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Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Environment
Industry
Local Government
Planning
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.

The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.

The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.

There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.

Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.

There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.

What the key issues were

The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.

Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:

  • system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
  • deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
  • the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
  • deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
  • the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.

There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.

The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.

What we recommended

The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.

The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

Fast facts

The Planning, Industry and Environment cluster aims to make the lives of people in New South Wales better by developing well-connected communities, preserving the environment, supporting industries and contributing to a strong economy.

There are 54 agencies, 609 State controlled Crown land managers that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land and 120 common trusts in the cluster.

  • 42% of the area of NSW is Crown land
  • $33.2b water and electricity infrastructure as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits
  • 7 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 54 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission’s (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. From 2020–21, the IPC is required to prepare financial statements under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018.
  • The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements were incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. These audits are currently underway, and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.
  • The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21. All 120 common trusts have never submitted their financial statements for audit. The department needs to do more to ensure that the CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 20 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include the revaluation of property, plant and equipment, documenting all significant management judgments and assumptions, and the implementation of new and updated accounting standards.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management has increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, and 40 per cent were repeat issues.
  • Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, and three high-risk findings were repeat issues.
  • There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Machinery of government changes

Machinery of government changes

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Whole of Government
Management and administration
Project management

What the report is about

The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are organised.

The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. Changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day.

Larger machinery of government changes typically occur after an election or a change of Premier.

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes.

What we found

The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported.

DPC and NSW Treasury provided principles to guide implementation but did not require departments to collect or report information about the benefits or costs of the changes.

The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled.

Major implementation challenges included negotiation about the allocation of corporate support staff and the integration of complex corporate and ICT systems.

What we recommended

DPC and NSW Treasury should:

  • consolidate existing guidance on machinery of government changes into a single document that is available to all departments and agencies
  • provide guidance for departments and agencies to use when negotiating corporate services staff transfers as a part of machinery of government changes, including a standard rate for calculating corporate services requirements
  • progress work to develop and implement common processes and systems for corporate services in order to support more efficient movement of staff between departments and agencies.

Fast facts

  • $23.7m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2019 DPIE changes to date, noting additional ICT costs will be incurred
  • $4.0m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2020 DRNSW changes, with an estimated $2.7 million ongoing annual cost
  • 40+ NSW Government entities affected by the 2019 machinery of government changes

The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are allocated and structured across government departments and agencies. A machinery of government change is the reorganisation of these structures. This can involve establishing, merging or abolishing departments and agencies and transferring functions and responsibilities from one department or agency to another.

The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. These changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day. Machinery of government changes are formally set out in Administrative Arrangements Orders, which are prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet, as instructed by the Premier, and issued as legislative instruments under the Constitution Act 1902.

The heads of agencies subject to machinery of government changes are responsible for implementing them. For more complex changes, central agencies are also involved in providing guidance and monitoring progress.

The NSW Government announced major machinery of government changes after the 2019 state government election. These changes took place between April and June 2019 and involved abolishing five departments (Industry; Planning and Environment; Family and Community Services; Justice; and Finance, Services and Innovation) and creating three new departments (Planning, Industry and Environment; Communities and Justice; and Customer Service). This also resulted in changes to the 'clusters' associated with departments. The NSW Government uses clusters to group certain agencies and entities with related departments for administrative and financial management. Clusters do not have legal status. Most other departments that were not abolished had some functions added or removed as a part of these machinery of government changes. For example, the functions relating to regional policy and service delivery in the Department of Premier and Cabinet were moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.

Our Report on State Finances 2019, tabled in October 2019, outlined these changes and identified several issues that can arise from machinery of government changes if risks are not identified early and properly managed. These include: challenges measuring the costs and benefits of machinery of government changes; disruption to services due to unclear roles and responsibilities; and disruption to control environments due to staff, system and process changes.

In April 2020, the Department of Regional NSW was created in a separate machinery of government change. This involved moving functions and agencies related to regional policy and service delivery from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment into a standalone department.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes. The audit investigated whether:

  • DPIE and DRNSW have integrated new responsibilities and functions in an effective and timely manner
  • DPIE and DRNSW can demonstrate the costs of the machinery of government changes
  • The machinery of government changes have achieved or are achieving intended outcomes and benefits.
Conclusion

It is unclear whether the benefits of the machinery of government changes that created the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) outweigh the costs. The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of directly attributable benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported. The benefits and costs of the machinery of government changes were not tracked because the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury did not require departments to collect or report this information. The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled. This was achieved despite short timelines and no additional budget allocation for the implementation of the changes.

The rationale for establishing DPIE was not documented at the time of the 2019 machinery of government changes and the anticipated benefits of the change were not defined by the government or the department. For DRNSW, the government’s stated purpose was to provide better representation and support for regional areas, but no prior analysis was conducted to quantify any problems or set targets for improvement. Both departments reported some anecdotal benefits linked to the machinery of government changes. However, improvements in these areas are difficult to attribute because neither department set specific measures or targets to align with these intended benefits. Since the machinery of government changes were completed, limited data has been gathered to allow comparisons of performance before and after the changes.

DPC and NSW Treasury advised that they did not define the purpose and benefits of the machinery of government changes, or request affected departments to do so, because these were decisions of the government and the role of the public service was to implement the decisions.

We have attempted to quantify some of the costs of the DPIE and DRNSW changes based on the information the audited agencies could provide. This information does not capture the full costs of the changes because some costs, such as the impact of disruption on staff, are very difficult to quantify, and the costs of ICT separation and integration work may continue for several more years. Noting these limitations, we estimate the initial costs of these machinery of government changes are at least $23.7 million for DPIE and $4.0 million for DRNSW. For DPIE, this is predominantly made up of ICT costs and redundancy payments made around the time of the machinery of government change. For DRNSW it includes ICT costs and an increase in senior executive costs for a standalone department, which we estimate is an ongoing cost of at least $1.9 million per year.

For the DPIE machinery of government change, there were risks associated with placing functions and agencies that represent potentially competing policy interests within the same 'cluster', such as environment protection and industry. We did not see evidence of plans to manage these issues being considered by DPIE as a part of the machinery of government change process.

The efficiency of machinery of government changes could be improved in several ways. This includes providing additional standardised guidance on the allocation of corporate functions and resources when agencies are being merged or separated, and consolidating guidance on defining, measuring and monitoring the benefits and costs of machinery of government changes.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #359 - released (17 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Members' additional entitlements 2021

Members' additional entitlements 2021

Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

The Auditor-General's review analyses claims made by members of the NSW Parliament during the 2020–21 financial year by testing a sample of transactions. Our sample consisted of 67 claims submitted by 52 of the 137 members.

What we found

While we did not identify any instances of material non-compliance with the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal's Determination, we did identify 31 departures from the Determination, which were of an administrative nature.

What we recommended

The Department of Parliamentary Services (the department) should continue to work with the Presiding Officers, members, the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly to enhance reporting of members' expenditure.

In 2020, we recommended the department work with the Tribunal to provide additional guidance to members to clarify:

  • the definition of 'parliamentary duties'
  • the activities that meet the definition
  • requirements for retaining documents.

The department will work with the Tribunal to clarify these items as part of its submission to the 2022 annual Determination.

Fast facts

  • 12 claims were submitted after 60 days
  • 7 Sydney allowance reconciliations were submitted late
  • 10 annual loyalty scheme declarations were submitted late
  • 2 publications had not made the required authorisations and attributions
  • $22.5m of additional entitlements were claimed in the 2020–21 financial year. This was 4.2% higher than in the 2019–20 financial year.

The Auditor-General has reviewed the compliance of the members of the NSW Parliament (members) with certain requirements outlined in the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal's Determination (the Determination) for the year ended 30 June 2021.

The Auditor-General's review analyses claims made by members during the 2020–21 financial year by testing a sample of transactions. Our sample consisted of 67 claims submitted by 52 of the 137 members.

Results

Although our review did not identify any instances of material non-compliance with the Determination for the year ended 30 June 2021, we did identify 31 departures from the Determination, which were of an administrative nature. Such departures may help identify areas in the current processes where greater clarity is needed or where training or education for members is needed. These departures were as follows:

  • 12 claims were not submitted for payment within 60 days of receipt or occurrence of the expense
  • 10 annual loyalty scheme declarations were submitted by members after the due date specified in the guideline
  • 7 reconciliations for the Sydney Allowance were submitted after the due date
  • 2 publications claimed under the Communications Allowance had not made the required authorisations and attributions on the publication.

Background

The Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal (the Tribunal) determines the salary and additional entitlements of members of the NSW Parliament (members), details of which are set out in the Tribunal's annual Determination. The NSW Parliament, through the Department of Parliamentary Services (the department), administers payments of additional entitlements to members in accordance with the Tribunal's annual Determination. An overview is presented below:

Twelve claims were not submitted for payment within 60 days of receipt or occurrence of the expense

The Determination requires members' expense claims to be submitted to the department within 60 days of when the expense is incurred or receipted. Our audit procedures identified 12 instances where members submitted their claims between six and 248 days late.

Ten annual loyalty/incentive scheme declarations were submitted by members after the due date specified in the guidelines

At the end of each financial year, members must declare they have not used loyalty/incentive scheme benefits accrued from their parliamentary duties for private purposes. The Determination requires current members to complete the declarations at the end of each year (by 27 August 2021 per the department's administrative process). Former members must complete the declarations within 30 days of leaving Parliament. We found ten current members submitted their declarations between three and 18 days late. The declaration is important as it affirms that loyalty benefits accrued using the members' parliamentary allowances and entitlements were not used for private purposes.

Seven reconciliations for the Sydney Allowance reconciliations were submitted after the due date

Open prior period recommendations

Enhanced public reporting

In 2016, the Auditor-General's Report to Parliament recommended the Tribunal consider requiring the department to regularly publish full details of members' expenditure claims on its website in an accessible and searchable format. The Tribunal had developed a plan requiring greater public reporting of members' additional expenditure from 1 July 2019 but does not have the power to require the department to facilitate this.

The Annual Reports of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council, published on the Parliament's website, currently list the total amount claimed during the year by each member for each allowance. However, transparency around members’ claims would be enhanced if information was more extensively and regularly published on the Parliament’s website. The department should continue to work with the Presiding Officers, members, the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly to enhance reporting of members' expenditure.

