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Published

Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.  

The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014. 

Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure. 

The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.

 

Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.

The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.

The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.

One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.

Conclusion

The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.

Waste levy

The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.

Grants for waste infrastructure

All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.

The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.

Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:

  • Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
  • Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.

A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.

Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:

  • Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
  • Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
  • Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
  • Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020

Published

Actions for Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Local Government
Planning
Environment
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years. 

Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.

The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.

The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.

The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency. 

Read full report (PDF)
 

This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.

This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.

Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.

Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.

Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.

Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.

Audit Conclusion

Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.

Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.

While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.

Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.

Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.

A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:

  • decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
  • monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
    • reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
    • monitoring projected status of plans.

Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.

Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs

The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:

  • financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
  • management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
  • independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  • ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
  • management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.

We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.

Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.

In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.

The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:

  • calculation and apportionment of LICs
  • funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
  • arrangements made with developers through VPAs.

The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look

Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.

However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.

Exhibit 10: Published information about LICs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
Financial details about contributions collected and spent Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements
Implementation plans for spending LICs Contribution plans S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan Contribution plans Developed annually within capital works plan
Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs Capital works plan and annual report Not published Not published Capital works plan
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.

Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent

Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.

The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.

Exhibit 11: Published information about VPAs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
VPA Register Council website and annual report Annual report Annual report Council website and annual report
VPA Deeds of Agreement Council website Available on request Available on request Council website
Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs In Deeds of Agreement In Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement
Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs Not published Not published Not published Not published
Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs Not published Not published In VPA Register Not published
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.

Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored

When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.

Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.

Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.

Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  3. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
  6. update procedures for managing LICs
  7. implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets. 

Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.

In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.

Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.

Recommendations

By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:

1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans

2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.

By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:

3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans

4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs

5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle

6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership

7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers

8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land

9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs

10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers

11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs

12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs

13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.

City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.

Recommendations

By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  3. periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
  4. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs. 

During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
  3. update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  6. implement security measures over critical or private information. 

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020

Published

Actions for Health capital works

Health capital works

Health
Compliance
Infrastructure
Procurement
Project management

This report examines whether NSW Health effectively planned and delivered major capital works to meet the demand for health services in New South Wales.

The report found that NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, the program was driven by Local Health District priorities without assessment of the State’s broader and future‑focussed health requirements.

The report found that unclear decision making roles and responsibilities between Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health limited the ability of NSW Health to effectively test and analyse investment options.

Project delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

The Auditor‑General recommends that NSW Health ensure its capital projects offer the greatest value to New South Wales by establishing effective policy guidance and enhancing project governance and management systems.

Read full report (PDF)

Since 2011–12, NSW Health has aimed to improve its facilities and build 'future focused' infrastructure. The NSW Government’s 2015–16 election commitments established a four-year $5.0 billion capital program for NSW Health to build and upgrade more than 60 hospitals and health services. The 2019–20 State Budget committed a further $10.1 billion over four years for another 29 projects. This is the largest investment to date on health capital works in New South Wales.

Recent reviews of infrastructure have recognised that population and demographic growth will require a change in the delivery and composition of health infrastructure, including considering greater use of non-traditional, non-capital health service options and assets.

To ensure that expenditure on capital works represents the best value for money, NSW Health's business cases need to be robust and supported by evidence that demonstrates they are worthy investments. The NSW Process of Facility Planning has been the main framework guiding the detailed planning and development of NSW Health's capital works proposals. This framework was developed by the then NSW Department of Health in 2010. Its aim is to ensure investment proposals are supported by rigorous planning processes that address health service needs and provide value for money.

Infrastructure projects of the complexity and scale being delivered by NSW Health carry inherent risks. For example, unplanned cost escalations can potentially impact on the State’s finances. Unforeseen delays can also reduce the intended benefits. The growth in the State’s health capital spend and project profile, means its exposure to such risks has increased over time.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of major capital works to meet demand for health services in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:

  • the Ministry of Health has effective procedures for planning and prioritising investments in major health capital works
  • Health Infrastructure develops robust business cases for initiated major capital works that reliably inform government decision making
  • Health Infrastructure has effective project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit focused on the Ministry of Health and Health Infrastructure – being the lead agencies within NSW Health responsible for prioritising, planning and delivering major health capital works across the State. The audit examined 13 business cases for eight discrete projects over a ten-year period.

Conclusion

NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, its planning and prioritisation processes were not assessed against a long-term statewide health infrastructure plan and lacked rigorous assessment against non-capital options creating a risk that they do not maximise value for New South Wales.

The scale of NSW Health's capital investment is significant and has grown substantially in recent years. The NSW Government’s election commitments in 2015–16 and 2019–20 collectively set out a $15.0 billion capital program to build and upgrade 89 hospitals and health services. NSW Health developed this infrastructure program in the absence of a statewide health infrastructure strategy and investment framework to focus its planning and decisions on the types of capital investments required to meet the long-term needs of the NSW health system.

