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Published

Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Health
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.

Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1 

Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2 

In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.

The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.

The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:

  • hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
  • inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
  • mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
  • custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.

The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions: 

  1. Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
  2. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
  3. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
Conclusion

NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.

There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.

NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.

NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.

In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.


1 Australian Burden of Disease Study: Impact and causes of illness and death in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 2011 (unaudited).
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.

In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:

  • culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
  • person centred and focussed on individual needs
  • delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
  • holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
  • delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
  • welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures. 

The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.

Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people

The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.

Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.

Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons. 

A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:

  • emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
  • community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
  • Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
  • community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.

The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education

Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education

Education
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Workforce and capability

This report examines whether the Department of Education has the required contract management capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts (over $250,000). In 2017–18, the department managed high-value goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years.

NSW government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

In 2017–18, the Department of Education (the Department) managed high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years. The Department delivers, funds and regulates education services for NSW students from early childhood to secondary school.

This audit examined whether the Department has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts.

We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We assessed the Department against the following criteria:

  1. The Department’s policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. The Department has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

The NSW Public Service Commission and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation are included as auditees as they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability, including:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Procurement Agency Accreditation Scheme
  • NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's responsibility for NSW Procurement will transfer to NSW Treasury on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements announced on 2 April 2019 and amended on 1 May 2019.

Conclusion

The Department of Education's procedures and policies for goods and services contract management are consistent with relevant guidance. It also has a systemic approach to defining the capability required for contract management roles. That said, there are gaps in how well the Department uses this capability to ensure its contracts are performing. We also found one program (comprising 645 contracts) that was not compliant with the Department's policies.

The Department has up-to-date policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance. The Department also communicates changes to procurement related policies, monitors compliance with policies and conducts regular reviews aiming to identify non-compliance.

The Department uses the NSW Public Service Commission's capability framework to support its workforce management and development. The capability framework includes general contract management capability for all staff and occupation specific capabilities for contract managers. The Department also provides learning and development for staff who manage contracts to improve their capability.

The Department provides some guidance on different ways that contract managers can validate performance information provided by suppliers. However, the Department does not provide guidance to assist contract managers to choose the best validation strategy according to contract risk. This could lead to inconsistent practice and contracts not delivering what they are supposed to.

We found that none of the 645 contracts associated with the Assisted Schools Travel Program (estimated value of $182 million in 2018–19) have contract management plans. This is contrary to the Department's policies and increases the risk that contract managers are not effectively reviewing performance and resolving disputes.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #325 - released 28 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Transport
Education
Health
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Workforce and capability

Three key agencies are not fully complying with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction for engaging probity practitioners, according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. They also do not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure that probity engagements achieved value for money.

Probity is defined as the quality of having strong moral principles, honesty and decency. Probity is important for NSW Government agencies as it helps ensure decisions are made with integrity, fairness and accountability, while attaining value for money.

Probity advisers provide guidance on issues concerning integrity, fairness and accountability that may arise throughout asset procurement and disposal processes. Probity auditors verify that agencies' processes are consistent with government laws and legislation, guidelines and best practice principles. 

According to the NSW State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038, New South Wales has more infrastructure projects underway than any state or territory in Australia. The scale of the spend on procuring and constructing new public transport networks, roads, schools and hospitals, the complexity of these projects and public scrutiny of aspects of their delivery has increased the focus on probity in the public sector. 

A Procurement Board Direction, 'PBD-2013-05 Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' (the Direction), sets out the requirements for NSW Government agencies' use and engagement of probity practitioners. It confirms agencies should routinely take into account probity considerations in their procurement. The Direction also specifies that NSW Government agencies can use probity advisers and probity auditors (probity practitioners) when making decisions on procuring and disposing of assets, but that agencies:

  • should use external probity practitioners as the exception rather than the rule
  • should not use external probity practitioners as an 'insurance policy'
  • must be accountable for decisions made
  • cannot substitute the use of probity practitioners for good management practices
  • not engage the same probity practitioner on an ongoing basis, and ensure the relationship remains robustly independent. 

The scale of probity spend may be small in the context of the NSW Government's spend on projects. However, government agencies remain responsible for probity considerations whether they engage external probity practitioners or not.

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW, the Department of Education and the Ministry of Health:

  • complied with the requirements of ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’
  • effectively ensured they achieved value for money when they used probity practitioners.

