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Published

Actions for Education 2022

Education 2022

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

Result of the Education cluster financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for Education cluster agencies.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the TAFE Commission's independent auditor's report as it did not have a delegation or sub-delegation from the Minister for Education and Early Learning to incur expenditure from cluster grants.

What the key issues were

Annual fair value assessments of land and buildings showed material differences in their carrying values. As a result, the Department of Education and the TAFE Commission completed desktop revaluations of land and buildings, collectively increasing the value of these assets by $1.2 billion and $4.7 billion respectively.

The Department of Education and the NSW Education Standards Authority accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. These changes resulted in the collective derecognition of $270.6 million of right-of-use assets and $382.9 million in lease liabilities.

What we recommended

A high-risk matter was reported in the management letter for the TAFE Commission highlighting non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding appropriate use of purchasing cards.

We recommended cluster agencies prioritise and address internal control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
  • An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the independent auditor's report for the Technical and Further Education Commission (TAFE Commission) as they did not have a delegation or sub-delegation from the Minister for Education and Early Learning to incur expenditure from cluster grants.
  • The Department of Education and the TAFE Commission's land and buildings were revalued upwards by a collective $5.9 billion. These uplifts were the result of managerial fair value assessments showing that the carrying values of land and buildings had materially departed from fair value.
  • Changes to accommodation arrangements managed by Property NSW on behalf of the department and the NSW Education Standards Authority resulted in the collective derecognition of approximately $270.6 million in right-of-use assets and corresponding lease liabilities totalling $382.9 million from the balance sheets of these agencies. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2021–22 audits identified 18 moderate issues across the cluster. Seven moderate risk issues were repeat issues related to general and application information technology controls and control deficiencies in key transactional systems used in preparing financial statements.
  • Of the 11 newly identified moderate risk issues, five related to information technology controls deficiencies; and five related to internal control deficiencies in key transactional systems used in preparing financial statements.
  • A high-risk matter was raised at the TAFE Commission relating to identified instances of non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding purchasing card use. 

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 31% were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2021–22, there were 29 findings raised across the cluster (28 in 2020–21). Thirty-one per cent of all issues were repeat issues (50% in 2020–21).

The most common new and repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies in agencies’ information technology general controls, application controls, and procurement and payroll practices.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies. 

A high-risk matter was reported at the TAFE Commission highlighting instances of non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding appropriate purchasing card use

As part of our audit of the TAFE Commission, we integrated the use of data analytics into the audit approach. We performed data analytics over aspects of payroll, procurement and accounts payable activities. This helped us to highlight anomalies or risks in those data sets that are relevant to the audit of the TAFE Commission and plan testing procedures to address those risks. Data analytics also assisted us in providing an insight into the internal control environment of the TAFE Commission, highlighting areas where key controls are not in place or are not operating as management intended.

Our analysis over purchasing card data supplied by the TAFE Commission for the period July 2021 to March 2022 found deficiencies in the provisioning, use and cancellation of purchasing cards. This included identified instances of:

  • controls effectively bypassed when a purchasing card surrendered by a former employee had been used by another employee
  • split payments, circumventing delegation / cardholder limits
  • delays in the submission and approval of purchasing card transactions.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating:

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

High: 0 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 5 new, 3 repeat 2

Low: 2 new, 1 repeat 3

The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:

  • agencies' user access administration and change management procedures, notably in the timing and frequency of managerial reviews over the granting and revocation of access to key systems relevant to financial reporting
  • the level of cyber security maturity
  • the monitoring of privileged user activities.
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High: 1 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 5 new, 3 repeat 2

Low: 4 new, 1 repeat 3

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:

  • the adequacy of monitoring and oversight activities over the use of multiple financial delegation configurations in finance systems for specific users
  • the timely recording and approval of overtime claims and higher duties allowances
  • the timely finalisation of policies and procedures
  • the management of excessive annual leave balances
  • formalisation of service-provider arrangements between government agencies
  • non-compliance with policies and procedures to guide secondary employment and pecuniary interest declarations
  • non-compliance with policies and procedures to guide the appropriate use of purchasing cards.
Financial reporting

High: 0 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 1 new, 1 repeat 2

Low: 2 new, 0 repeat 3

The financial audits identified:

  • opportunities for agencies to strengthen their financial preparation processes to facilitate a timelier and more efficient year-end audit
  • matters in respect of the timely capitalisation of work-in-progress
  • the need for agencies with non-financial assets subject to fair value to reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations
  • refinements in considering the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

1 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

 

Recommendation

We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above. 

Published

Actions for Student attendance

Student attendance

Education
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

Poor attendance at school is related to poor student outcomes, particularly once patterns of non-attendance have been established.

This report examined how the NSW Department of Education (the department) is managing student attendance in NSW government schools.

What we found

Around a third of students in Years 1–10 attended school less than 90% of the time in semester one, 2021. Missing more than 10% of school may put a student's educational outcomes at risk.

Since 2018, the department has improved the quality of student attendance data, analysis and reporting. However, there are still gaps in understanding the reasons for absence at a system level.

The department set state-wide and school-level targets to increase the proportion of students attending school at least 90% of the time. This emphasis risks diverting attention away from students with very low attendance rates.

There are gaps in central programs to support schools in lifting student attendance. Schools are taking a variety of approaches to this work.

There is a large gap in attendance between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students, which has increased since 2018.

What we recommended

The Department of Education should:

  • set new state-wide and school level attendance targets
  • evaluate its attendance support programs
  • update its attendance strategies and programs
  • publish the attendance level for each school in their annual reports
  • improve internal analysis and reporting of attendance data
  • finalise the review of the attendance policy, procedure and codes
  • review programs supporting Aboriginal student attendance and address any gaps
  • review the approach to enforcing compulsory school attendance.

Fast facts

  • 90% - attending school less than 90% of the time can put a student's educational outcomes at risk
  • 67.9% of Year 1–10 students in NSW government schools attended at least 90% of the time in semester one, 2021
  • 42.7% of Aboriginal Year 1–10 students in NSW government schools attended school at least 90% of the time in semester one, 2021.

Regular attendance at school is important for academic and other long-term outcomes. Students who do not attend regularly are less likely to complete school and more likely to experience poorer long-term health and social outcomes. A range of factors influence student attendance including student engagement and wellbeing, family and community factors and the school environment.

The NSW Department of Education's (the department's) Strategic Plan for 2018–2022 identifies improving student attendance as a priority. It has identified 95% as its expected level of attendance. It set targets to increase the proportion of students attending school at least 90% of the time, from 79.4% to 82% in primary schools and 64.5% to 70% for secondary schools.

This report focuses on attendance data for semester one of 2018, 2019 and 2021. Unless otherwise noted, attendance data refers to Years 1–10 in alignment with national reporting conventions. Changes in recording systems and definitions mean attendance data prior to 2018 is not comparable. Attendance data for semester one of 2020 and 2022 was significantly affected by COVID-related disruptions, which prevented many students across the State from attending school. Data for semester one of 2021 is considered relatively less affected by COVID-related disruptions.

The Education Act 1990 (the Act) sets out the responsibilities of students, parents and the department for ensuring students receive compulsory schooling. The department has developed policies, procedures and guidance to assist schools in managing their responsibilities to promote regular attendance. In this report, we define 'regular' attendance as at least 90% of the time. This is equivalent to missing one day of school each fortnight or four weeks of school across a school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether student attendance is effectively managed in NSW government schools for students from kindergarten to Year 10. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • there are effective systems and policies for managing student attendance
  • the department effectively supports schools to manage student attendance
  • schools are effectively managing student attendance.

