Reports
Supporting the District Criminal Court
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on whether the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system.
The audit found that in the provision of data and technology services, the department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The department has insufficient controls in place to ensure that data in the system is always accurate.
The department is also using outdated technology and could improve its delivery of technical support to courts.
The audit also assessed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. This reform aims to improve court efficiency by having more cases resolved earlier with a guilty plea in the Local Court. The audit found that the department effectively governed the implementation of the reform but is not measuring achievement of expected benefits, placing the objectives of the reform at risk.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the controls around courts data, reporting on key performance indicators, improving regional technical support and measuring the success of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform.
The District Court is the intermediate court in the New South Wales court system. It hears most serious criminal matters, except murder, treason and piracy. The Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) provides support to the District Court in a variety of ways. For example, it provides security services, library services and front-desk services. This audit examined three forms of support that the Department provides to the District Court:
- data collection, reporting and analysis - the Department collects data from cases in its case management system, JusticeLink, based on the orders Judges make in court and court papers
- technology - the Department provides technology to courts across New South Wales, as well as technical support for this technology
- policy - the Department is responsible for proposing and implementing policy reforms.
Recent years have seen a worsening of District Court efficiency, as measured in the Productivity Commission's Report on Government Services (RoGS). Efficiency in the court system is typically measured through timeliness of case completion. There is evidence that timeliness has worsened. For example, the median time from arrest to finalisation of a case in the District Court increased from 420 days in 2012–13 to 541 days in 2017–18.
As a result, the government has announced a range of measures to improve court performance, particularly in the District Court. These measures included the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform. One of the objectives of EAGP is to improve court efficiency, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve with a guilty plea in the Local Court.
This audit assessed whether the Department of Communities and Justice effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. We assessed this with the following lines of inquiry:
- Does the Department effectively collect, analyse and report performance information relevant to court efficiency?
- Does the Department effectively provide technology to support the efficient working of the courts?
- Does the Department have effective plans, governance and monitoring for the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform?
The audit did not consider other support functions provided by the Department. Further information on the audit, including detailed audit criteria, may be found in Appendix two.
The Department is responsible for providing technology to the courts, which can improve the efficiency of court operations by making them faster and cheaper. The Department is also responsible for providing technical support to courtrooms and registries. It is important that technical support is provided in a timely manner because some technical incidents can delay court sittings and thus impact on court efficiency. A 2013 Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development report emphasised the importance of technology and digitisation for reducing trial length.
While the Department may provide technology to the courts, they are not responsible for deciding when, how or if the technology is used in the courtroom.
The Department is using a significant amount of outdated technology, risking court delays
As of April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers out of warranty, 56.0 per cent of the court system's fleet. The court system also had 786 printing devices out of their normal warranty period, 75.1 per cent of all printers in use. The Department also advised that many of its court audio transcription machines are out of date. These machines must be running for the court to sit and thus it is critical that they are maintained to a high degree. The then Department of Justice estimated the cost of aligning its hardware across the whole Department with desired levels at $14.0 million per year for three years. Figures for the court system were not calculated but they are likely to be a significant portion of this figure.
Using outdated technology poses a risk to the court system as older equipment may be more likely to break down, potentially delaying courts or slowing down court services. In the court system throughout 2018, hardware made up 30.8 per cent of all critical incidents reported to technical support and 41.9 per cent of all high priority incidents. In addition, 16.2 per cent of all reported issues related to printing devices or printing.
From 2017 to 2018, technical support incidents from courts or court services increased. There were 4,379 technical support incidents in 2017, which increased significantly to 9,186 in 2018. The Department advised that some outside factors may have contributed to this increase. The Department was rolling out its new incident recording system throughout 2017, meaning that there would be an under‑reporting of incidents in that year. The Department also advised that throughout 2018 there was a greater focus on ensuring that every issue was logged, which had not previously been the case. Despite these factors, the use of outdated technology has likely increased the risk of technology breakages and may have contributed to the increase in requests for technical support.
Refreshing technology on a regular basis would reduce the risk of hardware failures and ensure that equipment is covered by warranty.
