universities.
NSW Government agencies must include an attestation on cyber security in their annual report and provide a copy to Cyber Security NSW by 31 August each year stating whether, for the preceding financial year, the agency has:
- assessed its cyber security risks
- appropriately addressed cyber security at agency governance forums
- a cyber incident response plan that is integrated with the security components of business continuity arrangements, and the response plan has been tested during the previous 12 months (involving senior business executives)
- certified the agency’s Information Security Management System (ISMS) or confirmed the agency’s Cyber Security Framework (CSF)
- a plan to continuously improve the management of cyber security governance and resilience.
The purpose of the attestation is to focus the agency's attention on its cyber risks and the mitigation of those risks.
Agencies assess their level of compliance in accordance with a maturity model. The CSP does not mandate a minimum maturity threshold for any requirement, including implementation of the Australian Cyber Security Centre's (ACSC) Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (Essential 8).
Agencies are required to set a target maturity level based on their risk appetite for each requirement, seek continual improvement in their maturity, and annually assess their maturity on an ascending scale of one to five for all requirements (refer to Appendix two for the maturity model). Each control within the Essential 8 is assessed on an ascending scale of zero to three reflecting the agency's level of alignment with the strategy (refer to Appendix three for the maturity model).
Scope of this audit
We assessed whether agencies had provided accurate reporting on their level of maturity implementing the requirements of the CSP in a documented way and covering all their systems.
The scope of this audit covered nine agencies (the participating agencies). These agencies were selected because they are the lead agency in their cluster, or have a significant digital presence within their respective cluster. The list of participating agencies is in section 1.2. The audit aimed to determine whether, during the year to 30th June 2020, the participating agencies:
- met their reporting obligations under the CSP
- provided accurate reporting in self-assessments against the CSP’s mandatory requirements, including their implementation of the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s (ACSC) Essential 8
- achieved implementation of mandatory requirements at maturity levels which meet or exceed the ‘level three - defined’ threshold (i.e. are documented and practiced on a regular and consistent basis).
While the audit does assess the accuracy of agency self-assessed ratings, the audit did not assess the appropriateness of the maturity ratings.
ConclusionKey elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. There has been insufficient progress to improve cyber security safeguards across NSW Government agencies.The NSW CSP replaced the NSW Digital Information Security Policy from 1 February 2019. New requirements of the CSP were, inter alia, to strengthen cyber security governance, strengthen cyber security controls and improve cyber security culture.The CSP is not achieving the objective of improved cyber governance, controls and culture because:
|
1. Key findings
The CSP allows agencies to determine their own level of maturity to implement the 'mandatory requirements', which can include not practicing a policy requirement or implementing a policy requirement on an ad hoc basis. These determinations do not need to be justified
Agencies can decide not to implement requirements of the CSP, or they can decide to implement them only in an informal or ad-hoc manner. The CSP allows agencies to determine their desired level of maturity in implementing the requirements on a scale of one to five - level one being 'initial – not practiced' and level five being 'optimised'. The desired level of maturity is determined by the agency based on their own assessment of the risk of the services they provide and the information they hold.
The reporting template for the 2019 version of the CSP stated that level three maturity - where a policy requirement is practiced on a regular and consistent basis and its processes are documented - was required for compliance with the CSP. This requirement was removed in the 2020 revision of the reporting template.
This CSP does not require the decisions on risk tolerance, or the timeframes agencies have set to implement requirements to be documented or formally endorsed by the agency head. There is no requirement to report these decisions to Cyber Security NSW.
Some comparable jurisdictions require formal risk acceptance decisions where requirements are not implemented. The NSW CSP does not have a similar formal requirement
Some jurisdictions, with a similar policy framework to NSW, require agencies to demonstrate reasons for not implementing requirements, and require agency heads to formally acknowledge the residual risk. The NSW CSP does not require these considerations to be documented, nor does it require an explicit acknowledgement and acceptance of the residual risk by the agency head or Cyber Security NSW. The NSW CSP does not require that the records of how agencies considered and decided which measures to adopt to be documented and auditable, limiting transparency and accountability of decisions made.
All of the participating agencies had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements in an ad hoc or inconsistent basis
All of the participating agencies had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements at level one or two. Maturity below level three typically means not all elements of the requirement have been implemented, or the requirements have been implemented on an ad-hoc or inconsistent basis.
None of the participating agencies has implemented all of the Essential 8 controls at level one – that is, only partly aligned with the intent of the mitigation strategy
Eight of the nine agencies we audited had not implemented any of the Essential 8 strategies to level three – that is, fully aligned with the intent of the mitigation strategy. At the time of this audit the ACSC advised that:
as a baseline organisations should aim to reach to reach Maturity Level Three for each mitigation strategy3.
The Australian Signals Directorate4 currently advises that, with respect to the Essential 8:
[even] level three maturity will not stop adversaries willing and able to invest enough time, money and effort to compromise a target. As such, organisations still need to consider the remainder of the mitigation strategies from the Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents and the Australian Government Information Security Manual
All agencies failed to reach even level one maturity for at least three of the Essential 8.