Consequently, locally focused priorities of the State’s 17 Local Health Districts have been the primary drivers of NSW Health’s capital investments since 2015–16. Local Health District investment proposals for hospitals were developed without consideration of alternative health options such as community health service models, technology-driven eHealth care, or private sector options. Without rigorous assessment against a range of potential health service options, there is a risk that selected projects do not maximise value for New South Wales.

In recognition of the need for a statewide approach to infrastructure planning, the Ministry of Health recently developed a 20-year Health Infrastructure Strategy and prioritisation framework in 2019. The strategy was approved by the NSW Government in April 2020.

NSW Health's ability to effectively test and analyse its capital investment options has been compromised by unclear decision-making roles and responsibilities between its Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health agencies.

While both Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have responsibilities for the assessment of business cases for proposed infrastructure projects, confusion about the roles of each agency at key steps compromised the efficacy of the process. Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have differing views about which agency is responsible for testing business case inputs and conducting comprehensive options appraisals.

As a result of this confusion, Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health did not rigorously test Local Health District capital investment proposals against defined statewide health infrastructure investment priorities. The NSW Process of Facility Planning does not clarify the responsibilities of all parties in validating and prioritising Local Health District's Clinical Service Plans and progressing them to business cases.

NSW Health's infrastructure priorities are not sufficiently supported by transparent documentation of selection methodology and the rationale for decisions. Consequently, there is a risk that recommended options, whilst having some economic and health service merit, do not represent the greatest value.

Substantial delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

Health Infrastructure did not fully comply with NSW Government guidelines for developing business cases and making economic appraisals for proposed capital investments. These weaknesses, along with delays and budget overruns on some projects, demonstrate a need for Health Infrastructure to strengthen its project governance, management and quality control systems.

 

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

NSW Health's Process of Facility Planning similarly highlights the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by Health Infrastructure that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of health infrastructure projects greater than $10.0 million.

Project challenges indicate opportunities for strengthening governance and project management

The three major hospital redevelopments examined in metropolitan, regional and rural areas had a combined Estimated Total Cost of more than $1.2 billion and comprised eight discrete projects and 13 separate business cases.

Almost all these projects experienced delivery challenges which impacted achievement of their original objectives and intended benefits. This is expected in complex and large-scale health infrastructure programs. However, in some projects the impacts were significant and resulted in substantial delays, unforeseen costs, and diversion of resources from other priority areas.

Our review of the selected case studies highlighted opportunities for enhancing governance and project management. Specifically, it indicates a need for improving transparency in the management of contingencies, risk management and assessments particularly relating to adverse site conditions and the selection of contractors. There is also a need to strengthen forward planning for options to address unfunded priorities within business cases that risk complicating the delivery of future project stages resulting in unforeseen costs and potentially avoidable budget overruns.

Need for increased transparency and accountability in the management of contingency funds

In February 2017, the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group approved the use of surplus funds of $13.76 million from Stage 1 of the Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment for new works deemed needed to support Stage 2. Following this decision, Health Infrastructure finalised and submitted a business case addendum for Stage 1 to the Ministry in March 2017, addressing the new works comprising a two-storey building for medical imaging and paediatric floors. The business case addendum also addressed options to fit out and procure major medical imaging equipment. The Ministry approved the Stage 1 business case in July 2017, noting the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group had already approved the use of remaining Stage 1 funds to deliver the new works.

Stage 1 was completed in 2015, almost two years before the Stage 1 business case addendum was prepared in February 2017.

The Ministry's decision to approve the new works using $13.76 million of surplus Stage 1 funds did not comply with the NSW Treasury Circular TC 12/20. This policy establishes the Treasurer's approval must be sought and received before a new capital project with an Estimated Total Cost of $5.0 million or more can be approved by NSW Health. The Ministry therefore exceeded its delegated authority in making this decision, as it was not evident it had sought and received the Treasurer's approval prior to doing so.

Consequently, the surplus Stage 1 funds should not have been used by the Ministry to deliver new works in the circumstances. Instead, they should have been released from the Stage 1 project in accordance with established NSW Health procedures, and the Stage 1 Estimated Total Cost revised down accordingly. This did not occur, and NSW Health ultimately directed $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds to the new works.

These circumstances indicate a need to strengthen transparency and accountability within NSW Health for the approval of new projects, and how contingency funds are used in the management of major health capital works. They also demonstrate the impact of weaknesses with options appraisal as the initial Stage 1 business case did not consider alternative options for addressing the initially unfunded works later covered by the Stage 1 business case addendum and ultimately funded from the Stage 1 contingency provision.

Weaknesses in service delivery planning resulted in unaccounted-for costs

In addition to proposing the above-noted new works, the 2017 Stage 1 Business Case Addendum for the Hornsby-Ku-ring-gai development sought to retrospectively address the estimated funding gap of around $14.0 million for the internal fit out, supply of major medical imaging equipment, and cost to operate the medical imaging service at Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital also not addressed in the originally Stage 1 business case.