The Department did not meet all court technical support targets in 2017 and 2018
The Digital and Technology Services branch (DTS) was responsible for providing technical support to the courts and the Courts and Tribunal Services branch prior to July 2019. DTS provided technical support in line with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Department. In 2017, DTS did not provide this support in a timely manner. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Exhibit 7 outlines DTS' targets under the SLA.
| Priority | Target resolution time | Target percentage in time (%) |
| 1. Critical | 4 hours | 80 |
| 2. High | 1 day | 80 |
| 3. Moderate | 3 days | 85 |
| 4. Low | 5 days | 85 |
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Source: Department of Communities and Justice, 2019.
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Critical incidents are particularly important for the Department to deal with in a timely manner because these include incidents which may delay a court sitting until resolved or incidents which impact on large numbers of staff. Some of the critical incidents raised with DTS specifically stated that they were delaying a court sitting, often due to transcription machines not working. High priority incidents include those where there is some impact on the functions of the business, which may in turn affect the efficiency of the court system. High priority incidents also include those directly impacting on members of the Judiciary.
This audit examined DTS' performance against its SLA in the 2017 and 2018 calendar years across the whole court system, not just the District Court. The total number of incidents, as well as critical and high priority incidents, can be seen in Exhibit 8.
| Priority | 2017 | 2018 |
| All | 4,379 | 9,186 |
| 1. Critical | 48 | 91 |
| 2. High | 128 | 315 |
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Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis of Department of Communities and Justice data, 2019.
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The Department's results against its SLA in 2017 and 2018 are shown in Exhibit 9.
The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform consists of five main elements:
- early disclosure of evidence from NSW Police Force to the prosecution and defence
- early certification of what the accused is going to be charged with to minimise changes
- mandatory criminal case conferencing between the prosecutor and accused's representation
- changes to Local Court case management
- more structured sentence discounts.
More detailed descriptions of each of these changes can be found in the Introduction. These reform elements are anticipated to have three key effects:
- accelerate the timing of guilty pleas
- increase the overall proportion of guilty pleas
- decrease the average length of contested trials.
Improving District Court efficiency is one of the stated aims of EAGP, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve in the Local Court and having fewer defendants plead guilty on the day of their trial in the District Court. The reform commenced in April 2018 and it is too early to state the impact of this reform on District Court efficiency.
The Department is responsible for delivering EAGP in conjunction with other justice sector agencies. They participated in the Steering Committee and the Working Groups, as well as providing the Project Management Office (PMO).
The Department is not measuring the economic benefits stated in the EAGP business case
The business case for EAGP listed nine quantifiable benefits which were expected to be derived from the achievement of the three key effects listed above. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits for five more, as shown in Exhibit 12.
| Benefit | Economic benefit (over ten years) | Being measured? |
| Accelerated timing of guilty pleas | $54.6m |  |
| Increased guilty plea rate | $90.7m | |
| Decreased average trial length | $27.5m | |
| A reduction in the delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial | N/A |  |
| Increase the number of finalised matters per annum | N/A | |
| Reduction of the current backlog of criminal trials in the District Court | N/A | |
| Reduction in bed pressure on the correction system due to reduced average time in custody |
$13.7m |  |
| Productivity improvements due to reduction in wasted effort | $53.3m | |
| Bankable cost savings due to jury empanelment avoided | $2.5m | |
| Key | |
Measuring | |
Not measuring economic benefit | |
Not measuring |
While it is too early to comment on the overall impact of EAGP, better practice in benefits realisation involves an ongoing effort to monitor benefits to ensure that the reform is on target and determine whether any corrective action is needed.
The Department is measuring the number of finalised matters per annum and while the Department is not measuring the reduction in the backlog as part of this program, this measure is reported as part of the Department's internal reporting framework. The Department is not monitoring the reduction in delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial directly as part of this reform, but this does form part of the monthly Operational Performance Report which the Department sends to the EAGP Steering Committee.