Conclusion

There are too many students in NSW Government schools who regularly miss school. In semester one of 2021, around a third of students in Years 1–10 attended school less than 90% of the time — a level that puts their educational outcomes at risk. Attendance problems are widespread. 775 of 2,200 schools in NSW had an average attendance rate below 90% in 2021. Aboriginal student attendance is significantly below non-Aboriginal students and there is no specific strategy to address this gap. The department needs to place greater attention on supporting schools to lift student attendance.

Good quality data on attendance patterns is critical to developing strategies to address the underlying reasons for absence. The quality of the department's data on student attendance has improved from 2018. This has allowed it to monitor attendance more closely throughout the year, rather than relying on a yearly collection. However, there are still gaps in capturing and analysing the reasons for absence.

The improved data collection allowed the department to begin reporting on the 'attendance level' for the first time in 2018. This measures the proportion of students attending more than 90% of the time. The department has set state-wide and school-level targets to improve the attendance level. The new targets have influenced the focus of strategies to lift attendance. There is now a greater focus on lifting students above the reportable benchmark of 90% rather than addressing more serious attendance concerns.

The School Success Model formalises the focus on achieving school-level targets. When introduced, the department stated that schools would receive targeted support as part of the rollout of the model. Targeted support for attendance was initially planned to be delivered in late 2021 but was delayed due to the impact of COVID. The two main attendance support programs do not cater to schools with fewer than 100 students and there are gaps in support due to two different methodologies being used to select schools.

The Home School Liaison Program is a longstanding program to support students with low attendance. Requests for support are rationed pending availability of case officers, which leads to younger students being prioritised. Older students are not supported because there is a lower chance of prosecution in the legal system if attendance is not restored by the program. There is insufficient monitoring of the adequacy of resources, activities and long-term outcomes of this program.

The department's Aboriginal Education Policy aims to have Aboriginal students matching or exceeding outcomes of non-Aboriginal students. In semester one, 2021 42.7% of Aboriginal students attended school regularly (at least 90% of the time) compared with 70.3% of non-Aboriginal students. The gap in attendance between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students has grown since 2018. There are relatively new programs supporting Aboriginal students in secondary school to attain their Higher School Certificate, but greater attention should be placed on supporting attendance for Aboriginal students in primary schools.

Schools are using a wide range of strategies to improve student attendance depending on their local contexts. Schools we spoke with told us of allocating responsibility to key staff members, closer monitoring of data, community engagement, rewards and incentives, before school sporting and breakfast programs, and partnerships with external agencies. The school planning and annual reporting process prompts schools to evaluate the impact of their strategies on progress towards their targets. The department could do more to promote evidence-based programs, showcase better practice examples from schools in NSW and identify the circumstances where these approaches are most effective. 

This chapter considers the effectiveness of systems to accurately collect, analyse and report student attendance data. It also considers the effectiveness of policies and procedures to support attendance and central oversight of attendance issues.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of the department's strategies to improve student attendance and the support it provides to schools to achieve this. It also considers the effectiveness of school-level strategies and actions for students with low attendance.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #368 - released 27 September 2022

Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for Transport 2021

Transport 2021

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

The results of the Transport cluster agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified financial statement audit opinions were issued for all Transport cluster agencies. Resolution of issues delayed signing the Transport Asset Holding Entity of NSW (TAHE) until 24 December 2021. Matters relating to TAHE are also reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Emphasis of Matter - TAHE

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in TAHE's audit opinion to draw attention to uncertainty associated with:

  • future access and licence fees that are subject to re-signed agreements
  • an additional $4.1 billion of funding that is outside the forward estimates period
  • a significant portion of the fair value of TAHE’s non-financial assets is reflected in the terminal value, which is outside the ten-year contract period to 30 June 2031, and the risk that TAHE will not be able to negotiate contract terms to support current projections.

TAHE's transition from RailCorp also changed its valuation of assets to an income approach, resulting in a $20.3 billion decrease to the fair value. The fair value decrease was because the cash flows were not sufficient to support the previous recorded value.

TAHE corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets. This followed significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting risk assumptions in its valuation that were not in line with comparable benchmarks.

Emphasis of Matter - State Transit Authority of New South Wales

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of NSW's (the Authority) audit opinion to draw attention to the financial statements not prepared on a going concern basis. This was because the NSW Government put the Authority's bus contracts out to competitive tender and accordingly, management assessed the Authority's principal activities are not expected to operate for a full 12 months after 30 June 2021.

The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the Transport cluster.

The 2020–21 audits identified six high-risk and 45 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Fourteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues, including information technology controls around management of user access for key financial systems and payroll processes.

The high-risk issues, in addition to those related to TAHE and previously reported in the report on State Finances 2021, include:

  • absence of conflict of declarations related to land acquisition processes at Transport for NSW
  • no evidence of conflict of interest declarations obtained by TAHE from consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements.

What we recommended

TAHE needs to:

  • finalise revised commercial agreements to reflect fees detailed in a Heads of Agreement signed on 18 December 2021
  • prepare robust projections and business plans to support the required rate of return.

NSW Treasury and TAHE should monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in the future.

Transport for NSW needs to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office.

Transport agencies should implement a process to ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed for land acquisitions and applied consistently across the cluster.

Transport agencies should implement a process to capture all contracts and agreements entered to ensure:

  • agencies are aware of contractual obligations
  • financial reporting implications are assessed, particularly with respect to leases, revenue and service concession arrangements.

Fast facts

The Transport cluster plans and delivers infrastructure and integrated services across all modes of transport. This includes road, rail, bus, ferry, light rail, cycling and walking. There are 11 agencies in the cluster.

  • $128b road and maritime system infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 26 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $24.9b rail systems infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 37% of reported issues were repeat issues