These entities are referred to as 'participating agencies' in this report.

We also surveyed 40 NSW Government agencies with the largest total expenditures (top 40 agencies) to get a cross sector view of their use of probity practitioners. These agencies are listed in Appendix two.

Conclusion

We found instances where each of the three participating agencies had not fully complied with the requirements of the NSW Procurement Board Direction ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’ when they engaged probity practitioners. We also found they did not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure the engagements achieved value for money.

In the sample of engagements we selected, we found instances where the participating agencies did not always:

  • document detailed terms of reference
  • ensure the practitioner was sufficiently independent
  • manage probity practitioners' independence and conflict of interest issues transparently
  • provide practitioners with full access to records, people and meetings
  • establish independent reporting lines   reporting was limited to project managers
  • evaluate whether value for money was achieved.

We also found:

  • agencies tend to rely on only a limited number of probity service providers, sometimes using them on a continuous basis, which may threaten the actual or perceived independence of probity practitioners
  • the NSW Procurement Board does not effectively monitor agencies' compliance with the Direction's requirements. Our enquiries revealed that the Board has not asked any agency to report on its use of probity practitioners since the Direction's inception in 2013. 

There are no professional standards and capability requirements for probity practitioners

NSW Government agencies use probity practitioners to independently verify that their procurement and asset disposal processes are transparent, fair and accountable in the pursuit of value for money. 

Probity practitioners are not subject to regulations that require them to have professional qualifications, experience and capability. Government agencies in New South Wales have difficulty finding probity standards, regulations or best practice guides to reference, which may diminish the degree of reliance stakeholders can place on practitioners’ work.

The NSW Procurement Board provides direction for the use of probity practitioners

The NSW Procurement Board Direction 'PBD-2013-15 for engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' outlines the requirements for agencies' use of probity practitioners in the New South Wales public sector. All NSW Government agencies, except local government, state owned corporations and universities, must comply with the Direction when engaging probity practitioners. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.

Published

Actions for Wellbeing of secondary school students

Wellbeing of secondary school students

Education
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Department of Education has a strong focus on supporting secondary school students’ wellbeing. However, it is difficult to assess how well the Department is progressing as it is yet to measure or report on the outcomes of this work at a whole-of-state level.

The Department of Education’s (the Department) purpose is to prepare young people for rewarding lives as engaged citizens in a complex and dynamic society. The Department commits to creating quality learning opportunities for children and young people, including a commitment to student wellbeing, which is seen as directly linked to positive learning outcomes. Wellbeing is defined broadly by the Department as “the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness”. Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing.

Several reforms have aimed to support student wellbeing in recent years. 'Local Schools, Local Decisions' gave NSW schools more local authority to make decisions, including schools' approaches to support student wellbeing. In 2016, the 'Supported Students, Successful Students' initiative provided $167 million over four years to support the wellbeing of students. From 2018, the 'Every Student is Known, Valued and Cared For' initiative provides a principal led mentoring program, and a website with policies, procedures and resources to support student wellbeing.

This audit assessed how well the Department of Education supports secondary schools to promote and support the wellbeing of their students and how well secondary schools are promoting and supporting the wellbeing of their students.

Conclusion

The Department has implemented a range of programs and reforms aimed at supporting student wellbeing. However, the outcomes of this work have yet to be measured or reported on at a system level, making it difficult to assess the Department's progress in improving student wellbeing.

Secondary schools have generally adopted a structured approach to deliver wellbeing support and programs, using both Department and localised resources. The approaches have been tailored to meet the needs of their school community. That said, public reporting on wellbeing improvement measures via annual school reports is of variable quality and needs to improve.

The Department’s wellbeing initiatives are supported by research and consultation, but outcomes have not been reported on

The Department’s development of wellbeing policy, guidance, tools and resources has been transparent, consultative and well researched. It has drawn on international and domestic evidence to support its aim to deliver a fundamental shift from welfare to wellbeing at the school and system level.

However, the key performance indicator to monitor and track progress in wellbeing has yet to be reported on despite the strategic plan including this as a priority for the period 2018 to 2022. This includes not yet reporting a baseline for the target, nor how it will be measured.