Clarifying key parameters of the annual Determination

In 2020, the Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament recommended the department work with the Tribunal to provide additional guidance to members to clarify:

  • the definition of 'parliamentary duties'
  • the activities that meet the definition
  • requirements for retaining documents.

To address this recommendation, the department has performed a review of the definitions and activities used by other jurisdictions, in their administration of members' entitlements. The department is also continuing to monitor for changes in the administration of members' entitlements occurring at the Federal level. The department will work with the Tribunal to clarify these items as part of its submission to the 2022 annual Determination.

Resolved prior period recommendations

Recommendations resolved since the 2020 Auditor-General's report

The 2019 Auditor-General's Report recommended the department work with the Tribunal to clarify whether members can claim the cost of travel from their General Travel Allowance when the travel was used to produce communications during the blackout period. Members are not permitted to use their Communications Allowance for the production and distribution of publications that they intended to distribute in a State Election year in the period from 26 January to the election date (the ‘blackout period’).

The 2021 Determination has clarified this matter by stating that during the 'blackout period' travel necessary for parliamentary duties rather than electioneering is acceptable. The 2021 Determination has also included the condition that a member may not use their General Travel Allowance to fund communications that would normally be funded from the Communications Allowance during a 'blackout period'.

Appendix one - Response from Department of Parliamentary Services

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Shared services and collaboration

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Premier and Cabinet cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.

The Library Council of New South Wales corrected a prior period error of $325 million. In 2017, the council split its collection assets into six asset classes, but not the related asset revaluation reserves. To correct this error, some revaluation decrements previously recognised in asset revaluation reserves were reclassified to accumulated funds.

Eight agencies did not complete all of the mandatory early close procedures.

What the key issues were

The Premier and Cabinet cluster was impacted by three Machinery of Government (MoG) changes during 2020–21.

The changes resulted in the transfer of activities and functions in and out of the cluster and the creation of a new entity - Investment NSW.

The transferor entities continued to provide services to Investment NSW subsequent to 30 June 2021. There were no formal service level agreements in place for the provision of these services.

The New South Wales Electoral Commission (the Commission) and Sydney Opera House Trust obtained letters of financial support from their relevant Minister and/or NSW Treasury in 2020–21. The postponement of local government elections impacted the Commission's operations due to increased planned expenditure to support a COVID-safe election. Sydney Opera House Trust's ability to generate revenue was impacted due to the closure of the Concert Hall partly due to COVID-19 and planned renovations.

The number of repeated audit issues raised with management and those charged with governance increased from 22 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.

There were 47 moderate risk and 28 low risk findings identified. Of the total findings there were 24 repeat issues.

What we recommended

Investment NSW should ensure services received from other agencies are governed by service level agreements.

Fast facts

The Department of Premier and Cabinet supports the Premier and Cabinet to deliver the government's objectives, infrastructure, preparedness for disaster, incident recovery, arts and culture.

  • $11.9b of property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $4.4b total expenditure incurred in 2020-21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 47 moderate risk findings were reported to management 
  • 38 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020-21
  • 32% of all reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed cluster agencies' 2020–21 financial statements.
  • Monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.
  • Thirteen agencies were exempt from financial reporting in 2020–21. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 47 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Sixteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to governance and oversight and information technology.
  • The number of moderate risk findings increased by 42 per cent in 2020–21.
  • The moderate risk issues included information technology improvements, lack of service level agreements, risk management, contract and procurement and asset management improvements.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy

Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy

Whole of Government
Compliance
Cyber security
Information technology

What the report is about

This audit assessed nine agencies’ compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) including whether, during the year to 30 June 2020, the participating agencies:

  • met their reporting obligations under the CSP
  • reported accurate self-assessments of their level of maturity implementing the CSP’s requirements including the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s (ACSC) Essential 8.

What we found

Key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. The CSP is not achieving the objectives of improved cyber governance, controls and culture because:

  • the CSP does not specify a minimum level for agencies to achieve in implementing the 'mandatory requirements' or the Essential 8
  • the CSP does not require agencies to report their target levels, nor does it require risk acceptance decisions to be documented or formally endorsed
  • each participating agency had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements in an ad hoc or inconsistent basis
  • none of the participating agencies had implemented all of the Essential 8 controls
  • agencies tended to over-assess their cyber security maturity - all nine participating agencies were unable to support all of their self-assessments with evidence
  • there is no monitoring of the adequacy or accuracy of agencies' self-assessments.

What we recommended

In this report, we repeat recommendations made in the 2019 and 2020 Central Agencies reports, that Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

Cyber Security NSW should:

  • monitor and report compliance with the CSP
  • require agencies to report the target and achieved levels of maturity
  • require agencies to justify why it is appropriate to target a low level of maturity
  • require the agency head to formally accept the residual risk
  • challenge agencies' target maturity levels.

Agencies should resolve discrepancies between their reported level of maturity and the level they are able to support with evidence.

Separately, the agencies we audited requested that we not disclose our audit findings. We reluctantly agreed to anonymise our findings, even though they are more than 12 months old. We are of the view that transparency and accountability to the Parliament of New South Wales are part of the solution, not the problem.

The poor levels of agency cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires leadership and resourcing.

Fast facts

The NSW Cyber Security Policy requires agencies to report their level of maturity implementing the mandatory requirements, which includes the ACSC's Essential 8.

  • 100% of audited agencies failed to reach level one maturity for at least three of the Essential 8 controls.

  • 53% of mandatory requirements implemented in an ad hoc or inconsistent manner, or not at all.

  • 89 of the 104 reporting agencies across government met the reporting deadline of 31 August.

This report assesses whether state government agencies are complying with the NSW Cyber Security Policy. The audit was based on the level of compliance reported at 30 June 2020.

Our audit identified non-compliance and significant weaknesses against the government’s policy.

Audited agencies have requested that we not report the findings of this audit to the Parliament of New South Wales, even though the findings are more than 12 months old, believing that the audit report would expose their weaknesses to threat actors.

I have reluctantly agreed to modify my report to anonymise agencies and their specific failings because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remedied. Time, leadership and prioritised action should have been sufficient for agencies to improve their cyber safeguards. I am of the view that transparency and accountability to the Parliament is part of the solution, not the problem.

The poor levels of cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires dedicated leadership and resourcing. To comply with some elements of the government’s policy agencies will have to invest in technical uplift and some measures may take time to implement. However, other elements of the policy do not require any investment in technology. They simply require leadership and management commitment to improve cyber literacy and culture. And they require accountability and transparency. Transparent reporting of performance is a key means to improve performance.

Cyber security is increasingly a focus of governments around Australia. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) is the Australian Government’s lead agency for cyber security and is part of the Australian Signals Directorate, a statutory authority within the Australian Government’s Defence portfolio. The ACSC has advised that government agencies at all levels, as well as individuals and other organisations were increasingly targeted over the 2021 financial year1. The ACSC received over 67,500 cybercrime reports, a 13 per cent increase on the previous year. This equates to one reported cyber attack every eight minutes. They also noted that attacks by cyber criminals and state actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex and that the attacks are increasingly likely to be categorised as ‘substantial’ in impact.

High profile attacks in Australia and overseas have included a sustained malware campaign targeted at the health sector2, a phishing campaign deploying emotet malware, spear phishing campaigns targeting people with administrator or other high-level access, and denial of service attacks. The continuing trend towards digital delivery of government services has increased the vulnerability of organisations to cyber threats.

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased these risks. It has increased Australian dependence on the internet – to work remotely, to access services and information, and to communicate and continue our daily lives. Traditional security policies within an organisation’s perimeter are harder to enforce in networks made up of home and other private networks, and assets the organisation does not manage. This has increased the cyber risks for NSW Government agencies.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security incidents in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these cyber breaches resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information contained in these email accounts. These attacks were the subject of the Auditor-General's report on Service NSW's handling of personal information tabled on 18 December 2020.

This audit also follows two significant performance audits. Managing cyber risks, tabled on 13 July 2021 found Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains were not effectively managing their cyber security risks. Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, tabled 7 April 2020 found that although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls.

The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) was issued by Cyber Security NSW, a business unit within the Department of Customer Service, and took effect from 1 February 2019. It applies to all NSW Government departments and public service agencies, including statutory authorities. Of the 104 agencies in the NSW public sector that self-assessed their maturity implementing the mandatory requirements, only five assessed their maturity at level three or above (on the five point maturity scale). This means that, according to their own self-assessments, 99 agencies practiced requirements within the framework in what the CSP’s maturity model describes as an ad hoc manner, or they did not practice the requirement at all. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cybersecurity and resilience as a matter of priority.

This audit looks specifically at the compliance of nine key agencies with the CSP. It looks at their achievement implementing the requirements of the policy, the accuracy of their self-assessments and the attestations they made as to their compliance with the CSP.

The CSP outlines the mandatory requirements to which all NSW Government departments and public service agencies must adhere. It seeks to ensure cyber security risks to agencies’ information and systems are appropriately managed. The key areas of responsibility for agencies are:

  • Lead - Agencies must implement cyber security planning and governance and report against the requirements outlined in the CSP and other cyber security measures.
  • Prepare - Agencies must build and support a cyber security culture across their agency and NSW Government more broadly.
  • Prevent - Agencies must manage cyber security risks to safeguard and secure their information and systems.
  • Detect/Respond/Recover - Agencies must improve their resilience including their ability to rapidly detect cyber incidents and respond appropriately.
  • Report - Agencies must report against the requirements outlined in the CSP and other cyber security measures.

DCS has only recommended, but not mandated the CSP for state owned corporations, local councils and universities.

NSW Government agencies must include an attestation on cyber security in their annual report and provide a copy to Cyber Security NSW by 31 August each year stating whether, for the preceding financial year, the agency has:

  • assessed its cyber security risks
  • appropriately addressed cyber security at agency governance forums
  • a cyber incident response plan that is integrated with the security components of business continuity arrangements, and the response plan has been tested during the previous 12 months (involving senior business executives)
  • certified the agency’s Information Security Management System (ISMS) or confirmed the agency’s Cyber Security Framework (CSF)
  • a plan to continuously improve the management of cyber security governance and resilience.

The purpose of the attestation is to focus the agency's attention on its cyber risks and the mitigation of those risks.

