What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains identify and manage their cyber security risks.

The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including implementing the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Essential 8 strategies to mitigate cyber security incidents, and identifying the agency’s most vital systems, their ‘crown jewels’. 

The audited agencies have requested that we do not disclose detail of the significant vulnerabilities detected during the audit, as these vulnerabilities are not yet remediated. We provided a detailed report to the agencies in December 2020 outlining significant issues identified in the audit. We have conceded to the agencies' request but it is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

What we found

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks.

Both agencies have assessed their cyber security risks as unacceptably high and both agencies had not identified all of the risks we detected during this audit – some of which are significant.

Both agencies have cyber security plans in place that aim to address cyber security risks. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have combined this into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program, part of the Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). 

However, neither agency has reached its target ratings for the CSP and the Essential 8 and maturity is low in relation to significant risks and vulnerabilities exposed.

Further, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making.

TfNSW is not implementing cyber security training effectively across the cluster with only 7.2% of staff having completed basic cyber security training.

What we recommended

TfNSW and Sydney Trains should:

• develop and implement a plan to uplift the Essential 8 controls to the agency's target state
• as a matter of priority, address the vulnerabilities identified as part of this audit and previously described in a detailed Audit Office report provided to both agencies
• ensure cyber security risk reporting to executives and the Audit and Risk Committee
• collect supporting information for the CSP self assessments 
• classify all information and systems according to importance and integrate this with the crown jewels identification process
• require more rigorous analysis to re-prioritise CDP funding 
• increase uptake of cyber security training.

TfNSW should assess the appropriateness of its target rating for each of the CSP mandatory requirements.

Department of Customer Service should:

• clarify the requirement for the CSP reporting to apply to all systems
• require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

Response to requests by audited agencies to remove information from this report

In preparing this audit report, I have considered how best to balance the need to support public accountability and transparency with the need to avoid revealing information that could pose additional risk to agencies’ systems. This has involved an assessment of the appropriate level of detail to include in the report about the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in this audit.

In making this assessment, the audit team consulted with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), Sydney Trains, and Cyber Security NSW to identify content which could potentially pose a threat to the agencies’ cyber security.

In December 2020, my office also provided TfNSW and Sydney Trains with a detailed report of many of the significant vulnerabilities identified in this audit, to enable the agencies to address the cyber security risks identified. The detailed report was produced as a result of a 'red team' exercise, which was conducted with both agencies' knowledge and consent. The scope of this exercise reflected the significant input provided by both agencies. More information on this exercise is at page 12 of this report.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have advised that in the six months from December 2020 and at the time of tabling this audit report, they have not yet remediated all the vulnerabilities identified. As a result, they, along with Cyber Security NSW, have requested that we not disclose all information contained in this audit report to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their systems and resulting harm to the community. I have conceded to this request because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remediated and leave the agencies exposed to significant risk.

It should be stressed that the risks identified in the detailed report exist due to the continued presence of these previously identified vulnerabilities, rather than due to their potential publication. The audited agencies, alone, are accountable for remediating these vulnerabilities and addressing the risks they pose.

It is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

That said, the conclusions drawn in this report are significant in terms of risk and remain valid, and the recommendations should be acted upon with urgency.

Cyber security risk is an increasing area of concern for governments in Australia and around the world. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cyber security attacks on government entities in Australia, including in New South Wales. Malicious cyber activity in Australia is increasing in frequency, scale, and sophistication. The Audit Office of New South Wales is responding to these risks with a program of audits in this area, which aim to identify the effectiveness of particular agencies in managing cyber risks, as well as their compliance with relevant policy.

Cyber Security NSW, part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS) releases and manages the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP). The CSP sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including making it mandatory for agencies to implement the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (the Essential 8). The Essential 8 are key controls which serve as a baseline set of protections which agencies can put in place to make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise a system. Agencies are required to self-assess their maturity against the CSP and the Essential 8, and report that assessment to Cyber Security NSW annually.

The CSP makes agencies responsible for identifying and managing their cyber security risks. The CSP sets out responsibilities and governance regarding risk identification, including making agencies responsible for identifying their 'crown jewels', the agency's most valuable and operationally vital systems. Once these risks are identified, agencies are responsible for developing a cyber security plan to mitigate those risks.

This audit focussed on two agencies: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains. TfNSW is the lead agency for the Transport cluster and provides a number of IT services to the entire cluster, including Sydney Trains. This audit focussed on the activities of TfNSW's Transport IT function, which is responsible for providing cyber security across the cluster, as well as directly overseeing four of TfNSW's crown jewels. Sydney Trains is one of the agencies in the Transport cluster. While it receives some services from TfNSW, it is also responsible for implementing its own IT controls, as well as controls to protect its Operational Technology (OT) environment. This OT environment includes systems which are necessary for the operation and safety of the train network.

To test the mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls, this audit involved a 'red team' simulated exercise. A red team involves authorised attackers seeking to achieve certain objectives within the target's environment. The red team simulated a determined external cyber threat actor seeking to gain access to TfNSW's systems. The red team also sought to test the physical security of some Sydney Trains' sites relevant to the agency's cyber security. The red team exercise was conducted with the knowledge of TfNSW and Sydney Trains.

This audit included the Department of Customer Service as an auditee, as they have ownership of the CSP through Cyber Security NSW. This audit did not examine the management of cyber risk in the Department of Customer Service.

This audit assessed how effectively selected agencies identify and manage their cyber security risks. The audit assessed this with the following criteria:

• Are agencies effectively identifying and planning for their cyber security risks?
• Are agencies effectively managing their cyber security risks?

Following this in-depth portfolio assessment, the Auditor-General for NSW will also table a report on NSW agencies' compliance with the CSP in the first quarter of 2021–22.

Agencies have assessed their cyber risks as being above acceptable levels

An agency's risk tolerance is the amount of risk which the agency will accept or tolerate without developing further strategies to modify the level of risk. Risks that are within an agency's risk tolerance may not require further mitigation and may be deemed acceptable, while risks which are above the agency's risk tolerance likely require further mitigation before they become acceptable to the agency.

Both agencies have defined their risk tolerance and have identified risks which are above this level, indicating that they are unacceptable to the agency. TfNSW has defined 'very high' risks as generally intolerable and 'high' risks as undesirable. Its risk tolerance is 'medium'. Sydney Trains has four classifications of risk: A, B, C and D. A and B risks are deemed 'unacceptable' and 'undesirable' respectively, while C risks are considered 'tolerable'. This aligns with the TfNSW definition of a medium risk tolerance.

Transport IT reported five enterprise-level cyber security risks through its enterprise risk reporting tool in September 2020, all of which relate to cyber security or have causes relating to cyber security. These risks are in aggregate form, rather than relating to specific vulnerabilities. At the time of the audit, one of these risks was rated as very high and the other four rated as high. At this time, Transport IT had identified a further seven divisional-level risks which were above the agency’s risk tolerance.

Similarly, Sydney Trains has identified one main cyber security risk in its IT enterprise-level risk register and another with a potential cyber cause. Both of these IT risks are deemed to have a residual risk of ‘unacceptable’.

Similarly, two cyber-related OT risks have been determined to be above the agency's risk tolerance. One risk is rated as 'unacceptable'. Another risk, while not entirely cyber rated, is rated 'undesirable' and is deemed to have some causes which may stem from a cyber-attack.

Agencies have assessed their current cyber risk mitigations as requiring improvement

In addition to the risk ratings stated above, at the time of the audit neither agency believed that its controls were operating effectively. Transport IT had rated the control environments for its cyber security enterprise risks as 'requires improvement'. Mitigations were listed in the risk register for these risks but, in some cases, they were unlikely to reduce the risk to the target state or by the target date. For example, one risk had actions listed as 'under review' and no further treatment actions listed, but a due date of July 2021, while another risk was being treated by the CDP with a due date of July 2021. The CDP identified in May 2020 that while the average risk identified as part of that program will be reduced to a medium level by this date, ten high risks will still remain. Given the delays in the program, this number may be higher. As such, it seems unlikely that the enterprise risk will be reduced to below a 'high' level by July 2021.

Sydney Trains’ IT and OT risk registers cross-reference controls and mitigations against the causes and consequences. The IT cyber security risk identified in the register had causes with no mitigations designed for them. Further, some of these causes did not have future mitigations designed for them. This risk also had controls in place which are identified as partially effective. For the unacceptable OT risk noted above, while there was a control designed for each of the potential causes, Sydney Trains had identified all of the controls in place as either partially effective or ineffective. This indicates that Sydney Trains was not effectively mitigating the causes of its cyber risks and, even where it had designed controls or mitigations, these were not always implemented to fully mitigate the cause of the risk.

Additional information on gaps in cyber mitigations which were exposed in the course of this audit has been detailed to both agencies. The Foreword of this report provides information about why this detail is not included here.

Essential 8 maturity is low across TfNSW and Sydney Trains and little progress was made in 2020

CSP mandatory requirement 3.2 states that agencies must implement the ACSC Essential 8. Agencies must also rate themselves against each of the Essential 8 on a maturity scale from zero to three and report this to Cyber Security NSW. A full list of the Essential 8 can be found in Exhibit 1. Both agencies have a low level of maturity against the Essential 8 not just in comparison to the targets they have set, but also in relation to the risks and vulnerabilities exposed. Both agencies have set target maturity ratings for the Essential 8 but none of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to this level. Having a low level of Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risks and vulnerabilities. Little progress was made between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods.

Transport IT has set a target rating of three across all of the Essential 8. Sydney Trains has set a target rating of three for its IT systems. Sydney Trains had an interim target of two for its OT systems in 2020 and advised that this has since increased to three. It should be noted that not all the Essential 8 are applicable to OT systems.

None of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to the target levels. Given that the Essential 8 provide the controls which are most commonly able to deter cyber-attacks, having maturity at a low level potentially exposes agencies to a cyber security attack.

Some work is underway across both TfNSW and Sydney Trains to improve the Essential 8 control ratings. The CDP provided some resources to the Essential 8 over 2019–20, with uplift focusing on specific systems. The CDP work in 2019 and 2020 relevant to the Essential 8 largely focussed on determining the current state of the Essential 8 and creating a target state roadmap. As a result, there was little improvement between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods. The CDP has a workstream for the Essential 8 in its FY 2020–21 funding allocation, however as noted above in Exhibit 6 this was delayed as resources were redeployed to Project La Brea. Regardless, work on some specific aspects of the Essential 8 remain part of the 2020–21 CDP allocation, with workstreams allocated to improving three of the Essential 8. In addition, some work from Project La Brea should lead to an improvement in the Essential 8.

Sydney Trains' Cyber Uplift Program included a workstream which had in scope the uplift in the Essential 8 in IT. There were also other workstreams which aimed to improve some of the Essential 8 for OT systems. Work is also ongoing as part of the CDP to uplift these scores in Sydney Trains.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have not reached their target maturity across the CSP mandatory requirements and TfNSW has not evaluated its cluster-wide target to ensure it is appropriate

Cyber Security NSW allows each agency to determine its target level of maturity for the first 20 CSP mandatory requirements. Agencies can tailor their target levels to their risk profile. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles.

Sydney Trains has set its target level of maturity for IT and OT. All of Sydney Trains' target maturity levels are at least a three (defined), with a target of four (quantitatively managed) for many of the mandatory requirements. While Cyber Security NSW does not currently mandate a minimum level of maturity, in 2019 there was a requirement for each agency to target a minimum level of three.

Sydney Trains has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements.

The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a program KPI to ensure that the entire cluster reaches a minimum maturity level of three against all the CSP requirements by 2023. TfNSW has not reviewed its CSP mandatory requirement targets to determine if a three is desirable for all requirements or if a higher target level may be more appropriate. It is important for senior management to set cyber security objectives as a demonstration of leadership and a commitment to cyber security.

TfNSW has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements for its Group IT ISMS, which was the focus of this audit.

Both agencies claimed progress in their implementation of the mandatory requirements between 2019 and 2020. The audit did not seek to verify the self-assessed results from either agency.

Both agencies operate ISMS in line with the CSP

CSP mandatory requirement 3.1 requires agencies to implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) or Cyber Security Framework (CSF), with scope at least covering systems identified as the agency's ‘crown jewels’. The ISMS or CSF should be compliant with, or modelled on, one or more recognised IT or OT standard. As noted in the introduction, an ISMS ‘consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.’ Both agencies operate an ISMS compliant with the CSP requirement.

As noted in the introduction, TfNSW operates four ISMS. The Transport IT ISMS is certified against ISO27001, the most common standard for ISMS certification. Three of TfNSW’s six crown jewels are managed within this ISMS. The other ISMS are not certified to relevant standards, though TfNSW claims that they align with relevant controls. This is sufficient for the purposes of the CSP.