The Department’s wellbeing resources are mostly well targeted but there is room for improvement

The Department’s allocation of resources to deliver wellbeing initiatives in schools is mostly well targeted, reflects a needs basis and supports current strategic directions. This could be improved with some changes to formula allocations and clearer definitions of the resourcing required for identified wellbeing positions in schools. The workforce modelling for forecasting supply and demand, specifically for school counsellors and psychologists, needs to separately identify these positions as they are currently subsumed in general teacher numbers.

Schools' reporting on wellbeing improvement measures is of variable quality and needs to improve

Schools we visited demonstrated a variety of approaches to wellbeing depending on their local circumstances and student populations. They make use of Department policies, guidelines, and resources, particularly mandatory policies and data collections, which have good compliance and take-up at school level. Professional learning supports specific wellbeing initiatives and online systems for monitoring and reporting have contributed to schools’ capacity and capabilities.

Schools report publicly on wellbeing improvement measures through annual school reports but this reporting is of variable quality. The Department plans to improve the capability of schools in data analysis and we recommend that this include the setting and evaluation of improvement targets for wellbeing.

The implementation of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework in schools is incomplete and the Department has not effectively prioritised and consolidated tools, systems and reporting for wellbeing

Schools' take up of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework is hindered by it not being linked to the school planning and reporting policy and tools—the School Excellence Framework. At some schools we visited, this disconnect has led to a lack of knowledge and confidence in using it in schools. The Department has identified the need to improve alignment of policies, frameworks and plans and has commenced work on this.

We found evidence of overburdening in schools for addressing student wellbeing—in the number of tools, online systems for information collection, and duplication in reporting. Following the significant reforms of recent years, the Department should consolidate its efforts by reinforcing existing effective programs and systems and addressing identified gaps and equity issues, rather than introducing further change for schools. In particular, methods and processes for complex case coordination need improvement.

The NSW Department of Education commits to creating quality learning opportunities for students. This includes strengthening students’ physical, social, emotional and spiritual development. The Department sets out to enable students to be healthy, happy, engaged and successful.

Welfare and wellbeing

The Department’s approach has significantly shifted from student welfare to wellbeing of the whole child and young person. Wellbeing is defined in departmental policy and strategy documents broadly, and as directly linked to learning and positive learning outcomes. “Wellbeing can be described as the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness…Wellbeing, or the lack of it, can affect a student’s engagement and success in learning…”

Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing. Distinctions between wellbeing and welfare in the school context are outlined below.

Exhibit 1: Welfare and wellbeing
Welfare Wellbeing
Operates from a basis of student need and doesn't always take into account a whole child view. For all students.
Rather than building on the strengths of students, operates from a deficit model of individual student problems or negative behaviours. Goes beyond just welfare needs of a few students and aims for all students to be healthy, happy, successful and productive individuals who are active and positive contributors to the school and society in which they live.

Source: Department of Education 2018 'Wellbeing is here' presentation.

Published

Actions for Supply of secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines

Supply of secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines

Education
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The NSW Department of Education’s plans and strategies to respond to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines are limited by incomplete data and underperforming scholarship and sponsorship program. The Department does not collect sufficient information to monitor what disciplines teachers actually teach nor does it predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. This restricts the Department’s ability to track and forecast the supply and demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines.

In recent years, Australian and international education policy has focused on improving outcomes in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects. However, research has identified a shortage of qualified secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines 1. This is projected to worsen due to a combination of student population increases, an ageing workforce, and fewer people going into teaching. Shortfalls are likely to be more acute in rural and remote areas, and areas of low socio-economic status.

The Department of Education (the Department) has a variety of strategies to encourage teachers to practise in locations or disciplines of need. These include scholarships for tertiary students going into teaching, sponsorships for teachers seeking approval to teach additional disciplines, and incentives to attract teachers to rural and remote locations. 

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department's workforce plans and strategies in responding to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines. We assessed:

  • how well the Department tracks the supply and demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines across NSW
  • whether the Department has effective strategies to attract and retain secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines.
Conclusion
There are two key shortcomings that fundamentally limit the effectiveness of the Department's plans and strategies to respond to the demand for secondary teachers in STEM-related disciplines. First, the Department is not accurately tracking the supply and demand for secondary teachers by discipline due to incomplete data. Second, not all scholarship and sponsorship places are allocated and many scholars withdraw from the programs before completion. The Department has recognised and started to address these problems with a new workforce model, revised incentives and scholarship programs. 