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the transport cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to significant uncertainty associated with the judgements, estimates and assumptions supporting the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment (PPE) and intangible assets.
  • In 2020–21, the former RailCorp transitioned to TAHE, a for-profit state-owned corporation. When TAHE became a for-profit entity, it was required to change its valuation approach. The value of a for-profit entity's assets cannot exceed the cash flows they might realise either through their sale or continued use. This change in the basis of valuation resulted in a decrease of $20.3 billion in the fair value of the assets. The decrease in fair value was because the cash flows, which support measurement under the income approach, were insufficient to support the previous valuation based on the current replacement cost of those assets.
  • TAHE also corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets after significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting higher risk assumptions in its valuation when compared to the relevant market benchmarks.
  • On 18 December 2021, a Heads of Agreement (HoA) was signed between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. This HoA reflected TAHE's intention to negotiate higher access and licence fees in order to meet the shareholding ministers' revised expectation of a higher rate of return. This matter resolved the treatment of a significant accounting issue in the State’s consolidated (whole-of-government) financial statements. Refer to the Report on State Finances tabled on 9 February 2022. The expectation of an additional $5.2 billion in fees added to the valuation of TAHE's PPE and intangibles, with a final value of $17.15 billion.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the cluster. AASB 1059 had a significant impact on Transport for NSW, Sydney Metro, Sydney Ferries and TAHE's 2020–21 financial statements.
  • TAHE corrected a misstatement of $97.2 million relating to the application of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' for the Airport Link Company Contract. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management increased from 56 in 2019–20 to 73 in 2020–21.
  • Thirty-seven per cent were repeat findings. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management and payroll processes. These included deficiencies in the monitoring of privileged user access to key financial systems, review of user access to key financial systems and segregation of duties between preparer and reviewer for new employee hires.
  • Six new high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of three compared to last year.
  • One high-risk issue related to conflicts of interests not being declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process at Transport for NSW.
  • Five high-risk issues arose from the audit of TAHE, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations
    • asset valuations
    • access price build up
    • detailed business modelling to support returns
    • conflict of interest management.
  • Based on the access and licence agreements signed at 30 June 2021 between TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, our review of the expected returns calculated by NSW Treasury did not support the assumption that there was a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return could be achieved from the NSW Government's investment in TAHE.
  • On 14 December 2021 the shareholding ministers' increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return from 1.5 per cent to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent.
  • On 18 December 2021 the revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement. The Heads of Agreement will increase access fees paid by rail operators to TAHE by $5.2 billion.
  • TAHE's access and licence agreements specified fees that were well short of the IPART regulated maximum (ceiling price).
  • The finalisation of the access and licence agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains resulted in a significant write-down of TAHE's asset value by $20.3 billion. The revaluation loss will need to be recovered as part of the shareholders’ rate of return of 2.5 per cent in order to sustain the whole-of-government accounting treatment of cash contributions recorded as an equity contribution and not a grant expense.
  • There was a significant adjustment to TAHE’s valuation between the financial statements originally submitted for the audit and the final, signed financial statements due to differences in risk assumptions resulting in a correction of a $1.2 billion misstatement. 

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 73 findings raised across the cluster (56 in 2019–20) and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (43 per cent in 2019–20).

In view of the recent performance audit ‘Managing Cyber Risks’ and compliance audit ‘Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy’ involving the cluster, it is noted with concern that the most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management. Moderate risk issues included completeness and accuracy of contract registers, accounting for assets and management of supplier and payroll masterfiles.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports, and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Control deficiencies may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation, and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
Moderate: 7 new, 4 repeat**

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • monitoring of privileged user access
  • user access management
  • password configuration management.
Low: 4 new, 1 repeat***
Internal control deficiencies or improvements
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified internal control deficiencies across key business processes, including:

  • declarations of conflicts of interest over land acquisitions (see further details below)
  • management of contracts and agreement register
  • accounting for assets
  • management of payroll and supplier masterfiles
  • payroll processes.
Moderate: 15 new, 8 repeat**
Low: 2 new, 5 repeat***
Financial reporting
High: 3 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • asset valuations (see further details below)
  • detailed business modelling to support returns (see further details below)
  • access price build-up (see further details below)
  • timely capitalisation of completed assets.
Moderate: 3 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 2 new***
Governance and oversight
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • control over TAHE assets and operations
  • governance over Cyber Security.
Moderate: 2 new**
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • conflict of interest (COI) management
  • outdated policies and procedures
  • incomplete probation procedures.
Moderate: 4 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 1 new, 7 repeat***

* High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
** Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
*** Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified six high-risk findings

High-risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Transport for NSW (new finding)

Declaration of conflicts of interest in the land acquisition process

In 2021, we conducted a performance audit over the Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia which examined:

  • whether Transport for NSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether Transport for NSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The report made several recommendations over Transport for NSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the land acquisition process. As part of the financial audit, we obtained an understanding of key controls and processes relating to the acquisition of land, relevant to the audit of the financial statements. We found that conflicts of interests were not always declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process. Furthermore, processes for declaring conflicts of interests are not consistently applied across cluster agencies.

Out of a sample of 19 land acquisitions tested, we identified:

  • 14 instances where there was no evidence of declarations of conflicts of interests made by the team members involved in the acquisition process
  • 2 instances where conflicts of interest declarations were completed by key members of the acquisition team only at a project level
  • 1 instance where conflicts of interest declarations were only completed by the property negotiator and the valuer, but not the other members of the acquisition team.

Management advised that the land acquisition processes, at the time of the land acquisitions, did not require formal conflicts of interests to be declared as they believe that as per Transport for NSW code of conduct, declaration is only required where the staff member considers that a potential or perceived Conflict of Interest exists. However, Transport for NSW's Procurement Policy requires the documentation of formal declarations from all staff involved in procurement activities to formally disclose any conflicts of interest or state that they do not have a conflict of interest.

This matter has been included as a high-risk finding in the management letter as absence of rigorous and consistent management of conflicts of interests, and non-compliance with established policies increases the risk that Transport for NSW may be exposed to reputational damage or financial losses in relation to land acquisitions. Furthermore, this may result in lack of probity or value-for money considerations during the land acquisition process.

Further details are elaborated below under 'Land acquisitions'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Control over TAHE assets and operations

The State-Owned Corporations Act 1989 maintains that all decisions relating to the operation of a statutory state-owned corporation (SOC) are to be made by or under the authority of the board. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988 (TAA), the functions of TAHE may only be exercised under one or more operating licences issued by the portfolio minister. The current Operating Licence confers terms and conditions for TAHE to carry out its functions, and imposes constraints on TAHE, including (but not limited to):

  • railway operations not permitted
  • transport services not permitted
  • TAHE must not carry out maintenance of its assets.

Such operating licences are short term in nature, and the TAA allows the transport minister (portfolio minister) to grant one or more operating licences to TAHE and may amend, substitute, or impose, amend or revoke conditions of the operating licence.

For the current year, the legal form of the arrangements established in its first year of operation imply TAHE has control over the assets based on the Implementation Deed and the agreements signed with the public operators.

However, risks remain as TAHE is in its early stages, and the actual substance of operations will need to be observed and considered.

Given the restrictions that can be placed on the entity through the Operating Licence, and the ability to make further changes to the Operating Licence and Statement of Expectations set by the portfolio minister, there is a risk there could be limitations placed on the Board of Directors to operate with sufficient independence in its decision-making with respect to the operations of TAHE. Over time, this may further impact the degree of control required by TAHE to satisfy the recognition criteria over its assets. It may also fundamentally change the presentation of TAHE’s financial statements.

Future limitations to the degree of control TAHE, and its Board, can exercise over its functions may impact the degree of control TAHE has over its assets going forward. As part of the 2021–22 audit, we will monitor and assess whether, in substance, these assets continue to be controlled by TAHE and whether, in substance, TAHE can operate as an independent SOC. We require management continue to demonstrate that TAHE continues to maintain control over its assets and has the ability to operate as an independent SOC. Further details are described below under 'Transport Asset Holding Entity'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Asset valuation

The final updated valuation was based on cash flows that were in a signed Heads of Agreement, which stated that it set out the proposed indicative future access and licence fees which will form the basis of the negotiations between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, who will work together to review access fees and licence fees payable under the agreements and to make all necessary changes to the Operating Agreements by 1 July 2022.

This adds uncertainty in the cash flows. It is crucial that TAHE formalises these updated fees in legally binding signed access and licence agreements with the relevant parties as soon as possible.

Refer below for further details on the Heads of Agreement.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Conflict of interest (COI) management

For procurement transactions through direct negotiation with single quotes, there was no evidence of COI declarations obtained from the consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements. Contractors and consultants are required to declare actual COI. However, there was no requirement to confirm nil conflict of interest. In addition, there is a risk that perceived COI may not be adequately assessed or managed. TAHE is expected to operate as an independent SOC and would need to ensure any perceived or actual conflict of interest is adequately addressed.