Sydney Trains operates two ISMS, one for IT and another for OT. Neither of these are certified to relevant ISMS Standards, however there have been conformance reviews of both IT and OT with relevant standards. These ISMS cover all crown jewels in the agency.

There are currently 11 ISMS in operation across the Transport cluster. TfNSW has proposed moving towards a holistic approach to these ISMS, with the CDP Board responsible for governing the available security controls and directing agency IT and OT teams to implement these.

Agencies are not routinely conducting audits of third-party suppliers to ensure compliance with contractual obligations

CSP mandatory requirement 1.5 makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers and ensuring that providers comply with the CSP and any other relevant agency security policies. The ACSC has provided advice on what organisations should do when managing third party suppliers of ICT. The ACSC advises that organisations should use contracts to define cyber security expectations and seek assurance to ensure that these contract expectations are being met. While both agencies usually include specific cyber security expectations in contracts, neither is routinely seeking assurance that these expectations are being met.

The NSW Government has mandated the use of the 'Core& One' contract template for low-value IT procurements and the Procure IT contract template for high-value IT procurements. Both of these contracts contain space for the procuring agency to include cyber security controls for the contractor to implement. The Procure IT contract template also includes a right-to-audit clause which allows agencies to receive assurance around the implementation of these controls. TfNSW and Sydney Trains used the mandated contracts for relevant contracts examined as part of this audit.

TfNSW included security controls in all the contracts examined as part of this audit. Compliance with ISO27001 was the most commonly stated security expectation. Of the contracts examined as part of this audit, only one contract did not have a right-to-audit clause. This contract was signed in October 2016. While these clauses are in place, TfNSW rarely conducted these audits on its third-party providers. Of the eight TfNSW contracts examined in detail, only two of these had been audited to confirm compliance with the stated security controls.

Sydney Trains included security controls in all but one of the contracts examined as part of this audit. Sydney Trains did not require contractors to be compliant with ISO27001, but only required compliance with whole-of-government policies. Sydney Trains does not routinely conduct audits of its third-party suppliers, however it did conduct deep-dive risk analyses of its top ten highest risk IT suppliers. This involved a detailed review of both the suppliers' security posture and also the contract underpinning the relationship with the supplier.

The CDP funding for 2020–21 includes a workstream for strategic third-party contract remediation. This funding is to conduct some foundational work which will allow the CDP to make further improvements in future years. While this funding will not address gaps in contract requirements or management across all contracts, this workstream aims to reduce the risks posed by strategic suppliers covering critical assets. Similarly, work is currently underway as part of the CDP to conduct OT risk assessments for key suppliers to Sydney Trains in a similar way to the work undertaken for IT suppliers.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed its third-party suppliers but TfNSW has not done so

It is important to conduct a risk assessment of suppliers to identify high-risk contractors. This allows agencies to identify those contractors who may require additional controls stated in the contract, those who require additional oversight, and also where auditing resources are best targeted.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed all its IT suppliers and, as noted above, has conducted a deep-dive risk analysis of its top ten highest risk suppliers. TfNSW has not undertaken similar analysis of its key suppliers, however it has identified risks attached to each of its strategic suppliers and has documented these. As a result of not risk assessing its suppliers, TfNSW cannot take a targeted approach to its contract management.

TfNSW demonstrated poor records handling relating to the contracts examined as part of this audit

TfNSW was not able to locate one of the contracts requested as part of the audit's sample. Other documentation, such as contract management plans, could not be located for many of the other contracts requested as part of this audit. These poor document handling practices limits TfNSW's ability to effectively oversee service providers and ensure that they are implementing agreed controls. It also limits public transparency on the effectiveness of these controls.

The Transport cluster is not effectively implementing cyber security awareness training

Agencies are responsible for implementing regular cyber security education for all employees and contractors under mandatory requirement 2.1 in the CSP. TfNSW is responsible for delivering this training to the whole Transport cluster, including Sydney Trains. The Transport cluster has basic cyber awareness training available for all staff. TfNSW also offers additional training provided by Cyber Security NSW targeted at executives and executive assistants. While TfNSW has training available to staff, it is not delivering this effectively. TfNSW does not make training mandatory for most staff nor does it require staff to repeat training regularly. Even among those staff who have been assigned the training, completion rates are low, meaning that delivery is not effectively monitored. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture.

TfNSW is responsible for creating and rolling out all forms of training to agencies within the Transport cluster. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains have the same mandatory cyber awareness training that is automatically assigned to new starters. At the time of the audit, this training was not mandatory for ongoing staff. TfNSW does make additional cyber security training available to staff who can choose to undertake the training themselves, or can be assigned the training by their manager. All TfNSW cyber security training is delivered via online modules and it is the responsibility of managers to ensure that it is completed.

Cyber security training completion rates for both TfNSW and Sydney Trains are low. Only 13.5 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had been assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training as of January 2021. Although this course is mandatory for new starters, only 53 per cent of staff assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training module had completed the course by January 2021. As a result, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the entire Transport cluster had completed this training at that time. In Sydney Trains, less than one per cent of staff had completed this training as at January 2021 and a further 7.6 per cent of staff have completed the 'Cyber Security: Beyond the Basics' training. These low completion rates indicate that TfNSW is not effectively rolling out cyber security training across the cluster.

In October 2020, the Department of Customer Service released 'DCS-2020-05 Cyber Security NSW Directive - Practice Requirement for NSW Government', which made annual cyber security training mandatory for all staff from 2021. In line with this requirement, TfNSW has advised that it will be gradually implementing mandatory annual training from July 2021 for all staff.

The Transport cluster undertakes activities to build a cyber-aware culture in accordance with the CSP, but awareness remains low

Increasing staff awareness of cyber security risks and maintaining a cyber secure culture are both mandatory requirements of the CSP. While TfNSW does undertake some activities to build a cyber aware culture, awareness of cyber security risks remains low. This can be demonstrated by the low training rates outlined above, and the 'Spot the Scammer' exercise, described in Exhibit 7. TfNSW is responsible for delivering these awareness raising activities across the cluster.

TfNSW frequently communicates with staff across the Transport cluster about various cyber security risks through multiple avenues. Both agencies use the intranet, emails and other awareness raising activities to highlight the importance for staff to be aware of the seriousness of cyber risks. Advice given on the intranet includes tips for spotting scammers on mobile phones, promoting the cluster-wide training courses, as well as various advice that staff could use when dealing with cyber risks in the workplace.

In addition to these awareness raising activities, TfNSW has also undertaken a cluster-wide phishing email exercise called 'Spot the Scammer'. This is outlined in Exhibit 7. This exercise was carried out in 2019 and 2020 and allowed the Transport cluster to measure the degree to which staff were able to identify phishing emails. As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the results of this exercise indicate that staff awareness of phishing emails remains low.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #353 - released (13 July 2021).

What the report is about

The report examined whether Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Infrastructure NSW (INSW) effectively assessed and justified major scope changes to the WestConnex project since 2014.

What we found

NSW Government decisions to fund WestConnex-related projects outside WestConnex's $16.812 billion budget have reduced transparency and understate the full cost of WestConnex.

The NSW Government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex has reduced transparency over the cost of the road component of Sydney Gateway. $1.76 billion of the cost to complete Sydney Gateway is funded outside the WestConnex budget.

Network integration costs, currently estimated at $2.3 billion, are also funded outside the WestConnex budget. Many of these costs are directly attributable to WestConnex and ought to be included in the reported budget.

The Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program, costing $198 million, should also be included as part of the WestConnex reported budget.

Decisions to exclude or remove these elements from WestConnex without justification have seen $4.26 billion of projects funded outside the $16.8 billion budget.

Positively, robust analysis was used to develop and incorporate design improvements into the 2015 WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case.

The separate components of WestConnex underwent all required assurance reviews. However, the NSW Government's assurance framework does not require ongoing ‘whole-of-program’ assurance for large and complex projects like WestConnex. The absence of a holistic review of WestConnex allows for some costs and benefits to avoid scrutiny.

What we recommended

TfNSW should:

• review the impact of scope changes on project objectives, costs and benefits for complex infrastructure projects
• ensure that estimated costs and benefits of works which are reasonably required to meet consent conditions are included in business cases for complex large infrastructure projects
• establish centralised and project specific record keeping for major infrastructure projects.

Infrastructure NSW should provide transparent whole of program assurance on total costs and benefits when complex projects are split into sub-projects.

Government should consider enhancing public transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes by requiring that large complex infrastructure programs undergo periodic review at a whole-of-program level.

WestConnex

WestConnex is a 33 km motorway network that will link the western and south‑western suburbs with the Sydney CBD and the Airport and Port Botany precinct. It will also connect with proposed future motorway links to the north shore, northern beaches, and southern Sydney. The project is being delivered in three stages, with completion scheduled for 2023.

When first conceived by Infrastructure NSW (INSW) in 2012, WestConnex was described as a single integrated concept. In August 2013, government approved a business case for an integrated concept of WestConnex, with an estimated cost of $14.881 billion (in nominal outturn costs). Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is the government agency (sponsor agency) accountable for the delivery of WestConnex in accordance with the business case. In August 2014, the NSW Government established the Sydney Motorway Corporation to fund, deliver and operate WestConnex.

In November 2015, the NSW Government publicly released an updated WestConnex business case with greater detail and design enhancements, which increased the estimated cost to $16.812 billion.

Subsequent to this update, further changes were made to the design, including realignment of the M4 to M5 Link connection to the Western Harbour Tunnel project, an expanded interchange at Rozelle, the deletion of the Camperdown Intersection, and the addition of the Iron Cove Link. The reported budget for WestConnex was not changed as a result of these design updates.

To fund WestConnex, Sydney Motorway Corporation consolidated a concessional loan of $2 billion from the Australian Government, private sector debt and equity funding from the State. The Australian Government also provided a $1.5 billion contribution to the State to partially fund construction of WestConnex.

In August 2018, the NSW Government sold 51 per cent of its stake in Sydney Motorway Corporation for $9.26 billion. At the time of writing, the NSW Government is in the process of selling its remaining 49 per cent stake of Sydney Motorway Corporation.

About this audit

In the course of delivering a complex major infrastructure project, it is reasonable to expect changes to the original design and scope. Changes may occur as the design moves from a high‑level concept to a detailed design for project delivery, as new risks or issues are identified, as demands change, or as other interdependent projects are approved. Changes can also occur in response to potential cost or delivery overruns which arise as a result of planning deficiencies. Where design and scope changes significantly change the project costs and/or expected benefits, the justification for these changes should be robust and transparent.

Following our 2014 performance audit, 'WestConnex: Assurance to the government', the NSW Government established the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework (IIAF) to improve accountability and transparency over major projects that are developed, procured, or delivered by government agencies. Under the framework, TfNSW, as project sponsor, is responsible for ensuring the WestConnex project meets all IIAF requirements. These include ensuring the project remains strategically aligned and viable, and benefits are on track. INSW is responsible for coordinating the assurance review process and reporting directly to NSW Cabinet on project delivery against time, budget and risks to project delivery.

The objective of this performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW and INSW effectively assessed and justified major scope changes to the WestConnex project since 2014.

1. Key findings

Government decisions to fund WestConnex related projects outside of WestConnex's $16.812 billion reported budget have reduced transparency over costs and understate the full cost of WestConnex

In 2015, the work required to integrate WestConnex with existing roads ('network integration') was funded as a separate project with an estimated cost of $1.534 billion outside the 2015 WestConnex budget of $16.812 billion. TfNSW then created the Network Integration Program to respond to the conditions of planning approval for WestConnex. The current estimated cost to deliver all network integration works is $2.3 billion.

Since the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, the NSW Government has removed several elements from the scope of WestConnex and funded them as separate projects, while keeping the published WestConnex budget at an estimated $16.812 billion. Projects removed include:

• Sydney Gateway, currently costed at $2.56 billion (with an $800 million contribution from WestConnex)
• Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program, costed at $198 million in late 2018 and funded though new funding to the Greater Sydney Commission.

Together, these projects represent costs of $4.26 billion that are not included in the WestConnex budget, but are required for WestConnex to achieve the objectives of the 2013 and 2015 WestConnex Business Cases. The costs of these elements in supporting the objectives of WestConnex is not tracked centrally, and there is no single point of oversight over them. Exhibit 1 compares total WestConnex forecast costs (including related projects) between November 2015 and April 2021.

Many network integration costs are directly attributable to WestConnex and ought to be included in the reported budget for WestConnex

Prior to 2015, the scope of WestConnex included enabling works needed before or during construction, as well as funding for future works to address any adverse traffic outcomes created by WestConnex which become apparent after its opening. These works are also known as network integration works.

When government approved the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, it noted that the project would require $1.534 billion for network integration works to address the impacts of WestConnex on the road network. However, the WestConnex project budget of $16.812 billion did not include funding for network integration works. Instead, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS, now TfNSW) was to fund network integration through its normal budget allocation.