Agencies assess their level of compliance in accordance with a maturity model. The CSP does not mandate a minimum maturity threshold for any requirement, including implementation of the Australian Cyber Security Centre's (ACSC) Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (Essential 8).

Agencies are required to set a target maturity level based on their risk appetite for each requirement, seek continual improvement in their maturity, and annually assess their maturity on an ascending scale of one to five for all requirements (refer to Appendix two for the maturity model). Each control within the Essential 8 is assessed on an ascending scale of zero to three reflecting the agency's level of alignment with the strategy (refer to Appendix three for the maturity model).

Scope of this audit

We assessed whether agencies had provided accurate reporting on their level of maturity implementing the requirements of the CSP in a documented way and covering all their systems.

The scope of this audit covered nine agencies (the participating agencies). These agencies were selected because they are the lead agency in their cluster, or have a significant digital presence within their respective cluster. The list of participating agencies is in section 1.2. The audit aimed to determine whether, during the year to 30th June 2020, the participating agencies:

  • met their reporting obligations under the CSP
  • provided accurate reporting in self-assessments against the CSP’s mandatory requirements, including their implementation of the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s (ACSC) Essential 8
  • achieved implementation of mandatory requirements at maturity levels which meet or exceed the ‘level three - defined’ threshold (i.e. are documented and practiced on a regular and consistent basis).

While the audit does assess the accuracy of agency self-assessed ratings, the audit did not assess the appropriateness of the maturity ratings.

Conclusion

Key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. There has been insufficient progress to improve cyber security safeguards across NSW Government agencies.
The NSW CSP replaced the NSW Digital Information Security Policy from 1 February 2019. New requirements of the CSP were, inter alia, to strengthen cyber security governance, strengthen cyber security controls and improve cyber security culture.
The CSP is not achieving the objective of improved cyber governance, controls and culture because:
  • The CSP does not specify a minimum level for agencies to achieve in implementing the 'mandatory requirements' or the Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents.
  • The CSP does not require agencies to report their target levels, nor does it require risk acceptance decisions to be documented or formally endorsed.
  • All of the participating agencies had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements in an ad hoc or inconsistent basis.
  • None of the participating agencies had implemented all of the Essential 8 controls to at least level one.
  • Agencies tended to over-assess their cyber security maturity, with all nine participating agencies unable to support some of their self-assessments of compliance with one or more mandatory criteria. Optimistic assessment of the current state of cyber resilience undermines effective decision making and risk management in responding to cyber risks.
  • There is no systematised and formal monitoring, by either Cyber Security NSW or another agency, of the adequacy or accuracy of agencies' cyber self-assessment processes.

 

1. Key findings

The CSP allows agencies to determine their own level of maturity to implement the 'mandatory requirements', which can include not practicing a policy requirement or implementing a policy requirement on an ad hoc basis. These determinations do not need to be justified

Agencies can decide not to implement requirements of the CSP, or they can decide to implement them only in an informal or ad-hoc manner. The CSP allows agencies to determine their desired level of maturity in implementing the requirements on a scale of one to five - level one being 'initial – not practiced' and level five being 'optimised'. The desired level of maturity is determined by the agency based on their own assessment of the risk of the services they provide and the information they hold.

The reporting template for the 2019 version of the CSP stated that level three maturity - where a policy requirement is practiced on a regular and consistent basis and its processes are documented - was required for compliance with the CSP. This requirement was removed in the 2020 revision of the reporting template.

This CSP does not require the decisions on risk tolerance, or the timeframes agencies have set to implement requirements to be documented or formally endorsed by the agency head. There is no requirement to report these decisions to Cyber Security NSW.

Some comparable jurisdictions require formal risk acceptance decisions where requirements are not implemented. The NSW CSP does not have a similar formal requirement

Some jurisdictions, with a similar policy framework to NSW, require agencies to demonstrate reasons for not implementing requirements, and require agency heads to formally acknowledge the residual risk. The NSW CSP does not require these considerations to be documented, nor does it require an explicit acknowledgement and acceptance of the residual risk by the agency head or Cyber Security NSW. The NSW CSP does not require that the records of how agencies considered and decided which measures to adopt to be documented and auditable, limiting transparency and accountability of decisions made.

All of the participating agencies had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements in an ad hoc or inconsistent basis

All of the participating agencies had implemented one or more of the mandatory requirements at level one or two. Maturity below level three typically means not all elements of the requirement have been implemented, or the requirements have been implemented on an ad-hoc or inconsistent basis.

None of the participating agencies has implemented all of the Essential 8 controls at level one – that is, only partly aligned with the intent of the mitigation strategy

Eight of the nine agencies we audited had not implemented any of the Essential 8 strategies to level three – that is, fully aligned with the intent of the mitigation strategy. At the time of this audit the ACSC advised that:

as a baseline organisations should aim to reach to reach Maturity Level Three for each mitigation strategy3.

The Australian Signals Directorate4 currently advises that, with respect to the Essential 8:

[even] level three maturity will not stop adversaries willing and able to invest enough time, money and effort to compromise a target. As such, organisations still need to consider the remainder of the mitigation strategies from the Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents and the Australian Government Information Security Manual

All agencies failed to reach even level one maturity for at least three of the Essential 8.

Cyber Security NSW modified the ACSC model for implementation of the Essential 8

The NSW maturity model used for the Essential 8 does not fully align with the ACSC’s model. At the time of this audit the major difference was the inclusion of level zero in the NSW CSP maturity scale. Level zero broadly means that the relevant cyber mitigation strategy is not implemented or is not applied consistently. Level zero had been removed by the ACSC in February 2019 and was not part of the framework at the time of this audit. It was re-introduced in July 2021 when the ACSC revised the detailed criteria for each element of the essential 8 maturity model. The indicators to reach level one on the new ACSC model are more detailed, specific and rigorous than those currently prescribed for NSW Government agencies. Cyber Security NSW asserted the level zero on the CSP maturity scale:

is not identical to the level zero of the ACSC’s previous Essential 8 maturity model, but is a NSW-specific inclusion designed to prevent agencies incorrectly assessing as level one when they have not achieved that level.

Attestations did not accurately reflect whether agencies implemented the requirements

Of the nine participating agencies, seven did not modify the proforma wording in their attestation to reflect their actual situation. Despite known gaps in their implementation of mandatory requirements, these agencies stated that they had 'managed cyber security risks in a manner consistent with the Mandatory Requirements set out in the NSW Government Cyber Security Policy'. Only two agencies modified the wording of the attestation to reflect their actual situation.

Attestations should be accurate so that agencies’ and the government’s response to the risk of cyber attack is properly informed by an understanding of the gaps in agency implementation of the policy requirements and the Essential 8. Without accurate information about these gaps, subsequent decisions as to prioritisation of effort and deployment of resources are unlikely to effectively mitigate the risks faced by NSW Government agencies.

Participating agencies were not able to support all of their self-assessments with evidence and had overstated their maturity assessments, limiting the effectiveness of agency risk management approaches

Seven of the nine participating agencies reported levels of maturity against both the mandatory requirements and the Essential 8 that were not supported by evidence.

Each of the nine participating agencies for this audit had overstated their level of maturity against at least one of the 20 mandatory requirements. Seven agencies were not able to provide evidence to support their self-assessed ratings for the Essential 8 controls.

Where agency staff over-assess the current state of their cyber resilience, it can undermine the effectiveness of subsequent decision making by Agency Heads and those charged with governance. It means that actions taken in mitigating cyber risks are less likely to be appropriate and that gaps in implementing cyber security measures will remain, exposing them to cyber attack.

Agencies' self-assessments across government exposed poor levels of maturity in implementing the mandatory requirements and the Essential 8 controls

We reviewed the data 104 NSW agencies provided to Cyber Security NSW. The 104 agencies includes nine audited agencies referred to in more detail in this report. Our review of the 104 agency self-assessment returns submitted to Cyber Security NSW highlighted that, consistent with previous years, there remains reported poor levels of cyber security maturity. We reported the previous years’ self-assessments in the Central Agencies 2019 Report to Parliament and the Central Agencies 2020 Report to Parliament.

Only five out of the 104 agencies self-assessed that they had implemented all of the mandatory requirements at level three or above (against the five point scale). Fourteen agencies self-assessed that they had implemented each of the Essential 8 controls at level one maturity or higher (using Cyber NSW’s four point scale). The remainder reported at level zero for implementation of one or more of the Essential 8 controls, meaning that for the majority of agencies the cyber mitigation strategy has not been implemented, or is applied inconsistently.

Where agencies had reported in both 2019 and 2020, agencies’ self-assessments showed little improvement over the previous year’s self-assessments:

  • 14 agencies reported improvement across both the Essential 8 and the mandatory requirements
  • 8 agencies reported a net decline in both the Essential 8 and the mandatory requirements.

The poor levels of maturity in implementing the Essential 8 over the last couple of years is an area of significant concern that requires better leadership and resourcing to prioritise the required significant improvement in agency cyber security measures.

2. Recommendations

Cyber Security NSW should:

1. monitor and report compliance with the CSP by:

  • obtaining objective assurance over the accuracy of self-assessments
  • requiring agencies to resolve inaccurate or anomalous self-assessments where these are apparent

2. require agencies to report:

  • the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement they have determined appropriate for their agency
  • the agency head's acceptance of the residual risk where the target levels are low

3. identify and challenge discrepancies between agencies' target maturity levels and the risks of the information they hold and services they provide

4. more closely align their policy with the most current version of the ACSC model.

Participating agencies should:

5. resolve the discrepancies between their reported level of maturity and the level they are able to demonstrate with evidence, and:

  • compile and retain in accessible form the artefacts that demonstrate the basis of their self-assessments
  • refer to the CSP guidance when determining their current level of maturity
  • ensure the attestations they make refer to departures from the CSP
  • have processes whereby the agency head and those charged with governance formally accept the residual cyber risks.

Repeat recommendation from the 2019 Central Agencies report and the 2020 Central Agencies report

6. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security and resilience as a matter of urgency.


The objective of the CSP is to ensure cyber security risks are appropriately managed. However, meeting this objective depends on the requirements being implemented at all agencies to a level of maturity that addresses their specific cyber security risks. Agency systems and data are increasingly interconnected. If an agency does not implement the requirements, or implements them only in an ad-hoc or informal way, an agency is more susceptible to their systems and data being compromised, which may affect the confidentiality of citizens' data and the reliability of services, including critical infrastructure services.

