Reports
Actions for Ensuring teaching quality in NSW public schools
Ensuring teaching quality in NSW public schools
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has released a report on how the New South Wales Education and Standards Authority (NESA) and the Department of Education (the Department) ensure teaching quality in NSW public schools.
Around 2,200 NSW public school principals are responsible for accrediting their teachers in line with the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers. The report found that NESA does not oversight principals’ decisions to ensure that minimum standards for teaching quality are consistently met.
The Department does not effectively monitor teaching quality across the state. With limited data, it is difficult for the Department to ensure its strategies to improve teaching quality are appropriately targeted to improve teaching quality.
The Department’s Performance and Development Framework does not adequately support principals and supervisors to effectively manage and improve teacher performance or actively improve teaching quality. The Department manages those teachers formally identified as underperforming through teacher improvement programs. Only 53 of over 66,000 teachers employed by the Department were involved in these programs in 2018.
The report makes three recommendations towards NESA to improve accreditation processes, and four recommendations to the Department to improve its systems and processes for ensuring teaching quality across the State.
Australian research has shown that quality teaching is the greatest in-school influence on student engagement and outcomes, accounting for 30 per cent of the variance in student performance. An international comparative study of 15-year-old students showed the performance of New South Wales students in reading, mathematics and science has declined between 2006 and 2015.
The Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (the Standards) describe the knowledge, skills and understanding expected of effective teachers at different career stages. Teachers must be accredited against the Standards to be employed in NSW schools. The NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) is responsible for ensuring all teachers in NSW schools are accredited. As part of the accreditation process the NSW Department of Education (The Department) assesses whether public school teachers meet proficient accreditation standards and advises NESA of its decisions.
The School Excellence Framework provides a method for the Department to monitor teaching quality at a school level across four elements of effective teaching practice. The Performance and Development Framework provides a method for teachers and their supervisors to monitor and improve teaching quality through setting professional goals to guide their performance and development.
The Department has a strategic goal that every student, every teacher, every leader and every school improves every year. In line with this goal, the Department has a range of strategies targeted to improving teaching quality at different career stages. These include additional resources to support new teachers, a program to support teachers to gain higher-level accreditation, support for principals to manage underperforming teachers, and a professional learning program where teachers observe and discuss each other's practice.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Education's and the NSW Education Standards Authority's arrangements to ensure teaching quality in NSW public schools. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:
- agencies effectively monitor the quality of teaching in NSW public schools
- strategies to improve the quality of teaching are planned, communicated, implemented and monitored well.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #327 - released 26 September 2019
Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales
Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales
A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.
Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1
Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2
In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.
The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.
The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:
- hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
- inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
- mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
- custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.
The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions:
- Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
- Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
- Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.
There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.
NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.
NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.
In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.
In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:
- culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
- person centred and focussed on individual needs
- delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
- holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
- delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
- welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures.
The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.
Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people
The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.
Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.
Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons.
A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:
- emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
- community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
- Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
- community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.
The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education
Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education
This report examines whether the Department of Education has the required contract management capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts (over $250,000). In 2017–18, the department managed high-value goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years.
NSW government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively.
Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).
In 2017–18, the Department of Education (the Department) managed high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years. The Department delivers, funds and regulates education services for NSW students from early childhood to secondary school.
This audit examined whether the Department has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts.
We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We assessed the Department against the following criteria:
- The Department’s policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
- The Department has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.
The NSW Public Service Commission and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation are included as auditees as they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability, including:
- NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
- NSW Procurement Agency Accreditation Scheme
- NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's responsibility for NSW Procurement will transfer to NSW Treasury on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements announced on 2 April 2019 and amended on 1 May 2019.