Cyber Security NSW modified the ACSC model for implementation of the Essential 8
The NSW maturity model used for the Essential 8 does not fully align with the ACSC’s model. At the time of this audit the major difference was the inclusion of level zero in the NSW CSP maturity scale. Level zero broadly means that the relevant cyber mitigation strategy is not implemented or is not applied consistently. Level zero had been removed by the ACSC in February 2019 and was not part of the framework at the time of this audit. It was re-introduced in July 2021 when the ACSC revised the detailed criteria for each element of the essential 8 maturity model. The indicators to reach level one on the new ACSC model are more detailed, specific and rigorous than those currently prescribed for NSW Government agencies. Cyber Security NSW asserted the level zero on the CSP maturity scale:
is not identical to the level zero of the ACSC’s previous Essential 8 maturity model, but is a NSW-specific inclusion designed to prevent agencies incorrectly assessing as level one when they have not achieved that level.
Attestations did not accurately reflect whether agencies implemented the requirements
Of the nine participating agencies, seven did not modify the proforma wording in their attestation to reflect their actual situation. Despite known gaps in their implementation of mandatory requirements, these agencies stated that they had 'managed cyber security risks in a manner consistent with the Mandatory Requirements set out in the NSW Government Cyber Security Policy'. Only two agencies modified the wording of the attestation to reflect their actual situation.
Attestations should be accurate so that agencies’ and the government’s response to the risk of cyber attack is properly informed by an understanding of the gaps in agency implementation of the policy requirements and the Essential 8. Without accurate information about these gaps, subsequent decisions as to prioritisation of effort and deployment of resources are unlikely to effectively mitigate the risks faced by NSW Government agencies.
Participating agencies were not able to support all of their self-assessments with evidence and had overstated their maturity assessments, limiting the effectiveness of agency risk management approaches
Seven of the nine participating agencies reported levels of maturity against both the mandatory requirements and the Essential 8 that were not supported by evidence.
Each of the nine participating agencies for this audit had overstated their level of maturity against at least one of the 20 mandatory requirements. Seven agencies were not able to provide evidence to support their self-assessed ratings for the Essential 8 controls.
Where agency staff over-assess the current state of their cyber resilience, it can undermine the effectiveness of subsequent decision making by Agency Heads and those charged with governance. It means that actions taken in mitigating cyber risks are less likely to be appropriate and that gaps in implementing cyber security measures will remain, exposing them to cyber attack.
Agencies' self-assessments across government exposed poor levels of maturity in implementing the mandatory requirements and the Essential 8 controls
We reviewed the data 104 NSW agencies provided to Cyber Security NSW. The 104 agencies includes nine audited agencies referred to in more detail in this report. Our review of the 104 agency self-assessment returns submitted to Cyber Security NSW highlighted that, consistent with previous years, there remains reported poor levels of cyber security maturity. We reported the previous years’ self-assessments in the Central Agencies 2019 Report to Parliament and the Central Agencies 2020 Report to Parliament.
Only five out of the 104 agencies self-assessed that they had implemented all of the mandatory requirements at level three or above (against the five point scale). Fourteen agencies self-assessed that they had implemented each of the Essential 8 controls at level one maturity or higher (using Cyber NSW’s four point scale). The remainder reported at level zero for implementation of one or more of the Essential 8 controls, meaning that for the majority of agencies the cyber mitigation strategy has not been implemented, or is applied inconsistently.
Where agencies had reported in both 2019 and 2020, agencies’ self-assessments showed little improvement over the previous year’s self-assessments:
- 14 agencies reported improvement across both the Essential 8 and the mandatory requirements
- 8 agencies reported a net decline in both the Essential 8 and the mandatory requirements.
The poor levels of maturity in implementing the Essential 8 over the last couple of years is an area of significant concern that requires better leadership and resourcing to prioritise the required significant improvement in agency cyber security measures.
2. Recommendations
Cyber Security NSW should:
1. monitor and report compliance with the CSP by:
- obtaining objective assurance over the accuracy of self-assessments
- requiring agencies to resolve inaccurate or anomalous self-assessments where these are apparent
2. require agencies to report:
- the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement they have determined appropriate for their agency
- the agency head's acceptance of the residual risk where the target levels are low
3. identify and challenge discrepancies between agencies' target maturity levels and the risks of the information they hold and services they provide
4. more closely align their policy with the most current version of the ACSC model.
Participating agencies should:
5. resolve the discrepancies between their reported level of maturity and the level they are able to demonstrate with evidence, and:
- compile and retain in accessible form the artefacts that demonstrate the basis of their self-assessments
- refer to the CSP guidance when determining their current level of maturity
- ensure the attestations they make refer to departures from the CSP
- have processes whereby the agency head and those charged with governance formally accept the residual cyber risks.
Repeat recommendation from the 2019 Central Agencies report and the 2020 Central Agencies report
6. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security and resilience as a matter of urgency.
The objective of the CSP is to ensure cyber security risks are appropriately managed. However, meeting this objective depends on the requirements being implemented at all agencies to a level of maturity that addresses their specific cyber security risks. Agency systems and data are increasingly interconnected. If an agency does not implement the requirements, or implements them only in an ad-hoc or informal way, an agency is more susceptible to their systems and data being compromised, which may affect the confidentiality of citizens' data and the reliability of services, including critical infrastructure services.
Agencies determine their own target level of maturity, which may mean the requirement is not addressed, or is addressed in an ad hoc or inconsistent way
While the CSP is mandatory for all agencies, it does not set a minimum maturity threshold for agencies to meet.