The Department’s current workforce planning model does not provide the information needed to target workforce plans and strategies to areas of need. This is because it does not predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. An internal review in 2017 acknowledged the limitations of this model. In response the Department developed a new model, which it is currently enhancing, to predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. For this to be successful, the Department needs to monitor the level of out-of-field teaching and improve data on the willingness of teachers to work in particular locations. 

The Department does not allocate all available scholarship and sponsorship places and around 30 per cent of recipients do not complete the term of their agreement. An internal review in 2017 highlighted that some programs were not targeting workforce need and that there were no key performance indicators to determine the overall effectiveness of these programs. However, scholarship programs and incentives are promoted well through social media and face-to-face events at Universities. Further, the Department has used findings from internal reviews of incentives and scholarships in 2016 and 2017 to inform recent changes to programs. 

The Department has little oversight of access to practicum placements for pre-service teachers in areas of need. Professional experience agreements were established with each University in 2015 to improve the placement process for disciplines of need. Initial teacher education students must complete several ‘practicum placements’ before they can be qualified to teach in a school. Several universities we consulted reported difficulties finding practicum placements for pre-service teachers specialising in STEM-related disciplines. The Department is now revising the agreements to improve the quality of data it collects on the number, location and subject area of practicum placements. 

1 Australian Council for Educational Research 2015, The teacher workforce in Australia - supply, demand and data issues.

 

The Department is not accurately tracking the supply and demand for secondary teachers by discipline due to incomplete data. 

The Department’s current workforce planning model does not accurately predict supply and demand for teachers by discipline and location. An internal review in 2017 acknowledged the limitations of this model. In response the Department developed a new model which it is currently enhancing to address the findings of the review. For this model to be successful, the Department needs to monitor the level of out-of-field teaching and improve data on the willingness of teachers to work in particular locations. Further work also needs to be undertaken to refine the assumptions that underpin the Department’s workforce planning models as it starts to predict the need for teachers by discipline.

The Department has not publicly reported on the supply and demand for teachers by discipline since 2015. While it does report annually on its current workforce profile, this information is not detailed enough to inform future strategies or programs. More detailed public reporting may help the Department to influence the future supply of teachers by communicating its projected areas of need. Planned improvements to the Department's workforce planning model, as relayed to us, will add to the data available on areas of need. Once available, this should be reported publicly. 

Recommendations
By December 2019, the Department of Education should:

  1. Improve its workforce planning model to better understand and communicate supply and demand for teachers by: 
    • determining the extent, and analysing the impact, of out-of-field teaching by permanent and temporary teachers in each school
    • sourcing additional data to more accurately reflect teacher location preferences
    • projecting supply and demand by subject level and geographic area
    • regularly reporting on the supply and demand for secondary teachers in each discipline to communicate future areas of need to future teacher education students.

The Department's current scholarship and sponsorship programs are not allocating all available places and many scholars withdraw from the programs before completion. An internal review in 2017 raised several issues with the effectiveness of programs and the Department has started to revise its scholarship, sponsorship and incentive programs. 

An internal review in 2017 highlighted that scholarship and sponsorship programs were not targeting workforce need, and that there were no key performance indicators to determine the overall effectiveness of these strategies. In addition, the review found that only 79 per cent of available scholarship placements are allocated each year, and 31 per cent of scholarship recipients withdraw prior to completing their required service period. The Department recently announced changes to its scholarship programs from 2019 onwards.

The Department has incentives to encourage teachers to work in rural and remote areas, including teachers in STEM-related disciplines. Incentives include access to priority transfers, rental subsidies and other allowances. Research conducted in 2016 examined the influence of incentives in encouraging teachers to work in rural and remote areas. The Department used findings of this research when updating its set of rural and remote incentives in 2017.

The Department promotes its scholarship and sponsorship programs through the teach.NSW website. It uses social media to direct applicants to this website. It also promotes its programs through careers fairs, University open days, and professional events. Past applicants have reported that the website clearly communicates eligibility criteria and the terms of agreement for all scholarship programs. 

The Department could strengthen its relationship with universities to attract teachers to areas of need by collecting and analysing data on practicum placements, facilitating placements for scholarship recipients, and communicating predicted teacher needs by discipline. 