The Department is not monitoring any of the economic benefits stated in the business case. These economic benefits are a mixture of bankable savings and productivity improvements. This amounts to a total of $242.3 million over ten years which was listed in the business case as potential economic benefits from the implementation of this reform against the total cost of $206.9 million over ten years. The Department is collecting proxy indicators which would assist in these calculations for several indicators, but it is not actively monitoring these savings. For example, the Department is monitoring average trial length, but is not using this information to calculate economic benefits derived from changes in trial length.
The Department is also not collecting information related to the average length of custody as part of this program. This means that it is unable to determine if EAGP is putting less pressure on the correctives system and it is not possible for the Department to calculate the savings from this particular benefit.
While stakeholders are optimistic about the impact of EAGP, not measuring the expected benefits stated in the business case means that the Department does not know if the reform is achieving what it was designed to achieve. Further, the Department does not know if it must take corrective action to ensure that the program achieves the stated benefits. These two things put the overall program benefits at risk.
The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit stated in the business case. The Department holds the Steering Committee responsible for the realisation of all benefits. Benefits realisation is the process which ensures that the agency reaches benefits as stated in the business case. Assigning responsibility for benefits realisation to the Steering Committee rather than individuals is not in line with good practice.
Good practice benefits realisation involves assigning responsibility for the realisation of each benefit to an individual at the business unit level. This ensures there is a single point of accountability for each part of the program with knowledge of the benefit and the ability to take corrective action if it looks like that benefit will not be realised. This responsibility should sit at the operational level where detailed action can most easily be undertaken. The role of a Steering Committee in benefits realisation is to ensure that responsible parties are monitoring their benefits and taking appropriate corrective action.
The Department advised that it believes the Steering Committee should have responsibility for the realisation of benefits due to the difficulty of attributing the achievement of each benefit to one part of the reform alone. Given the Steering Committee meets only quarterly, it is not well placed to take action in response to variances in performance.
BOCSAR are planning to undertake an overall evaluation of EAGP which is planned for release in 2021. Undertaking this evaluation will require high quality data to gain an understanding of the drivers of the reform. However, data captured throughout the first year of EAGP has proven unreliable, which may reduce the usefulness of BOCSAR's evaluation. These data issues were discussed in Exhibit 5 in Chapter 2, above. Access to accurate data is vital for conducting any program evaluation and inaccurate data raises the risk that the BOCSAR evaluation will not be able to provide an accurate evaluation of the impact of EAGP.
In addition to the BOCSAR evaluation, the Department had plans for a series of 'snapshot' evaluations for some of the key elements of the reform to ensure that they were operating effectively. These were initially delayed due to an efficiency dividend which affected EAGP. In August 2019, the Department commissioned a review of the implementation of several key success factors for EAGP.
The implementation stage of EAGP had clear governance, lines of authority and communication. The Steering Committee, each Working Group and each agency had clear roles and responsibilities, and these were organised through a Project Management Office (PMO) provided by the former Department of Justice. The governance structure throughout the implementation phase can be seen at Exhibit 13.
The Steering Committee was established in December 2016 and met regularly from March 2017. It comprised senior members of key government agencies, as well as the Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate for most of the duration of the implementation period. The Steering Committee met at least monthly throughout the life of the program. The Steering Committee was responsible for overseeing the delivery of EAGP and making key decisions relating to implementation, including spending decisions. The Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate abstained from financial decisions. The Steering Committee updated the governance and membership of the Steering Committee as appropriate throughout the life of the reform.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #329 - released 18 December 2019
Ensuring teaching quality in NSW public schools
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has released a report on how the New South Wales Education and Standards Authority (NESA) and the Department of Education (the Department) ensure teaching quality in NSW public schools.
Around 2,200 NSW public school principals are responsible for accrediting their teachers in line with the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers. The report found that NESA does not oversight principals’ decisions to ensure that minimum standards for teaching quality are consistently met.
The Department does not effectively monitor teaching quality across the state. With limited data, it is difficult for the Department to ensure its strategies to improve teaching quality are appropriately targeted to improve teaching quality.
The Department’s Performance and Development Framework does not adequately support principals and supervisors to effectively manage and improve teacher performance or actively improve teaching quality. The Department manages those teachers formally identified as underperforming through teacher improvement programs. Only 53 of over 66,000 teachers employed by the Department were involved in these programs in 2018.