Management should implement a process to:

  • ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed when engaging all consultants and contractors (including involvement with other engagements and confirmation of nil conflicts of interests)
  • ensure probity is undertaken to identify any actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

The declarations should consider individuals and relationships that may create, or may be perceived to create, conflicts of interest.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Detailed business modelling to support returns

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity, including recovering the revaluation loss incurred in 2020–21.

TAHE needs to revise its business plan and include detailed business modelling that supports the shareholding ministers' revised expectations of return (2.5 per cent return on the State’s equity injections and recovery of the write-down of assets over the average useful life of those assets) and align the business plan and Statement of Corporate Intent. This requires more detailed projections, estimates and plans that support how TAHE expects to recover the asset write-down and expected returns to government. The current modelling for ten years needs to be enhanced with modelling over the expected recovery period of approximately 33 years.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Access price build-up

Management explained that in determining access and licence fees for the agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, assets prior to the commencement of equity injections in 2015–16 were excluded from the calculations. Management explained the premise being that these assets were previously funded by government through capital grants. The replacement and refurbishment of these assets is expected to be through government funded maintenance performed through the public rail operators and/or the equity injections from NSW Treasury rather than through access and licence fees.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Forty-five moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 73.1 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 14 were repeat findings, and 31 were new issues. 

Key moderate risk findings related to:

  • weaknesses in user access management to key financial systems
  • management of contracts and agreements register
  • management of supplier and payroll masterfiles
  • accounting for assets
  • control deficiencies at service organisations
  • segregation of duties relating to the hiring of employees
  • conflict of interest management
  • annual leave management
  • review of internal audit charter
  • disaster recovery planning.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales

Background

The establishment of TAHE was originally announced by the NSW Government in the 2015–16 State Budget. On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, transitioned to the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE), a for-profit statutory state-owned corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts.

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to Transport for NSW, a General Government Sector (GGS) agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to the former RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to the former RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result.

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections and was no longer recorded as an expense to the GGS budget, even though the business model was yet to be determined. The change, as explained in the 2015–16 State Budget, was due to the expectation that the former RailCorp will transition to TAHE, which was intended, over time to provide a commercial return. That Budget also highlighted how the change, which was largely a change in the basis of accounting, was intended to improve the GGS budget result each year. In total, the GGS has contributed approximately $11.1 billion to TAHE since 2015–16. This includes the equity injections from the GGS to TAHE made in the current year of $2.4 billion.

NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for the stand-up of TAHE of 1 July 2019, which included finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets. The enactment of the Transport Administration Act 1988 resulted in RailCorp transitioning to TAHE on 1 July 2020, 12 months after its originally planned operational date. Contributions paid to the former RailCorp and subsequently to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high-risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model adopted and the flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below. For further details refer to the Report on State Finances 2021.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Financial data

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2021

Stronger Communities 2021

Justice
Community Services
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Stronger Communities cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies.

Eleven of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadline. Five agencies did not perform all mandatory procedures.

The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the Department of Communities and Justice's (the department) 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively (relating to three correctional centres with private sector operators).

The department was, this year for the first time, able to reliably measure Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. The department recorded a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021. Liabilities for Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim continue to be not recorded on the basis they are unable to be reliably measured.

The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit of the financial statements for the cluster increased from 61 in 2019–20 to 72 in 2020–21.

What the key issues were

The number of issues reported to management decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21. However, 45 per cent were repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.

Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year. High risk issues related to deficiencies in IT access controls at Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust; a lack of a formal agreement between the Office of Sport and Planning Ministerial Corporation over the management of a sporting venue; asset revaluations at both Fire and Rescue NSW and the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building; and three issues related to revenue recognition control deficiencies at New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and two of its subsidiaries.

What we recommended

Cluster agencies should ensure all applicable mandatory early close procedures are completed and the outcomes provided to the audit team in accordance with the deadlines set by NSW Treasury.

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

Fast facts

The Stronger Communities cluster, consisting of 28 agencies, aims to deliver community services that support a safe and just New South Wales.

  • $14.0b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021 
  • $20.9b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 7 high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 72 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 45% of reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies including the acquittal and compliance audits for the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and Crown Solicitor's Office.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included within the Multicultural NSW and Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner’s Independent Auditor's Report. While the paragraph did not modify the audit opinion, it noted the agencies did not have a signed instrument of delegation from their responsible Minister(s) to incur expenditure for the 2020–21 financial year and therefore were non‑compliant with section 5.5 of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 .
  • 11 of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and all other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. The agencies cited changes in key staff, delays in finalising actuarial and valuation work and the timing of Audit and Risk Committee meetings as the main reasons for not meeting the deadlines. Five agencies did not complete all mandatory procedures.
  • The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) was, for the first time, able to reliably measure and record a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021 for Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim liabilities continue to be not recorded on the basis they are still unable to be reliably measured.
  • The International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretations Committee released an agenda decision on 'Configuration or customisation costs in a cloud computing arrangement' (the IFRIC agenda decision). The department treated the financial impacts of the IFRIC agenda decision as a change in accounting policy and retrospectively recorded prepaid assets and expenses of $52.3 million and $90.5 million respectively relating to intangible assets they had previously capitalised.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the department's 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively in relation to three correctional centres with private sector operators.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of issues reported to management has decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21, and 45 per cent were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.
  • Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year.
  • The two high risk issues identified in 2019–20 relating to New South Wales Institute of Sport were resolved.

Findings reported to management

The overall number of findings has decreased, but the level of repeat issues increased

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 172 findings raised across the cluster (191 in 2019–20). 45 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (32 per cent in 2019–20).

Repeat issues largely related to weaknesses in controls over information technology (IT), governance and oversight.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision‑making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

2020–21 audits identified seven high risk findings

High risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies. Two high risk findings reported in 2019–20 were resolved.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (new finding) * The audit of Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust's IT access controls identified:
  • activity (audit) logs of privileged access within iPOS (purchasing system) and Microsoft Dynamics (sales system) are not maintained and periodically reviewed by an independent officer
  • the review of privileged activity logs of booking system Event Business Management Software (EBMS) is not formally documented
  • 8 generic super user accounts are being shared across four IT systems including iPOS, Microsoft Dynamics, EBMS and SUN (accounting system).
The matter has been included as a high risk finding in the management letter as there is an increased risk of:
  • unauthorised transactions and changes to financial data
  • unauthorised users gaining access to financial systems
  • data breaches or financial loss.
Fire and Rescue NSW (new finding) Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) completed a comprehensive revaluation of its fire appliances in 2020–21. The audit of the revaluation found there was inadequate analysis and quality control by management over the valuation process prior to the outcomes being included in the financial statements.
FRNSW had 57 fleet assets that have not been revalued due to problems with data supplied by the valuer. The written down value:
  • did not agree to the valuer's calculations for 28 assets
  • was provided by the valuer for 29 assets, but there were no supporting calculations.
These assets have been left at their previous book values of $3.0 million. The accounting standards require the entire class of assets to be revalued when a revaluation is performed.
The review also found:
  • inconsistent valuation of vehicles of the same make, model, age and specifications
  • errors had been made when the previous valuation was uploaded into the fixed asset register
  • the valuer incorrectly included additional equipment in the replacement cost estimate for vehicles that did not have that equipment.
The matter has been included as a high risk finding as it resulted in monetary misstatements and caused delays to the overall timeframes for the audit.
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) (new finding) The audit of NSWALC's revenue identified there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Employment and Training Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Employment and Training Limited's revenue found:
  • there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • the financial statements' preparation did not include updated accounting policies reflecting the requirements of AASB 15 'Revenue from Contracts with Customers' (AASB 15) and AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' (AASB 1058).
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Housing Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Housing Limited's revenue identified it:
  • did not perform formal assessments of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • deferred revenue recognition for funding received from NSWALC  (the parent entity). There are no sufficiently specific performance obligations in the funding letter, hence revenue should be recognised on receipt of the funding
  • recognised rental income from managing properties from the Aboriginal Housing Office (AHO) without considering the agreement, which requires remittance of profit to the AHO
  • the financial statements did not include updated accounting policies according to the requirements of AASB 15 and AASB 1058.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
Office of Sport (new finding)