The reporting template issued in 2019 stated that agencies were required to reach level three maturity in order to comply with the CSP. The 2020 revision6 of the CSP and guidance indicates that level three maturity may not be sufficient to mitigate risks. It advises the agency may determine the level to which it believes it is suitable to implement the requirements, and allows for an agency to aim for a target level of maturity less than level three. The agency can set its optimal maturity level with reference to its risk tolerance with the objective that that aim ‘to be as high as possible’. However, ‘as high as possible’ does not necessarily mean ‘fully implemented’. The CSP contemplates that a lower level of maturity is sufficient if it aligns with the agency's risk tolerance.
2019 reporting template | 2020 reporting template |
‘A Mandatory Requirement is considered met if a maturity level of three is achieved. The Agency may choose to pursue a higher maturity level if required.
There is no mandated level for the Essential 8 Maturity reporting’. |
‘There is no mandated maturity level for either the Mandatory Requirement reporting or Essential 8 reporting. Agencies need to risk-assess their optimal maturity and aim to be 'as high as possible’. |
Source: Maturity Reporting Template v4.0, February 2019.
|
Source: CSP Reporting Template 2020, May 2020.
|
The Department of Customer Service asserts that while the quotes above were part of their annual templates and policy documents, their documents were incorrect. They assert that the policy has never required a minimum level of maturity to be reached. They have responded to our enquiries that:
…a level three maturity was not a requirement of the Policy or Maturity Model’ and ‘it is misleading to suggest it was a requirement of the Policy.
This audit found that, based on the 2020 reporting template there is no established minimum baseline. Consequently, because the Department of Customer Service had not established a minimum baseline agencies are able to target lower levels (providing they were within the agency’s own risk appetite), which includes targeting to not practice a CSP policy requirement, or to practice a CSP policy requirement on an ad hoc basis.
Where requirements are not implemented, documentation of formal acceptance of the residual risks by the agency head is not required
The New Zealand Government has an approach that is not dissimilar to NSW, in that it also identifies 20 mandatory requirements and allows for a risk based approach to implementation. However, the New Zealand approach puts more rigor around risk acceptance decisions.
The New Zealand Government requires that agencies that do not implement the requirements must demonstrate that a measure is not relevant for them. It requires agencies to document the rationale for not implementing the measure, including explicit acknowledgement of the residual risk by the agency head. They require these records to be auditable.
A security measure with a ‘must’ or ‘must not’ compliance requirement is mandatory. You must implement or follow mandatory security measures unless you can demonstrate that a measure is not relevant in your context.
Not using a security measure without due consideration may increase residual risk for your organisation. This residual risk needs to be agreed and acknowledged by your organisation head.
A formal auditable record of how you considered and decided which measures to adopt is required as part of the governance and assurance processes within your organisation.
The NSW CSP does not require these considerations to be documented or auditable and does not require an explicit acknowledgement or acceptance of the residual risk by the agency head.
None of the participating agencies achieved level three implementation for all mandatory risk prevention and mitigation requirements
Maturity level three is the minimum level whereby an agency has implemented documented processes that are practiced on a regular basis across their environment. An agency has not reached level three if the requirement is implemented on an ad-hoc or inconsistent basis, or if not all elements of the requirement have been implemented.
None of the participating agencies achieved level three implementation for all mandatory requirements.
The requirements of the CSP are organised into five sections. Agency implementation of these requirements is discussed in the next five sections of this report.
- Lead: Planning and governance requirements. Section 2.1
- Prepare: Cyber security culture requirements. Section 2.2
- Prevent: Managing cyber incident prevention requirements. Section 2.3
- Detect/Respond/Recover: Resilience requirements. Section 2.4
- Report: Reporting requirements. Section 2.5.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – The maturity model for the mandatory requirements
Appendix three – Essential 8 maturity model
Appendix four – About the audit
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Fast-tracked Assessment Program
Fast-tracked Assessment Program
What the report is about
This report examines the effectiveness of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, administered by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) between April 2020 and October 2020.
The program aimed to support the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis by accelerating the final assessment stages for planning proposals and development applications.
DPIE selected projects and planning proposals for fast tracked assessment that demonstrated the potential to:
- deliver jobs
- progress to the next stage of development within six months of determination
- deliver public benefit.
The audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls.
What we found
Through tranches three to six of the program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE reported that 89 per cent of these proceeded to the next stage of development within six months.
Assessment of projects and planning proposals was compliant with legislation and other requirements. However, the audit found gaps in DPIE's management of conflicts of interest.
DPIE has not evaluated or costed the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which it provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.
Aspects of the program have been incorporated into longer term reforms to create a new level of transparency over the progress and status of planning assessments.
What we recommended
DPIE should:
- strengthen controls over conflicts of interest
- evaluate the Fast-tracked Assessment Program.
Fast facts
Construction industry support
- The program aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis
59 fast-tracked projects
- 59 projects and 42 planning proposals projects were assessed in six tranches
89% of all fast-tracked assessments in tranches three to six progressed to the next stage of the planning process within six months of determination
In April 2020, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) introduced programs aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis. One of these was the Fast-tracked Assessment Program. This program identified planning proposals and development applications (DAs), across six tranches, that were partially-assessed and could be accelerated to determination.