It is important to recognise these costs as part of the total WestConnex project cost because:

• TfNSW created the Network Integration Program to respond to network traffic and transport elements of the planning conditions of approval for WestConnex granted by the then NSW Department of Planning and Environment under the Environment, Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
• NSW Treasury guidelines for business cases note that accurate cost estimates include assessment of the financial impact of meeting the conditions of planning approval.
• Travel time and vehicle operating cost benefits attributed to the WestConnex project in the 2015 WestConnex Business Case assume that some network integration works, then costed at $373 million, were in place.

Refer to Appendix two for more detail on network integration works.

Some of the projects in the WestConnex Network Integration Program provide community and place benefits, such as parklands and cycleways. These benefits have not been attributed to WestConnex. Additionally, some network integration works are likely to deliver additional traffic related benefits to WestConnex. As the Network Integration Program’s primary purpose is to meet the conditions of planning approval for WestConnex, TfNSW should attribute all the costs and benefits of the program to WestConnex.

To September 2021, the total funded cost of the Network Integration Program is approximately $2.077 billion. TfNSW estimates that it will need a further $222 million to complete all expected network integration works.

The NSW Government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex has reduced transparency and accountability for TfNSW's underestimation of the cost of the road component of Sydney Gateway

Sydney Gateway is a high‑capacity connection between the new St Peters Interchange and the Sydney Airport and Port Botany precinct. It includes a road and rail components. The road component was included in the scope of WestConnex in the 2015 WestConnex Business Case. The November 2015 design, which TfNSW costed at $800 million, involved separate roadways from the St Peters Interchange to the International terminal, and to the domestic terminals and Mascot airport precinct.

By October 2016, TfNSW was aware that the $800 million budget for Sydney Gateway was insufficient and revised the forecast cost for the road component to $1.8 billion. The original cost estimate did not sufficiently consider the cost of:

• constructing a complex design adjacent to the airport precinct
• obtaining access to land required for the project
• managing environmental contamination.

On 9 August 2017, the then Minister for WestConnex announced that the Sydney Gateway project was not part of WestConnex.

The 2015 WestConnex Business Case notes that material changes to the WestConnex budget, funding, scope, or timeframe are subject to Cabinet approval processes. It states that, when seeking approval for material changes, the portfolio Minister will make a submission to the relevant Cabinet Committee. Changes in project scope required the approval of the then Cabinet Committee on Infrastructure and should have been endorsed by the WestConnex Interdepartmental Steering Committee.

TfNSW and the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) assert that there is no documentation to support the government’s decision to separate Sydney Gateway from the WestConnex Program, or the WestConnex Interdepartmental Steering Committee's endorsement of a submission to Cabinet seeking approval for the separation.

The established governance processes for major scope changes were not followed in this instance. The lack of transparency regarding government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex also reduces visibility of TfNSW's underestimation of the cost of delivering the road component of Sydney Gateway.

The November 2018 Final Business Case for Sydney Gateway, which was approved by the government, included an estimate of $2.45 billion (nominal outturn cost) for the road component. This estimate included an $800 million contribution from WestConnex. A more recent estimate (late 2020) for this project is $2.56 billion (nominal outturn cost).

The Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program should be included as part of the WestConnex budget

A specific objective of the 2015 WestConnex Business Case was the creation of opportunities for urban renewal along and around Parramatta Road. The business case included an allocation of $198 million in the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget for the Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement program, designed to implement aspects of the objective. In November 2018, the NSW Government removed the Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program from the WestConnex program of works and reallocated the $198 million (inside the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget) for urban renewal works around the Rozelle Interchange. As part of this decision, government approved new funding of $198 million to the Greater Sydney Commission for the urban amenity program, outside the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget. This understates the cost of WestConnex meeting its objectives by $198 million.

There is no requirement for ongoing ‘whole‑of‑program’ assurance of the WestConnex program of works, including related projects

In August 2015, INSW conducted its first Gateway Review of WestConnex as a program consisting of composite projects. Following that review, TfNSW registered each of the components of WestConnex with INSW as individual projects, rather than keeping WestConnex registered as a program or mega‑project. This is not inconsistent with the IIAF and all WestConnex related projects, including Sydney Gateway and the Network Integration Program, have undergone independent assurance reviews as individual projects under the IIAF.

Once a program like WestConnex is broken down into its composite parts, there is no requirement for the sponsor agency (TfNSW) or INSW to provide independent assurance on the program as a whole until it is completed. This is then done as part of the Gateway review for benefits realisation, which examines whether project benefits are being measured and meet expectations. These individual projects are, in themselves, significant in scale and complexity. While addressing them as discrete components for the purposes of the assurance review process can be justified, the absence of strategic, holistic reviews of WestConnex allows for total costs and benefits to become opaque and avoid scrutiny. Programs of this scale require greater ongoing transparency on total costs and benefits in order to ensure confidence they will meet intended objectives within budget.

There is a lack of public transparency on the total costs and benefits of the WestConnex project

Prior to 2018, the Audit Office provided assurance on costs borne and levied by Sydney Motorway Corporation and its controlled entities. Since the NSW Government sold 51 per cent of its stake in WestConnex in August 2018, the Auditor‑General no longer has the mandate to provide this assurance. The Audit Office is also unable to provide any assurance regarding the performance of tolling concessions.

This means that the total costs of WestConnex, including those levied on road users through tolling, are not reported alongside the full cost of delivering the project. This information, and independent assurance over that information, would provide transparency and context to the outcome of government's sale of its interest in WestConnex.

To enhance the transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes, government could consider requiring large and complex infrastructure programs to undergo periodic review at a whole‑of‑program level. This could take the form of annual reports to Parliament on the total costs and benefits of selected large and complex projects by the responsible agency. The reports could include an assessment of the cost to government and cost to the community of funding and financing. Independent assurance of the agency report would provide Parliament with greater confidence that infrastructure is delivered economically and providing value for money for the people of NSW.

The Australian National Audit Office provides similar assurance on selected Department of Defence acquisition projects as part of its annual Major Projects Report.

Design enhancements included in the 2015 WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case were supported by robust analysis

The 2015 WestConnex Business Case contained more detail than the 2013 WestConnex business case. Design enhancements were made as a result of modelling analysis conducted over the two years since the 2013 business case. Enhancements included a full underground link between Kingsgrove and St Peters as part of the New M5 and re‑alignment of the M4‑M5 link tunnel (Stage 3) to include the Rozelle Interchange. The Rozelle Interchange will provide a direct connection to the Anzac Bridge and Victoria Road, and will enable a connection to the proposed Western Harbour Tunnel and Beaches Link. A map and description of these elements can be found at Exhibits 2 and 3 of this report.

In 2016, TfNSW revised the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle to address traffic and integration issues

As part of preparing the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, TfNSW prepared a Project Definition and Delivery Report (PDDR) for the M4‑M5 Link. This report describes the scope of the project, including a high‑level concept design. TfNSW identified limitations with the proposed design of the M4‑M5 in the PDDR, which it would need to address as the project moved to a detailed design stage. In particular, these limitations included:

• poor integration with the Bays Precinct masterplan
• traffic capacity constraints on Victoria Road and Anzac Bridge
• construction complexity.

Following a comprehensive review in mid‑2016, TfNSW changed the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle Interchange to address these limitations. These changes included:

• deletion of the Camperdown intersection to improve traffic conditions on Parramatta Road
• a fully underground and larger Rozelle Interchange with 10‑hectare dedicated parklands
• a toll‑free tunnel link from Iron Cove Bridge to Anzac Bridge
• increasing the lanes in the dual tunnels from three to four each way.

TfNSW documented, but did not publish, the rationale for the design changes, including how the changes addressed the limitations of the previous design while providing increased community benefit through the creation of open space. TfNSW undertook cost comparison studies which estimated that these changes would have a neutral impact on the estimated project cost while achieving the same or improved benefits.

TfNSW's record‑keeping systems for large infrastructure investments negatively impact accountability and transparency

In response to our formal requests for relevant information, made during the conduct of this audit, TfNSW advised that complete and valid records of key decision‑making processes, analysis and advice were unavailable. Additionally, TfNSW often provided information that was incomplete or unverifiable (for instance, unsigned briefing notes). This is not consistent with accepted governance practices and does not comply with the requirements of the State Records Act 1998.

We also requested that TfNSW provide a list of relevant documents held by the Sydney Motorway Corporation (SMC). While TfNSW acknowledged that SMC may hold material relevant to the audit, TfNSW did not have a list or description of these documents. As SMC is now a majority privately held entity, both the Audit Office and TfNSW have limited power to require SMC to provide documentation.

The delivery timeframe for large and complex infrastructure projects such as WestConnex frequently exceeds five years, and some projects can take over a decade to deliver. These projects represent a significant investment of public resources and government agencies should expect independent review and assurance activities such as performance audits. The establishment of dedicated record keeping facilities for major infrastructure projects, such as data rooms, would improve transparency and accountability. This would ensure that the use of public resources is fully auditable in line with public expectations and the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, the State Records Act 1998 and the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

2. Recommendations

By December 2021, TfNSW should:

1. review the impact of scope changes on project objectives, costs and benefits for complex infrastructure projects

2. when preparing business cases for complex large infrastructure projects, ensure that the estimated costs and benefits of works which are reasonably expected to meet consent conditions are included in the overall project cost and its benefits (as per Treasury guidelines)

3. establish and maintain centralised and project‑specific record keeping, including through dedicated project data rooms, to ensure major infrastructure projects can readily be subject to external oversight and assurance.

By June 2022, INSW should:

4. provide transparent whole‑of‑program assurance on total costs and benefits throughout the project life‑cycle when complex projects are split into sub‑projects.

By June 2022, NSW Government should:

5. consider enhancing the public transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes by requiring that large complex infrastructure programs undergo periodic review at a whole‑of‑program level. This could take the form of reports to Parliament on the total costs and benefits on selected large and complex projects by the responsible agency, including cost to government and cost to community of funding and financing, as well as an accompanying independent assessment of the agency report.

Following our 2014 performance audit report 'WestConnex: Assurance to the government', the NSW Government established the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework (IIAF). INSW is responsible for the development, implementation and administration of the IIAF. The assurance framework involves gateway reviews, health checks, deep dive reviews, and project monitoring and reporting at various stages in the lifecycle of a project. The main aims of the IIAF are to help ensure major infrastructure projects are delivered on time and on budget, and to ensure that reports are regularly monitored by the Cabinet of the NSW Government. The IIAF gateway review process is compulsory for all significant investments and expenditure under the NSW Treasury Gateway Policy.

In accordance with the IIAF, INSW is responsible for the following:

• providing a dedicated Assurance Team including Gateway Review Managers to coordinate Reviews
• determining appropriate expert reviewers, and manages scheduling, commissioning and administration of Assurance Review reports. Infrastructure NSW is independent of the Expert Review Team
• monitoring Tier 1 – High Profile/High Risk projects, Tier 2 and Tier 3 (if required) project performance through independent Assurance Reviews
• providing independent analysis and advice on key risks and any corrective actions recommended for Tier 1 – High Profile/High Risk, Tier 2 and Tier 3 projects
• escalating projects to Infrastructure Investor Assurance Committee (IIAC) and Cabinet where projects present ‘red flag issues’ and where corrective action is needed
• working with delivery agencies to register all capital projects with an estimated cost greater than $10.0 million and ensures they are risk profiled and assigned a risk‑based project tier with an endorsed IIAF Project Registration report
• preparing forward looking annual Cluster Assurance Plans
• maintaining and continuously improves the IIAF process
• reporting to the IIAC, Cabinet and Infrastructure NSW Board
• regularly report to NSW Treasury on the performance of the IIAF.

In relation to WestConnex, TfNSW is the sponsor agency responsible for meeting relevant IIAF requirements, including:

• registering and risk profiling projects
• IIAF gateway, health check, and deep dive assurance reviews
• regular reporting.

Under the IIAF, it is mandatory for all capital projects valued over $10.0 million to be registered with INSW. Capital projects can be registered either as a program (comprising of a group of related projects or activities) or as a project (which may or may not be part of a program).

According to the IIAF, programs tend to have a lifespan of several years and aim to deliver outcomes and benefits related to an organisation's strategic objectives. Projects tend to have a shorter lifespan, and deal with outputs. Projects can, however, be grouped under a single program if they are similar in nature or if they are aimed at collectively achieving a strategic objective. Complex projects can be delivered in multiple stages, under different contracts, and across different time periods.

The last assurance review of the entire WestConnex program of works as a whole was in 2015

INSW conducted the first IIAF gateway review of WestConnex in August 2015. TfNSW developed a draft WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case to consolidate the latest analysis on WestConnex, and to confirm that the project remained fit for purpose, economically viable, and financially deliverable. The review followed a recommendation in our 2014 performance audit report that business cases be thoroughly revisited.