The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Dissolution Act 2002 transferred the assets, rights and liabilities relating to the Sydney International Regatta Centre (SIRC) to the Planning Ministerial Corporation (the Corporation) effective from 1 July 2002. The Corporation recognised the related land assets but did not recognise any of the built assets at the time of transfer. The total value of the land and built assets at 30 June 2021 was
$13.8 million and $11.2 million (written down value) respectively.

The SIRC has been managed by the Office of Sport (the Office) for many years in accordance with a not yet executed management agreement.

It appears there was a clear intention in 2005 that the control of SIRC built assets was to be transferred from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation (a predecessor of the Office), through the exchange of letters between the relevant Ministers and an Administrative Order (the Order). The Order transferred the SIRC staff from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. However, it was silent on whether the relevant built assets were transferred.

Currently, the Office recognises the SIRC built assets in the financial statements whilst the Corporation recognises the land assets as the legal owner of the property.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as the lack of a formal management agreement casts doubt over the accounting treatment of SIRC property.

The Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building (new finding)

The audit of the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building's property, plant and equipment identified:

  • the fixed assets register for plant and equipment had not previously included sufficient detail about the individual assets to which costs related to reconcile it to the work performed by management's valuation expert
  • the financial statements did not meet the requirement of AASB 108 ‘Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors’  to disclose the nature and reason why it corrected a prior period error of $778,000.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to property, plant and equipment.


*         The finding related to the former Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (based on the completion audit for the period 1 March 2020 to 30 November 2020). This agency was dissolved and transferred to Venues NSW on 1 December 2020.
 

Recommendation (repeat issue)

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

The table below describes issues commonly identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues with:

  • user access administration
  • cyber security including governance arrangements, monitoring of third-party system access and patch management
  • password security and policy parameters
  • development, review and testing of disaster recovery plans.

Moderate2
8 new,
22 repeat

Low1
5 new,
6 repeat
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across the following key business processes: 

  • expenditure, including the approval of purchase requisitions and review of open purchase orders
  • supplier and employee masterfile maintenance
  • segregation of duties.

Moderate2
6 new,
3 repeat

 Low1
23 new,
7 repeat

Financial reporting

High3
4 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in financial reporting processes, including:

  • fully depreciated assets still in use, indicating the need to perform more frequent assessments of useful lives of assets
  • robustness of property, plant and equipment asset revaluations
  • incomplete or inaccurate recording of balances in the financial statements.

Moderate2
9 new,
1 repeat

Low1
11 new,
5 repeat

Governance and oversight
High3
1 new

The financial audits identified areas where agencies could strengthen governance and oversight processes, including:

  • review and update of policies and procedures
  • formalising existing key business arrangements
  • records management practices.
Moderate2
5 new,
11 repeat
Low1
12 new,
8 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
7 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve their compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies, including:

  • management of excessive annual leave balances
  • existence of and compliance with financial delegations
  • related party transactions disclosures from key management personnel.
Low1
2 new,
8 repeat

4 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year

Seventy‑eight moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 22 per cent decrease from 2019–20. Of these, 43 were repeat findings, and 35 were new issues.

Moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21 include:

  • weaknesses in governance arrangements, including outdated policies and procedures and arrangements that do not align with NSW Government guidelines, such as the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework and NSW Cyber Security Policy
  • weaknesses in user access administration including:
    • user access reviews
    • monitoring of privileged user access and activities
    • password policy configuration
  • cyber security improvements including:
    • implementation and update of governance arrangements
    • monitoring of third‑party system access
    • patch management improvement
  • outdated instruments of financial delegation and non‑compliance with established financial delegations
  • weaknesses in supplier and employee masterfile maintenance.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Health 2021

Health 2021

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Health cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Health cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements of all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic increased the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were pandemic related.

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement. The basis of the qualification related to 19 instances (18 in 2018–19) of non-compliance relating to three of the 20 prudential requirements across five aged care facilities.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster increased from 112 in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high risk (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate risk (47 in 2019–20). Nearly one half of the issues were repeat issues.

The three new high-risk issues identified were:

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

The absence of a tailored debt recovery strategy, data integrity issues and uncertainties around future HQ arrangements increased risks around the recoverability of HQ fees from travellers.

COVID-19 inventories

Data errors and anomalies in the impairment model and difficulties forecasting key factors impacting the management of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) increased uncertainty associated with the valuation and impairment of COVID-19 inventories.

COVID-19 vaccines

The Commonwealth did not provide information about the cost of vaccines provided to NSW free of charge, which required the performance of internal valuations to reflect the consumption of vaccines in the financial statements.

What we recommended

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

Develop a tailored assessment methodology to estimate recoverability of HQ fees and work with Revenue NSW to develop a tailored debt recovery strategy.

COVID-19 inventories

Review the current stocktaking and impairment methodology to incorporate validation of data key to the management of COVID-19 related PPE.

COVID-19 vaccines

Work with the Commonwealth to obtain primary price information on COVID-19 vaccines.

Fast facts

The Health cluster, comprising 15 local health districts, five pillars agencies, two specialty health networks and six shared state-wise services agencies, deliver health services to the people of New South Wales.

  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 47.4% of reported issues were repeat issues
  • $23.5b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $26.8b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general-purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of all corrected monetary misstatements for 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were related to complexities arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making. This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has increased from 112 issues in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate (47 in 2019–20); with nearly one half of all control deficiencies reported in 2020–21 being repeat issues.
  • The complexities arising from accounting for agreements between governments to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic presented three new high risk audit findings with respect to the:
    • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
    • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories
    • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government.
  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements were amongst the repeat issues observed again in the 2020–21 financial reporting period.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, with 47.4 per cent of all issues being repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of cluster agencies. The Audit Office does this through our management letters, which include observations, implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 116 findings raised across the cluster (112 in 2019–20). 47.4 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (38.4 per cent in 2019–20).

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
7 new,
3 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • lack of reviews of user access and privileged user access for
  • HealthRoster
  • Assets and Facilities Management Online
  • vMoney Powerhouse
  • Patient Billing and Revenue Collection system.

Repeat issues included:

  • deficient password controls
  • no independent review for data integrity of any changes made to HealthRoster
  • incomplete reviews of StaffLink User Access.

Low1
4 new,
5 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3

1 new, 

0 repeat

We identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including new issues relating to:

  • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories (personal protective equipment)
  • instances where employees' timesheets were approved in advance
  •  monthly reconciliations not reviewed in a timely manner
  • asset revaluation processes at Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District.
     