In accordance with the program objectives, the planning proposals and DAs selected for fast-tracked assessment had to:
- deliver jobs – particularly in the construction industry
- be capable of progressing to the next stage of development within six months of determination
- deliver public benefit.
At the same time, the Fast-tracked Assessment Program was to lay a foundation for future reform of the planning system by piloting changes in the assessment process that could be adopted in the medium to long term.
This audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls. The audit focused on tranches three to six of the program, which were determined between July 2020 and October 2020. The rationale for focusing on these four tranches was that the program design had been slightly modified after the first two tranches to address identified risks.
Conclusion
Through tranches three to six of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 31 DAs and 16 planning proposals selected in these tranches proceeded to the next stage of development within six months of determination. DPIE achieved this while also successfully managing the risk of non-compliance with planning controls arising from the accelerated process. While DPIE has incorporated components of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program into other longer-term reforms, it has not evaluated the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which the program provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.
Between April and October 2020, DPIE adopted a case management approach to accelerate the final stages of assessment for 42 planning proposals and 59 DAs in six tranches. Tranches three to six were the focus of this audit and included 22 planning proposals and 31 DAs. Applicants involved in the program were expected to progress their projects to the next stage of development within six months of determination. While DPIE had no way of compelling applicants to do this and relied on non-binding commitments obtained from applicants, DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 47 of the 53 applicants selected in tranches three to six honoured this commitment.
Fast-tracked assessment only applied to the final stages of assessment and required DPIE staff and other stakeholders to work towards a determination deadline. DPIE effectively used a case management approach to manage the risk that the accelerated timeframe could result in planning controls not being fully compliant with legislation. There is some room for improvement in the process, as four of 28 staff assessing planning proposals and DAs had not lodged current conflict of interest declarations.
Based on the results of and learnings from the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE has incorporated some elements of the program into other longer-term reforms. There is now increased transparency about when applicants can expect to receive a planning determination and DPIE has also introduced a case management approach for strategic and high priority planning applications. Applicants benefiting from case-managed assessment are now required to commit to a formal service charter that specifies the obligations of both DPIE and the applicant.
DPIE has not evaluated the Fast-tracked Assessment Program to understand the costs and benefits of the program, nor which aspects of the program were most effective as a basis for future reform.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Planning determination pathways
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #354 - released (27 July 2021).
Actions for Managing cyber risks
Managing cyber risks
What the report is about
This audit assessed how effectively Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains identify and manage their cyber security risks.
The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including implementing the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Essential 8 strategies to mitigate cyber security incidents, and identifying the agency’s most vital systems, their ‘crown jewels’.
The audited agencies have requested that we do not disclose detail of the significant vulnerabilities detected during the audit, as these vulnerabilities are not yet remediated. We provided a detailed report to the agencies in December 2020 outlining significant issues identified in the audit. We have conceded to the agencies' request but it is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.
What we found
TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks.
Both agencies have assessed their cyber security risks as unacceptably high and both agencies had not identified all of the risks we detected during this audit – some of which are significant.
Both agencies have cyber security plans in place that aim to address cyber security risks. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have combined this into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program, part of the Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP).
However, neither agency has reached its target ratings for the CSP and the Essential 8 and maturity is low in relation to significant risks and vulnerabilities exposed.
Further, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making.
TfNSW is not implementing cyber security training effectively across the cluster with only 7.2% of staff having completed basic cyber security training.
What we recommended
TfNSW and Sydney Trains should:
- develop and implement a plan to uplift the Essential 8 controls to the agency's target state
- as a matter of priority, address the vulnerabilities identified as part of this audit and previously described in a detailed Audit Office report provided to both agencies
- ensure cyber security risk reporting to executives and the Audit and Risk Committee
- collect supporting information for the CSP self assessments
- classify all information and systems according to importance and integrate this with the crown jewels identification process
- require more rigorous analysis to re-prioritise CDP funding
- increase uptake of cyber security training.
TfNSW should assess the appropriateness of its target rating for each of the CSP mandatory requirements.
Department of Customer Service should:
- clarify the requirement for the CSP reporting to apply to all systems
- require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.
Fast facts
- $42m Total value of the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program over three years.
- 7.2% Percentage of staff across the Transport cluster who had completed introductory cyber security training
Response to requests by audited agencies to remove information from this report
In preparing this audit report, I have considered how best to balance the need to support public accountability and transparency with the need to avoid revealing information that could pose additional risk to agencies’ systems. This has involved an assessment of the appropriate level of detail to include in the report about the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in this audit.
In making this assessment, the audit team consulted with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), Sydney Trains, and Cyber Security NSW to identify content which could potentially pose a threat to the agencies’ cyber security.
In December 2020, my office also provided TfNSW and Sydney Trains with a detailed report of many of the significant vulnerabilities identified in this audit, to enable the agencies to address the cyber security risks identified. The detailed report was produced as a result of a 'red team' exercise, which was conducted with both agencies' knowledge and consent. The scope of this exercise reflected the significant input provided by both agencies. More information on this exercise is at page 12 of this report.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains have advised that in the six months from December 2020 and at the time of tabling this audit report, they have not yet remediated all the vulnerabilities identified. As a result, they, along with Cyber Security NSW, have requested that we not disclose all information contained in this audit report to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their systems and resulting harm to the community. I have conceded to this request because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remediated and leave the agencies exposed to significant risk.