Conclusion The Department of Education's procedures and policies for goods and services contract management are consistent with relevant guidance. It also has a systemic approach to defining the capability required for contract management roles. That said, there are gaps in how well the Department uses this capability to ensure its contracts are performing. We also found one program (comprising 645 contracts) that was not compliant with the Department's policies. The Department has up-to-date policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance. The Department also communicates changes to procurement related policies, monitors compliance with policies and conducts regular reviews aiming to identify non-compliance. The Department uses the NSW Public Service Commission's capability framework to support its workforce management and development. The capability framework includes general contract management capability for all staff and occupation specific capabilities for contract managers. The Department also provides learning and development for staff who manage contracts to improve their capability. The Department provides some guidance on different ways that contract managers can validate performance information provided by suppliers. However, the Department does not provide guidance to assist contract managers to choose the best validation strategy according to contract risk. This could lead to inconsistent practice and contracts not delivering what they are supposed to. We found that none of the 645 contracts associated with the Assisted Schools Travel Program (estimated value of $182 million in 2018–19) have contract management plans. This is contrary to the Department's policies and increases the risk that contract managers are not effectively reviewing performance and resolving disputes. |
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #325 - released 28 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Managing growth in the NSW prison population
Managing growth in the NSW prison population
The Department of Justice has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growing prisoner numbers according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.
At the time of this audit, the NSW Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for delivering custodial corrections services in New South Wales through its Corrective Services NSW division (Corrective Services NSW). From 1 July 2019, the Department of Family and Community Services and Justice will be responsible for these functions.
Within DOJ, Corrective Services NSW is responsible for administering sentences and legal orders through custodial and community-based management of adult offenders. Its key priorities are:
- providing safe, secure and humane management of prisoners
- reducing reoffending
- improving community safety and confidence in the justice system.
The prison population in New South Wales grew by around 40 per cent between 2012 to 2018, from 9,602 to 13,630 inmates. This rate of growth was higher than experienced prior to 2012. DOJ forecasts growth to continue over the short and longer-term.
DOJ has responded to inmate population growth by doubling-up and tripling-up the number of prison beds in cells, reactivating previously closed prisons, and a $3.8 billion program of new prison capacity. DOJ has also developed a long-term prison infrastructure strategy that projects long-term needs and recommended investments to meet these needs.
This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively DOJ is responding to growth in the NSW prison population. In this report, we have not analysed the sources of demand or recommended ways that custody may be avoided. These are largely government policy issues.
The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services outlines the performance indicator framework for corrective services in Australia (Appendix three). We have used measures from this framework to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOJ’s responses to prison bed capacity needs.
In this section, we analyse system-wide indicators as DOJ has not consistently published or reported data for individual correctional centres over the period of review.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Managing women in custody
Appendix three - Corrective services performance indicator framework
Appendix four - About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #319 - released 24 May 2019
Actions for Wellbeing of secondary school students
Wellbeing of secondary school students
The Department of Education has a strong focus on supporting secondary school students’ wellbeing. However, it is difficult to assess how well the Department is progressing as it is yet to measure or report on the outcomes of this work at a whole-of-state level.
The Department of Education’s (the Department) purpose is to prepare young people for rewarding lives as engaged citizens in a complex and dynamic society. The Department commits to creating quality learning opportunities for children and young people, including a commitment to student wellbeing, which is seen as directly linked to positive learning outcomes. Wellbeing is defined broadly by the Department as “the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness”. Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing.
Several reforms have aimed to support student wellbeing in recent years. 'Local Schools, Local Decisions' gave NSW schools more local authority to make decisions, including schools' approaches to support student wellbeing. In 2016, the 'Supported Students, Successful Students' initiative provided $167 million over four years to support the wellbeing of students. From 2018, the 'Every Student is Known, Valued and Cared For' initiative provides a principal led mentoring program, and a website with policies, procedures and resources to support student wellbeing.
This audit assessed how well the Department of Education supports secondary schools to promote and support the wellbeing of their students and how well secondary schools are promoting and supporting the wellbeing of their students.
Conclusion
The Department has implemented a range of programs and reforms aimed at supporting student wellbeing. However, the outcomes of this work have yet to be measured or reported on at a system level, making it difficult to assess the Department's progress in improving student wellbeing.