The report makes three recommendations towards NESA to improve accreditation processes, and four recommendations to the Department to improve its systems and processes for ensuring teaching quality across the State.
Australian research has shown that quality teaching is the greatest in-school influence on student engagement and outcomes, accounting for 30 per cent of the variance in student performance. An international comparative study of 15-year-old students showed the performance of New South Wales students in reading, mathematics and science has declined between 2006 and 2015.
The Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (the Standards) describe the knowledge, skills and understanding expected of effective teachers at different career stages. Teachers must be accredited against the Standards to be employed in NSW schools. The NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) is responsible for ensuring all teachers in NSW schools are accredited. As part of the accreditation process the NSW Department of Education (The Department) assesses whether public school teachers meet proficient accreditation standards and advises NESA of its decisions.
The School Excellence Framework provides a method for the Department to monitor teaching quality at a school level across four elements of effective teaching practice. The Performance and Development Framework provides a method for teachers and their supervisors to monitor and improve teaching quality through setting professional goals to guide their performance and development.
The Department has a strategic goal that every student, every teacher, every leader and every school improves every year. In line with this goal, the Department has a range of strategies targeted to improving teaching quality at different career stages. These include additional resources to support new teachers, a program to support teachers to gain higher-level accreditation, support for principals to manage underperforming teachers, and a professional learning program where teachers observe and discuss each other's practice.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Education's and the NSW Education Standards Authority's arrangements to ensure teaching quality in NSW public schools. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:
- agencies effectively monitor the quality of teaching in NSW public schools
- strategies to improve the quality of teaching are planned, communicated, implemented and monitored well.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #327 - released 26 September 2019
Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education
This report examines whether the Department of Education has the required contract management capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts (over $250,000). In 2017–18, the department managed high-value goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years.
NSW government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively.
Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).
In 2017–18, the Department of Education (the Department) managed high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years. The Department delivers, funds and regulates education services for NSW students from early childhood to secondary school.
This audit examined whether the Department has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts.
We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We assessed the Department against the following criteria:
- The Department’s policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
- The Department has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.
The NSW Public Service Commission and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation are included as auditees as they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability, including:
- NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
- NSW Procurement Agency Accreditation Scheme
- NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's responsibility for NSW Procurement will transfer to NSW Treasury on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements announced on 2 April 2019 and amended on 1 May 2019.
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Conclusion The Department of Education's procedures and policies for goods and services contract management are consistent with relevant guidance. It also has a systemic approach to defining the capability required for contract management roles. That said, there are gaps in how well the Department uses this capability to ensure its contracts are performing. We also found one program (comprising 645 contracts) that was not compliant with the Department's policies. The Department has up-to-date policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance. The Department also communicates changes to procurement related policies, monitors compliance with policies and conducts regular reviews aiming to identify non-compliance. The Department uses the NSW Public Service Commission's capability framework to support its workforce management and development. The capability framework includes general contract management capability for all staff and occupation specific capabilities for contract managers. The Department also provides learning and development for staff who manage contracts to improve their capability. The Department provides some guidance on different ways that contract managers can validate performance information provided by suppliers. However, the Department does not provide guidance to assist contract managers to choose the best validation strategy according to contract risk. This could lead to inconsistent practice and contracts not delivering what they are supposed to. We found that none of the 645 contracts associated with the Assisted Schools Travel Program (estimated value of $182 million in 2018–19) have contract management plans. This is contrary to the Department's policies and increases the risk that contract managers are not effectively reviewing performance and resolving disputes. |
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #325 - released 28 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Contracting non-government organisations
This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.
Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.
Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.
In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.
This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.
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Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs. FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality. In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management. FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes. FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting. Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Development assessment: pre-lodgement and lodgement in Camden Council and Randwick City Council
The report found that both councils could do more to monitor and assess the effectiveness of their pre-lodgement and lodgement stages. The audit highlighted that Randwick City Council closely follows guidance designed to encourage good practice in these initial stages of its development assessments. It also demonstrated it was timely when processing lodgements. Camden Council is partially following the guidance and could not demonstrate that its lodgement stage was timely.