It should be stressed that the risks identified in the detailed report exist due to the continued presence of these previously identified vulnerabilities, rather than due to their potential publication. The audited agencies, alone, are accountable for remediating these vulnerabilities and addressing the risks they pose.
It is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.
That said, the conclusions drawn in this report are significant in terms of risk and remain valid, and the recommendations should be acted upon with urgency.
Cyber security risk is an increasing area of concern for governments in Australia and around the world. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cyber security attacks on government entities in Australia, including in New South Wales. Malicious cyber activity in Australia is increasing in frequency, scale, and sophistication. The Audit Office of New South Wales is responding to these risks with a program of audits in this area, which aim to identify the effectiveness of particular agencies in managing cyber risks, as well as their compliance with relevant policy.
Cyber Security NSW, part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS) releases and manages the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP). The CSP sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including making it mandatory for agencies to implement the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (the Essential 8). The Essential 8 are key controls which serve as a baseline set of protections which agencies can put in place to make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise a system. Agencies are required to self-assess their maturity against the CSP and the Essential 8, and report that assessment to Cyber Security NSW annually.
The CSP makes agencies responsible for identifying and managing their cyber security risks. The CSP sets out responsibilities and governance regarding risk identification, including making agencies responsible for identifying their 'crown jewels', the agency's most valuable and operationally vital systems. Once these risks are identified, agencies are responsible for developing a cyber security plan to mitigate those risks.
This audit focussed on two agencies: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains. TfNSW is the lead agency for the Transport cluster and provides a number of IT services to the entire cluster, including Sydney Trains. This audit focussed on the activities of TfNSW's Transport IT function, which is responsible for providing cyber security across the cluster, as well as directly overseeing four of TfNSW's crown jewels. Sydney Trains is one of the agencies in the Transport cluster. While it receives some services from TfNSW, it is also responsible for implementing its own IT controls, as well as controls to protect its Operational Technology (OT) environment. This OT environment includes systems which are necessary for the operation and safety of the train network.
To test the mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls, this audit involved a 'red team' simulated exercise. A red team involves authorised attackers seeking to achieve certain objectives within the target's environment. The red team simulated a determined external cyber threat actor seeking to gain access to TfNSW's systems. The red team also sought to test the physical security of some Sydney Trains' sites relevant to the agency's cyber security. The red team exercise was conducted with the knowledge of TfNSW and Sydney Trains.
This audit included the Department of Customer Service as an auditee, as they have ownership of the CSP through Cyber Security NSW. This audit did not examine the management of cyber risk in the Department of Customer Service.
This audit assessed how effectively selected agencies identify and manage their cyber security risks. The audit assessed this with the following criteria:
- Are agencies effectively identifying and planning for their cyber security risks?
- Are agencies effectively managing their cyber security risks?
Following this in-depth portfolio assessment, the Auditor-General for NSW will also table a report on NSW agencies' compliance with the CSP in the first quarter of 2021–22.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks. Significant weaknesses exist in their cyber security controls, and both agencies have assessed that their cyber risks are unacceptably high. Neither agency has reached its Essential 8 or Cyber Security Policy target levels. This low Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risk. Both agencies are implementing cyber security plans to address identified cyber security risks.
This audit identified other weaknesses, such as low numbers of staff receiving basic cyber security awareness training. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies, indicating that their cyber security risk identification is only partially effective.
Agency executives do not receive regular detailed information about cyber risks and how they are being managed, such as information on mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls for cyber risk. As a result, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of executive decision-making.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains are partially effective at identifying their cyber security risks and both agencies have cyber security plans in place
Both agencies regularly carry out risk assessments and have identified key cyber security risks, including risks that impact on the agencies' crown jewels. These risks have been incorporated into the overall enterprise risk process. However, neither agency regularly reports detailed cyber risk information to agency executives to adequately inform them about cyber risk. The Cyber Security Policy (CSP) requires agencies to foster a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making. By not informing agency executives in this way, TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not fulfilling this requirement.
Agencies' cyber security risk assessment processes are not sufficiently comprehensive to identify all potential risks. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies.
To address identified cyber security risks, both agencies have received funding approval to implement cyber security plans. TfNSW first received approval for its cyber security plan in 2017. Sydney Trains received approval for its cyber security plan in February 2020. In 2020–21 TfNSW and Sydney Trains combined their plans into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program business case valued at $42.0 million over three years. This is governed as part of a broader Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). The CDP largely takes a risk-based approach to annual funding. The Cyber Defence Portfolio Steering Committee and Board can re-allocate funds from an approved project to a different project. This re-allocation process could be improved by making it more risk-based.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks
Neither agency has fully mitigated its cyber security risks. These risks are significant. Neither TfNSW nor Sydney Trains have reduced their cyber risk to levels acceptable to the agencies. Both agencies have set a risk tolerance for cyber security risks, and the identified enterprise-level cyber security risks remain above this rating. Both agencies' self-attested maturity against the Essential 8 remains low in comparison to the agencies' target levels, and in relation to the significant risks and vulnerabilities that are exposed. Little progress was made against the Essential 8 in 2020.