Repeat issues included:

  • forced finalisation of rosters in order to finalise processing of payroll
  • partial repeat issue relating to HealthShare NSW's stocktake process, refer to details in the following section of this report.

Moderate2
6 new,
12 repeat

 Low1
10 new,
4 repeat

Financial reporting

High3

2 new, 
0 repeat

We identified weaknesses with respect to financial reporting in relation to the:

  • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
  • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government
  • application of AASB 16 'Leases'
  • improvement in health agencies' grant register to better support management's accounting treatment under the applicable revenue accounting standards.

Moderate2
6 new,
1 repeat

Low1
8 new,
3 repeat

Governance and oversight
Moderate2
9 new,
5 repeat

We identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • ensure better documentation around governance arrangements for major health capital works delivered by Health Infrastructure
  • absence of documented practices at health agencies level relating to Visiting Medical Officer claims.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • delegations manual for Health Infrastructure remains in draft and has done so since 2017.
Low1
2 new,
2 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
1 new,
7 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, with new findings including:

  • bank signatories list not updated to remove terminated employees
  • subsequent changes made to Junior Medical Officers' approved rosters not approved by an authorised delegate.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • management of excessive annual leave
  • non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act) by Ambulance NSW.
Low1
5 new,
13 repeat

4Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

Complexities arising from the COVID-19 response

The 2020–21 audit identified three new high-risk findings

COVID-19 has presented the cluster with several new accounting challenges. New and evolving matters arose from changes to operating conditions, which characterised the 2020–21 financial reporting period. Issues with a high degree of estimation uncertainty will require ongoing attention as the strategies employed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic evolve.

Expected rate of recovery of outstanding Hotel Quarantine invoices

The estimation of the amount likely to be recovered is complicated not only by the uncertainties that exist regarding the assumptions those estimations rely upon, but also the debt collection processes and strategies put into place to manage the accumulated debtors' balance. Debt collection is not administered by the cluster, but rather Revenue NSW. We observed an absence of a methodology to assess the likelihood of recovery. Instead, Sydney Local Health District was relying on Revenue NSW to develop and execute on a collection strategy. Sydney Local Health District was using the same approach to hotel quarantine debts as it did to other Health receivables. As the approach to managing international borders evolves over time, so too will the cluster's need to develop robust estimation models to assess the likely collectability of debtors. 

Procurement, management and impairment of COVID-19 inventories

$656.2 million of COVID-19 inventories were procured in 2020–21, with $220.2 million consumed; $558.7 million impaired and a further $217.1 million written off. Estimates of the degree to which inventories are expired, not fit for purpose or are faulty is often based on management judgement at all stages in the procurement cycle.

With respect to the stocktaking methodology applied, the following issues were identified:

  • discrepancies noted in the stock bin listing provided for audit
  • discrepancies in the recount sheet generated
  • inconsistent application of the stocktake methodology
  • inconsistent labelling of quarantined stock
  • a lack of an approach for validating stock expiry dates, which is a key input to the impairment calculations.

Although management had developed processes and a methodology to count as well as to assess the level of inventory that was not fit for purpose, ongoing attention to the operating environment that emerges post pandemic will be important in assessing the degree to which existing COVID-19 inventories can be integrated into a ‘business as usual’ model going forward. Further refinement of the key elements of the stocktaking methodology will also be required to ensure that key inputs upon which management relies to calculate the year-end inventory impairment provision can be appropriately validated.

Valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government

The 2020–21 financial reporting period saw the Commonwealth acquire COVID-19 vaccines and provide these to state jurisdictions to dispense to their communities. The vaccines, although provided free of charge require recognition. However, Health entities were not responsible for acquiring the vaccines and data on the vaccines' cost was not shared by the Commonwealth. Management undertook a valuation using publicly available data to estimate the value to attribute to the vaccine inventory; developed new systems and leveraged existing pharmacy systems to track physical quantities received from the Commonwealth and ultimately distributed to NSW citizens. As the response to the pandemic evolves, larger quantities, and new lines of vaccine stock will be dealt with, and policy settings will need to adapt when patterns of distribution of those vaccines (e.g., timing of third booster shots) emerge. The Ministry of Health will need to ensure that the valuations applied to the prices of inventory distributed and held in stock are as accurate as possible. This can be done through further refinement of the existing valuation methodology, obtaining price information from the Commonwealth and engaging specialist pharmaceutical valuers.

Emerging trends

Recognition of provisions without sufficient support

Several NSW Health entities raised accruals and provisions in 2020–21, which did not have an appropriate basis for recognition. Liabilities can only be recognised where there is a present obligation to make a payment arising from a past event. A number of these errors remain uncorrected in the financial statements of those entities as they are not material, individually or in aggregate to the financial statements as a whole. Increased training and guidance are required to ensure that treatment within the cluster is consistent and reflects events that have occurred and give rise to obligations.

Treatment of Commonwealth funding

In the 2020–21 and 2019–20 financial reporting periods, we observed prior period errors arising from the treatment of Commonwealth funding. These errors related to recognising revenue under funding agreements entered into with the Commonwealth in the incorrect period. The conditions of these funding arrangements, the transactional information requiring validation and the circumstances when revenue should be recognised are not always clear and can be complex. Early and continuous engagement with the Commonwealth is required to ensure that revenue recognition principles are consistently applied across the cluster.

Key repeat issues

Management of excessive annual leave

NSW Treasury guidelines stipulate annual leave balances exceeding 30 days are considered excess annual leave balances. Managing excess annual leave balances has been reported as an issue for the cluster for more than five years, with the average percentage of employees with excessive leave balances over the last five years being 36.1 per cent (35.5 per cent over five years covering 2015–16 to 2019–20).

The operational demands required to manage the COVID-19 pandemic have presented new challenges for the cluster in trying to manage its excessive leave balances. 39.2 per cent of employees now have excess leave balances at 30 June 2021 (35.4 per cent at 30 June 2020).

The state's leave policy C2020-12 Managing Accrued Recreation Leave Balances requires agencies to manage excessive leave balances to 30 days or less to maintain their workforces physical and mental health.

Accurate time recording

Forced-finalisation of time records by system administrators within HealthRoster remains an issue and we continue to observe time records forced-finalised by system administrators so pay runs can be finalised on a timely basis. During 2020–21, a total of two million (2.2 million in 2019–20) time records were force approved, which represents 5.7 per cent of total time records (6.9 per cent in 2019–20).

Existence, completeness and accuracy of key agreements

Delivery of major capital projects

Health Infrastructure (a division of the Health Administration Corporation) is responsible for the delivery of major capital projects with a budgeted spend of more than $10.0 million. Health Infrastructure oversee the planning, design, procurement, and construction phases. Capital works in progress are recognised in the financial statements of the health entity that intends to use those assets upon completion. The health entities recognise both the capital work in progress and the revenue associated with the capital funding from the Ministry for the construction of the assets. Capital funding is currently agreed with health entities as part of the annual Service Agreement. The assumption that the health entities control the assets during their construction is consistent with Health Infrastructure's role as an agent for the health entity and the Ministry's policy directive PD2020-033 'Management and control of Health Administration Corporation owned Real Property'.

We continued to observe a lack of clarity regarding agreements between Health Infrastructure, the Ministry and the cluster agency that will eventually receive the completed asset. This can lead to confusion and uncertainty around the rights and obligations of each party to the transaction.