Secondary schools have generally adopted a structured approach to deliver wellbeing support and programs, using both Department and localised resources. The approaches have been tailored to meet the needs of their school community. That said, public reporting on wellbeing improvement measures via annual school reports is of variable quality and needs to improve.
The Department’s wellbeing initiatives are supported by research and consultation, but outcomes have not been reported on
The Department’s development of wellbeing policy, guidance, tools and resources has been transparent, consultative and well researched. It has drawn on international and domestic evidence to support its aim to deliver a fundamental shift from welfare to wellbeing at the school and system level.
However, the key performance indicator to monitor and track progress in wellbeing has yet to be reported on despite the strategic plan including this as a priority for the period 2018 to 2022. This includes not yet reporting a baseline for the target, nor how it will be measured.
The Department’s wellbeing resources are mostly well targeted but there is room for improvement
The Department’s allocation of resources to deliver wellbeing initiatives in schools is mostly well targeted, reflects a needs basis and supports current strategic directions. This could be improved with some changes to formula allocations and clearer definitions of the resourcing required for identified wellbeing positions in schools. The workforce modelling for forecasting supply and demand, specifically for school counsellors and psychologists, needs to separately identify these positions as they are currently subsumed in general teacher numbers.
Schools' reporting on wellbeing improvement measures is of variable quality and needs to improve
Schools we visited demonstrated a variety of approaches to wellbeing depending on their local circumstances and student populations. They make use of Department policies, guidelines, and resources, particularly mandatory policies and data collections, which have good compliance and take-up at school level. Professional learning supports specific wellbeing initiatives and online systems for monitoring and reporting have contributed to schools’ capacity and capabilities.
Schools report publicly on wellbeing improvement measures through annual school reports but this reporting is of variable quality. The Department plans to improve the capability of schools in data analysis and we recommend that this include the setting and evaluation of improvement targets for wellbeing.
The implementation of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework in schools is incomplete and the Department has not effectively prioritised and consolidated tools, systems and reporting for wellbeing
Schools' take up of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework is hindered by it not being linked to the school planning and reporting policy and tools—the School Excellence Framework. At some schools we visited, this disconnect has led to a lack of knowledge and confidence in using it in schools. The Department has identified the need to improve alignment of policies, frameworks and plans and has commenced work on this.
We found evidence of overburdening in schools for addressing student wellbeing—in the number of tools, online systems for information collection, and duplication in reporting. Following the significant reforms of recent years, the Department should consolidate its efforts by reinforcing existing effective programs and systems and addressing identified gaps and equity issues, rather than introducing further change for schools. In particular, methods and processes for complex case coordination need improvement.
The NSW Department of Education commits to creating quality learning opportunities for students. This includes strengthening students’ physical, social, emotional and spiritual development. The Department sets out to enable students to be healthy, happy, engaged and successful.
Welfare and wellbeing
The Department’s approach has significantly shifted from student welfare to wellbeing of the whole child and young person. Wellbeing is defined in departmental policy and strategy documents broadly, and as directly linked to learning and positive learning outcomes. “Wellbeing can be described as the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness…Wellbeing, or the lack of it, can affect a student’s engagement and success in learning…”
Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing. Distinctions between wellbeing and welfare in the school context are outlined below.
Welfare | Wellbeing |
---|---|
Operates from a basis of student need and doesn't always take into account a whole child view. | For all students. |
Rather than building on the strengths of students, operates from a deficit model of individual student problems or negative behaviours. | Goes beyond just welfare needs of a few students and aims for all students to be healthy, happy, successful and productive individuals who are active and positive contributors to the school and society in which they live. |
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Key policies, guidance, and systems
Appendix three - Funding and resources for schools
Appendix four - Measuring wellbeing
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #318 - released 23 May 2019
Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts
Governance of Local Health Districts
The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.
Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:
- established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
- governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
- managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
- accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.
The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.
The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.
These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.
The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.
This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:
- Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
- Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
- continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
- improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
- greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
- including governance-related performance measures
- more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
- ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.
NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.
The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.
While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:
- the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
- to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
- individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.
These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.
Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.
The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.
Recommendations
- By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
- work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
- develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
- provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
- By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
- providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
- ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
- improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
- continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
- improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
- greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
- by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
- more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
- ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.
Recommendations
3. By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:
a) revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b) clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c) developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d) reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Functions of a Local Health District
Appendix three - Functions of a Local Health District Board
Appendix four - Routine performance monitoring and reporting
Appendix five - Escalation model for the NSW Health Performance Framework
Appendix six - About the audit
Appendix seven - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #316 - released 18 April 2019
Actions for Transport Access Program
Transport Access Program
The following report is available in an Easy English version that is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability and some people from different cultural backgrounds.
View the Easy English version of the Transport Access Program report
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for the third stage of its Transport Access Program balanced compliance with national disability standards with broader customer outcomes. Demographics, deliverability and value for money were also considered. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full compliance, limiting its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales.
Accessible public transport is about more than physical accessibility. It also means barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.
Transport for NSW has an obligation under Australian Government legislation to provide accessible services to people with disabilities in a manner which is not discriminatory. Under the Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (the DSAPT - an instrument of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) (Commonwealth)), there is a requirement to modify and develop new infrastructure, means of transport and services to provide access for people with disabilities. All public transport operators are required to ensure that at least 90 per cent of their networks met DSAPT by December 2017 and the networks will need to be 100 per cent compliant with all parts of the standards by 31 December 2022. Trains are not required to be fully compliant with DSAPT until December 2032.
The Transport Access Program (TAP) is Transport for NSW's largest program with a specific focus on improving access to public transport for people with disability. The TAP is a series of projects to upgrade existing public transport infrastructure across four networks: Sydney Trains, Intercity Trains, Regional Trains and Sydney Ferries. Transport for NSW established the TAP as a rolling program and, to date, it has delivered the first tranche of TAP (TAP 1) and is completing the final projects for the second tranche (TAP 2). NSW budget papers estimate that by 30 June 2018, Transport for NSW had spent $1.2 billion in the TAP since its commencement in 2011-12.
After the completion of TAP 1 and TAP 2 (as well as through other transport infrastructure programs), Transport for NSW estimates that 58.5 per cent of the Sydney Trains, Regional Trains and Intercity Trains networks, and 66 per cent of the Sydney Ferries network, will be accessible. To close the significant gap in compliance with the DSAPT target, the objective for TAP 3 is ‘to contribute to Disability Discrimination Act 1992 related targets through DSAPT compliance upgrades’.
The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW has an effective process to select and prioritise projects as part of the TAP, with a specific focus on the third tranche of TAP funding.
In August 2018, at the commencement of this audit, Transport for NSW intended to complete the selection of projects for the TAP 3 final business case in December 2018. Transport for NSW advise that it now intends to complete the development stage and final business case in the first quarter of 2019, prior to the final investment decision of the TAP program. This report is based on the TAP 3 strategic business case and information provided by Transport for NSW up to December 2018.
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for TAP 3 balanced DSAPT compliance goals with broader customer outcomes. It also considered demographics, deliverability and value for money. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full DSAPT compliance, and this limits its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective.
In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales. Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services.
The social model of disability, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, views people with disability as not disabled by their impairment but by the barriers in the community and environment that restrict their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
Accessible public transport is more than the provision of physical access to premises and conveyances, it provides barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the main types of difficulties experienced by people with disability when using public transport relate to steps (39.9 per cent), difficulty getting to stops and stations (25 per cent), fear and anxiety (23.3 per cent) and lack of seating or difficulty standing (20.7 per cent).
Transport for NSW has a Disability Inclusion Action Plan (the Action Plan) 2018-2022 that sets an overall framework for planning, delivering and reporting on initiatives to increase accessibility of the transport network. It covers all elements of the journey experienced when using public transport, including journey planning, staff training, customer services and interaction between the physical environment and modes of transport. Appendix five outlines the guiding principles of the Action Plan.