A development application is a formal application for development that requires consent under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. It is usually lodged with the local council for processing and determination, and consists of standard application forms, supporting technical reports and plans.
In March 2017, the NSW Department of Planning and Environment (DPE)1 released the ‘Development Assessment Best Practice Guide' designed to help councils assess development applications in a timely manner and provide a better experience for applicants.
DPE's guide describes the development assessment process in five stages.
According to the Guidance, councils should systematically measure, monitor and review development assessment outcomes and timeframes against performance targets to ensure the process is transparent, accountable and outcome-focused.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Council's alignment with the guidance
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #322 - released 20 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Domestic waste management in Campbelltown City Council and Fairfield City Council
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, today released a report on Domestic waste management in Campbelltown City Council and Fairfield City Council.The report found that both Councils collect and transport domestic kerbside waste effectively and process it at a low cost. The Councils also effectively process waste placed in green-lid and yellow-lid bins, but neither Council has been able to enforce their contracts for processing red-lid bin waste. As a result, almost all such waste goes straight to landfill.
Local councils provide waste management services to their residents. They collect domestic waste primarily through kerbside services, but also at council drop off facilities. Waste management is one of the major services local councils deliver. Each year, councils collectively manage an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of waste generated by New South Wales residents.
Waste disposed of in landfills attracts a NSW Government waste levy. Councils’ kerbside services help residents to separate recyclable and non recyclable waste. This reduces the cost of waste disposed to landfill. These services typically provide yellow-lid bins for dry recyclables, green-lid bins for garden organics and red-lid bins for residual waste. To increase the level of recycling, some councils deliver residual waste to alternative waste treatment facilities for processing. This can involve composting and the recovery of resources, including plastics and metals, which can be recycled.
Appendix one - Responses from local councils
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #320 - released 5 June 2019
Managing growth in the NSW prison population
The Department of Justice has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growing prisoner numbers according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.
At the time of this audit, the NSW Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for delivering custodial corrections services in New South Wales through its Corrective Services NSW division (Corrective Services NSW). From 1 July 2019, the Department of Family and Community Services and Justice will be responsible for these functions.
Within DOJ, Corrective Services NSW is responsible for administering sentences and legal orders through custodial and community-based management of adult offenders. Its key priorities are:
- providing safe, secure and humane management of prisoners
- reducing reoffending
- improving community safety and confidence in the justice system.
The prison population in New South Wales grew by around 40 per cent between 2012 to 2018, from 9,602 to 13,630 inmates. This rate of growth was higher than experienced prior to 2012. DOJ forecasts growth to continue over the short and longer-term.
DOJ has responded to inmate population growth by doubling-up and tripling-up the number of prison beds in cells, reactivating previously closed prisons, and a $3.8 billion program of new prison capacity. DOJ has also developed a long-term prison infrastructure strategy that projects long-term needs and recommended investments to meet these needs.
This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively DOJ is responding to growth in the NSW prison population. In this report, we have not analysed the sources of demand or recommended ways that custody may be avoided. These are largely government policy issues.
The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services outlines the performance indicator framework for corrective services in Australia (Appendix three). We have used measures from this framework to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOJ’s responses to prison bed capacity needs.
In this section, we analyse system-wide indicators as DOJ has not consistently published or reported data for individual correctional centres over the period of review.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Managing women in custody
Appendix three - Corrective services performance indicator framework
Appendix four - About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #319 - released 24 May 2019
Wellbeing of secondary school students
The Department of Education has a strong focus on supporting secondary school students’ wellbeing. However, it is difficult to assess how well the Department is progressing as it is yet to measure or report on the outcomes of this work at a whole-of-state level.
The Department of Education’s (the Department) purpose is to prepare young people for rewarding lives as engaged citizens in a complex and dynamic society. The Department commits to creating quality learning opportunities for children and young people, including a commitment to student wellbeing, which is seen as directly linked to positive learning outcomes. Wellbeing is defined broadly by the Department as “the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness”. Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing.