Agencies determine their own target level of maturity, which may mean the requirement is not addressed, or is addressed in an ad hoc or inconsistent way

While the CSP is mandatory for all agencies, it does not set a minimum maturity threshold for agencies to meet.

The reporting template issued in 2019 stated that agencies were required to reach level three maturity in order to comply with the CSP. The 2020 revision6 of the CSP and guidance indicates that level three maturity may not be sufficient to mitigate risks. It advises the agency may determine the level to which it believes it is suitable to implement the requirements, and allows for an agency to aim for a target level of maturity less than level three. The agency can set its optimal maturity level with reference to its risk tolerance with the objective that that aim ‘to be as high as possible’. However, ‘as high as possible’ does not necessarily mean ‘fully implemented’. The CSP contemplates that a lower level of maturity is sufficient if it aligns with the agency's risk tolerance.

2019 reporting template 2020 reporting template
‘A Mandatory Requirement is considered met if a maturity level of three is achieved. The Agency may choose to pursue a higher maturity level if required.

There is no mandated level for the Essential 8 Maturity reporting’.

‘There is no mandated maturity level for either the Mandatory Requirement reporting or Essential 8 reporting. Agencies need to risk-assess their optimal maturity and aim to be 'as high as possible’.
Source: Maturity Reporting Template v4.0, February 2019.
Source: CSP Reporting Template 2020, May 2020.

The Department of Customer Service asserts that while the quotes above were part of their annual templates and policy documents, their documents were incorrect. They assert that the policy has never required a minimum level of maturity to be reached. They have responded to our enquiries that:

…a level three maturity was not a requirement of the Policy or Maturity Model’ and ‘it is misleading to suggest it was a requirement of the Policy.

This audit found that, based on the 2020 reporting template there is no established minimum baseline. Consequently, because the Department of Customer Service had not established a minimum baseline agencies are able to target lower levels (providing they were within the agency’s own risk appetite), which includes targeting to not practice a CSP policy requirement, or to practice a CSP policy requirement on an ad hoc basis.

Where requirements are not implemented, documentation of formal acceptance of the residual risks by the agency head is not required

The New Zealand Government has an approach that is not dissimilar to NSW, in that it also identifies 20 mandatory requirements and allows for a risk based approach to implementation. However, the New Zealand approach puts more rigor around risk acceptance decisions.

The New Zealand Government requires that agencies that do not implement the requirements must demonstrate that a measure is not relevant for them. It requires agencies to document the rationale for not implementing the measure, including explicit acknowledgement of the residual risk by the agency head. They require these records to be auditable.

A security measure with a ‘must’ or ‘must not’ compliance requirement is mandatory. You must implement or follow mandatory security measures unless you can demonstrate that a measure is not relevant in your context.

Not using a security measure without due consideration may increase residual risk for your organisation. This residual risk needs to be agreed and acknowledged by your organisation head.

A formal auditable record of how you considered and decided which measures to adopt is required as part of the governance and assurance processes within your organisation.

Source: Overview of Protective Security Requirements, New Zealand Government (PSR-Overview-booklet.pdf (protectivesecurity.govt.nz).

The NSW CSP does not require these considerations to be documented or auditable and does not require an explicit acknowledgement or acceptance of the residual risk by the agency head.

None of the participating agencies achieved level three implementation for all mandatory risk prevention and mitigation requirements

Maturity level three is the minimum level whereby an agency has implemented documented processes that are practiced on a regular basis across their environment. An agency has not reached level three if the requirement is implemented on an ad-hoc or inconsistent basis, or if not all elements of the requirement have been implemented.

None of the participating agencies achieved level three implementation for all mandatory requirements.

The requirements of the CSP are organised into five sections. Agency implementation of these requirements is discussed in the next five sections of this report.

  • Lead: Planning and governance requirements. Section 2.1
  • Prepare: Cyber security culture requirements. Section 2.2
  • Prevent: Managing cyber incident prevention requirements. Section 2.3
  • Detect/Respond/Recover: Resilience requirements. Section 2.4
  • Report: Reporting requirements. Section 2.5.

 


6The reporting template issued in 2019 required agencies to reach level three, but that guidance was removed in the 2020 revision.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – The maturity model for the mandatory requirements

Appendix three – Essential 8 maturity model

Appendix four – About the audit

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Planning
Industry
Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report examines the effectiveness of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, administered by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) between April 2020 and October 2020. 

The program aimed to support the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis by accelerating the final assessment stages for planning proposals and development applications. 

DPIE selected projects and planning proposals for fast tracked assessment that demonstrated the potential to:

  • deliver jobs
  • progress to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

The audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls.

What we found

Through tranches three to six of the program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE reported that 89 per cent of these proceeded to the next stage of development within six months.

Assessment of projects and planning proposals was compliant with legislation and other requirements. However, the audit found gaps in DPIE's management of conflicts of interest.

DPIE has not evaluated or costed the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which it provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19. 

Aspects of the program have been incorporated into longer term reforms to create a new level of transparency over the progress and status of planning assessments. 

What we recommended

DPIE should:

  • strengthen controls over conflicts of interest 
  • evaluate the Fast-tracked Assessment Program.

Fast facts

Construction industry support 
  • The program aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis
59 fast-tracked projects 
  • 59 projects and 42 planning proposals projects were assessed in six tranches
89% of all fast-tracked assessments in tranches three to six progressed to the next stage of the planning process within six months of determination

In April 2020, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) introduced programs aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis. One of these was the Fast-tracked Assessment Program. This program identified planning proposals and development applications (DAs), across six tranches, that were partially-assessed and could be accelerated to determination.

In accordance with the program objectives, the planning proposals and DAs selected for fast-tracked assessment had to:

  • deliver jobs – particularly in the construction industry
  • be capable of progressing to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

At the same time, the Fast-tracked Assessment Program was to lay a foundation for future reform of the planning system by piloting changes in the assessment process that could be adopted in the medium to long term.

This audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls. The audit focused on tranches three to six of the program, which were determined between July 2020 and October 2020. The rationale for focusing on these four tranches was that the program design had been slightly modified after the first two tranches to address identified risks.

Conclusion

Through tranches three to six of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 31 DAs and 16 planning proposals selected in these tranches proceeded to the next stage of development within six months of determination. DPIE achieved this while also successfully managing the risk of non-compliance with planning controls arising from the accelerated process. While DPIE has incorporated components of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program into other longer-term reforms, it has not evaluated the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which the program provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.

Between April and October 2020, DPIE adopted a case management approach to accelerate the final stages of assessment for 42 planning proposals and 59 DAs in six tranches. Tranches three to six were the focus of this audit and included 22 planning proposals and 31 DAs. Applicants involved in the program were expected to progress their projects to the next stage of development within six months of determination. While DPIE had no way of compelling applicants to do this and relied on non-binding commitments obtained from applicants, DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 47 of the 53 applicants selected in tranches three to six honoured this commitment.

Fast-tracked assessment only applied to the final stages of assessment and required DPIE staff and other stakeholders to work towards a determination deadline. DPIE effectively used a case management approach to manage the risk that the accelerated timeframe could result in planning controls not being fully compliant with legislation. There is some room for improvement in the process, as four of 28 staff assessing planning proposals and DAs had not lodged current conflict of interest declarations.

Based on the results of and learnings from the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE has incorporated some elements of the program into other longer-term reforms. There is now increased transparency about when applicants can expect to receive a planning determination and DPIE has also introduced a case management approach for strategic and high priority planning applications. Applicants benefiting from case-managed assessment are now required to commit to a formal service charter that specifies the obligations of both DPIE and the applicant.

DPIE has not evaluated the Fast-tracked Assessment Program to understand the costs and benefits of the program, nor which aspects of the program were most effective as a basis for future reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Planning determination pathways

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #354 - released (27 July 2021).

Published

Actions for Managing cyber risks

Managing cyber risks

Whole of Government
Transport
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains identify and manage their cyber security risks.

The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including implementing the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Essential 8 strategies to mitigate cyber security incidents, and identifying the agency’s most vital systems, their ‘crown jewels’. 

The audited agencies have requested that we do not disclose detail of the significant vulnerabilities detected during the audit, as these vulnerabilities are not yet remediated. We provided a detailed report to the agencies in December 2020 outlining significant issues identified in the audit. We have conceded to the agencies' request but it is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

What we found

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks.

Both agencies have assessed their cyber security risks as unacceptably high and both agencies had not identified all of the risks we detected during this audit – some of which are significant.

Both agencies have cyber security plans in place that aim to address cyber security risks. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have combined this into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program, part of the Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). 

However, neither agency has reached its target ratings for the CSP and the Essential 8 and maturity is low in relation to significant risks and vulnerabilities exposed.

Further, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making.

TfNSW is not implementing cyber security training effectively across the cluster with only 7.2% of staff having completed basic cyber security training.

What we recommended

TfNSW and Sydney Trains should:

  • develop and implement a plan to uplift the Essential 8 controls to the agency's target state
  • as a matter of priority, address the vulnerabilities identified as part of this audit and previously described in a detailed Audit Office report provided to both agencies
  • ensure cyber security risk reporting to executives and the Audit and Risk Committee
  • collect supporting information for the CSP self assessments 
  • classify all information and systems according to importance and integrate this with the crown jewels identification process
  • require more rigorous analysis to re-prioritise CDP funding 
  • increase uptake of cyber security training.

TfNSW should assess the appropriateness of its target rating for each of the CSP mandatory requirements.

Department of Customer Service should:

  • clarify the requirement for the CSP reporting to apply to all systems
  • require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

Fast facts

  • $42m Total value of the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program over three years.
  • 7.2% Percentage of staff across the Transport cluster who had completed introductory cyber security training

Response to requests by audited agencies to remove information from this report

In preparing this audit report, I have considered how best to balance the need to support public accountability and transparency with the need to avoid revealing information that could pose additional risk to agencies’ systems. This has involved an assessment of the appropriate level of detail to include in the report about the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in this audit.

In making this assessment, the audit team consulted with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), Sydney Trains, and Cyber Security NSW to identify content which could potentially pose a threat to the agencies’ cyber security.