During September 2015, INSW conducted additional informal reviews to identify strategic risks associated with public release of the WestConnex business case. Subsequently, INSW gave the Premier of NSW its views on the draft business case, including the following points:

• The $398 million budget for Sydney Gateway was insufficient to meet the benefits claimed in the business case for a ‘functional’ connection to Sydney Airport and Port Botany. INSW studies indicate a future‑proof solution would require a minimum spend of $755 million.
• Enabling works for WestConnex estimated at $1.534 billion were excluded from the cost of WestConnex. Significant work remained for RMS to identify mitigation measures to address planning approvals and network performance issues.
• Enabling works (a Southern Connector), an access ramp and surface road improvements within St Peters were excluded from the draft 2015 business case despite their inclusion in the WestConnex scope in the 2014–15 State Budget.
• The overall cost of works not funded within the WestConnex budget ranged from $2.011 billion to $2.196 billion. This included the enabling works, access ramp and surface road improvements and the shortfall for Sydney Gateway.

All WestConnex related projects, including Sydney Gateway have undergone independent assurance reviews under the IIAF

Since INSW submitted the first WestConnex progress update report to Cabinet in June 2015, INSW has been reporting monthly on the different stages of the WestConnex Program, including Sydney Gateway, as the projects were registered with INSW as High‑Profile, High‑Risk projects. Separate reporting enabled INSW to report and review each stage with more detailed scrutiny, compared to the reporting and reviewing at a program level.

WestConnex Stage 2 (New M5) underwent both mandatory and non‑mandatory reviews at key points in the project lifecycle. Three mandatory gateway reviews – at Gate 2 (Final business case), Gate 3 (Readiness for market), and Gate 4 (Tender evaluation) – were conducted by TfNSW before the introduction of IIAF. Four non‑mandatory health check reviews and one non‑mandatory deep dive review were conducted after the introduction of the IIAF managed by INSW.

Similarly, WestConnex Stage 3 projects – M4‑M5 link, M4‑M5 Tunnels, and Rozelle Interchange – also underwent mandatory and non‑mandatory reviews at key points in their lifecycle under IIAF.

The M4‑M5 Link had two mandatory gateway reviews and one non‑mandatory health check review under IIAF. These reviews were conducted before Stage 3 was split into two stages, due to major design changes to the Rozelle Interchange and the M4‑M5 tunnels.

The M4‑M5 tunnels had two mandatory gateway reviews (at Gates 3 and 4), one non‑mandatory health check review, and one non‑mandatory deep dive review under IIAF.

Rozelle Interchange also underwent three mandatory gateway reviews at Gate 3 (part 1), Gate 3 (part 2), and Gate 4, two non‑mandatory health check reviews, and one non‑mandatory deep dive review under IIAF.

Since mid‑2017, the Sydney Gateway project has undergone required independent assurance reviews, as well as a number of optional assurance reviews

In November 2016, INSW conducted a mandatory Gate 1 gateway review on a strategic business case for the Sydney Gateway Project. TfNSW did not proceed with this business case. Following the separation of Sydney Gateway from WestConnex in mid‑2017, TfNSW developed a new business case for Sydney Gateway. It has undergone the required Gate 1, Gate 2, and Gate 3 gateway reviews, as well as two non‑mandatory health check reviews, and three non‑mandatory deep dive reviews under IIAF.

Network integration works have undergone all IIAF required assurance reviews

TfNSW completed a strategic business case for the Network Integration Program in August 2020, and INSW completed a gateway review in November 2020. This is despite network integration projects starting as early as 2015, with $645 million having been spent by June 2020. The strategic business case included a prioritisation process for completing remaining works in the program. Prior to November 2020, TfNSW registered individual network integration projects with INSW, and these projects have undergone gateway reviews where required.

The Network Integration Program strategic business case does not include Rozelle interchange network integration works ($353 million) and additional network integration works to settle a contractor claim adjacent to St Peters Interchange ($190 million). These were excluded from the business case on the basis they had already been approved by government, and as such were not subject to the prioritisation elements of the business case. TfNSW has not developed separate business cases for these works, although the scope of the St Peters Interchange works was developed through a negotiated process.

TfNSW did not prepare business cases for some network integration works which have commenced, including the $323 million Campbell Road/Euston Road works

Prior to its development of the August 2020 strategic business case, TfNSW did not prepare business cases for many network integration works that have commenced, and in some instances were completed, before 2019. Significantly, TfNSW did not prepare a business case for the Campbell Road/Euston Road works, which cost $323 million and have been completed.

In 2016, TfNSW’s Business Case Policy requires the creation of business cases for capital projects costing over $1.0 million. At the time of writing this report, TfNSW’s draft policy requires full business cases for capital projects costing $10.0 million or more.

There is no requirement for ongoing ‘whole‑of‑program’ assurance of the WestConnex program of works, including related projects

INSW conducted its first gateway review of WestConnex (as a program, which consisted of composite projects) in August 2015. Following that review, TfNSW registered each of the components of WestConnex with INSW as individual projects, rather than keeping WestConnex registered as a program or complex project. The IIAF allows this to occur.

Separate registration enabled INSW to report and review each stage with more scrutiny compared to whole‑of‑program level review.

Such an approach has merit, considering the individual stages (and components of these stages) are multi‑million dollar works in their own right. Each project has its own timing for gateway reviews at stages such as 'Readiness for Market' and 'Tender Evaluation'.

Once a program such as WestConnex is broken down into its composite parts, there is no requirement for the sponsor agency (TfNSW) or INSW to conduct independent assurance on the program of works as a whole until the whole program is completed as part of the Benefits Realisation (Gate 6) gateway review. The absence of strategic, holistic reviews of projects of the scale and complexity such as WestConnex during their delivery allows for total costs and benefits to become opaque and avoid scrutiny. Projects of this scale require greater ongoing transparency on total costs and benefits in order to ensure confidence they will meet intended objectives within budget.

INSW has advised us that it has prepared a proposal to expand its assurance function to include whole‑of‑program review of inter‑related infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – Network integration works

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #351 - released (17 June 2021).

What the report is about

The report assessed how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice is responding to homelessness through the NSW Government’s Homelessness Strategy.

It also assessed the effectiveness of the department’s efforts to address street homelessness in its COVID-19 response.

What we found

The strategy was designed to build evidence to inform future state-wide action rather than to end homelessness.

The department received significantly less funding than it sought for the strategy.

Actions delivered under the strategy have a narrow reach in terms of locations and number of people targeted for assistance.

The strategy will have limited short-term impact on homelessness across NSW, but it is building evidence on what works to prevent and reduce homelessness.

The department effectively implemented a crisis response to assist over 4,350 people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during the pandemic.

While there was an effective crisis response to assist people sleeping rough during the pandemic, more will need to be done to ensure a sustainable response which prevents people returning to homelessness.

What we recommend

The department should:

• provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
• commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s 10-year plan for social housing and 20-year housing strategy
• enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people, and people with lived experience of homelessness
• partner with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities to design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
• evaluate the homelessness response to COVID-19, integrate the lessons learned into future practice, and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies or disasters
• regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

Homelessness exists when a person does not have suitable accommodation alternatives. A person is considered to be experiencing homelessness if their current living arrangement:

• is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or
• has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or
• does not allow them to have control of, and access to space for social relations.

The number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales increased by 37 per cent between the last two censuses, from 27,479 in 2011, to 37,715 in 2016. New South Wales recorded the largest increase of all the states and territories in both the number of people experiencing homelessness and in the homeless rate (from 40.8 to 50.4 persons per 10,000).

The NSW Government's primary service response to homelessness is crisis, temporary and transitional accommodation, and support services, funded at more than $1.0 billion over four years from 2018–19. These are ‘commissioned services’ delivered by non‑government organisations under contracts with the Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) and out of scope for this audit. We assessed how the Department manages contracts for specialist homelessness services in our 2019 audit 'Contracting non‑government organisations'.

The policy framework for the NSW Government's response to homelessness is the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23 (the Strategy), which is examined in this audit. The Department is responsible for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy. The Strategy comprises 21 actions, ten of which directly target people at risk of, or already experiencing, homelessness through measures such as:

• screening high school students for the risk of homelessness and providing supports
• assisting vulnerable people to maintain their tenancies in social housing or the private rental market
• providing purpose‑built social housing.

These ten actions comprise $160 million of the Strategy's $169 million funding.

In December 2019, the first evidence of the COVID‑19 virus emerged. People sleeping without shelter or in public places (sleeping rough) typically live in communal arrangements, with some having limited access to basic hygiene supplies or showering facilities. These factors may increase the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 amongst this population.

In response to the pandemic, the NSW Government provided additional funding for the Department to institute a range of actions aimed at preventing vulnerable people from becoming homeless, and people sleeping rough from contracting or transmitting the virus. These were informed by, but separate to, actions under the Homelessness Strategy.

This audit focused on the temporary accommodation provided to individuals experiencing street homelessness during the pandemic, and the new 'Together Home' program established in 2020 to transition people with experience or history sleeping rough from temporary accommodation into more sustainable longer‑term housing.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department is implementing the Homelessness Strategy and addressing street homelessness in its COVID‑19 response. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department:

• has effectively developed an evidence‑based Strategy and established supporting arrangements to implement it
• is ensuring the Strategy is achieving its objectives and outcomes
• is effectively supporting people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during COVID‑19 and to transition into more sustainable longer‑term housing.

1. Key findings: the Homelessness Strategy

The Strategy's geographical and client reach is limited because it is building the evidence base on what works

The Department's objectives to intervene early, provide effective supports and create an integrated person‑centred system to address homelessness are clear, but are not being pursued state‑wide.

There were existing gaps in the available evidence which made it difficult for the Department to develop a holistic, state‑wide, long‑term solution to homelessness. Some of the actions under the Strategy have a degree of supporting evidence. Other actions are intended to generate evidence through pilots and by evaluating existing programs more robustly.

At least one Strategy action is available in each of the Department's 16 districts, and there are examples of the Department rolling out practice changes from Strategy pilots across the state. However, progress towards the Strategy aims is confined to pockets where actions are being trialled.

Once fully implemented, Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's 128 local government areas and will support approximately 8,200 people ‑ which equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people who were experiencing homelessness at the time of the last census in New South Wales in 2016 more than 37,000 people. This does not include the number of people at risk of homelessness.

A key gap in Strategy actions is addressing Aboriginal homelessness.

The Department received significantly less funding than sought and designed the Strategy to build the evidence base rather than eliminate homelessness

The Department could not meet the evidence threshold for a cost benefit analysis required by a Treasury business case, given the limited evidence available locally and internationally on what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier. The Department sought new, targeted investment to extend a small number of initiatives with proven effect, and to build the evidence base about other measures that work, rather than the quantum of funding required to end homelessness in New South Wales.

Even so, approved funding was significantly less than that sought by the Department. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. It directed 95 per cent of the total Strategy funding to supports and accommodation for people at risk of or experiencing homelessness.

The Department intends to use the gathered data from implementation of the Strategy to expand effective prevention and early intervention measures after it concludes, subject to budget approval. It expects that, over time, these initiatives will reduce the demand for crisis services.

Actions may not be scaled up at the end of the Strategy's term, perpetuating the Strategy's limited reach and narrow impact on homelessness

The Department's approach of testing interventions and building the evidence base through the Strategy was well described and provided a clear rationale in its original advice to government. An evaluation framework has been designed to generate sufficient evidence on the overall Strategy and its individual actions for a cost benefit analysis to support a future budget bid.

The Department intends to use the findings from interim evaluation reports, due by September 2021, to determine the programs and pilots with promising evidence that should continue to the end of the Strategy term. It expects this to enable more qualitative and quantitative data to be available to the evaluations, as well as to support service continuity.

However, delays in delivery of some actions under the Strategy, and the time taken for outcomes to be achieved and show up in the data, will impact on the strength of the evidence available at the mid‑term and final Strategy evaluation points. This raises a risk that future funding for a comprehensive Strategy will not be secured ‑ and prevention and early intervention activities not continued or scaled up beyond pilot sites ‑ if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes.

Given its limited reach, even if the existing Strategy actions were retained, and no expansion occurred, it would continue to have a narrow impact on homelessness in New South Wales. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt.

2. Key findings: the COVID‑19 response to homelessness

The Department effectively planned and implemented its homelessness response to the pandemic and reduced the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 for people sleeping rough

The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group.

The Department engaged with the specialist homelessness services sector from mid‑March 2020 to modify service delivery, advise on infection control and plan extra supports. It explored options with temporary accommodation providers to support self‑isolation for clients, and scaled up its assertive outreach patrols by staff, specialist caseworkers and health professionals to support people sleeping rough into crisis or temporary accommodation for safety.

The Minister directed the Department to address street homelessness in the COVID‑19 response using the Government’s second stage of stimulus funding. The Department procured hotel, motel or serviced apartment accommodation for 400 people who were sleeping rough, or unable to physically distance in large crisis accommodation centres, within a week of the ministerial direction, building on existing programs. The Department provided advice to the Minister on the need to adjust existing policy settings to meet the forecast demand for temporary accommodation services.