Several reforms have aimed to support student wellbeing in recent years. 'Local Schools, Local Decisions' gave NSW schools more local authority to make decisions, including schools' approaches to support student wellbeing. In 2016, the 'Supported Students, Successful Students' initiative provided $167 million over four years to support the wellbeing of students. From 2018, the 'Every Student is Known, Valued and Cared For' initiative provides a principal led mentoring program, and a website with policies, procedures and resources to support student wellbeing.
This audit assessed how well the Department of Education supports secondary schools to promote and support the wellbeing of their students and how well secondary schools are promoting and supporting the wellbeing of their students.
Conclusion
The Department has implemented a range of programs and reforms aimed at supporting student wellbeing. However, the outcomes of this work have yet to be measured or reported on at a system level, making it difficult to assess the Department's progress in improving student wellbeing.
Secondary schools have generally adopted a structured approach to deliver wellbeing support and programs, using both Department and localised resources. The approaches have been tailored to meet the needs of their school community. That said, public reporting on wellbeing improvement measures via annual school reports is of variable quality and needs to improve.
The Department’s wellbeing initiatives are supported by research and consultation, but outcomes have not been reported on
The Department’s development of wellbeing policy, guidance, tools and resources has been transparent, consultative and well researched. It has drawn on international and domestic evidence to support its aim to deliver a fundamental shift from welfare to wellbeing at the school and system level.
However, the key performance indicator to monitor and track progress in wellbeing has yet to be reported on despite the strategic plan including this as a priority for the period 2018 to 2022. This includes not yet reporting a baseline for the target, nor how it will be measured.
The Department’s wellbeing resources are mostly well targeted but there is room for improvement
The Department’s allocation of resources to deliver wellbeing initiatives in schools is mostly well targeted, reflects a needs basis and supports current strategic directions. This could be improved with some changes to formula allocations and clearer definitions of the resourcing required for identified wellbeing positions in schools. The workforce modelling for forecasting supply and demand, specifically for school counsellors and psychologists, needs to separately identify these positions as they are currently subsumed in general teacher numbers.
Schools' reporting on wellbeing improvement measures is of variable quality and needs to improve
Schools we visited demonstrated a variety of approaches to wellbeing depending on their local circumstances and student populations. They make use of Department policies, guidelines, and resources, particularly mandatory policies and data collections, which have good compliance and take-up at school level. Professional learning supports specific wellbeing initiatives and online systems for monitoring and reporting have contributed to schools’ capacity and capabilities.
Schools report publicly on wellbeing improvement measures through annual school reports but this reporting is of variable quality. The Department plans to improve the capability of schools in data analysis and we recommend that this include the setting and evaluation of improvement targets for wellbeing.
The implementation of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework in schools is incomplete and the Department has not effectively prioritised and consolidated tools, systems and reporting for wellbeing
Schools' take up of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework is hindered by it not being linked to the school planning and reporting policy and tools—the School Excellence Framework. At some schools we visited, this disconnect has led to a lack of knowledge and confidence in using it in schools. The Department has identified the need to improve alignment of policies, frameworks and plans and has commenced work on this.
We found evidence of overburdening in schools for addressing student wellbeing—in the number of tools, online systems for information collection, and duplication in reporting. Following the significant reforms of recent years, the Department should consolidate its efforts by reinforcing existing effective programs and systems and addressing identified gaps and equity issues, rather than introducing further change for schools. In particular, methods and processes for complex case coordination need improvement.
The NSW Department of Education commits to creating quality learning opportunities for students. This includes strengthening students’ physical, social, emotional and spiritual development. The Department sets out to enable students to be healthy, happy, engaged and successful.