In December 2020, my office also provided TfNSW and Sydney Trains with a detailed report of many of the significant vulnerabilities identified in this audit, to enable the agencies to address the cyber security risks identified. The detailed report was produced as a result of a 'red team' exercise, which was conducted with both agencies' knowledge and consent. The scope of this exercise reflected the significant input provided by both agencies. More information on this exercise is at page 12 of this report.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have advised that in the six months from December 2020 and at the time of tabling this audit report, they have not yet remediated all the vulnerabilities identified. As a result, they, along with Cyber Security NSW, have requested that we not disclose all information contained in this audit report to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their systems and resulting harm to the community. I have conceded to this request because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remediated and leave the agencies exposed to significant risk.

It should be stressed that the risks identified in the detailed report exist due to the continued presence of these previously identified vulnerabilities, rather than due to their potential publication. The audited agencies, alone, are accountable for remediating these vulnerabilities and addressing the risks they pose.

It is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

That said, the conclusions drawn in this report are significant in terms of risk and remain valid, and the recommendations should be acted upon with urgency.

Cyber security risk is an increasing area of concern for governments in Australia and around the world. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cyber security attacks on government entities in Australia, including in New South Wales. Malicious cyber activity in Australia is increasing in frequency, scale, and sophistication. The Audit Office of New South Wales is responding to these risks with a program of audits in this area, which aim to identify the effectiveness of particular agencies in managing cyber risks, as well as their compliance with relevant policy.

Cyber Security NSW, part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS) releases and manages the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP). The CSP sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including making it mandatory for agencies to implement the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (the Essential 8). The Essential 8 are key controls which serve as a baseline set of protections which agencies can put in place to make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise a system. Agencies are required to self-assess their maturity against the CSP and the Essential 8, and report that assessment to Cyber Security NSW annually.

The CSP makes agencies responsible for identifying and managing their cyber security risks. The CSP sets out responsibilities and governance regarding risk identification, including making agencies responsible for identifying their 'crown jewels', the agency's most valuable and operationally vital systems. Once these risks are identified, agencies are responsible for developing a cyber security plan to mitigate those risks.

This audit focussed on two agencies: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains. TfNSW is the lead agency for the Transport cluster and provides a number of IT services to the entire cluster, including Sydney Trains. This audit focussed on the activities of TfNSW's Transport IT function, which is responsible for providing cyber security across the cluster, as well as directly overseeing four of TfNSW's crown jewels. Sydney Trains is one of the agencies in the Transport cluster. While it receives some services from TfNSW, it is also responsible for implementing its own IT controls, as well as controls to protect its Operational Technology (OT) environment. This OT environment includes systems which are necessary for the operation and safety of the train network.

To test the mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls, this audit involved a 'red team' simulated exercise. A red team involves authorised attackers seeking to achieve certain objectives within the target's environment. The red team simulated a determined external cyber threat actor seeking to gain access to TfNSW's systems. The red team also sought to test the physical security of some Sydney Trains' sites relevant to the agency's cyber security. The red team exercise was conducted with the knowledge of TfNSW and Sydney Trains.

This audit included the Department of Customer Service as an auditee, as they have ownership of the CSP through Cyber Security NSW. This audit did not examine the management of cyber risk in the Department of Customer Service.

This audit assessed how effectively selected agencies identify and manage their cyber security risks. The audit assessed this with the following criteria:

  • Are agencies effectively identifying and planning for their cyber security risks?
  • Are agencies effectively managing their cyber security risks?

Following this in-depth portfolio assessment, the Auditor-General for NSW will also table a report on NSW agencies' compliance with the CSP in the first quarter of 2021–22.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks. Significant weaknesses exist in their cyber security controls, and both agencies have assessed that their cyber risks are unacceptably high. Neither agency has reached its Essential 8 or Cyber Security Policy target levels. This low Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risk. Both agencies are implementing cyber security plans to address identified cyber security risks.
This audit identified other weaknesses, such as low numbers of staff receiving basic cyber security awareness training. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies, indicating that their cyber security risk identification is only partially effective.
Agency executives do not receive regular detailed information about cyber risks and how they are being managed, such as information on mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls for cyber risk. As a result, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of executive decision-making.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains are partially effective at identifying their cyber security risks and both agencies have cyber security plans in place

Both agencies regularly carry out risk assessments and have identified key cyber security risks, including risks that impact on the agencies' crown jewels. These risks have been incorporated into the overall enterprise risk process. However, neither agency regularly reports detailed cyber risk information to agency executives to adequately inform them about cyber risk. The Cyber Security Policy (CSP) requires agencies to foster a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making. By not informing agency executives in this way, TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not fulfilling this requirement.

Agencies' cyber security risk assessment processes are not sufficiently comprehensive to identify all potential risks. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies.

To address identified cyber security risks, both agencies have received funding approval to implement cyber security plans. TfNSW first received approval for its cyber security plan in 2017. Sydney Trains received approval for its cyber security plan in February 2020. In 2020–21 TfNSW and Sydney Trains combined their plans into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program business case valued at $42.0 million over three years. This is governed as part of a broader Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). The CDP largely takes a risk-based approach to annual funding. The Cyber Defence Portfolio Steering Committee and Board can re-allocate funds from an approved project to a different project. This re-allocation process could be improved by making it more risk-based.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks

Neither agency has fully mitigated its cyber security risks. These risks are significant. Neither TfNSW nor Sydney Trains have reduced their cyber risk to levels acceptable to the agencies. Both agencies have set a risk tolerance for cyber security risks, and the identified enterprise-level cyber security risks remain above this rating. Both agencies' self-attested maturity against the Essential 8 remains low in comparison to the agencies' target levels, and in relation to the significant risks and vulnerabilities that are exposed. Little progress was made against the Essential 8 in 2020.

Neither agency has reached its target levels of maturity for the CSP mandatory requirements. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles. The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a KPI to achieve a target rating of three for all CSP requirements where business appropriate. TfNSW considers this target rating to be its target for all the CSP requirements. However TfNSW has not undertaken analysis to determine whether this target is appropriate to its business.

The CSP makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers. While both agencies usually included their cyber security expectations in contracts with third-party suppliers, neither agency was routinely conducting audits to ensure that these expectations were being met.

The CSP requires agencies to make staff aware of cyber security risks and deliver cyber security training. TfNSW is responsible for delivering cyber security training across the Transport cluster, including in Sydney Trains. TfNSW was not effectively delivering cyber security training across the cluster because training was not mandatory for all staff at the time of the audit and completion rates among those staff assigned the training was low. As such, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had completed introductory cyber security training as at January 2021.

Agencies have assessed their cyber risks as being above acceptable levels

An agency's risk tolerance is the amount of risk which the agency will accept or tolerate without developing further strategies to modify the level of risk. Risks that are within an agency's risk tolerance may not require further mitigation and may be deemed acceptable, while risks which are above the agency's risk tolerance likely require further mitigation before they become acceptable to the agency.

Both agencies have defined their risk tolerance and have identified risks which are above this level, indicating that they are unacceptable to the agency. TfNSW has defined 'very high' risks as generally intolerable and 'high' risks as undesirable. Its risk tolerance is 'medium'. Sydney Trains has four classifications of risk: A, B, C and D. A and B risks are deemed 'unacceptable' and 'undesirable' respectively, while C risks are considered 'tolerable'. This aligns with the TfNSW definition of a medium risk tolerance.

Transport IT reported five enterprise-level cyber security risks through its enterprise risk reporting tool in September 2020, all of which relate to cyber security or have causes relating to cyber security. These risks are in aggregate form, rather than relating to specific vulnerabilities. At the time of the audit, one of these risks was rated as very high and the other four rated as high. At this time, Transport IT had identified a further seven divisional-level risks which were above the agency’s risk tolerance.

Similarly, Sydney Trains has identified one main cyber security risk in its IT enterprise-level risk register and another with a potential cyber cause. Both of these IT risks are deemed to have a residual risk of ‘unacceptable’.

Similarly, two cyber-related OT risks have been determined to be above the agency's risk tolerance. One risk is rated as 'unacceptable'. Another risk, while not entirely cyber rated, is rated 'undesirable' and is deemed to have some causes which may stem from a cyber-attack.

Agencies have assessed their current cyber risk mitigations as requiring improvement

In addition to the risk ratings stated above, at the time of the audit neither agency believed that its controls were operating effectively. Transport IT had rated the control environments for its cyber security enterprise risks as 'requires improvement'. Mitigations were listed in the risk register for these risks but, in some cases, they were unlikely to reduce the risk to the target state or by the target date. For example, one risk had actions listed as 'under review' and no further treatment actions listed, but a due date of July 2021, while another risk was being treated by the CDP with a due date of July 2021. The CDP identified in May 2020 that while the average risk identified as part of that program will be reduced to a medium level by this date, ten high risks will still remain. Given the delays in the program, this number may be higher. As such, it seems unlikely that the enterprise risk will be reduced to below a 'high' level by July 2021.

Sydney Trains’ IT and OT risk registers cross-reference controls and mitigations against the causes and consequences. The IT cyber security risk identified in the register had causes with no mitigations designed for them. Further, some of these causes did not have future mitigations designed for them. This risk also had controls in place which are identified as partially effective. For the unacceptable OT risk noted above, while there was a control designed for each of the potential causes, Sydney Trains had identified all of the controls in place as either partially effective or ineffective. This indicates that Sydney Trains was not effectively mitigating the causes of its cyber risks and, even where it had designed controls or mitigations, these were not always implemented to fully mitigate the cause of the risk.

Additional information on gaps in cyber mitigations which were exposed in the course of this audit has been detailed to both agencies. The Foreword of this report provides information about why this detail is not included here.

Essential 8 maturity is low across TfNSW and Sydney Trains and little progress was made in 2020

CSP mandatory requirement 3.2 states that agencies must implement the ACSC Essential 8. Agencies must also rate themselves against each of the Essential 8 on a maturity scale from zero to three and report this to Cyber Security NSW. A full list of the Essential 8 can be found in Exhibit 1. Both agencies have a low level of maturity against the Essential 8 not just in comparison to the targets they have set, but also in relation to the risks and vulnerabilities exposed. Both agencies have set target maturity ratings for the Essential 8 but none of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to this level. Having a low level of Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risks and vulnerabilities. Little progress was made between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods.