The Department secured additional temporary accommodation when and where it was required, to accommodate the number of people sleeping rough who wanted support. Between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, the Department provided temporary accommodation to 32,158 individuals, of which 4,355 people were sleeping rough, totalling more than 70,000 nights of temporary accommodation and services.

The Department met regularly with NSW homelessness peak organisations and established a Taskforce involving other government agencies, peak organisations, and service providers, to assist in quickly executing the measure and resolving issues arising. The Taskforce built on existing collaborative arrangements in place to support cross‑sectoral coordination, enabling it to respond quickly to COVID‑19.

The Department worked with NSW Health and health providers to ensure its COVID‑19 response to homelessness was in line with health guidelines. As of May 2021, just one participant in the Department's enhanced temporary accommodation program had contracted COVID‑19.

The Department does not know how many people sleeping rough who were assisted with enhanced temporary accommodation have returned to homelessness

Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a specialist housing team, and contracted a non‑government provider, to connect people placed in hotels with support services, provide tailored support, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing.

The Department’s data indicates that between May 2020 and 31 January 2021, over 1,800 people who had previously been sleeping rough had been engaged in this program, more than four times the expected client numbers. Almost half moved into further accommodation when they left the program, including people supported with longer‑term housing such as social housing, community leasing under the Together Home program, and private rental arrangements.

However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who disengaged from services. The Department advises that this would have required additional resourcing to do so.

The Department offers assistance to people in temporary accommodation to find longer term options, and has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. It intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance from the Department.

The Department cannot identify precisely how many people sleeping rough who were assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people formerly sleeping rough who left temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 left with an unknown housing outcome. This includes people who were not eligible for social housing, were stranded due to border closures, or who disengaged from the Department or funded support services.

The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches.

The Together Home program was established quickly to assist people into more permanent accommodation but will not meet demand as a standalone response

The Department established the Together Home program in September 2020 to provide longer‑term accommodation to people who were sleeping rough during the pandemic. Community housing providers head‑lease properties in the private rental market for two years and sub‑lease these to clients, while ensuring they receive additional support, such as health services, to help them maintain the lease.

Under the initial tranche of funding, the Together Home program aimed to support 400 people sleeping rough. This target was met by April 2021. Due to increased rental demand in many areas of the state, there were some delays in securing properties in certain areas. In addition, people on temporary visas, or with existing public housing debt, are ineligible for this program.

A further $29.0 million was provided to this program through the 2020–21 NSW Budget, creating 400 additional program places. However, the total number of 800 Together Home places will not be sufficient to provide housing for the more than 4,000 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation.

The Department advises it is using a range of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation outside of the Together Home program. These options include social housing, supported transitional accommodation, subsidised private rental, boarding houses, and referral to mental health and substance addiction rehabilitation facilities.

The Department’s latest annual state‑wide street count suggested that the number of people sleeping rough across New South Wales decreased by 13 per cent between February 2020 and February 2021. The Department has acknowledged that it could do more to monitor and support the housing outcomes for people in temporary accommodation after they exit.

The Department has plans to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year program, through commissioned community housing and private rental assistance. However, it is not clear how this will overcome existing housing challenges given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing.

3. Recommendations

By July 2022, the Department of Communities and Justice should:

1. use data and analysis identified through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 and provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports

2. use the evidence obtained through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 to commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s ten‑year plan for social housing and 20‑year housing strategy

3. establish and sustain governance arrangements that enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people and people with lived experience of homelessness

4. in partnership with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities, design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services

5. evaluate the homelessness response to COVID‑19 and integrate the lessons learned into future practice; and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies/disasters

6. establish and sustain a means to regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback; and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.

This chapter considers how effectively the NSW Homelessness Strategy was developed and is currently being implemented by the Department of Communities and Justice.

This chapter examines how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice addressed homelessness in its response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, and how well it is applying lessons learned from the pandemic to future policy and service development.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Actions within the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23

Appendix three – Reported progress on Homelessness Strategy actions to date (unaudited)

Appendix four – Key homelessness data collections

Appendix five – Temporary accommodation for people sleeping rough standard practice vs COVID 19 response

Appendix six – Key measures in the COVID 19 response to homelessness

Appendix seven – About the audit

Appendix eight – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #350 - released (4 June 2021).

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

• whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
• whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

• whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
• whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

• the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
• the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
• the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

• Secretary of Transport for NSW
• Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
• Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
• Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
• Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
• Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand ¹ space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost. 

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m², this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation ². The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot. 

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds. 

Appendix one – Response from agency 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the planning and delivery of new, redeveloped and upgraded public schools.

School Infrastructure NSW has identified the need to accommodate an additional 180,000 enrolments in public schools by 2039 with a large portion of this growth expected in metropolitan Sydney. It has also identified that around 34,000 teaching spaces will require upgrading to be fit-for-purpose.

Although School Infrastructure NSW has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet those needs. Developing a longer-term list of priorities would help signal the areas of greatest need and allow more time to develop the best options to meet those needs.

The audit found that School Infrastructure NSW has focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future needs. 

The report makes eight recommendations to improve long-term planning for future needs, strengthen the quality of estimated project costs and benefits, and embed a continuous improvement program. 

In 2016, the Department of Education prepared a School Assets Strategic Plan (2016 SASP) which outlined long-term funding needs to support the expected growth in enrolments to 2031. Following the release of the 2016 SASP, the NSW Government substantially increased funding for new and upgraded schools from $2.4 billion in the 2016–17 State Budget to $4.2 billion in 2017–18.

In 2017, the Department of Education established School Infrastructure NSW (SINSW) to lead the delivery of the 2016 SASP and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. This significantly larger program of work required rapid development of internal capacity, governance arrangements, and project management systems. This needed to be done at the same time as scoping and planning for the list of announced projects.

As there are limited funds available to meet growing needs across the State, it is important that SINSW has effective methods to prioritise projects to communities with the greatest need. To ensure that projects deliver value for money, business cases need to have robust estimates of project costs and benefits. Business cases also need to account for the inherent risks in delivering infrastructure projects. Unplanned cost escalations can reduce the number of new or modernised classrooms SINSW can deliver. Unforeseen delays may also impact families who make significant life choices based on their expectations that a school will open at the beginning of the school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of new, upgraded and redeveloped schools to meet demand for public school education in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether the Department:

• has effective procedures for planning and prioritising school capital works to meet present and future demands
• develops robust business cases for school capital works that reliably inform decision-making
• has effective program/project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit examined business cases for 12 projects as case studies. These include a mix of projects initiated before and after the establishment of SINSW.

This audit commenced in June 2020 and examined strategies and demographic projections developed prior to the emergence of COVID-19. This audit did not examine potential longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on future demands for public school education.

1. Key findings

SINSW delivered projects against an established program of works in its first years of operation

At establishment, SINSW inherited a portfolio of existing projects and 123 new projects announced as part of the 2017–18 Budget (to commence over 2017–18 and 2018–19). It has progressively worked through individual project planning to deliver against these projects.

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. The 2018–19 Budget also allocated funding for 'planning' 22 new projects. Seventeen of the 22 projects had been identified by SINSW as a priority.

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. Thirteen of these projects were funded in that year with a further 27 projects included as election commitments. SINSW identified 20 new projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2020–21 but only two of these were funded. SINSW advised this was due to a constrained budget environment.

There is an anticipated shortfall of classrooms based on the current funded program

Despite increased funding since 2017–18, SINSW advised the NSW Government in early 2020 that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. Accordingly, it is vital that new funding is prioritised to projects which best meet demand.

SINSW only identified specific priorities over a two-year horizon in its Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21. The School Assets Strategic Plan 2016 and the 2020 update make the case for sustained funding for school building and redevelopment. These plans estimate annual funding requirements and show geographic areas with increasing forecast enrolments. Detailing how priorities over a ten-year timeframe fit within a ten-year capital planning limit would create more certainty about meeting growth demands.

There has been progress in formalising prioritisation frameworks, data tools and supporting governance arrangements

SINSW committed to planning for new and redeveloped schools in 'School Community Groups' in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. This is a new way of planning which considers the educational needs over a defined geographical area. It has developed a planning tool to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also established governance frameworks to improve transparency over decisions to reprioritise this list.

SINSW has refined its approach to planning in School Community Groups over the past four years. It now prepares Service Needs Reports to investigate needs, identify projects, prioritise, determine scope and timing, and assess non-capital options. SINSW has yet to finalise arrangements for how needs identified in Service Needs Reports progress to the strategic business case stage.

Projects announced prior to developing a business case have less opportunity to consider a range of options to meet the service needs

Business cases for projects already announced by government (or announced for planning) go through the same process of determining the service need and impacts on surrounding schools. However, for some announced projects, the range of options considered in the business case is influenced by the parameters of the announcement. This makes it more difficult to genuinely pursue alternate options that could better meet the identified service need.

Projects identified by SINSW have a more rigorous process of considering options. Service Needs Reports explore a wide range of asset and non-asset interventions across the School Community Group. Options are narrowed as the projects move through the strategic and final business case stages. SINSW uses its Investment Review Committee to engage key stakeholders early in the process so that they are informed about how non-asset solutions have been considered and why SINSW is progressing the business case for a capital solution for particular projects.

Several business cases underestimated project costs and risks, leading to scope and budget increases

Several business cases we reviewed did not adequately identify the initial scope requirements, project-specific risks or the likely project cost. For two business cases, this appeared to be due to an attempt to fit the project within a predetermined amount. Announcing a project’s scope, budget and timeframe before proper planning increases risks to successful delivery against expectations.

Several of the projects we examined required drawdowns on contingency funds due to inadequate consideration of scope, costs and project risks at the planning stage. Contingency funds are intended for unanticipated extra costs rather than those that could have or should have been identified at the planning stage.

Guidance on benefit calculations has provided a consistent framework for business cases

Business cases we examined presented a consistent set of benefits based on guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury. Following this guidance helps to compare cost-benefit analyses across business cases. However, the evidence for the estimated benefits is based on contexts outside of NSW. SINSW has the tools and data sources to calculate benefits more suited to the context of particular schools. Doing so would improve the accuracy of cost-benefit analyses. SINSW advised that it is currently updating the guidance in partnership with NSW Treasury.

SINSW involves school principals, executives and teaching staff in developing education rationales when commencing projects. These documents help align projects with education outcomes. They also provide a baseline for post-occupancy evaluation, which is important to determine whether the new school infrastructure is being used in the ways that were anticipated in the business case.

SINSW could elevate its existing assurance review process to consolidate lessons learned

SINSW engages external peer reviewers to conduct assurance reviews on its projects at multiple stages of planning and delivery. It has established a Community of Practice for external reviewers to keep them up to date on new developments and requirements. Higher value projects are also subject to review by Infrastructure NSW under the Investor Assurance Framework.

By looking at all projects at all stages, assurance reviews can identify systematic issues across the full portfolio of projects. A recent assurance review analysed common findings from reviews of strategic and final business cases. This provides a helpful way to improve internal processes. SINSW advised that it is implementing a continuous improvement program, which will be able to take findings from assurance reviews to build organisational capabilities.

2. Recommendations

By September 2021, the Department of Education should:

1. finalise the investment prioritisation approach with agreement from key stakeholders
2. finalise and update on an ongoing basis a ten-year list of priorities to meet the forecast demand for new classrooms and contemporary fit for purpose learning environments, which identifies individual projects and programs in the short-term and priority geographic areas and programs in the medium-term
3. seek a ten-year Capital Planning Limit from NSW Treasury to ensure the needs identified in the ten-year list of priorities are met and are coordinated with the forward capital programs of other agencies
4. improve the quality of data on cost benchmarks that underpin the annual ten-year Capital Investment Plan and updates to the School Assets Strategic Plan
5. embed an evidence-based cost benefit analysis framework for school investment, in consultation with NSW Treasury, by:
   • validating benefits estimated in previous business cases with actual results
   • building the evidence base in relation to contemporary learning environments
6. regularly share data on forecast needs with relevant planning agencies to promote strategic opportunities for servicing education needs
7. implement the continuous improvement program for service planning, options assessment, business case development, project delivery and handover. The program should be informed by findings from assurance reviews, post-occupancy evaluations and project lessons learned
8. establish benefits realisation processes and practices that:
   • ensure business cases set baselines and targets for benefits
   • review benefits during delivery, prior to handover and as part of Post Occupancy Evaluations
   • identify which part(s) of the Department are best placed to develop, manage and evaluate benefits on an ongoing basis.

There have been significant increases in funding for education infrastructure since the 2017–18 Budget and further growth in demand for places in schools is forecast. SINSW has the challenge, not only of meeting the need for new classrooms due to population growth, but also upgrading facilities to enable modern teaching techniques. In addition, community expectations of what constitutes a vibrant and successful school community continues to increase.