Welfare and wellbeing
The Department’s approach has significantly shifted from student welfare to wellbeing of the whole child and young person. Wellbeing is defined in departmental policy and strategy documents broadly, and as directly linked to learning and positive learning outcomes. “Wellbeing can be described as the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness…Wellbeing, or the lack of it, can affect a student’s engagement and success in learning…”
Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing. Distinctions between wellbeing and welfare in the school context are outlined below.
| Welfare | Wellbeing |
|---|---|
| Operates from a basis of student need and doesn't always take into account a whole child view. | For all students. |
| Rather than building on the strengths of students, operates from a deficit model of individual student problems or negative behaviours. | Goes beyond just welfare needs of a few students and aims for all students to be healthy, happy, successful and productive individuals who are active and positive contributors to the school and society in which they live. |
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Key policies, guidance, and systems
Appendix three - Funding and resources for schools
Appendix four - Measuring wellbeing
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #318 - released 23 May 2019
Workforce reform in three amalgamated councils
The Inner West Council and the Snowy Monaro and Queanbeyan-Palerang Regional Councils have all made progress towards efficient organisational structures following the amalgamation of their former council areas in 2016, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of New South Wales.
All three councils are now operating with a single workforce and have largely achieved the milestones they planned for the first stage of their amalgamations. None have finished reviewing and aligning services across their former council areas nor integrated their ICT systems. They need to do this to be in a position to implement an optimal structure.
On 12 May 2016, the NSW Government announced the amalgamation of 42 councils into 19 new councils. This followed a period of 18 months during which the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) had assessed councils' ‘fitness for the future’, and communities were consulted about proposed mergers. A further amalgamated council was created on 9 September 2016.
Upon amalgamation, existing elected councils were abolished, interim General Managers appointed, and Administrators engaged to undertake the role of the previously elected councils until Local Government elections were held 18 months later. During the period of administration, councils were asked to report on the progress of their amalgamations to the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC).
Council amalgamations not only require a re-drawing of boundaries, but re-establishment of local representation, decisions about alignment of services across the former council areas, and establishment of an amalgamated workforce.
The objective of this audit was to assess whether three councils, Inner West Council, Queanbeyan-Palerang Regional Council and Snowy Monaro Regional Council, are effectively reforming their organisation structures to realise efficiency benefits from amalgamation and managing the impact on staff.
Following amalgamation, all three councils developed detailed plans to bring their former workforces together, review positions and salaries, amalgamate salary structures and align human resources policies. All three councils have largely achieved the milestones included in these plans.
Benefits realisation plans show that councils did not expect to achieve material savings or efficiencies from workforce reform within the first three years of amalgamation.
Administrators at all three councils endorsed lower savings targets than the NSW Government’s early analysis suggested may be possible. All three councils have plans or strategies to progress and achieve benefits from the amalgamation. However, Inner West Council and Snowy Monaro Regional Council could more clearly link their reform initiatives with expected benefits and include this in public reporting.
Amalgamations represent a substantial period of change for affected communities and amalgamated councils should be routinely reporting to their communities about the costs and benefits of amalgamation.
Councils have not yet determined their future service offerings and service levels nor completed integration of ICT systems. These decisions need to be made before an optimal organisation structure can be implemented.
Before amalgamated councils can implement an optimal organisation structure, they need to review and confirm their customer service offerings and service levels in consultation with their communities. This work is underway but is not yet complete in any of the councils.
Progress towards an efficient structure has been slowed by staff protections in the Local Government Act 1993 (the Act) and a range of logistical and administrative issues associated with amalgamation. These include multiple IT systems and databases that need to be integrated and different working conditions, policies and practices in the former councils that are not yet fully
harmonised.
The councils implemented legislated staff protections and focused on the people side of change but cannot reliably measure the impact of their change management efforts.
The Act provides protections that reduce the impact of amalgamations on staff. Beyond implementing these protections, the councils have communicated with staff, sought to prepare them for change, and involved staff in key decisions. All councils have conducted staff surveys over time. However, at this stage these staff surveys have not provided an effective or reliable measure of the impact of change management efforts.
Appendix one - Response from councils and Office of Local Government
Appendix two - Compliance with staff protections in the Local Government Act 1993
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #317 - released 1 May 2019
Firearms regulation
There are gaps in how the Firearms Registry administers the firearms licencing and registration scheme for existing licence holders, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. These gaps reduce the Registry’s effectiveness in regulating firearms use and ownership.
While the Firearms Registry has systems to promptly update details in the firearms register for changes in firearm ownership and for criminal or anti-social behaviour of licence holders, some key information, including addresses, is not accurate or up-to date. 'This exposes a critical gap in the Registry’s data on the location of licence holders and their firearms,' Ms Crawford said.