Transport IT has set a target rating of three across all of the Essential 8. Sydney Trains has set a target rating of three for its IT systems. Sydney Trains had an interim target of two for its OT systems in 2020 and advised that this has since increased to three. It should be noted that not all the Essential 8 are applicable to OT systems.

None of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to the target levels. Given that the Essential 8 provide the controls which are most commonly able to deter cyber-attacks, having maturity at a low level potentially exposes agencies to a cyber security attack.

Some work is underway across both TfNSW and Sydney Trains to improve the Essential 8 control ratings. The CDP provided some resources to the Essential 8 over 2019–20, with uplift focusing on specific systems. The CDP work in 2019 and 2020 relevant to the Essential 8 largely focussed on determining the current state of the Essential 8 and creating a target state roadmap. As a result, there was little improvement between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods. The CDP has a workstream for the Essential 8 in its FY 2020–21 funding allocation, however as noted above in Exhibit 6 this was delayed as resources were redeployed to Project La Brea. Regardless, work on some specific aspects of the Essential 8 remain part of the 2020–21 CDP allocation, with workstreams allocated to improving three of the Essential 8. In addition, some work from Project La Brea should lead to an improvement in the Essential 8.

Sydney Trains' Cyber Uplift Program included a workstream which had in scope the uplift in the Essential 8 in IT. There were also other workstreams which aimed to improve some of the Essential 8 for OT systems. Work is also ongoing as part of the CDP to uplift these scores in Sydney Trains.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have not reached their target maturity across the CSP mandatory requirements and TfNSW has not evaluated its cluster-wide target to ensure it is appropriate

Cyber Security NSW allows each agency to determine its target level of maturity for the first 20 CSP mandatory requirements. Agencies can tailor their target levels to their risk profile. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles.

Sydney Trains has set its target level of maturity for IT and OT. All of Sydney Trains' target maturity levels are at least a three (defined), with a target of four (quantitatively managed) for many of the mandatory requirements. While Cyber Security NSW does not currently mandate a minimum level of maturity, in 2019 there was a requirement for each agency to target a minimum level of three.

Sydney Trains has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements.

The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a program KPI to ensure that the entire cluster reaches a minimum maturity level of three against all the CSP requirements by 2023. TfNSW has not reviewed its CSP mandatory requirement targets to determine if a three is desirable for all requirements or if a higher target level may be more appropriate. It is important for senior management to set cyber security objectives as a demonstration of leadership and a commitment to cyber security.

TfNSW has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements for its Group IT ISMS, which was the focus of this audit.

Both agencies claimed progress in their implementation of the mandatory requirements between 2019 and 2020. The audit did not seek to verify the self-assessed results from either agency.

Both agencies operate ISMS in line with the CSP

CSP mandatory requirement 3.1 requires agencies to implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) or Cyber Security Framework (CSF), with scope at least covering systems identified as the agency's ‘crown jewels’. The ISMS or CSF should be compliant with, or modelled on, one or more recognised IT or OT standard. As noted in the introduction, an ISMS ‘consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.’ Both agencies operate an ISMS compliant with the CSP requirement.

As noted in the introduction, TfNSW operates four ISMS. The Transport IT ISMS is certified against ISO27001, the most common standard for ISMS certification. Three of TfNSW’s six crown jewels are managed within this ISMS. The other ISMS are not certified to relevant standards, though TfNSW claims that they align with relevant controls. This is sufficient for the purposes of the CSP.

Sydney Trains operates two ISMS, one for IT and another for OT. Neither of these are certified to relevant ISMS Standards, however there have been conformance reviews of both IT and OT with relevant standards. These ISMS cover all crown jewels in the agency.

There are currently 11 ISMS in operation across the Transport cluster. TfNSW has proposed moving towards a holistic approach to these ISMS, with the CDP Board responsible for governing the available security controls and directing agency IT and OT teams to implement these.

Agencies are not routinely conducting audits of third-party suppliers to ensure compliance with contractual obligations

CSP mandatory requirement 1.5 makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers and ensuring that providers comply with the CSP and any other relevant agency security policies. The ACSC has provided advice on what organisations should do when managing third party suppliers of ICT. The ACSC advises that organisations should use contracts to define cyber security expectations and seek assurance to ensure that these contract expectations are being met. While both agencies usually include specific cyber security expectations in contracts, neither is routinely seeking assurance that these expectations are being met.

The NSW Government has mandated the use of the 'Core& One' contract template for low-value IT procurements and the Procure IT contract template for high-value IT procurements. Both of these contracts contain space for the procuring agency to include cyber security controls for the contractor to implement. The Procure IT contract template also includes a right-to-audit clause which allows agencies to receive assurance around the implementation of these controls. TfNSW and Sydney Trains used the mandated contracts for relevant contracts examined as part of this audit.

TfNSW included security controls in all the contracts examined as part of this audit. Compliance with ISO27001 was the most commonly stated security expectation. Of the contracts examined as part of this audit, only one contract did not have a right-to-audit clause. This contract was signed in October 2016. While these clauses are in place, TfNSW rarely conducted these audits on its third-party providers. Of the eight TfNSW contracts examined in detail, only two of these had been audited to confirm compliance with the stated security controls.

Sydney Trains included security controls in all but one of the contracts examined as part of this audit. Sydney Trains did not require contractors to be compliant with ISO27001, but only required compliance with whole-of-government policies. Sydney Trains does not routinely conduct audits of its third-party suppliers, however it did conduct deep-dive risk analyses of its top ten highest risk IT suppliers. This involved a detailed review of both the suppliers' security posture and also the contract underpinning the relationship with the supplier.

The CDP funding for 2020–21 includes a workstream for strategic third-party contract remediation. This funding is to conduct some foundational work which will allow the CDP to make further improvements in future years. While this funding will not address gaps in contract requirements or management across all contracts, this workstream aims to reduce the risks posed by strategic suppliers covering critical assets. Similarly, work is currently underway as part of the CDP to conduct OT risk assessments for key suppliers to Sydney Trains in a similar way to the work undertaken for IT suppliers.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed its third-party suppliers but TfNSW has not done so

It is important to conduct a risk assessment of suppliers to identify high-risk contractors. This allows agencies to identify those contractors who may require additional controls stated in the contract, those who require additional oversight, and also where auditing resources are best targeted.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed all its IT suppliers and, as noted above, has conducted a deep-dive risk analysis of its top ten highest risk suppliers. TfNSW has not undertaken similar analysis of its key suppliers, however it has identified risks attached to each of its strategic suppliers and has documented these. As a result of not risk assessing its suppliers, TfNSW cannot take a targeted approach to its contract management.

TfNSW demonstrated poor records handling relating to the contracts examined as part of this audit

TfNSW was not able to locate one of the contracts requested as part of the audit's sample. Other documentation, such as contract management plans, could not be located for many of the other contracts requested as part of this audit. These poor document handling practices limits TfNSW's ability to effectively oversee service providers and ensure that they are implementing agreed controls. It also limits public transparency on the effectiveness of these controls.

The Transport cluster is not effectively implementing cyber security awareness training

Agencies are responsible for implementing regular cyber security education for all employees and contractors under mandatory requirement 2.1 in the CSP. TfNSW is responsible for delivering this training to the whole Transport cluster, including Sydney Trains. The Transport cluster has basic cyber awareness training available for all staff. TfNSW also offers additional training provided by Cyber Security NSW targeted at executives and executive assistants. While TfNSW has training available to staff, it is not delivering this effectively. TfNSW does not make training mandatory for most staff nor does it require staff to repeat training regularly. Even among those staff who have been assigned the training, completion rates are low, meaning that delivery is not effectively monitored. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture.

TfNSW is responsible for creating and rolling out all forms of training to agencies within the Transport cluster. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains have the same mandatory cyber awareness training that is automatically assigned to new starters. At the time of the audit, this training was not mandatory for ongoing staff. TfNSW does make additional cyber security training available to staff who can choose to undertake the training themselves, or can be assigned the training by their manager. All TfNSW cyber security training is delivered via online modules and it is the responsibility of managers to ensure that it is completed.

Cyber security training completion rates for both TfNSW and Sydney Trains are low. Only 13.5 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had been assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training as of January 2021. Although this course is mandatory for new starters, only 53 per cent of staff assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training module had completed the course by January 2021. As a result, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the entire Transport cluster had completed this training at that time. In Sydney Trains, less than one per cent of staff had completed this training as at January 2021 and a further 7.6 per cent of staff have completed the 'Cyber Security: Beyond the Basics' training. These low completion rates indicate that TfNSW is not effectively rolling out cyber security training across the cluster.

In October 2020, the Department of Customer Service released 'DCS-2020-05 Cyber Security NSW Directive - Practice Requirement for NSW Government', which made annual cyber security training mandatory for all staff from 2021. In line with this requirement, TfNSW has advised that it will be gradually implementing mandatory annual training from July 2021 for all staff.

The Transport cluster undertakes activities to build a cyber-aware culture in accordance with the CSP, but awareness remains low

Increasing staff awareness of cyber security risks and maintaining a cyber secure culture are both mandatory requirements of the CSP. While TfNSW does undertake some activities to build a cyber aware culture, awareness of cyber security risks remains low. This can be demonstrated by the low training rates outlined above, and the 'Spot the Scammer' exercise, described in Exhibit 7. TfNSW is responsible for delivering these awareness raising activities across the cluster.

TfNSW frequently communicates with staff across the Transport cluster about various cyber security risks through multiple avenues. Both agencies use the intranet, emails and other awareness raising activities to highlight the importance for staff to be aware of the seriousness of cyber risks. Advice given on the intranet includes tips for spotting scammers on mobile phones, promoting the cluster-wide training courses, as well as various advice that staff could use when dealing with cyber risks in the workplace.

In addition to these awareness raising activities, TfNSW has also undertaken a cluster-wide phishing email exercise called 'Spot the Scammer'. This is outlined in Exhibit 7. This exercise was carried out in 2019 and 2020 and allowed the Transport cluster to measure the degree to which staff were able to identify phishing emails. As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the results of this exercise indicate that staff awareness of phishing emails remains low.