Neither agency has reached its target levels of maturity for the CSP mandatory requirements. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles. The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a KPI to achieve a target rating of three for all CSP requirements where business appropriate. TfNSW considers this target rating to be its target for all the CSP requirements. However TfNSW has not undertaken analysis to determine whether this target is appropriate to its business.
The CSP makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers. While both agencies usually included their cyber security expectations in contracts with third-party suppliers, neither agency was routinely conducting audits to ensure that these expectations were being met.
The CSP requires agencies to make staff aware of cyber security risks and deliver cyber security training. TfNSW is responsible for delivering cyber security training across the Transport cluster, including in Sydney Trains. TfNSW was not effectively delivering cyber security training across the cluster because training was not mandatory for all staff at the time of the audit and completion rates among those staff assigned the training was low. As such, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had completed introductory cyber security training as at January 2021.
Agencies have assessed their cyber risks as being above acceptable levels
An agency's risk tolerance is the amount of risk which the agency will accept or tolerate without developing further strategies to modify the level of risk. Risks that are within an agency's risk tolerance may not require further mitigation and may be deemed acceptable, while risks which are above the agency's risk tolerance likely require further mitigation before they become acceptable to the agency.
Both agencies have defined their risk tolerance and have identified risks which are above this level, indicating that they are unacceptable to the agency. TfNSW has defined 'very high' risks as generally intolerable and 'high' risks as undesirable. Its risk tolerance is 'medium'. Sydney Trains has four classifications of risk: A, B, C and D. A and B risks are deemed 'unacceptable' and 'undesirable' respectively, while C risks are considered 'tolerable'. This aligns with the TfNSW definition of a medium risk tolerance.
Transport IT reported five enterprise-level cyber security risks through its enterprise risk reporting tool in September 2020, all of which relate to cyber security or have causes relating to cyber security. These risks are in aggregate form, rather than relating to specific vulnerabilities. At the time of the audit, one of these risks was rated as very high and the other four rated as high. At this time, Transport IT had identified a further seven divisional-level risks which were above the agency’s risk tolerance.
Similarly, Sydney Trains has identified one main cyber security risk in its IT enterprise-level risk register and another with a potential cyber cause. Both of these IT risks are deemed to have a residual risk of ‘unacceptable’.
Similarly, two cyber-related OT risks have been determined to be above the agency's risk tolerance. One risk is rated as 'unacceptable'. Another risk, while not entirely cyber rated, is rated 'undesirable' and is deemed to have some causes which may stem from a cyber-attack.
Agencies have assessed their current cyber risk mitigations as requiring improvement
In addition to the risk ratings stated above, at the time of the audit neither agency believed that its controls were operating effectively. Transport IT had rated the control environments for its cyber security enterprise risks as 'requires improvement'. Mitigations were listed in the risk register for these risks but, in some cases, they were unlikely to reduce the risk to the target state or by the target date. For example, one risk had actions listed as 'under review' and no further treatment actions listed, but a due date of July 2021, while another risk was being treated by the CDP with a due date of July 2021. The CDP identified in May 2020 that while the average risk identified as part of that program will be reduced to a medium level by this date, ten high risks will still remain. Given the delays in the program, this number may be higher. As such, it seems unlikely that the enterprise risk will be reduced to below a 'high' level by July 2021.
Sydney Trains’ IT and OT risk registers cross-reference controls and mitigations against the causes and consequences. The IT cyber security risk identified in the register had causes with no mitigations designed for them. Further, some of these causes did not have future mitigations designed for them. This risk also had controls in place which are identified as partially effective. For the unacceptable OT risk noted above, while there was a control designed for each of the potential causes, Sydney Trains had identified all of the controls in place as either partially effective or ineffective. This indicates that Sydney Trains was not effectively mitigating the causes of its cyber risks and, even where it had designed controls or mitigations, these were not always implemented to fully mitigate the cause of the risk.
Additional information on gaps in cyber mitigations which were exposed in the course of this audit has been detailed to both agencies. The Foreword of this report provides information about why this detail is not included here.
Essential 8 maturity is low across TfNSW and Sydney Trains and little progress was made in 2020
CSP mandatory requirement 3.2 states that agencies must implement the ACSC Essential 8. Agencies must also rate themselves against each of the Essential 8 on a maturity scale from zero to three and report this to Cyber Security NSW. A full list of the Essential 8 can be found in Exhibit 1. Both agencies have a low level of maturity against the Essential 8 not just in comparison to the targets they have set, but also in relation to the risks and vulnerabilities exposed. Both agencies have set target maturity ratings for the Essential 8 but none of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to this level. Having a low level of Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risks and vulnerabilities. Little progress was made between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods.
Transport IT has set a target rating of three across all of the Essential 8. Sydney Trains has set a target rating of three for its IT systems. Sydney Trains had an interim target of two for its OT systems in 2020 and advised that this has since increased to three. It should be noted that not all the Essential 8 are applicable to OT systems.
None of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to the target levels. Given that the Essential 8 provide the controls which are most commonly able to deter cyber-attacks, having maturity at a low level potentially exposes agencies to a cyber security attack.