Recommendations
By December 2019, the Department of Education should:

2. Implement changes to address the findings of the 'Teacher Scholarship Realignment' report, including by:

  • testing a range of program designs with target candidates to determine the best options to attract more suitable applicants
  • establishing key performance indicators, and setting targets, to better monitor the effectiveness of the programs
  • reducing the number of scholars appointed to over-establishment positions
  • increasing the proportion of scholars appointed to priority locations 
  • further analysing scholarship recipients career paths to inform future improvements to the scholarship programs.

3. Review its role in the practicum placement process of pre-service teachers by:

  • analysing how many students each school accommodates per year, to ensure there are appropriate placements available for students in high needs disciplines
  • working with universities to facilitate practicum placements for scholarship recipients
  • establishing mechanisms for ongoing monitoring of its partnerships with universities to ensure they are meeting their aims.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference - Report number #313 - released 29 January 2019.

Published

Actions for Education 2018

Education 2018

Education
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of agencies in the Education cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of these agencies. 'I am pleased to report that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of both agencies in the Education cluster', the Auditor-General said. Statements were submitted and audited within statutory deadlines.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Education cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster for 2017–18.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of both cluster agencies. Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Both cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting financial statements. Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of cluster agencies’ financial statements and completion of audits, but scope exists to improve outcomes by resolving issues and supplying supporting documentation earlier.
2.3 Key issues from financial audits
Inconsistencies in the Department’s annual leave and long service leave data, identified over the past three audits, remain unresolved. This issue impacts the Department’s liability estimates for annual leave and long service leave, including associated on-costs. It also on-flows to the Crown Entity, which assumes the Department's liability for long service leave. Recommendation: The Department should confirm leave data and review assumptions following deployment of the new HR/Payroll system to better estimate the liability for employee benefits and the amount to be assumed by the Crown Entity.
2.4 Key financial information
Cluster agencies recorded net deficits in 2017–18.

The Department recorded a net deficit of $30.7 million in 2017–18 against a budgeted surplus of $122 million.

The NSW Education Standards Authority recorded a net deficit of $4.1 million against a budgeted deficit of $4.7 million.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1  Internal controls
Twenty internal control deficiencies were identified during our audits of cluster agencies. We assessed one as a high risk finding.  
Eight internal control weaknesses were repeat issues from previous financial audits that had not been fully addressed by management. Recommendation: Management should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses.
3.2 Information technology
Delivery of the Learning Management and Business Reform (LMBR) program is complete.

The LMBR program has been a major project for the Department since it was established in 2006.

A staged approach was adopted for implementing the Department’s new HR/Payroll system to manage the risks associated with this large-scale roll-out.

3.3 Valuation of the Department’s land and buildings
The Department completed a revaluation of land and building assets during 2017–18.

A market approach was used to revalue the Department’s land, resulting in a revaluation increment of $2.3 billion.

A current replacement cost approach was used to revalue the Department’s school buildings, resulting in an increment of $6.2 billion.

3.4 Maintenance of school facilities
The Department regularly assesses the condition of school buildings and uses Life Cycle Costing to predict maintenance and capital renewal, and to prioritise maintenance activities. The Life Cycle Costing assessment conducted by the Department in 2017–18 rated 70 per cent of school buildings as being in either as new or good condition. No school buildings were rated as being in end-of-life condition.
3.4 School asset delivery
The Department’s School Assets Strategic Plan is designed to ensure that there are sufficient fit-for-purpose places for students up to 2031. The Department created a new division, School Infrastructure NSW, to oversee the planning, supply and maintenance of schools and implement major school infrastructure projects.

This chapter provides service delivery outcomes for the Education cluster for 2017–18. It provides important contextual information about the cluster's operation, but the data on achievement of these outcomes is not audited. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information.

Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Health 2018

Health 2018

Health
Financial reporting

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on the New South Wales Health Cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of thirty health entities in New South Wales. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of health entities’ property, plant and equipment created challenges, particularly for local health districts.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities. We identified fewer misstatements than last year, but they were more significant. The Ministry of Health sets significant accounting policies centrally and provides a template for the preparation of health entities' financial statements. These processes promote consistent quality in the financial reports of health entities.

Significant errors identified in 2017–18 predominantly related to revaluations of property, plant and equipment.
 