Transport for NSW's Transport Social Policy branch developed the Action Plan in consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The director of the Transport Social Policy branch is a member of the TAP executive steering committee, which supports alignment between the Action Plan and TAP.
Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan describes a customer focussed approach to accessibility
One of the guiding principles of the Action Plan is ‘intelligent compliance’. Transport for NSW describes this as compliance that prioritises customer-focused outcomes over a narrow focus on legal compliance with accessibility standards. As well as being compliant, infrastructure should be practical, usable, fit for purpose and convenient.
The TAP prioritisation and selection methodology reflects Transport for NSW’s focus on intelligent compliance. We consider this a reasonable approach as had Transport for NSW focussed exclusively on achieving compliance with the DSAPT targets by upgrading the most affordable infrastructure, some locations, that are used by more customers, would remain inaccessible to people with disability. However, this approach should not be seen as an alternative to Transport for NSW meeting its DSAPT compliance obligations.
TAP program staff consult with the Accessible Transport Advisory Committee
The Accessible Transport Advisory Committee (ATAC) has representatives from disability and ageing organisations, who provide expert guidance to Transport for NSW on access and inclusion. The ATAC provide guidance and feedback on projects and project solutions, including user testing where appropriate. TAP program staff provide regular updates at ATAC meetings, which include briefings on progress. The ATAC also provides feedback and suggestions to TAP program staff, which is considered and sometimes included in current and future projects.For example, in March 2017 the TAP program team briefed the ATAC on the challenges with respect to a number of ferry wharves and sought support for DSAPT exemptions proposed in the TAP 3 strategic business case.
In June 2018, the Program team sought feedback on a variety of lift button options to improve accessibility on future TAP projects. In September 2018, during the ATAC meeting attended by the Audit Office, the program team sought feedback on the standard designs for TAP 3. Some ATAC members noted that the standard design included Braille lettering on the lift buttons, and that this was not good practice because people can accidently press the button while reading it. As a result, Transport for NSW are incorporating this feedback into design requirements for the lifts for TAP 3, which will consider larger buttons, clearer Braille and Braille signage adjacent to the button. |
Transport for NSW has not briefed the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation and selection process
TAP program staff briefed the Advisory Committee about the prioritisation and selection methodology, after the Minister approved it in 2016. However, Transport for NSW have not briefed or consulted the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation process. Infrastructure NSW noted this issue during its review of the strategic business case.
Transport for NSW advised us that it established the ATAC as an advisory group, and that Transport for NSW does not disclose sensitive information to it. Transport for NSW intends to share the outcome of the prioritisation process following the completion of the TAP 3 development stage and final investment decision.
The TAP communication plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Disability Inclusion Action Plan
The Disability Inclusion Action Plan includes an action item to ‘provide a listing of stations and wharves to be upgraded with estimated time of construction as each new tranche of the Transport Access Program is announced’ The TAP Communication Plan that we reviewed does not include this provision instead focussing on communication on a per project basis. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Compliance requirements of Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport
Appendix three - TAP 1 and TAP 2 sub-programs
Appendix four - Prioritisation Assessment for the TAP 3 Strategic Business Case
Appendix five - The guiding principles of Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan
Appendix six - Transport projects and programs that contribute to DSAPT compliance
Appendix seven - About the audit
Appendix eight - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference - Report number #314 - released 19 February 2019.
Actions for Supply of secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines
Supply of secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines
The NSW Department of Education’s plans and strategies to respond to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines are limited by incomplete data and underperforming scholarship and sponsorship program. The Department does not collect sufficient information to monitor what disciplines teachers actually teach nor does it predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. This restricts the Department’s ability to track and forecast the supply and demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines.
In recent years, Australian and international education policy has focused on improving outcomes in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects. However, research has identified a shortage of qualified secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines 1. This is projected to worsen due to a combination of student population increases, an ageing workforce, and fewer people going into teaching. Shortfalls are likely to be more acute in rural and remote areas, and areas of low socio-economic status.