Cross border patient funding arrangements

When patients require medical care in a jurisdiction where they are not generally domiciled, there are arrangements in place to provide funding to support cross border patient treatments. We have previously observed that agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions have not been finalised, and this continues to be the case. In the case of Victoria, no agreement has been finalised for the past seven years.

We continue to note that the cluster has long outstanding receivables and payables with other states. The absence of formal agreements between the states hampers the settlement of the debts relating to the treatment of cross border patients. The following table shows the status of Cross Border Agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions:

States 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
Queensland Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised Not finalised
Victoria Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised
Australian Capital Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
South Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Tasmania Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Northern Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Western Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised

Albury Base Hospital

Albury Base hospital is located on the border of NSW and Victoria and services residents of both states. Documentation supporting the extension of the expired Intergovernmental Agreement 2009–2017 between NSW and Victoria in relation to the integration of health services in Wodonga and Albury could not be located.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.

The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.

What we found

The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020. 

The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools. 

Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.

The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.

Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools. 

Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.

Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas. 

Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.

There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress. 

Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.

Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.

What we recommended

  1. Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods. 
  2. Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
  3. Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
  4. Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
  5. Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
  6. Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
  7. Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.

The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
 

Fast facts

  • $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
  • 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury 
  • 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
  • 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
  • 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
  • 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.

The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:

  • $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
  • $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):

  • effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
  • is effectively implementing the program.

This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.

Conclusion

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.

Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.

The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.

The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.

The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Education 2021

Education 2021

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Education cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Education cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Education cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on the Department of Education (the department), the NSW Education Standards Authority and the NSW Skills Board's financial statements.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) audit opinion drawing attention to legislative non-compliance concerning financial delegations during the reporting year.

The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 14 in 2019–20 to seven.

What the key issues were

The department and the TAFE Commission revalued their land assets this year, recognising collective increases of $863.8 million.

The department and the TAFE Commission are not scheduled to perform comprehensive revaluations of their buildings until 2022–23. Construction costs, which are a key input in their current replacement cost valuation methodologies for buildings, may have increased by an estimated nine per cent since the last comprehensive revaluation in 2017–18 based on broad based indices used by the department and the TAFE Commission. While the estimated index increase indicates the fair value of buildings may exceed the carrying values, the use of such high-level indicators has a degree of estimation uncertainty due to the specialised nature of the assets. Therefore, both agencies did not adjust the values of their buildings.

The number of issues we reported to management decreased. Fifty per cent of issues were repeated from prior years.

Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies, with six identified in procurement and payroll controls.

What we recommended

The department and the TAFE Commission reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

Fast facts

The Education cluster, comprising four agencies, administers and delivers education and training services for NSW students, workers and industry.

  • $38.6b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $21.2b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 22 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management
  • monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 50% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.

  • Comprehensive revaluations of the Department of Education (the department) and the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) land assets resulted in collective net increases of $863.8 million to the carrying values of these entities' land assets.

  • Fair value assessments, based on broad indices, of the department and the TAFE Commission's buildings, indicated that replacement costs may have increased by an estimated nine per cent. Whilst the next comprehensive valuation is not scheduled until 2022–23, the department and the TAFE Commission will need to consider the outcomes of their annual assessments to ensure that the carrying amounts continue to reflect the fair value of these specialised assets in their financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 22 moderate issues across the cluster. Eleven moderate risk issues were repeat issues and related to general and application information technology controls and deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.
  • Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies and improvements, with identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll accounting for six.
  • A high-risk issue identified in 2019–20 relating to the Department of Education's (the department) monitoring of privileged user activity has largely been addressed.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has decreased. Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 28 findings raised across the cluster (33 in 2019–20). Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues (45 per cent in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology general controls, application controls, and identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
2 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • agencies' user access administration and change management procedures, notably in the timing and frequency of managerial reviews over the granting and revocation of access to key systems relevant to financial reporting
  • application controls and segregation of duties in payroll systems, allowing certain users to access or modify employee records as well as process payroll
  • system configurations whereby preparers of manual journals can also post without a secondary review
  • password reviews undertaken that align with approved password guidelines
  • the monitoring of privileged user activities.

Low1
2 new,
1 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

Moderate2
7 new,
4 repeat

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • the adequacy of monitoring and oversight activities over the use of multiple financial delegation configurations in finance systems for specific users
  • the timely recording and approval of overtime claims and higher duties allowances
  • the timely finalisation of policies and procedures
  • procurement practices including a high proportion of retrospective purchase orders and the timely receipting of goods and services
  • the timely notification of employee resignations or employees applying for leave without pay, leading to salary overpayments
  • the management of excessive annual leave balances
  • the extent of review or approval of changes to lease information.

 Low1
1 new,
2 repeat

Financial reporting

Moderate2
2 new,
1 repeat

The financial audits identified:
  • opportunities for agencies to strengthen their financial preparation processes to facilitate a timelier and more efficient year-end audit
  • the need for agencies with non-financial assets subject to fair value to reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and to refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Low1
0 new,
0 repeat


3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

 
Note: Management letter findings are based on final management letters issued to agencies.

The department continues to address recommendations to improve monitoring of privileged user access

Privileged users have higher levels of access to systems, and in some instances, may include access that can bypass segregation of duty controls. If reviews of access logs are not fully embedded in the control environment, the risk of unauthorised transactions occurring and not being detected in a timely manner is elevated.

In 2019–20 a high-risk issue was reported at the department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP. This year the department has largely addressed our findings by initiating a review of the identified instances of privileged user activity and establishing periodic oversight controls. There remains a need to improve the timeliness and completeness of these newly implemented controls.

Data analytics identified the root cause of internal control deficiencies in procurement and payroll

Our 2020–21 agency management letters identified seven new moderate risk internal control deficiency matters, of which six related to payroll and procurement.

To enhance our financial statement audit of the department we applied data analytics over elements of the department's procurement and payroll control processes. Our procedures, conducted over periods across the financial year, helped identify the following:

  • a low level of compliance with procurement practices requiring the creation of purchase orders before invoices are received. The root cause was a lack of understanding by agency staff of the procurement processes
  • transactions related to previous years being recorded in the current year. The root cause was a lack of understanding of the three-way matching process and the goods received/not invoiced facilities within SAP
  • negative payments in fortnightly pay runs, predominantly representing deductions to recover salary payments made in error. The root cause was the lack of timeliness in notifying payroll for cessation of employment, or for employees undertaking secondments who should have been classified as being on leave without pay.
 
 

Recommendation

We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above. 

Appendix one – Early close procedures

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Rail freight and Greater Sydney

Rail freight and Greater Sydney

Transport
Information technology
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

What the report is about

The movement of freight contributes $66 billion annually to the NSW economy. Two thirds of all freight in NSW moves through Greater Sydney, and the volume of freight moving through Greater Sydney is expected to increase by 48 per cent by 2036.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of transport agencies in improving the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney, and to meet current and future freight demand.

What we found

Transport agencies do not have strategies or targets in place to improve the efficiency or capacity of the metropolitan shared rail network for freight.

The transport agencies acknowledge that they do not have sufficient information to achieve the most efficient freight outcomes and they do not know how to use the shared rail network to maximise freight capacity without compromising passenger rail services.

The Freight and Ports Plan 2018-2023 contains one target for rail freight - to increase the use of rail at Port Botany to 28 per cent by 2021. However, Transport for NSW (TfNSW)'s data indicates this target will not be met.