The Firearms Registry may also be making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions due to a lack of clear internal policies and guidance. These decisions include licence suspensions or revocations, assessing reasons for the acquisition of firearms, and initiating enforcement actions for breaches by licence holders. Ms Crawford noted that 'these gaps mean the Registry cannot be confident it conducts aspects of its licencing activities effectively.'
The report’s recommendations aim to improve the integrity of the data in the register and ensure that the Firearms Registry is making sound and consistent decisions in regulating firearms use and ownership.
Firearms used by the general public in NSW are regulated through the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (the Act) and the Firearms Regulation 2017 (NSW) (Regulation). In October 2018, there were over 237,500 firearm licence holders and just over one million registered firearms in NSW.
The Act and Regulation reflect the National Firearms Agreement reached by all Australian jurisdictions in 1996 and confirmed in 2017. This Agreement sets out the minimum requirements for regulating firearms. The Act recognises that possessing and using firearms are privileges conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety.
The NSW Police Force (NSW Police), which includes the Firearms Registry (the Registry), is responsible for administering the Act and Regulation, and for operating the NSW firearms licensing and registration scheme. Relevant third parties such as approved clubs, firearms dealers and shooting ranges also carry some administrative and oversight responsibilities under the Act and Regulation.
The role of the Registry includes administering the following requirements under the Act and Regulation that are relevant to this audit:
- licence conditions
- licence suspensions and revocations
- initiating seizure of firearms
- assessing permits to acquire firearms
- administering the good reason test
- maintaining the register of firearms
- approving alternative safe storage arrangements.
The Registry's other activities identified in this report support its regulatory responsibilities under the NSW Government framework for better regulation.
This audit assessed how well the Registry administers the requirements of the Act and Regulation for existing firearms licence holders. To effectively administer these requirements, the Registry should have:
- a reliable database that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme
- appropriate risk-based policies and procedures for the Registry’s operation that are consistent with the Act and Regulation.
We did not assess the Registry’s processes in assessing and issuing firearms licences to new applicants or renewing licences of existing licence holders. We also did not examine the administrative actions conducted by police officers who are not part of the Registry.
See Section 1 for details on the role of the Registry. See Appendix six for details of the audit.
The Registry is promptly advised of the sale of firearms or potential criminal or anti-social behaviour activity of licence holders and it promptly updates relevant information in the register.
Licence holders do not always advise the Registry of their address changes within the time required. The Registry does not have processes to efficiently identify these changes if not advised. This exposes a critical gap in the Registry's data on the location of some firearms. While the Registry has implemented a number of programs for checking the accuracy of data in the register, some of these programs have either ceased or been severely curtailed. For example, the Registry was conducting various checks on the accuracy of the data relating to the description of firearms in the register and correcting errors. These checks ceased after July 2017, with only around 50 per cent of the register checked.
There is an increased risk of the Registry making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions.
The Registry lacks appropriate policies and guidance for important administrative decisions and sanctions. These include making decisions about licence suspensions and revocations, assessing good reasons for acquiring firearms, and initiating some enforcement actions. There is also limited review of these critical decisions.
The Commissioner of Police’s response to this report (Appendix one) indicates he disagrees with some of our findings and recommendations based on his view that the firearms licensing and registration scheme is a ‘co-regulatory model’. The conclusion and recommendations of this report are based on the provisions in the Act which indicate that the Commissioner, and through him the NSW Police Force (including the Firearms Registry), is the responsible regulator. We acknowledge that other stakeholders have obligations to undertake certain actions in accordance with the Act and Regulation. This is further discussed below.
To effectively administer the requirements of the Act and Regulation, the register that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme should have readily accessible, accurate and up-to-date information regarding the status of licence holders and registered firearms.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Reasons for firearms licences to be suspended or revoked
Appendix three - Licence holder obligations
Appendix four - Firearms licence categories
Appendix five - Firearms distribution
Appendix six - About the audit
Appendix seven - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #315 - released 28 February 2019