The Department of Education (the Department) has a variety of strategies to encourage teachers to practise in locations or disciplines of need. These include scholarships for tertiary students going into teaching, sponsorships for teachers seeking approval to teach additional disciplines, and incentives to attract teachers to rural and remote locations.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department's workforce plans and strategies in responding to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines. We assessed:
- how well the Department tracks the supply and demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines across NSW
- whether the Department has effective strategies to attract and retain secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines.
There are two key shortcomings that fundamentally limit the effectiveness of the Department's plans and strategies to respond to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines. First, the Department is not accurately tracking the supply and demand for secondary teachers by discipline due to incomplete data. Second, not all scholarship and sponsorship places are allocated and many scholars withdraw from the programs before completion. The Department has recognised and started to address these problems with a new workforce model, revised incentives and scholarship programs.
The Department’s current workforce planning model does not provide the information needed to target workforce plans and strategies to areas of need. This is because it does not predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. An internal review in 2017 acknowledged the limitations of this model. In response the Department developed a new model, which it is currently enhancing, to predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. For this to be successful, the Department needs to monitor the level of out-of-field teaching and improve data on the willingness of teachers to work in particular locations.
The Department does not allocate all available scholarship and sponsorship places and around 30 per cent of recipients do not complete the term of their agreement. An internal review in 2017 highlighted that some programs were not targeting workforce need and that there were no key performance indicators to determine the overall effectiveness of these programs. However, scholarship programs and incentives are promoted well through social media and face-to-face events at Universities. Further, the Department has used findings from internal reviews of incentives and scholarships in 2016 and 2017 to inform recent changes to programs.
The Department has little oversight of access to practicum placements for pre-service teachers in areas of need. Professional experience agreements were established with each University in 2015 to improve the placement process for disciplines of need. Initial teacher education students must complete several ‘practicum placements’ before they can be qualified to teach in a school. Several universities we consulted reported difficulties finding practicum placements for pre-service teachers specialising in STEM-related disciplines. The Department is now revising the agreements to improve the quality of data it collects on the number, location and subject area of practicum placements.
The Department is not accurately tracking the supply and demand for secondary teachers by discipline due to incomplete data.
The Department’s current workforce planning model does not accurately predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. An internal review in 2017 acknowledged the limitations of this model. In response the Department developed a new model which it is currently enhancing to address the findings of the review. For this model to be successful, the Department needs to monitor the level of out-of-field teaching and improve data on the willingness of teachers to work in particular locations. Further work also needs to be undertaken to refine the assumptions that underpin the Department’s workforce planning models as it starts to predict the need for teachers by discipline.
The Department has not publicly reported on the supply and demand for teachers by discipline since 2015. While it does report annually on its current workforce profile, this information is not detailed enough to inform future strategies or programs. More detailed public reporting may help the Department to influence the future supply of teachers by communicating its projected areas of need. Planned improvements to the Department's workforce planning model, as relayed to us, will add to the data available on areas of need. Once available, this should be reported publicly.
Recommendations
By December 2019, the Department of Education should:
- Improve its workforce planning model to better understand and communicate supply and demand for teachers by:
- determining the extent, and analysing the impact, of out-of-field teaching by permanent and temporary teachers in each school
- sourcing additional data to more accurately reflect teacher location preferences
- projecting supply and demand by subject level and geographic area
- regularly reporting on the supply and demand for secondary teachers in each discipline to communicate future areas of need to future teacher education students.
The Department's current scholarship and sponsorship programs are not allocating all available places and many scholars withdraw from the programs before completion. An internal review in 2017 raised several issues with the effectiveness of programs and the Department has started to revise its scholarship, sponsorship and incentive programs.
An internal review in 2017 highlighted that scholarship and sponsorship programs were not targeting workforce need, and that there were no key performance indicators to determine the overall effectiveness of these strategies. In addition, the review found that only 79 per cent of available scholarship placements are allocated each year, and 31 per cent of scholarship recipients withdraw prior to completing their required service period. The Department recently announced changes to its scholarship programs from 2019 onwards.