Exhibit 7 - Spot the Scammer exercise
In both 2019 and 2020, TfNSW performed a ‘Spot the Scammer’ exercise in which they sent out over 25,000 emails to staff based on a real phishing attack in order to measure awareness and response. The exercise tested staff 'click through rate', the percentage of staff who clicked on the fake phishing link. In 2019, these results were then compared to industry benchmarks, with over a 20 per cent click through rate being considered 'very high'. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains were considered to have a ‘very high’ click through rate in comparison to these benchmarks in both 2019 and 2020. This indicates that staff awareness of phishing emails was low. The click through rate for TfNSW was 24 per cent in 2020, an increase from 22 per cent in 2019. For Sydney Trains, the click through rate in 2020 was 32 per cent, which was a decrease from 40 per cent in 2019.
Source: Audit Office analysis of TfNSW documents.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #353 - released (13 July 2021).

Published

Actions for Internal Controls and Governance 2017

Internal Controls and Governance 2017

Finance
Education
Community Services
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk

Agencies need to do more to address risks posed by information technology (IT).

Effective internal controls and governance systems help agencies to operate efficiently and effectively and comply with relevant laws, standards and policies. We assessed how well agencies are implementing these systems, and highlighted opportunities for improvement.
 

1. Overall trends

New and repeat findings

The number of reported financial and IT control deficiencies has fallen, but many previously reported findings remain unresolved.

High risk findings

Poor systems implementations contributed to the seven high risk internal control deficiencies that could affect agencies.

Common findings

Poor IT controls are the most commonly reported deficiency across agencies, followed by governance issues relating to cyber security, capital projects, continuous disclosure, shared services, ethics and risk management maturity.

2. Information Technology

IT security

Only two-thirds of agencies are complying with their own policies on IT security. Agencies need to tighten user access and password controls.

Cyber security

Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat.

Other IT systems

Agencies can improve their disaster recovery plans and the change control processes they use when updating IT systems.

3. Asset Management

Capital investment

Agencies report delays delivering against the significant increase in their budgets for capital projects.

Capital projects

Agencies are underspending their capital budgets and some can improve capital project governance.

Asset disposals

Eleven per cent of agencies were required to sell their real property through Property NSW but didn’t. And eight per cent of agencies can improve their asset disposal processes.

4. Governance

Governance arrangements

Sixty-four per cent of agencies’ disclosure policies support communication of key performance information and prompt public reporting of significant issues.

Shared services

Fifty-nine per cent of agencies use shared services, yet 14 per cent do not have service level agreements in place and 20 per cent can strengthen the performance standards they set.

5. Ethics and Conduct

Ethical framework

Agencies can reinforce their ethical frameworks by updating code‑of‑conduct policies and publishing a Statement of Business Ethics.

Conflicts of interest

All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour.

6. Risk Management 

Risk management maturity

All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity.

Risk management elements

Many agencies can improve risk registers and strengthen their risk culture, particularly in the way that they report risks to their lead agency.

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2016–17 financial audits related to the internal controls and governance of the 39 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. These agencies represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW agencies and were considered to be a large enough group to identify common issues and insights.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2017 cluster financial audit reports tabled in Parliament from October to December 2017.

This new report offers strategic insight on the public sector as a whole

In previous years, we have commented on internal control and governance issues in the volumes we published on each ‘cluster’ or agency sector, generally between October and December. To add further value, we then commented more broadly about the issues identified for the public sector as a whole at the start of the following year.

This year, we have created this report dedicated to internal controls and governance. This will help Parliament to understand broad issues affecting the public sector, and help agencies to compare their own performance against that of their peers.

Without strong control measures and governance systems, agencies face increased risks in their financial management and service delivery. If they do not, for example, properly authorise payments or manage conflicts of interest, they are at greater risk of fraud. If they do not have strong information technology (IT) systems, sensitive and trusted information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.

These problems can in turn reduce the efficiency of agency operations, increase their costs and reduce the quality of the services they deliver.

Our audits do not review every control or governance measure every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present the most significant risks that agencies should mitigate. This report divides these into the following six areas:

  1. Overall trends
  2. Information technology
  3. Asset management
  4. Governance
  5. Ethics and conduct
  6. Risk management.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume then illustrates this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Issues

Recommendations

1.1 New and repeat findings

The number of internal control deficiencies reduced over the past three years, but new higher-risk information technology (IT) control deficiencies were reported in 2016–17.

Deficiencies repeated from previous years still make up a sizeable proportion of all internal control deficiencies.

Recommendation

Agencies should focus on emerging IT risks, but also manage new IT risks, reduce existing IT control deficiencies, and address repeat internal control deficiencies on a more timely basis.

1.2 High risk findings

We found seven high risk internal control deficiencies, which might significantly affect agencies.

Recommendation

Agencies should rectify high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority

1.3 Common findings

The most common internal control deficiencies related to poor or absent IT controls.

We found some common governance deficiencies across multiple agencies.

Recommendation

Agencies should coordinate actions and resources to help rectify common IT control and governance deficiencies.

Information technology (IT) has become increasingly important for government agencies’ financial reporting and to deliver their services efficiently and effectively. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place over their IT systems. We found that IT security remains the source of many control weakness in agencies.

Issues Recommendations

2.1 IT security

User access administration

While 95 per cent of agencies have policies about user access, about two-thirds were compliant with these policies. Agencies can improve how they grant, change and end user access to their systems.

Recommendation

Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to sensitive systems. Agencies should:

  • establish and enforce clear policies and procedures
  • review user access regularly
  • remove user access for terminated staff promptly
  • change user access for transferred staff promptly.

Privileged access

Sixty-eight per cent of agencies do not adequately manage who can access their information systems, and many do not sufficiently monitor or restrict privileged access.

Recommendation

Agencies should tighten privileged user access to protect their information systems and reduce the risks of data misuse and fraud. Agencies should ensure they:

  • only grant privileged access in line with the responsibilities of a position
  • review the level of access regularly
  • limit privileged access to necessary functions and data
  • monitor privileged user account activity on a regular basis.

Password controls

Forty-one per cent of agencies did not meet either their own standards or minimum standards for password controls.

Recommendation

Agencies should review and enforce password controls to strengthen security over sensitive systems. As a minimum, password parameters should include:

  • minimum password lengths and complexity requirements
  • limits on the number of failed log-in attempts
  • password history (such as the number of passwords remembered)
  • maximum and minimum password ages.

2.2 Cyber Security

Cyber security framework

Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat.

Recommendation

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should revisit its existing framework to develop a shared cyber security terminology and strengthen the current reporting requirements for cyber incidents.

Cyber security strategies

While 82 per cent of agencies have dedicated resources to address cyber security, they can strengthen their strategies, expertise and staff awareness.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • mandate minimum standards and require agencies to regularly assess and report on how well they mitigate cyber security risks against these standards
  • develop a framework that provides for cyber security training.

Agencies should ensure they adequately resource staff dedicated to cyber security.

2.3 Other IT systems

Change control processes

Some agencies need to improve change control processes to avoid unauthorised or inaccurate system changes.

Recommendation

Agencies should consistently perform user acceptance testing before system upgrades and changes. They should also properly approve and document changes to IT systems.

Disaster recovery planning

Agencies can do more to adequately assess critical business systems to enforce effective disaster recovery plans. This includes reviewing and testing their plans on a timely basis.

Recommendation

Agencies should complete business impact analyses to strengthen disaster recovery plans, then regularly test and update their plans.

Agency service delivery relies on developing and renewing infrastructure assets such as schools, hospitals, roads, or public housing. Agencies are currently investing significantly in new assets. Agencies need to manage the scale and volume of current capital projects in order to deliver new infrastructure on time, on budget and realise the intended benefits. We found agencies can improve how they:

  • manage their major capital projects
  • dispose of existing assets.
Issues Recommendations or conclusions

3.1 Capital investment

Capital asset investment ratios

Most agencies report high capital investment ratios, but one-third of agencies’ capital investment ratios are less than one.

Recommendation

Agencies with high capital asset investment ratios should ensure their project management and delivery functions have the capacity to deliver their current and forward work programs.

Volume of capital spending

Most agencies have significant forward spending commitments for capital projects. However, agencies’ actual capital expenditure has been below budget for the last three years.

Conclusion

The significant increase in capital budget underspends warrant investigation, particularly where this has resulted from slower than expected delivery of projects from previous years.

3.2 Capital projects

Major capital projects

Agencies’ major capital projects were underspent by 13 percent against their budgets.

Conclusion

The causes of agency budget underspends warrant investigation to ensure the NSW Government’s infrastructure commitment is delivered on time.

Capital project governance

Agencies do not consistently prepare business cases or use project steering committees to oversee major capital projects.

Conclusion

Agencies that have project management processes that include robust business cases and regular updates to their steering committees (or equivalent) are better able to provide those projects with strategic direction and oversight.

3.3. Asset disposals

Asset disposal procedures

Agencies need to strengthen their asset disposal procedures.

Recommendations

Agencies should have formal processes for disposing of surplus properties.

Agencies should use Property NSW to manage real property sales unless, as in the case for State owned corporations, they have been granted an exemption.

Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours that help an organisation to achieve its objectives, comply with legal and other requirements, and meet a high standard of probity, accountability and transparency.

This chapter sets out the governance lighthouse model the Audit Office developed to help agencies reach best practice. It then focuses on two key areas: continuous disclosure and shared services arrangements. The following two chapters look at findings related to ethics and risk management.

Issues Recommendations or conclusions

4.1 Governance arrangements

Continuous disclosure

Continuous disclosure promotes improved performance and public trust and aides better decision-making. Continuous disclosure is only mandatory for NSW Government Businesses such as State owned corporations.

Conclusion

Some agencies promote transparency and accountability by publishing on their websites a continuous disclosure policy that provides for, and encourages:

  • regular public disclosure of key performance information
  • disclosure of both positive and negative information
  • prompt reporting of significant issues.

4.2 Shared services

Service level agreements

Some agencies do not have service level agreements for their shared service arrangements.

Many of the agreements that do exist do not adequately specify controls, performance or reporting requirements. This reduces the effectiveness of shared services arrangements.

Conclusion

Agencies are better able to manage the quality and timeliness of shared service arrangements where they have a service level agreement in place. Ideally, the terms of service should be agreed before services are transferred to the service provider and:

  • specify the controls a provider must maintain
  • specify key performance targets
  • include penalties for non-compliance.