Sydney Trains records data on train movements and collects some data on delays and incidents. TfNSW collects data for the construction of the Standard Working Timetable and third-party contracts.

However, a lack of clarity around what data is gathered and who has ownership of the data makes data sharing difficult and limits its analysis and reporting.

The Freight and Ports Plan 2018-2023 includes the goal of 'Reducing avoidable rail freight delays', but the transport agencies do not have any definition for an avoidable delay and, as a result, do not measure or report them.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are appointed to manage and deliver the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE)'s obligations to allow rail freight operators to use the shared rail network. There are no performance measures in rail freight operator contracts or inter-agency agreements. This limits transport agencies' ability to improve performance.

TfNSW’s Freight Branch is working on four freight-specific strategies; a review of the Plan, a freight rail strategy, a port efficiency strategy and a freight data strategy.

TfNSW has not yet determined the timeframes or intended outcomes of these strategies.

What we recommended

Transport agencies should:

  • commit, as part of the review of Future Transport 2056, to delivering the freight-specific strategies currently in development and develop whole-of-cluster accountability for this work including timeframes, specific targets and clear roles and responsibilities 
  • improve the collection and sharing of freight data
  • develop a plan to reduce avoidable freight delays
  • systematically collect data on the management of all delays involving and/or impacting rail-freight
  • develop and implement key performance indicators for the agreements between the transport agencies.

Fast facts    

  • 288 million tonnes of freight volume predicted to pass through Greater Sydney in 2036, up from 194 million in 2016 (an increase of 48%)

  • 54 trucks that can be replaced by one 600 m long port shuttle freight train    

  • 26,671 freight trains that passed through the metropolitan shared rail network between 1 July 2020 and 30 June 2021

The movement of freight contributes $66.0 billion annually to the New South Wales economy — or 13 per cent of the Gross State Product. Two thirds of all freight in New South Wales moves through Greater Sydney, and the volume of freight moving through Greater Sydney is expected to increase by 48 per cent by 2036. This increasing demand is driven by increasing population and economic growth.

The sequence of activities required to move goods from their point of origin to the eventual consumer (the supply chain) is what matters most to shippers and consumers. Road can provide a single-mode door-to-door service, whereas conveying goods by rail typically involves moving freight onto road at some point. In Greater Sydney, 80 per cent of all freight is moved on road. Freight often passes through intermodal terminals (IMTs) as it transitions from one mode of transport to the next.

In 2016, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) released Future Transport 2056 - the NSW Government's 40-year vision for transport in New South Wales, which is intended to guide investment over the longer term. In Future Transport 2056, TfNSW noted that New South Wales will struggle to meet increasing demand for freight movements unless rail plays a larger role in the movement of freight.

Sydney Trains manages the metropolitan shared rail network, which is made up of rail lines that are used by both passenger and freight trains. The Transport Administration Act 1988 requires that, for the purposes of network control and timetabling, NSW Government transport agencies give ‘reasonable priority’ to passenger trains on shared lines. As the Greater Sydney population and rail patronage continue to grow, so too will competition for access to the shared rail network. See Appendix two for details of the area encompassed by Greater Sydney.

Freight operators can also use dedicated rail freight lines operated by the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC - an Australian Government statutory-owned corporation). As the metropolitan shared rail network connects with dedicated freight lines, freight operators often use both to complete a journey.

TfNSW, Sydney Trains and the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) work in conjunction with other rail infrastructure owners and private sector entities, including port operators, privately operated IMTs and freight-shipping companies. TfNSW and Sydney Trains are responsible for managing the movement of freight across the metropolitan shared rail network. TAHE is the owner of the rail infrastructure that makes up the metropolitan shared rail network. The NSW Government established TAHE, a NSW Government state-owned corporation, on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner - RailCorp. The Auditor-General for New South Wales has commenced a performance audit on TAHE which is expected to table in 2022.

On 1 July 2021, TAHE entered into new agreements with TfNSW and Sydney Trains to operate, manage and maintain the metropolitan shared rail network. Until 30 June 2021, and in accordance with TAHE's Implementation Deed, TAHE operated under the terms of RailCorp's existing arrangements and agreements.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW, Sydney Trains and TAHE in improving the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney, and to meet current and future freight demand.

The audit focused on:

  • the monitoring of access to shared rail lines
  • the management of avoidable delays of rail freight movements
  • steps to increase the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney.

Conclusion

Transport agencies do not have clear strategies or targets in place to improve the freight efficiency or capacity of the metropolitan shared rail network. They also do not know how to make best use the rail network to achieve the efficient use of its rail freight capacity. These factors expose the risk that rail freight capacity will not meet anticipated increases in freight demand.

Future Transport 2056 notes that opportunities exist to shift more freight onto rail, and that making this change remains an important priority for the NSW Government. However, the transport agencies acknowledge that they do not have sufficient information to achieve the most efficient freight outcomes. In particular, transport agencies do not know how to use the shared rail network in a way that maximises freight capacity without compromising passenger rail services.

Neither Future Transport 2056 nor the Freight and Ports Plan 2018–2023 give any guidance on how transport agencies will improve the efficiency or capacity of the shared rail network. Other than a target for rail freight movements to and from Port Botany, which TfNSW's data indicates will not be met, there are no targets for improving rail freight capacity across the shared network. The lack of specific strategies, objectives and targets reduces accountability and makes it difficult for transport agencies to effectively improve the use of rail freight capacity in line with their commitment to do so.

Sydney Trains and Transport for NSW do not effectively use data to improve rail freight performance and capacity.

To drive performance improvement when planning for the future, transport agencies need good quality data on freight management and movements. Sydney Trains records data on train movements in real-time and collects some data on delays and incidents. TfNSW collects data for the construction of the Standard Working Timetable (SWTT) and third-party contracts. However, the different types of data gathered and the separation between the teams responsible mean that there is a lack of clarity around what data is gathered and who has ownership it. This lack of coordination prevents best use of the data to develop a single picture of how well the network is operating or how performance could be improved.

Sydney Trains' ability to evaluate the effectiveness of its incident and delay mitigation strategies is also limited by a lack of information on its management of rail-freight related delays or incidents. While Sydney Trains collects data on major incidents, it can only use this to conduct event-specific analysis on the causes of an incident, and to review the operational and management response. The use of complete and accurate incident data would assist to define, identify and reduce avoidable delays. Reducing avoidable delays is a goal of the Freight and Ports Plan 2018–2023. More complete data on all incidents would help TfNSW to have more effective performance discussions with rail freight operators to help improve performance.

TfNSW has started developing strategies to identify how it can use rail freight capacity to achieve efficient freight outcomes, but it has not committed to implementation timeframes for this work.

TfNSW’s Freight Branch has started work on four freight-specific strategies to improve freight efficiency: a review of the Plan, a freight rail strategy, a port efficiency strategy and a freight data strategy. However, none of these strategies will be fully developed before the end of 2022. TfNSW has not yet determined the implementation timeframes or intended outcomes of these strategies, although TfNSW reports that it is taking an iterative approach and some recommendations and initiatives will be developed during 2022. 

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - The Greater Sydney region

Appendix three - TfNSW strategic projects 

Appendix four - Sydney Trains path priority principles 

Appendix five - Sydney Trains delay management

Appendix six - About the audit 

Appendix seven - Performance auditing
 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #357 - released (19 October 2021).