Given growing demand and budget constraints, projects must be selected to best meet the needs of the community and planning and prioritisation are vital. SINSW has been progressing planning for announced projects as well as implementing a new type of strategic state-wide planning and prioritisation, cluster planning, where options are developed for School Community Groups.

The primary role of a business case is to reliably inform an investment and/or policy decision. Over the period of review, the NSW Government's guidelines for business cases have established this requires recommendations based on convincing arguments, sufficient evidence, and accurate costing of alternatives and expected benefits. Business case guidelines are underpinned by guides for economic appraisal and cost-benefit analysis.

As SINSW moves to prioritise business cases for interventions in School Community Groups, it will increasingly need to demonstrate rigour in its assessment of all options. It will also need to ensure that scope identification, cost and risk planning and the setting of contingencies are accurate. This will help decision-makers better understand, plan for and manage the investment required to meet the demand for school infrastructure.

For this audit, we examined business cases and related documentation for 12 projects. Several of these projects were developed before School Infrastructure NSW was established in mid-2017.

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

SINSW's guidance similarly highlight the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by SINSW that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of school infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #347 - released (8 April 2021).

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure 

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within my Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure, dated 8 April 2021. 

On page two, the original text was as follows: 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget and election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

The original text has now been changed to 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

On page three, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded three new projects that had not already been announced. One of the three projects was identified by SINSW as a priority. 

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. 

On page three the original text was as follows: 

SINSW identified 33 priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.

The original text has now been changed to  

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. 

On page eleven, in Exhibit 4, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 43 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 43 projects: 

•    1 was identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for one new project)
•    40 had already been announced
•    2 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 42 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 42 projects: 

•    2 were identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for two new projects)
•    40 had already been announced.

On page eleven, the original text was as follows: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 33 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 31 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.  

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the management of the One TAFE NSW modernisation program.

In 2016, the Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW' which stated that TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out the need to progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from separate institutes to a single institute model. TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision.

The Auditor General found that the One TAFE NSW modernisation program did not deliver against its key objectives within planned timeframes. The modernisation program originally aimed to realise $250 million in annual savings from 2018–19. Because of project delays and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW did not meet the original savings target. TAFE NSW has made progress on key elements of the program and anticipates that savings will be realised in coming years.

The report makes two recommendations to improve governance arrangements for delivering on commercial objectives and increasing transparency of non commercial activities. 

The report also identifies a series of lessons for future government transformation programs.

TAFE NSW is the public provider of Vocational Education and Training (VET) in New South Wales. In 2018, TAFE NSW enrolled 436,000 students in more than 1,200 courses at around 130 locations across the State.

There have been major policy changes impacting TAFE NSW over the past decade. Under the Smart and Skilled reform, TAFE NSW started to compete with other Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) for a share of the student market.

In 2016, the NSW Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW'. The Vision stated that a failure to adapt to market circumstances had left TAFE NSW with unsustainable costs and inefficiencies. To address this, TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out that TAFE NSW must progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from a model of separate institutes to a One  TAFE NSW model. The NSW Government set TAFE NSW a target to achieve savings through implementing the Vision.

TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision. The program initially aimed to deliver savings of $250 million per year from 2018–19, but this target was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered.

This audit assessed whether TAFE NSW effectively managed the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

• delivery of the program was well planned
• the program was driven by sound governance arrangements
• TAFE NSW is making progress against the intended outcomes of the program.

The audit focused on the effectiveness of planning, governance and reporting arrangements. It examined five projects within the overall modernisation program as case studies.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #346 - released 17 December 2020

The Auditor‑General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining procurement management in Local Government.

The audit assessed the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. All six councils had procurement management policies that were consistent with legislative requirements, but the audit found compliance gaps in some councils. The audit also identified opportunities for councils to address risks to transparency and accountability, and to ensure value for money is achieved when undertaking procurement.

The Auditor‑General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment review the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 and publish updated and more comprehensive guidance on procurement management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector on opportunities to strengthen procurement practices.

Effective procurement is important in ensuring councils achieve their objectives, demonstrate value for money and deliver benefits to the community when purchasing goods and services. Procurement also comes with risks and challenges in ensuring the purchased goods and services deliver to expectations. The risks of fraud and conflicts of interest also need to be mitigated.

The legislative requirements related to procurement in the Local Government sector are focused on sourcing and assessing tender offers. These requirements are included in the Local Government Act 1993 (the Act), the Local Government Amendment Act 2019 (the Amendment), the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 (the Regulation), the Tendering Guidelines for NSW Local Government 2009 (the Tendering Guidelines), the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act) and the State Records Act 1998.

General requirements and guidance relevant to councils are also available in the Model Code of Conduct for Local Councils in NSW 2018 (the Model Code), the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework 2019 and in publications by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).^₁

Individual councils have developed their own procurement policies and procedures to expand on the legislative requirements. Understandably, these vary to reflect each council’s location, size and procurement needs. Nevertheless, the general principles of effective procurement management (such as transparency and accountability) and risk-mitigating practices (such as segregation of duties and the provision of training) are relevant to all councils.

The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2018 provided a sector-wide summary of aspects of procurement management in Local Government (see Section 2.1 of this report). This audit builds on this state-wide view by examining in detail the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. This report also provides insights on opportunities to strengthen procurement management in the sector.

The selected councils for this audit were Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council, Tweed Shire Council, Waverley Council and Wollongong City Council. They were selected to provide a mix of councils of different geographical classifications, sizes, priorities and levels of resourcing.

Recommendations

1. By June 2022, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment should:
   1. publish comprehensive and updated guidance on effective procurement practices – including electronic tender submissions and procurements below the tender threshold
   2. review and update the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 to reflect the increasing use of electronic tender submissions rather than paper copies.
2. By December 2021, the six audited councils should consider the opportunities to improve procurement management in line with the improvement areas outlined in chapter three of this report.
3. Cumberland City Council should immediately:
   1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
   2. introduce procedures to ensure supplier performance reviews are conducted as per the council’s policy
4. Georges River Council should immediately:
   1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
   2. introduce procedures to ensure all the steps up to the awarding of a contract are documented as per the council’s policy
   3. introduce procedures to ensure outcome evaluations are conducted as per the council’s policy.
5. Lockhart Shire Council should immediately:
   1. include additional information in the council’s contract register to ensure compliance with Section 29(b), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the GIPA Act
   2. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report.
6. Waverley Council should immediately ensure contracts are disclosed in the annual report as per Section 217(1)(a2) of the Regulation.

While all six councils had procurement policies in place and were generally compliant with legislative requirements, this report has identified common gaps in processes and practices that expose risks to transparency, accountability and value for money.

This section discusses how councils can mitigate risks and ensure the best outcomes are achieved from their procurements.

Documented justification of procurement needs

The ICAC notes that determining what goods and services an agency requires is the first step of procurement, and the scope for corruption in how need is determined is significant. Without documenting how procurement needs have been justified, councils cannot demonstrate that they fulfill business needs, nor how the procurements may link to the councils’ strategic plans to deliver to the community.

This audit found that none of the six councils’ policies required them to document justification of procurement needs, and none did so consistently in practice. Councils can address this gap by building into their procurement planning process a requirement for staff to document the justification of procurement needs. For higher value procurements, this could be extended to include analysis of options, an assessment of risks and defining intended outcomes. Similarly, clearly establishing and documenting how relevant procurements relate to a council’s community strategic plans or operational plans helps ensure transparency.

Although a formal business case may not be required for many procurements (for example, low-value procurements or routine replacements), some form of documented justification for the expenditure should still be kept on record to demonstrate that the procurement relates to business purposes and is needed.

Segregation of duties

Segregation of duties is an effective control for reducing risks of error, fraud and corruption in procurement. It works on the principle that one person should not have end-to-end control of a procurement. Effective segregation of duties also often involves managerial or independent oversight that is built into the process. Four of the audited councils (Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) appropriately addressed segregation of duties in their procurement frameworks. For example:

• All procurements in Cumberland City Council required a delegated officer’s approval before commencing, and the requisitioning department is responsible for ensuring the completion of the goods, works or services associated with each contract. For contracts over $50,000, a specific ‘Authority to Procure’ form had to be completed by the requesting staff, signed by an approver and then forwarded to the procurement team.

• Reflecting its small size, all procurements in Lockhart Shire Council were managed by one senior staff member. Nevertheless, this staff member had to bring contract management plans to the rest of the Executive Leadership Team for review and discussion, with large contracts such as those above the tender threshold referred to Council for approval.

The ICAC notes that segregation of duties helps to control discretion, which has particular risk implications for some types of procurement.₂ This includes those involving low-value and high-volume transactions, restricted tenders, long-standing procurements and ‘pet projects’ (projects advocated by individual staff members). In cases where corruption risks are low, ICAC notes that monitoring staff’s involvement in procurement may be a cost-effective alternative to total segregation of duties.

Assessment of supplier performance

Councils need to monitor and assess supplier performance to ensure suppliers deliver the goods and services as agreed. The audit found that all six councils consistently monitored progress in capital works and for externally funded projects. Contract monitoring in these cases included ensuring timelines, funding, and legislative requirements were met. This is positive, as capital works made up the bulk of procurements (in terms of volume) in all of the audited councils.

That said, in all six councils, the level of scrutiny was lower for other types of procurements, and there is scope for improvement. For instance, the approach to monitoring capital works or externally funded projects could be replicated across other procurements of a similar nature and value. Conducting assessments and keeping records of supplier performance on all procurements does not need to be onerous, but instead provides useful information to inform future decision-making—including by helping ensure supplier pricing remains competitive, and avoiding re-engaging underperforming suppliers.

The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that NSW Government agencies establish systems and processes jointly with the suppliers to ensure compliance with contract terms and performance requirements. It also advises that agencies should drive continuous improvement and encourage innovation in coordination with suppliers and key stakeholders.

Centralised contract register

Centrally registering a contract provides improved transparency of procurement activities and facilitates monitoring and compliance checks. While councils are already required to maintain a contract register for all contracts above the reporting threshold (as per the GIPA Act), given the threshold is set at a relatively high benchmark ($150,000), there is merit in councils extending the practice to procurements below the reporting threshold. A central and comprehensive register of contracts helps avoid duplication of procurements and re-contracting of underperforming suppliers.

Three of the audited councils (Georges River Council, Tweed Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) had contract register policies that applied to procurements below the reporting threshold during the audited period. For example, Georges River Council required contracts valued at $10,000 or above to be registered with the procurement team, and Tweed Shire Council had a threshold of $50,000.

Evaluation of community outcomes and value for money

Councils may be progressing procurements to fulfill their strategic and business plans, or using them to fulfill commitments to the community. In these instances, outcomes evaluation is an important way to demonstrate to the community that the intended benefits and value for money have been delivered.

Five of the six audited councils did not require evaluations of community outcomes and value for money. While Georges River Council required contracts valued at $50,000 or more to be monitored, evaluated and reported on at least annually throughout the contract and also at its conclusion, in the procurements we examined the only ‘outcome evaluations’ that the council had conducted were community surveys that did not refer to individual procurements. Councils can miss opportunities to understand the impact of their work on the local community if evaluations of procurement outcomes are not completed. Evaluation findings are also valuable in guiding future resource allocation decisions.

Value for money in the procurement of goods and services is more than just having the specified goods delivered or services carried out. The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that state government agencies track and report benefits to demonstrate how value for money is being delivered. The framework notes that value for money is not necessarily the lowest price, nor the highest quality good or service, but requires a balanced assessment of a range of financial and non-financial factors, such as: quality, cost, fitness for purpose, capability, capacity, risk, total cost of ownership or other relevant factors.

Procurement training

Effective procurement management relies on the capability of staff involved in various stages of the process. Guidance can be provided through training, which is an important element of any procurement management framework. It ensures that staff members are aware of the councils' policies and procedures. If structured appropriately and provided in a timely manner, training can help to standardise practices, ensure compliance, reduce chances of error, and mitigate risks of fraud or corruption.

The ICAC notes that effective procurement management depends on the competence of staff undertaking procurements and the competence of those who oversee procurement activities. As the public sector is characterised by varying levels of procurement expertise, the ICAC notes that the sector would benefit from a structured approach to training and the application of minimum standards.₃

At the time of this audit, only Wollongong City Council addressed staff training requirements in its procurement management framework. Exhibit 8 details its approach.

Two of the audited councils have now also introduced procurement training:

• Georges River Council implemented online training, which is mandatory for new staff and serves as refresher training for existing staff. The council also provides in-person training for selected staff (covering contract management, contract specification writing and contractor relationship management) and has developed quick reference cards for all staff to increase awareness of the council's procurement processes.
• Tweed Shire Council implemented mandatory online training for all staff members. The training covers the council's procurement policy and protocol as well as relevant legislation. It is linked to relevant council documents such as the Procurement Toolkit on the council's intranet, and includes a quiz for which training participants must score at least 80 per cent to have the training marked as completed.