Shared service performance

Some agencies do not set performance standards for their shared service providers or regularly review performance results.

Conclusion

Agencies can achieve better results from shared service arrangements when they regularly monitor the performance of shared service providers using key measures for the benefits realised, costs saved and quality of services received.

Before agencies extend or renegotiate a contract, they should comprehensively assess the services received and test the market to maximise value for money.

All government sector employees must demonstrate the highest levels of ethical conduct, in line with standards set by The Code of Ethics and Conduct for NSW government sector employees.

This chapter looks at how well agencies are managing these requirements, and where they can improve their policies and processes.

We found that agencies mostly have the appropriate codes, frameworks and policies in place. But we have highlighted opportunities to improve the way they manage those systems to reduce the risks of unethical conduct.

Issues Recommendations or conclusions

5.1 Ethical framework

Code of conduct

All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour.

Recommendation

Agencies should regularly review their code-of-conduct policies and ensure they keep their codes of conduct up-to-date.

Statement of business ethics

Most agencies maintain an ethical framework, but some can enhance their related processes, particularly when dealing with external clients, customers, suppliers and contractors.

Conclusion

Agencies can enhance their ethical frameworks by publishing a Statement of Business Ethics, which communicates their values and culture.

5.2 Potential conflicts of interest

Conflicts of interest

All agencies have a conflicts-of-interest policy, but most can improve how they identify, manage and avoid conflicts of interest.

Recommendation

Agencies should improve the way they manage conflicts of interest, particularly by:

  • requiring senior executives to make a conflict-of-interest declaration at least annually
  • implementing processes to identify and address outstanding declarations
  • providing annual training to staff
  • maintaining current registers of conflicts of interest.

Gifts and benefits

While all agencies already have a formal gifts-and-benefits policy, we found gaps in the management of gifts and benefits by some that increase the risk of unethical conduct.

Recommendation

Agencies should improve the way they manage gifts and benefits by promptly updating registers and providing annual training to staff.

Risk management is an integral part of effective corporate governance. It helps agencies to identify, assess and prioritise the risks they face and in turn minimise, monitor and control the impact of unforeseen events. It also means agencies can respond to opportunities that may emerge and improve their services and activities.

This year we looked at the overall maturity of the risk management frameworks that agencies use, along with two important risk management elements: risk culture and risk registers.

Issues Recommendations or conclusions

6.1 Risk management maturity

All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity in their application.

Agencies’ averaged a score of 3.1 out of five across five critical assessment criteria for risk management. While strategy and governance fared best, the areas that most need to improve are risk culture, and systems and intelligence.

Conclusion

Agencies have introduced risk management frameworks and practices as required by the Treasury’s:

  • 'Risk Management Toolkit for the NSW Public Sector'
  • 'Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the NSW Public Sector'.

However, more can be done to progress risk management maturity and embed risk management in agency culture.

6.2 Risk management elements

Risk culture

Most agencies have started to embed risk management into the culture of their organisation. But only some have successfully done so, and most agencies can improve their risk culture.

 

 

Conclusion

Agencies can improve their risk culture by:

  • setting an appropriate tone from the top
  • training all staff in effective risk management
  • ensuring desired risk behaviours and culture are supported, monitored, and reinforced through business plans, or the equivalent and employees' performance assessments.

Risk registers and reporting

Some agencies do not report their significant risks to their lead agency, which may impair the way resources are allocated in their cluster. Some agencies do not integrate risk registers at a divisional and whole-of-enterprise level.

Conclusion

Agencies not reporting significant risks at the cluster level increases the likelihood that significant risks are not being mitigated appropriately.

Effective risk management can improve agency decision-making, protect reputations and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. By embedding risk management directly into their operations, agencies can also derive extra value for their activities and services.

Published

Actions for Planning and Environment 2017

Planning and Environment 2017

Planning
Environment
Asset valuation
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management

The following report highlights results of financial audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these agencies.

The audits were completed for most agencies in the cluster and unqualified audit opinions issued. Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven small agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline, and six of these remain incomplete. Apart from these small agencies, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard.

1. Financial reporting and controls

Financial reporting Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 39 of the 45 cluster agencies. Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven small agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline. Six of these audits remain incomplete at the date of this report.
  Agencies completed early close procedures mandated by the Treasury. We noted opportunities for agencies to improve the effectiveness of these procedures.
Internal Controls One in six internal control weaknesses identified during the financial audits were repeat issues. Agencies should action audit recommendations promptly.
  User administration over financial systems needs to be strengthened to prevent inappropriate access to financial information.

2. Service Delivery

 
Housing completions Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicates the Department of Planning and Environment achieved the Premier's priority for housing completions in 2016–17. 
Increasing housing supply Australian Bureau of Statistics data shows the Department of Planning and Environment achieved the annual target of delivering over 50,000 housing approvals over the past three years.
Major project assessment Progress against the State priority target to reduce time taken to assess planning applications for State significant developments is difficult to determine as the measure is unclear.
Litter management The Environment Protection Authority's data indicates that progress towards the Premier's priority target for litter reduction slowed in 2016–17.
Cultural participation The Department of Planning and Environment’s data indicates overall attendance at cultural venues and events in New South Wales increased by 16 per cent in 2015–16.

This report provides Parliament and others with the audit results, observations and recommendations for Planning and Environment cluster agencies. The report has been structured into two chapters focussing on financial reporting and controls and service delivery.

The Planning and Environment cluster plays a role in ensuring each community across New South Wales receives the services and infrastructure it needs.

This chapter outlines our audit observations and recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of Planning and Environment cluster agencies for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation

2.1 Quality of financial reporting

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 39 of the 45 cluster agencies' financial statements.

Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their completion. Six audits remain incomplete at the date of this report.

Apart from these seven small agency audits, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard.

2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting

Seven agencies' financial statement audits were not completed by the statutory deadline with six audits incomplete at the date of this report.

Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline. These agencies would benefit from performing additional early close procedures in future reporting periods.

2.3 Financial and sustainability analysis

Water and Electricity utility agencies continue to operate with low liquidity ratios.

A liquidity ratio below one is an indicator that an entity may not be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due.

Whilst liquidity ratios were below one, utility agencies demonstrated they can continue to support ongoing operations due to:

  • access to regulated revenue streams

  • assets with long useful lives to generate revenue

  • debt funding limits approved by the NSW Treasurer under the Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987.

2.5 Internal controls

One in six internal control weaknesses reported in 2016–17 were repeat issues.

Delays in implementing audit recommendations can prolong the risk of fraud and error.

Recommendation (repeat issue): anagement letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing repeat issues.

Nine of these internal control weaknesses related to the creation, modification, deletion and review of user access to financial systems.

These control weaknesses may compromise the integrity and security of financial data.

Recommendation (repeat issue): Management of user administration over financial systems should be strengthened to prevent inappropriate access to financial information.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation

3.1 Premier's and State priorities

The Planning and Environment cluster is responsible for delivering five Premier's and State priorities.

One priority target was achieved in 2016–17, two targets are on track to be achieved and progress towards one target slowed.

Progress against one target cannot be determined.

3.2 Planning

Housing Completion

 
There were 63,506 housing completions in
2016–17. This was 4.1 per cent above the Premier’s priority target of delivering 61,000 housing completions per year.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data shows the housing completions target was achieved in
2016–17.

Housing supply

The number of approvals for new houses in
2016–17 was 72,472 against the State priority target of more than 50,000 approvals per year.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicates the housing approvals target was achieved in
2016–17.

Major project assessment

 
State significant developments are not clearly defined for the purposes of reporting against the State priority target. The Department of Planning and Environment will clarify with the Department of Premier and Cabinet which developments are captured by the State priority target.
The Department of Planning and Environment’s data shows the time taken to assess complex State significant developments increased by 16 per cent in 2016–17 while the time taken to assess less complex developments reduced by 20 per cent. The Department of Planning and Environment considers it is on track to meet the State priority target of halving the time taken to assess State significant developments, despite uncertainty over the target measure.

Housing acceleration fund

 

Program business cases were not developed for projects in Housing Acceleration Fund Rounds 1 to 4.

The Department advised a program business case will be developed for Housing Acceleration Fund Round 5 projects.

A program business case is necessary to ensure related projects are evaluated, managed and coordinated effectively.
 

A benefit realisation review process has not yet been approved for Housing Acceleration Fund projects.

The Department of Planning and Environment advised it is developing a benefit realisation review process.

A benefit realisation review process is necessary to determine whether funded projects achieved intended outcomes.

Greater Sydney Commission

 
The Greater Sydney Commission forecasts a further 725,000 dwellings in the greater Sydney region will be required up to 2036 to meet housing demand. In response to population growth, the Commission has set a five-year housing supply target of 189,100 houses across the five Greater Sydney Commission districts.

ePlanning system

 
The Department of Planning and Environment did not perform a benefit realisation review for phase one of the ePlanning project. It has committed to performing a benefit realisation review after completion of phase two in 2018. It cannot be determined if phase one of the project delivered expected outcomes as a benefit realisation review was not performed.

3.3. Environment and Heritage

Litter volume in New South Wales was 6.6 litres per 1,000 square metres in 2016–17, an increase of 16 per cent from the prior year. This is above the Premier's priority litter volume target of 4.2 litres per 1,000 square metres by 2020. The Environment Protection Authority's data indicates the progress towards the target of reducing the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020 has slowed.
The NSW Government plans to invest $240 million to facilitate strategic biodiversity conservation on private land. Performance measures have not yet been developed for the private land conservation program.

3.4 Water

IPART reduced water usage charges for most Sydney Water Corporation customers in 2016–17. Water usage prices in New South Wales compare favourably to larger water utilities in other jurisdictions.

Hunter Water Corporation's water recycling and water conservation performance has been stable over recent years.

The volume of Sydney Water Corporation’s recycled water reduced by 12 per cent in 2016–17 compared to the previous year.

Sydney Water Corporation experienced reduced industry demand for recycled water. Several large industrial customers relocated away from Sydney.

3.5 Arts and culture

A State priority target is to increase overall attendance at cultural venues and events in New South Wales by 15 per cent from 2014–15 levels by 2019. The Department of Planning and Environment's data indicates overall attendance increased by 16 per cent in 2015–16, although attendance fluctuated across individual venues and events. This indicates progress towards achieving the overall target by 2019.