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Entities' continue to bring forward financial statement procedures to 31 March where possible. All entities submitted their financial statements on time. Health entities continue to meet statutory deadlines. 
2.3 Financial and sustainability analysis
NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $377.7 million in 2017–18. Fewer health entities recorded operating deficits in 2017–18. The operating surplus was $123 million less than budgeted, and $29.0 million less than the surplus recorded for 2016–17. NSW Health budgets for surpluses to help it invest in new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments.
Expenses across NSW Health increased by 5.5 per cent in 2017–18 (4.4 per cent in 2016–17). The expense growth rate for NSW Health is 0.5 percentage points lower than the projected long-term annual expense growth rate of six per cent.
The capital replacement ratio (investment in new assets divided by depreciation) for NSW Health is 2.0. NSW Health's high capital replacement ratios for ten health entities in 2017–18 is driven by its substantial ongoing investment in hospitals and other assets.
2.4 Performance against budget
This year, four out of 17 (ten out of 17 in 2016–17) local health districts and specialty networks reported a budget variance outside of performance expectations. Health entities' budgets are revised frequently throughout the year by the Ministry of Health. In 2017–18 the budgeted expenses of health entities were incrementally increased throughout the year by a total of $807 million.

The Ministry of Health expects health entities not to exceed their revised budgeted expenses by more than 0.5 per cent. Four of the local health districts did not meet this requirement.
 
2.5 Financial impact of health entity employees
Thirty-four per cent of NSW Health’s workforce has excess annual leave balances, compared to 35 per cent in 2016–17.

Managing excess annual leave continues to challenge health entities.
Recommendation: Health entities should further review the approach to managing excess annual leave in 2018–19, and:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year on a monthly basis
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • encourage staff that perform key control functions to take a minimum of two consecutive weeks' leave a year as a fraud mitigation strategy.
The Ambulance Service of NSW reported an average sick leave rate of 88.9 hours per FTE in 2017–18, an increase from 85.2 hours per FTE in 2016–17. Managing sick leave continues to challenge the Ambulance Service of NSW.
Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further implement and monitor targeted human resource strategies to address the high rates of sick leave taken.
The Ambulance Service of NSW reported overtime payments of $74.8 million ($74.6 million in 2016–17). This continues to be significantly higher than other health entities. Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce excessive overtime payments.
Weak timesheet approval controls mean unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Recommendation: Health entities should, as part of the benefits realisation of HealthRoster, continue to rectify time and leave recording control weaknesses, to reduce the risk of timesheet errors and fraud.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal control deficiencies
The number of internal control deficiencies decreased. However, almost a quarter of control deficiencies are repeat issues and over a quarter relate to managing employees' leave and time recording. Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees' leave, employees' time recording or information system limitations can be difficult for entities to resolve in a timely manner. Nonetheless, the longer the deficiency remains unaddressed the more likely the vulnerability will contribute to error or fraud.
 
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Revaluation of property, plant and equipment
Three health entities did not effectively oversee the asset revaluations performed by the experts they engaged in 2017–18. All three entities made material adjustments to their draft financial statements. Valuation of health property, plant and equipment is complex and subjective. Health entities and the Ministry of Health rely on the experts they engage, but needed to do more to review and oversee their work.
Capital projects
NSW Health manages a significant capital program ($1.7 billion in 2017–18). We noted significant revisions to completion dates and budgeted costs for some projects. NSW Health complied with approval requirements for business cases, initial budgets and budget variations for the projects we reviewed. For some projects revisions to planned completion dates and budgeted costs impact on the ability to assess the timeliness and cost effectiveness of projects. Combining stages of projects for simplicity of reporting, as a project progresses also makes it difficult to see how the project is tracking to the original plan.
Asset maintenance
The five health entities with the highest maintenance expense used different methods to estimate budgets for maintenance expense. Entities that calculated maintenance budgets by applying CPI factors to prior year expenses were less likely to deliver within budget. Maintenance budgets are more accurately predicted when estimates are made of expected costs and prepared with the input of asset maintenance staff.
 
Two of the five entities recorded significantly higher unplanned maintenance expenditure. Planned maintenance expenditure for these entities was lower than other entities.

The entities plan to address this by performing condition audits of their assets, increasing planned maintenance and replacing assets.

All five of the entities were using assets that have been fully depreciated. The replacement cost of each entities' fully depreciated assets represented between 3–7 per cent total replacement cost. While entities are now regularly reassessing the useful lives of their assets, they continue to use some assets that were fully depreciated prior to the implementation of these processes.

Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.