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Councils’ procurement contracts

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #345 - released 17 December 2020

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining NSW Health’s management of health and safety risks to nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital wards over the past five years, including during the first six months of the 2020 COVID-19 health emergency.

The Auditor-General found that while NSW Health effectively managed most incidents and risks to the physical health and safety of hospital staff during ‘business as usual’ activities, systems and resources are not fully effective to manage staff psychological and wellbeing risks, particularly for nurses.

The Auditor-General found that NSW Health was effective in managing most COVID-19 health and safety risks to hospital staff. Overall effectiveness could have been improved had pandemic preparedness training been delivered across all Local Health Districts. Additionally, state-wide communication systems could have been improved to provide hospital clinicians with access to a ‘single source of truth’ with the latest advice from NSW Health authorities.

NSW Health’s planning and preparation for the supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was partially effective. At various times, some PPE items could not be sourced from established suppliers. Face masks, goggles and protective gowns were substituted with products that differed in shape, size and fitting from usual items, and in some hospitals, substituted masks were used without being locally fit tested by hospital staff.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations aimed at enhancing hospital health and safety risk reporting practices, along with a recommendation that NSW Health conduct a post pandemic 'lessons learned' review and make policy and operational recommendations for future pandemic responses.

Over the past decade, there have been increases in the numbers of health and safety incidents affecting nurses and junior doctors in NSW hospitals. These increases have been associated with higher numbers of patients with acute mental health conditions, age-related cognitive impairments, and patients presenting in emergency departments under the influence of drugs and alcohol.  

This audit commenced in August 2019, with a focus on the health, safety and wellbeing of nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital wards. Our audit focused on emergency departments, mental health wards and aged care wards during 'business as usual’ periods of hospital operations. 

In the early months of 2020, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) brought new health and safety risks to hospital staff. These risks included the potential for infection amongst health workers, increased staff workloads, and impacts on staff wellbeing.  

In May 2020, we expanded the focus of the audit to assess the effectiveness of NSW Health’s management of the health and safety risks to staff during the COVID-19 health emergency. We assessed the impacts on emergency departments and intensive care units, as these were the wards where staff were most likely to come into contact with COVID-19.  

The Audit Office acknowledges the ongoing health and safety challenges that the pandemic has brought to NSW Health staff – in particular to hospital clinicians and the managers who support them.  

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s:

• systems, forums and workplace cultures to support reporting and generate data about risk
• initiatives to support safe workplaces and effectively respond to health and safety incidents
• actions to continuously improve staff health, safety and wellbeing in hospital environments.

The first three chapters of this report describe the effectiveness of NSW Health’s ‘business as usual’ health and safety risk management. The fourth and fifth chapters describe the effectiveness of NSW Health’s health and safety risk management during the COVID-19 pandemic.  

1. Audit recommendations

By December 2021, NSW Health should:

1. Evaluate the effectiveness of the new incident management system to enable full reporting of health and safety incidents and risks in all hospital wards, including those where incidents and risks are common, and monitor for consistency of reporting over time
2. Expand the categories of hospital incident data reported to Ministry executives in the Work Health and Safety Dashboard reports, including by linking injury data to incident types by hospital ward category, and monitor in conjunction with Local Health Districts for emerging trends and improvement over time
3. Ensure that nurses and junior doctors have regular opportunities to report on risks to their psychological health and wellbeing, and that system managers have access to aggregate data to guide responses to mitigate these risks
4. Develop and implement an evidence-based guiding framework and strategy to support hospital staff in the aftermath of traumatic or unexpected workplace incidents, and monitor implementation
5. At regular intervals, publicly report aggregate Root Cause Analysis data detailing the hospital system factors that contribute to clinical incidents
6. Develop and implement a systemwide platform for sharing research and information about hospital health and safety initiatives across the health system
7. Conduct a post-pandemic 'lessons learned' review focusing on the effectiveness of key strategies deployed in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic and make policy and operational recommendations for future pandemic responses. In particular, ensure:
   • regular scenario-based pandemic training for hospital staff
   • updated policies and protocols for hospital infection controls
   • capability to upscale authoritative communication with frontline health workers at the earliest notification of a health emergency and for the duration of the emergency
   • systems and safeguards to ensure the supply and availability of clinically appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) during all phases of a pandemic.

Local Health Districts were effective in leading health and safety infection control activity

According the NSW Health Influenza Pandemic Plan (Pandemic Plan), the Chief Executives of Local Health Districts have ultimate responsibility for public health unit preparations during health emergencies. If necessary, they can ‘draw on the support of the State Pandemic Management Team and local emergency management resources’.

During the preparations and early response phases to the COVID-19 pandemic, Local Health Districts were at the forefront of most NSW hospital activity. They took the lead role in developing hospital infection control protocols and guidance about the appropriate uses of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Each Local Health District established its own responses to the health emergency, based on the best clinical advice available to them. The localised approach meant that there were some minor differences in infection control practices across the NSW health system.

Throughout February and March 2020, there was limited centralised policy or guidance from the Ministry and its Pillar Health agencies about COVID-19 infection control practices. It was not possible to mandate practices at a time when information about the virus was evolving. Clinical responses were changing as more became known about COVID-19, especially about its patterns of transmission and its impacts on people with the disease.

During February and March 2020, Local Health District executives communicated with hospital staff via a range of methods. Some sent daily e-memos with the latest updates. Some scheduled more regular meetings with hospital clinicians. Some Districts set up extensive staff training sessions and information briefings to keep all personnel updated with the latest advice. Physical distancing made it difficult to bring staff together in large groups, so a range of communications measures were implemented.

Clinical staff also utilised their clinical training and expertise to prepare their wards and train frontline staff in infection control procedures. Some sourced information from national and international colleagues to add to localised knowledge of the virus.

When the first evidence of COVID-19 community transmission was identified in the Northern Sydney Local Health District, hospital staff followed infection control protocols that were based on local guidance and information. With the support from the District executive team and infectious diseases experts, hospital clinicians set up their own infection control protocols and PPE protections. Within a week the District had produced a matrix to guide staff in the uses of PPE during COVID-19 procedures, and had circulated the guidance to all hospital clinicians.

At the end of March 2020, a version of the Northern Sydney PPE matrix was published on the Clinical Excellence Commission’s website and it has now become NSW Health’s standard guideline for PPE during COVID-19 procedures. Once this guideline was published centrally, infection control practices were standardised across NSW hospitals.

This form of District-led policy making is not ‘business as usual’ practice for NSW Health. Policy making processes were somewhat reversed during the early response phases to COVID-19. This flexible policy approach supports the governance arrangements described in the Pandemic Plan, which assigns responsibility for ‘supporting and maintaining quality care across health services and implementing infection control measures as appropriate’ to Local Health Districts.

In non-health emergency situations, clinical policy and protocols are usually initiated and developed by the Ministry and the Clinical Excellence Commission and are subsequently shared across the health system after a quality control process. The localised approach adopted in the months from February to March 2020, allowed for rapid and flexible responses to changing information – to protect the health and safety of the hospital workforce and the wider community.

Hospital staff across NSW would have been better prepared for COVID-19 if pandemic training had been delivered across all Local Health Districts in the past decade

Local Health Districts are responsible for training hospital staff in preparation for public health emergencies. NSW’s policy describing Public Health Emergency Response Preparedness Minimum Standards requires that clinical staff participate in at least one annual emergency training exercise if they hold a position where they are likely to be called upon in an emergency. Staff must participate in an actual response exercise or a relevant training session. The training must also include re-familiarisation with PPE.

Available evidence about emergency response training in NSW indicates that at least two Local Health Districts have delivered pandemic focussed training in the past decade. Our interviews with managers of emergency departments and intensive care units indicates that most other Districts have focused their emergency training on mass patient trauma incidents such as plane crashes, train crashes and terrorist attacks. While the potential for these types of mass trauma events is real, and warrants training and preparation, significant global outbreaks of diseases have also had potential to threaten NSW communities. In previous decades, global health communities have been at risk of diseases such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS).

In the two Districts where pandemic training was provided in NSW, staff participated in community influenza vaccination exercises. These were focused on upskilling staff to follow emergency command structures, manage high volume patient flows, and organise sanitisation logistics during a hospital-based training exercise.

Our interviews with nurse managers in emergency departments and intensive care units indicate that in the majority of other Local Health Districts, key personnel were unaware of the NSW Pandemic Plan. Interviewed staff also reported insufficient scenario-based training in pandemic responses over the last ten years.

The Ministry, the Clinical Excellence Commission and the Health Education and Training Institute (HETI) are responsible for online training and 'state-wide strategies and resources to maintain high levels of compliance with infection control and patient safety recommendations'. The HETI website contains online training modules in infection control and PPE donning and doffing procedures. Other infection control information and research is available on the websites of the Clinical Excellence Commission and the Agency for Clinical Innovation.

Online training modules are effective for upskilling staff in a range of skills, but are not a substitute for real-time, rapid incident response training. Face-to-face training provides opportunities for first responders to test procedures in hospital environments. Incident response training provides opportunities for staff to assess their levels of compliance with protocols and their competence with equipment in scenario situations. It is the responsibility of Local Health Districts to provide this form of training to the health staff in their District.

Two NSW Health policies that govern clinical arrangements during pandemics are outdated

The Ministry had not updated two policies that had the potential to assist emergency departments and intensive care units in aspects of their ward preparation for the COVID-19 pandemic. Both policies were on the NSW Health website, but neither were shared with hospital staff in the planning phases for the pandemic. Both policies are out of date and have not been revised within required timeframes.

The 2010 Influenza Pandemic - Providing Critical Care policy was due for review in May 2015 and was not updated at the time of the COVID-19 health emergency. Similarly, the 2007 policy Hospital Response to Pandemic Influenza Part 1: Emergency Department Response was due for review in June 2012 and has not been updated.

These policies were designed to assist clinical staff to make necessary ward arrangements for infection control. They set out the steps for rapid identification of contingent workforces, isolation procedures, and management of patient flows to separate those with suspected infection from other patient cohorts. They were a potential addendum to the NSW Pandemic Plan which describes the command and control responsibilities of health agencies in health emergencies.

Our interviews with nurse managers from emergency departments and intensive care units indicate that in the absence of pandemic policy, they sought clinical guidance from external sources and Local Health District experts. Interviewees told us that a lack of policy guidance about ward arrangements and infection control practices in a pandemic increased their workloads and hours of overtime in the early response phases to COVID-19. With the support of Local Health Districts, clinical staff made rapid adjustments in order to respond to changing testing requirements and ward arrangements.

The Ministry was slow to establish a centralised communication channel to communicate with frontline staff

NSW Health’s governance and communication arrangements during a pandemic are set out in the Pandemic Plan. The Plan requires that government agencies ‘commence enhanced arrangements, establish communications measures’ and confirm ‘governance arrangements’ when there is evidence of person to person transmission during an influenza outbreak. NSW Health received the first notifications of the novel coronavirus risks in January 2020.

During the preparation and early response phases to COVID-19, the Ministry and its central agencies were slow in establishing a single, authoritative channel through which to communicate consistent messages to frontline staff. Clinical staff required up-to-date information about COVID-19 testing criteria as requirements were changing rapidly, sometimes daily. While there was no expectation for fixed policy at this time, hospital staff required the latest instructions about treatment requirements, and updates on the numbers of COVID-19 infections in their region.

As information about COVID-19 was evolving, information was communicated across the health system via ‘multiple channels and sources’. While the Ministry and its central agencies communicated extensively with Local Health Districts during March 2020, hospital staff reported to us that they weren’t always sure where they could find the latest advice about testing protocols or infection controls.

Frontline staff told audit office staff that they were checking multiple sources and time-stamping advice to ensure they had the most up to date information on a daily basis. While some Local Health Districts managed clear communication links with frontline staff, nurse managers told us that communication was ‘chaotic’ during the early phases of pandemic preparation. Key personnel were not always available outside business hours and nurse managers advise that they spent hours at the end of shifts, seeking and printing the latest advice for weekend and night shift personnel. By the end of March 2020, the Ministry and the Clinical Excellence Commission websites became better organised to communicate with frontline clinicians.

A recommendation to the Ministry of Health after H1N1 swine flu could be equally applied in the COVID-19 context. The NSW Government’s report: Key Recommendations on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza recommended the establishment of ‘clear pathways of communication … so that all employees have confidence in where their information will come from and who they should approach if they need additional information.’

NSW Health acknowledges the challenges and the lessons from the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, a strategy released in August 2020, sets out NSW Health’s own recommendation for the future management of PPE including: ‘Aligning a single source of truth for PPE education and evidence-based guidance to ensure clarity of information on appropriate use, supported by an influential network of Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) practitioners at the forefront.