Some work is underway across both TfNSW and Sydney Trains to improve the Essential 8 control ratings. The CDP provided some resources to the Essential 8 over 2019–20, with uplift focusing on specific systems. The CDP work in 2019 and 2020 relevant to the Essential 8 largely focussed on determining the current state of the Essential 8 and creating a target state roadmap. As a result, there was little improvement between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods. The CDP has a workstream for the Essential 8 in its FY 2020–21 funding allocation, however as noted above in Exhibit 6 this was delayed as resources were redeployed to Project La Brea. Regardless, work on some specific aspects of the Essential 8 remain part of the 2020–21 CDP allocation, with workstreams allocated to improving three of the Essential 8. In addition, some work from Project La Brea should lead to an improvement in the Essential 8.
Sydney Trains' Cyber Uplift Program included a workstream which had in scope the uplift in the Essential 8 in IT. There were also other workstreams which aimed to improve some of the Essential 8 for OT systems. Work is also ongoing as part of the CDP to uplift these scores in Sydney Trains.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains have not reached their target maturity across the CSP mandatory requirements and TfNSW has not evaluated its cluster-wide target to ensure it is appropriate
Cyber Security NSW allows each agency to determine its target level of maturity for the first 20 CSP mandatory requirements. Agencies can tailor their target levels to their risk profile. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles.
Sydney Trains has set its target level of maturity for IT and OT. All of Sydney Trains' target maturity levels are at least a three (defined), with a target of four (quantitatively managed) for many of the mandatory requirements. While Cyber Security NSW does not currently mandate a minimum level of maturity, in 2019 there was a requirement for each agency to target a minimum level of three.
Sydney Trains has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements.
The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a program KPI to ensure that the entire cluster reaches a minimum maturity level of three against all the CSP requirements by 2023. TfNSW has not reviewed its CSP mandatory requirement targets to determine if a three is desirable for all requirements or if a higher target level may be more appropriate. It is important for senior management to set cyber security objectives as a demonstration of leadership and a commitment to cyber security.
TfNSW has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements for its Group IT ISMS, which was the focus of this audit.
Both agencies claimed progress in their implementation of the mandatory requirements between 2019 and 2020. The audit did not seek to verify the self-assessed results from either agency.
Both agencies operate ISMS in line with the CSP
CSP mandatory requirement 3.1 requires agencies to implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) or Cyber Security Framework (CSF), with scope at least covering systems identified as the agency's ‘crown jewels’. The ISMS or CSF should be compliant with, or modelled on, one or more recognised IT or OT standard. As noted in the introduction, an ISMS ‘consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.’ Both agencies operate an ISMS compliant with the CSP requirement.
As noted in the introduction, TfNSW operates four ISMS. The Transport IT ISMS is certified against ISO27001, the most common standard for ISMS certification. Three of TfNSW’s six crown jewels are managed within this ISMS. The other ISMS are not certified to relevant standards, though TfNSW claims that they align with relevant controls. This is sufficient for the purposes of the CSP.
Sydney Trains operates two ISMS, one for IT and another for OT. Neither of these are certified to relevant ISMS Standards, however there have been conformance reviews of both IT and OT with relevant standards. These ISMS cover all crown jewels in the agency.
There are currently 11 ISMS in operation across the Transport cluster. TfNSW has proposed moving towards a holistic approach to these ISMS, with the CDP Board responsible for governing the available security controls and directing agency IT and OT teams to implement these.
Agencies are not routinely conducting audits of third-party suppliers to ensure compliance with contractual obligations
CSP mandatory requirement 1.5 makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers and ensuring that providers comply with the CSP and any other relevant agency security policies. The ACSC has provided advice on what organisations should do when managing third party suppliers of ICT. The ACSC advises that organisations should use contracts to define cyber security expectations and seek assurance to ensure that these contract expectations are being met. While both agencies usually include specific cyber security expectations in contracts, neither is routinely seeking assurance that these expectations are being met.
The NSW Government has mandated the use of the 'Core& One' contract template for low-value IT procurements and the Procure IT contract template for high-value IT procurements. Both of these contracts contain space for the procuring agency to include cyber security controls for the contractor to implement. The Procure IT contract template also includes a right-to-audit clause which allows agencies to receive assurance around the implementation of these controls. TfNSW and Sydney Trains used the mandated contracts for relevant contracts examined as part of this audit.
TfNSW included security controls in all the contracts examined as part of this audit. Compliance with ISO27001 was the most commonly stated security expectation. Of the contracts examined as part of this audit, only one contract did not have a right-to-audit clause. This contract was signed in October 2016. While these clauses are in place, TfNSW rarely conducted these audits on its third-party providers. Of the eight TfNSW contracts examined in detail, only two of these had been audited to confirm compliance with the stated security controls.
Sydney Trains included security controls in all but one of the contracts examined as part of this audit. Sydney Trains did not require contractors to be compliant with ISO27001, but only required compliance with whole-of-government policies. Sydney Trains does not routinely conduct audits of its third-party suppliers, however it did conduct deep-dive risk analyses of its top ten highest risk IT suppliers. This involved a detailed review of both the suppliers' security posture and also the contract underpinning the relationship with the supplier.