The Department has incentives to encourage teachers to work in rural and remote areas, including teachers in STEM-related disciplines. Incentives include access to priority transfers, rental subsidies and other allowances. Research conducted in 2016 examined the influence of incentives in encouraging teachers to work in rural and remote areas. The Department used findings of this research when updating its set of rural and remote incentives in 2017.
The Department promotes its scholarship and sponsorship programs through the teach.NSW website. It uses social media to direct applicants to this website. It also promotes its programs through careers fairs, University open days, and professional events. Past applicants have reported that the website clearly communicates eligibility criteria and the terms of agreement for all scholarship programs.
The Department could strengthen its relationship with universities to attract teachers to areas of need by collecting and analysing data on practicum placements, facilitating placements for scholarship recipients, and communicating predicted teacher needs by discipline.
Recommendations
By December 2019, the Department of Education should:
2. Implement changes to address the findings of the 'Teacher Scholarship Realignment' report, including by:
- testing a range of program designs with target candidates to determine the best options to attract more suitable applicants
- establishing key performance indicators, and setting targets, to better monitor the effectiveness of the programs
- reducing the number of scholars appointed to over-establishment positions
- increasing the proportion of scholars appointed to priority locations
- further analysing scholarship recipients career paths to inform future improvements to the scholarship programs.
3. Review its role in the practicum placement process of pre-service teachers by:
- analysing how many students each school accommodates per year, to ensure there are appropriate placements available for students in high needs disciplines
- working with universities to facilitate practicum placements for scholarship recipients
- establishing mechanisms for ongoing monitoring of its partnerships with universities to ensure they are meeting their aims.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference - Report number #313 - released 29 January 2019.
Actions for Government Advertising 2017-18
Government Advertising 2017-18
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).
This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:
- the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
- the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:
- reduce the cost of green slips
- reduce the cost of health insurance
- increase the number of jobs
- increase investment in the state.'
SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.
Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.
This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.
The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve
The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.
In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets.
In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.
The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.
The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms
One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages.
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.
Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.
Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.
Perceived benefit | Percentage aware of this benefit |
---|---|
Reduced costs of green slips for vehicle owners | 71% |
A fairer scheme for all people | 29% |
Reduced costs of comprehensive vehicle insurance | 20% |
Better support for people injured on our roads | 15% |
Less chances of fraudulent claims | 15% |
Lowering insurance company profits | 13% |
Quicker payment of claims to injured people | 10% |
Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.
The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition.
ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.
To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition.
By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.
SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement.
SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:
- it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
- the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
- the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.
In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund.
The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.
The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines
The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.
The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA
The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate.
The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.
This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.
The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
TAFE was able to place most of its campaign media within cost-efficient timeframes. TAFE also achieved efficiencies by re-using many creative materials from a previous campaign.
The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target
The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.
The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.
The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.
TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.
TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings
Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.
The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines
The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.
6.2 The cost benefit analysis must isolate the additional costs and benefits attributable to the advertising campaign itself compared to the base-case of not-advertising. 6.3 The cost benefit analysis must specify the extent to which the expected benefits could be achieved without advertising. 6.4 The cost benefit analysis must outline what options other than advertising could be used to successfully implement the program and achieve the program benefits and a comparison of their costs. |
In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA.
TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.
During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.
The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us.
The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second
The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.
The following principles apply to the style and content of government advertising campaigns:
|
TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.
In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.
One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.
DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch
On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.
TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.
Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.
DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.
The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.
Co-branding partners the agency logo with the NSW Government logo. The NSW Government logo must always be presented as the dominant or lead brand. The Brand Guidelines provide the following template shown below the exhibit box. The NSW Government logo is on the left and the agency logo is placed on the right, with a dividing line between them. |
Appendix one - Responses from agencies
Appendix two - About the campaigns
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018
Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018