Ministry executives advise that communication with health staff has improved since the early phases of the pandemic. The Ministry now sends weekly COVID-19 updates to over 130,000 health staff via email. In addition, NSW Health now has two COVID-19 tabs on its website with current information, including COVID-19 testing advice. According to Ministry executives, these communication channels could be used or replicated if needed for future health emergencies. The Ministry also provides health information and updates via a phone application called Med App. This App is preferred by doctors and is less likely to be used by nurses. As at October 2020, there are 13,000 users of Med App. Push notifications can be made on Med App through SMS alerts.

Personal protective equipment (PPE) was not always available in required sizes and some hospital masks and gowns were substituted with products that differed from the usual items

Since the emergence of COVID-19 in Australia, all clinicians in NSW hospitals have had access to some form of PPE for their clinical requirements. If staff did not have appropriate equipment for each COVID-19 related procedure, they were guided by the formal advice issued to the NSW Health workforce on 11 March 2020 stating that: ‘The safety of NSW Health staff is a priority at all times, especially during COVID-19. Where safe working practices confirm specific PPE (e.g. face shields/masks or other equipment) are required for the protection of staff due to COVID-19, in all circumstances:

• staff are to wear prescribed PPE as instructed
• staff are not to undertake or be required to undertake tasks requiring PPE if the PPE is not available for use. Any such tasks are not to proceed until required PPE is available
• any staff member who is concerned about their safety must raise their concerns immediately to their manager.’

At periods during March and April 2020, some PPE items were not available in the required sizes or the regular brands to which staff were accustomed. HealthShare NSW was not able to source PPE from usual suppliers. HealthShare NSW sourced PPE including N95 masks from non-traditional suppliers. Some PPE items differed in shape and size from the usual hospital equipment. While senior executives from HealthShare NSW advise that all products were approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), in some hospitals, nurse managers advise that staff were not able to ‘fit test’ substituted masks. Fit testing determines the type and the size of the respirator mask that achieves an adequate seal on an individual’s face.

In March and April 2020, ‘duck bill’ (N95) masks were not available in some hospitals. According to stock managers and clinical managers in Local Health Districts, duck bills are the preferred mask for staff with smaller faces, particularly female staff members. The duck bill mask is a standard PPE product, and as such, is fit tested during mandatory PPE training. During the early response phases to COVID-19, most Local Health Districts were provided with substitute N95 masks. Fit testing of the substituted N95 masks was not able to be conducted in all NSW hospitals during the early phases of COVID-19. During the first wave of COVID-19 in March and April 2020, hospital staff told audit staff that there was no time and a lack of equipment to appropriately fit test substituted N95 masks.

Nurse managers in emergency departments advise that in some instances, staff made adaptations to PPE to improve protections, such as doubling masks, adding elastics or bringing their own equipment. These adaptations were not consistent with guidelines. Nurse managers advise that in some cases, adaptations to PPE or ill-fitting masks created pressure sores and contact dermatitis. Just over half of the stock managers of Local Health Districts advised that PPE stock was procured from outside the HealthShare NSW system. Stock managers in some Districts advise that facial shields and goggles sourced from non-traditional suppliers by HealthShare NSW were of a lesser quality than standard equipment. Stock managers and nurse managers reported that the changes in PPE products caused confusion and stress amongst staff.

Local Health Districts were proactive in assisting hospital staff to mitigate risks of COVID-19 infections. Some Local Health Districts assigned ‘tiger teams’ to assist staff with their PPE practices. Tiger teams provide clinical expertise and advice to staff, answer questions about infection control and provide training on PPE practice in hospital ward environments. They assist and support PPE donning and doffing practices to ensure the appropriate sequencing of applying and removing PPE for effective infection control. They provide mask fit checking guidance to assist staff in correct PPE practices.

Districts ran extensive refresher PPE training sessions for clinical staff. Some hospitals ran regular PPE demonstrations so that staff could observe correct PPE procedures at set times during the day. These activities assisted staff to implement appropriate infection control in the period before the Clinical Excellence Commission’s web-based materials and videos became available in late March and early April 2020. These online resources now provide comprehensive guidance to hospital staff in PPE practices.

HealthShare NSW placed limits or caps on some high-demand PPE items that were too low to meet requirements in some Local Health Districts and had to be adjusted to meet actual demand

The NSW Pandemic Plan describes the responsibilities of the Ministry and its central agencies to manage and maintain the State Medical Stockpile of essential PPE supplies and antiviral medications. During a pandemic, HealthShare NSW has responsibility for warehousing, monitoring and distributing health supplies to the health workforce.

Due to a reported global shortage of PPE and limits to the NSW stockpile, HealthShare NSW placed limits on the provision of approximately 100 high-demand items to NSW hospitals. HealthShare NSW advise that the PPE order capping ceilings were implemented ‘to ensure local stockpiling does not occur’. A centralised ordering process was established with Local Health Districts so that PPE product ordering occurred through single hospital locations (214 across the State), rather than at the ward level. Escalation processes were established to allow Districts to request one-off increases to supply, and a process was set up to permanently increase the order cap limit for any PPE item by facility.

According to HealthShare NSW, ‘as incoming central supply has improved, order caps have subsequently increased in line with strong engagement and governance with the Local Health Districts to ensure the appropriate levels of supply are provided’. The original capped levels were determined by assessing PPE usage in wards during the flu season of 2019. As the flu season case numbers of 2019 were relatively low, some Local Health District managers advised that the levels of PPE during 2019 were not comparable to the level of PPE required for the COVID-19 pandemic.

After advocacy from hospital stock managers and clinicians, HealthShare NSW increased capped PPE levels in many Local Health Districts.

Executive members of the State Health Emergency Operations Centre (SHEOC) advise that its PPE supply strategy needs to be carefully developed as there are vast differences in PPE usage rates during 'business as usual' periods and pandemic periods. If NSW Health kept the level of PPE required in planning for a worst-case scenario, this would equate to an extensive surplus of PPE that could not be utilised during business as usual periods. The SHEOC Executive advise that it is not feasible or economical to store this level of PPE. They advise that given the costs of PPE, and the fact that the products have a shelf life, a diversified supply line is a more reliable method for ensuring PPE during surge and non-surge periods.

Early data modelling showed ICU patient numbers at levels not manageable with levels of ventilators and equipment

Early projections of patient numbers requiring acute care for COVID-19, were at levels that would not have been manageable with the equipment and resources of NSW hospitals. Throughout March through to May 2020, government data modelling indicated significant surges of community infections and surges in intensive care patients.

Early estimates were based on overseas trends, and if actual cases had matched projections, NSW hospitals would not have had sufficient ventilators to meet demand. The knowledge of this shortfall caused high levels of anxiety among nursing and medical staff.

While the data was based on the best available information, it had negative implications for the health and safety of the nurse and junior doctor workforce. Managers of intensive care wards and emergency departments reported stress amongst the workforce. Staff concerns were primarily about being faced with ‘the unmanageable’, along with heightened fears about contracting the virus with the knowledge that there was insufficient equipment to treat acute patients.

As it transpired, overall numbers of COVID-19 infections were lower than projected during the early months of the pandemic. The lower infection rates in the general population have meant fewer instances of patients requiring intensive care in NSW hospitals. In addition, HealthShare NSW has been able to increase the numbers of ventilators in NSW hospitals to prepare for future surges in patients requiring acute respiratory care.

SHEOC Executive advise that NSW Health undertook an accelerated procurement strategy in early 2020 to increase its stock of ventilators, and that ventilator capacity has always far-exceeded actual requirements.

NSW Health has developed a strategy to improve the management of PPE for the NSW health workforce

In August 2020, NSW Health released a strategy that sets out its future management and planning approaches to the provision of PPE for the NSW Health workforce. NSW Health’s Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Strategy describes the learnings and challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic in sourcing and distributing PPE. It sets out the systems and methods for distributing PPE to staff and patients and focuses on how staff are kept informed on the appropriate use of PPE at all times. A supporting communications strategy has been developed to support its implementation.

The strategy contains enhanced transparency measures to regularly inform staff about PPE stock levels and to provide data about PPE usage rates by item types in wards in NSW hospitals. The NSW Health PPE strategy describes a changed approach to ordering, storing and allocating PPE. This includes diversifying the supply lines for PPE products to increase supply options in circumstances where supply lines become disrupted. It includes a centralised system for coordinating the supply of hospital PPE through Local Heath District coordination points and centralised distribution points in large hospitals.

Our interviews with hospital PPE stock managers and nurse managers indicate that staff find the new ordering system to be an improvement upon the previous stock ordering method.

According to the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Strategy, NSW health is upgrading its models for monitoring and benchmarking PPE usage across the health system. Systems are being improved for forecasting demand volumes during business as usual periods and during health emergency surges.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Audit methodology

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #344 - released 9 December 2020

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.

The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.

The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’ 

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.

Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.

The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.

Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.

The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.

Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.

The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.

This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.

Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.

We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.

We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Key terms

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining credit card management in Local Government.

The audit was in response to a letter from the then Minister for Local Government in November 2018. The audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils, including in the areas of policies, procedures, compliance and monitoring.

The audit found that all six councils had gaps in their credit card policies and procedures. The Auditor-General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment publish guidelines on credit card management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector with respect to credit card management.

Read full report (PDF)

In 2018–19, all councils responding to an Audit Office survey (representing over 90 per cent of the sector) indicated they issued credit cards to staff members to make work-related purchases. As there are no sector-wide requirements or policies for credit card use and management in Local Government, councils have developed their credit card management frameworks to suit their own needs. The quality of credit card policies and procedures may therefore vary across the sector.

Credit cards are an efficient means of payment, especially for low-value purchases. Compared to the use of petty cash, credit card transactions provide better transparency and accountability for expenditure. By using credit cards, councils only need to make one payment each month, which can reduce the time spent on paying separate vendors, as in the case of purchase orders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils: Dubbo Regional Council, Junee Shire Council, Lane Cove Council, Nambucca Valley Council, Penrith City Council and Shellharbour City Council. The councils selected represent a mix of rural, regional and metropolitan councils. They were also among the top ten users of credit cards within their geographical classification, in terms of the number of credit cards issued or the number of transactions per credit card.

This audit referenced the NSW Treasury's Policy and Guidelines Paper TPP17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards', as its principles and recommendations for NSW Government agencies are relevant for councils.

The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2019 provided a high-level overview of credit card management across the sector. While over 90 per cent of councils reported that they had a credit card policy and a credit card acquittal process, the quality of these policies and procedures may vary across the sector as there is no standardised or recommended approach to credit card management for Local Government. This audit complements the Report on Local Government 2019 by providing a detailed discussion of the effectiveness of credit card management practices in councils.

Council staff provided with a credit card can purchase from a wide range of businesses, including online transactions with overseas vendors. However, councils may limit the types of purchases that staff can make through their policies and procedures or by setting controls that block certain transaction types such as cash advances. To examine credit card usage, the audit obtained credit card transaction data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2019 for the six councils in this review. The data included:

• transaction date
• amount
• merchant category code (MCC)
• merchant name.

The audit analysed the number and value of transactions by each council, and the types of purchases made using credit cards.

The existence of a documented approach to managing credit cards ensures transparency and consistency of use within the council. A credit card management framework that contains preventative and detective controls can also minimise risks of fraud, misuse and wastage.

There is no prescribed credit card management framework for Local Government, but typical components of a credit card management framework include:

• policies and procedures
• guidance for staff
• monitoring and reporting.

With no detailed guidance notes similar to those in TPP17–09 for NSW Government, councils have developed their own credit card management framework based on their size, structure, resources and intended credit card usage. For instance, the size of a council has implications for the number of credit cards issued, which in turn influences the arrangements for training and guidance provided to cardholders and approvers.

The intended level of credit card usage may determine whether a council adopts a manual or electronic credit card management system and councils should identify the system that best meets their needs. For instance, a council with few credit cards may not be able to justify investment in an electronic system. On the other hand, a manual system may only be viable for councils with a low number of credit cards and a low number of transactions.

Among the six councils audited, the three councils with fewer cards and a lower number of transactions had a manual credit card management system, while the three councils with more cards and a higher number of transactions used an electronic system.

Exhibit 10 summarises the six councils' policies on use of credit cards.

While it is important for councils to have an established credit card management framework, it is equally important that they ensure compliance in practice. This chapter examines councils' credit card management practices – how well staff members were complying with policies and procedures, and how effective their credit card controls were. The chapter is structured to cover:

• preventative controls (embedded in the issuance, use and cancellation of cards) that prevent fraud and misuse
• detective controls (embedded in reconciliation and record keeping) that assist in detecting fraud and misuse.

Where ineffective credit card management practices are identified, councils should reflect on whether they need to more closely monitor compliance, or whether there are fundamental deficiencies in their policies and procedures that need to be refined.

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #340 - released 3 September 2020