The CDP funding for 2020–21 includes a workstream for strategic third-party contract remediation. This funding is to conduct some foundational work which will allow the CDP to make further improvements in future years. While this funding will not address gaps in contract requirements or management across all contracts, this workstream aims to reduce the risks posed by strategic suppliers covering critical assets. Similarly, work is currently underway as part of the CDP to conduct OT risk assessments for key suppliers to Sydney Trains in a similar way to the work undertaken for IT suppliers.
Sydney Trains has risk assessed its third-party suppliers but TfNSW has not done so
It is important to conduct a risk assessment of suppliers to identify high-risk contractors. This allows agencies to identify those contractors who may require additional controls stated in the contract, those who require additional oversight, and also where auditing resources are best targeted.
Sydney Trains has risk assessed all its IT suppliers and, as noted above, has conducted a deep-dive risk analysis of its top ten highest risk suppliers. TfNSW has not undertaken similar analysis of its key suppliers, however it has identified risks attached to each of its strategic suppliers and has documented these. As a result of not risk assessing its suppliers, TfNSW cannot take a targeted approach to its contract management.
TfNSW demonstrated poor records handling relating to the contracts examined as part of this audit
TfNSW was not able to locate one of the contracts requested as part of the audit's sample. Other documentation, such as contract management plans, could not be located for many of the other contracts requested as part of this audit. These poor document handling practices limits TfNSW's ability to effectively oversee service providers and ensure that they are implementing agreed controls. It also limits public transparency on the effectiveness of these controls.
The Transport cluster is not effectively implementing cyber security awareness training
Agencies are responsible for implementing regular cyber security education for all employees and contractors under mandatory requirement 2.1 in the CSP. TfNSW is responsible for delivering this training to the whole Transport cluster, including Sydney Trains. The Transport cluster has basic cyber awareness training available for all staff. TfNSW also offers additional training provided by Cyber Security NSW targeted at executives and executive assistants. While TfNSW has training available to staff, it is not delivering this effectively. TfNSW does not make training mandatory for most staff nor does it require staff to repeat training regularly. Even among those staff who have been assigned the training, completion rates are low, meaning that delivery is not effectively monitored. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture.
TfNSW is responsible for creating and rolling out all forms of training to agencies within the Transport cluster. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains have the same mandatory cyber awareness training that is automatically assigned to new starters. At the time of the audit, this training was not mandatory for ongoing staff. TfNSW does make additional cyber security training available to staff who can choose to undertake the training themselves, or can be assigned the training by their manager. All TfNSW cyber security training is delivered via online modules and it is the responsibility of managers to ensure that it is completed.
Cyber security training completion rates for both TfNSW and Sydney Trains are low. Only 13.5 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had been assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training as of January 2021. Although this course is mandatory for new starters, only 53 per cent of staff assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training module had completed the course by January 2021. As a result, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the entire Transport cluster had completed this training at that time. In Sydney Trains, less than one per cent of staff had completed this training as at January 2021 and a further 7.6 per cent of staff have completed the 'Cyber Security: Beyond the Basics' training. These low completion rates indicate that TfNSW is not effectively rolling out cyber security training across the cluster.
In October 2020, the Department of Customer Service released 'DCS-2020-05 Cyber Security NSW Directive - Practice Requirement for NSW Government', which made annual cyber security training mandatory for all staff from 2021. In line with this requirement, TfNSW has advised that it will be gradually implementing mandatory annual training from July 2021 for all staff.
The Transport cluster undertakes activities to build a cyber-aware culture in accordance with the CSP, but awareness remains low
Increasing staff awareness of cyber security risks and maintaining a cyber secure culture are both mandatory requirements of the CSP. While TfNSW does undertake some activities to build a cyber aware culture, awareness of cyber security risks remains low. This can be demonstrated by the low training rates outlined above, and the 'Spot the Scammer' exercise, described in Exhibit 7. TfNSW is responsible for delivering these awareness raising activities across the cluster.
TfNSW frequently communicates with staff across the Transport cluster about various cyber security risks through multiple avenues. Both agencies use the intranet, emails and other awareness raising activities to highlight the importance for staff to be aware of the seriousness of cyber risks. Advice given on the intranet includes tips for spotting scammers on mobile phones, promoting the cluster-wide training courses, as well as various advice that staff could use when dealing with cyber risks in the workplace.
In addition to these awareness raising activities, TfNSW has also undertaken a cluster-wide phishing email exercise called 'Spot the Scammer'. This is outlined in Exhibit 7. This exercise was carried out in 2019 and 2020 and allowed the Transport cluster to measure the degree to which staff were able to identify phishing emails. As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the results of this exercise indicate that staff awareness of phishing emails remains low.
In both 2019 and 2020, TfNSW performed a ‘Spot the Scammer’ exercise in which they sent out over 25,000 emails to staff based on a real phishing attack in order to measure awareness and response. The exercise tested staff 'click through rate', the percentage of staff who clicked on the fake phishing link. In 2019, these results were then compared to industry benchmarks, with over a 20 per cent click through rate being considered 'very high'. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains were considered to have a ‘very high’ click through rate in comparison to these benchmarks in both 2019 and 2020. This indicates that staff awareness of phishing emails was low. The click through rate for TfNSW was 24 per cent in 2020, an increase from 22 per cent in 2019. For Sydney Trains, the click through rate in 2020 was 32 per cent, which was a decrease from 40 per cent in 2019. |
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #353 - released (13 July 2021).