The Stage 1 business case addendum considered various procurement options to purchase and run the medical imaging services ranging from State operation purchase options to private operation purchase options.

It recommended outsourcing the operation and provision of equipment to the private sector based on estimated savings to the public sector initially of around $650,000 per annum reducing over time to $270,000. The Ministry endorsed this option in June 2017, but it did not ultimately proceed.

A July 2018 report to the Executive Steering Committee on the project shows NSW Health later decided to deliver operation of the medical imaging unit 'traditionally' with an updated estimate of the cost at approximately $16.4 million. The report also shows the Ministry supported the costs now being met by the Northern Sydney Local Health District.

This means the funding gap previously identified in the Stage 1 business case addendum for fitting out the medical imaging building and supply of major medical equipment would need to be met fully by the State, representing a $16.4 million cost overrun for the project.

Examined reports to the Executive Steering Committee show this was largely funded by the Northern Sydney Local Health District via the disposal of land realising approximately $15.0 million in proceeds.

This initially unforeseen cost, along with the additional $11.0 million for the new works approved under the Stage 1 business case addendum, were ultimately merged with the Stage 2 project initially approved in 2017–18 with an Estimated Total Cost of $200 million.

The extent of budget variation on the Hornsby Kur-ring-gai development has not been transparent

The 2019–20 State Budget provided an additional $65.0 million for a further Stage 2A to deliver additional built capacity to support outpatient services, enhanced allied health services, re-housed community health services and the delivery of prioritised clinical services unfunded as part of Stage 2. The funds were approved based on an Investment Decision Template (IDT) that examined two options in addition to the base case representing scoping alternatives to the preferred master planned capital solution.

However, we found the IDT showed around 23 per cent of the $65.0 million sought (i.e. $15.0 million) was to be allocated to fund the deficit in Stage 2, which had arisen as a result of project delays due to adverse site conditions. This was not discussed in the IDT.

The February 2020 report to the Executive Steering Committee shows a combined Stage 2 and 2A final forecast cost of $292.6 million against a potential budget of $290.7 million representing an overall deficit for the project of around 0.6 per cent.

However, this favourable final budget position does not transparently show the funding challenges experienced over the project's implementation to-date. The three major budget issues include:

  • inappropriate use of around $11.0 million in Stage 1 contingency for originally unfunded works contrary to Treasury policy
  • the additional $16.4 million cost unforeseen in the Stage 1 business case for delivering medical imaging services mostly funded through the sale of land
  • an additional $15.0 million from Stage 2A to cover the budget overrun in Stage 2 due to adverse site conditions.

The cumulative impact of these events is that Stages 1 and 2 of the Hornsby project cost approximately $42.4 million than it should have in the circumstances around 14 per cent more than what the revised combined Estimated Total Cost for both stages should have been after releasing the $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds, with Stage 2 delayed by around 14 months.

Opportunity for strengthening risk management for adverse site conditions

Major construction projects often experience adverse site conditions which can be difficult to fully detect in advance. However, we found this was a common occurrence in the projects we examined sometimes with significant time and/or budget impacts indicating scope to enhance related risk and cost assessments. Specifically:

  • Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions during demolition works resulted in an 11-month delay for delivering the medical imaging unit and 14-month delay completing Stage 2 main works including need for additional $15.0 million in funds to cover the resultant budget deficit for the project.
  • Blacktown Mt Druitt Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions combined with project complexity delayed completion of the early works by approximately five months. This contributed to the delay in completing the main construction works which occurred around nine months later than planned in the business case.
  • Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment Stages 3 and 4: Health Infrastructure advised adverse site conditions including asbestos containing materials and ground conditions delayed works for the main building with completion forecast for March 2021, around 21 months later than planned in the final business case. This resulted in the need for additional $13.5 million to cover increased construction costs and risks, increasing the Stage 3 and 4 forecast final cost from $150 million to $163.5 million as at February 2020.

These examples indicate a risk the cumulative impact of adverse site conditions may be substantial when measured across both time and Health Infrastructure's full delivery program. They also point to potential for Health Infrastructure to achieve efficiencies and improved outcomes from strengthening its approach to assessing and mitigating the risks from adverse site conditions.

Limited due diligence with prospective contractors risks avoidable delays and costs

Main construction works on Stage 1 of the Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment were completed in October 2015, approximately 13 months later than planned in the final business case. Delays were mainly due to insolvency of the early works contractor resulting in their departure from the project. The ensuing 11-month delay in completing the early works significantly impacted the overall schedule and delivery of main construction works.

The insolvency event was significant as it affected nine separate Health Infrastructure projects – three of which had yet to reach practical completion. It also affected state-funded projects in other sectors. It resulted in the need for additional funding of $11.5 million that was provided in the 2014–15 State Budget increasing the total Stage 1 and 2 budget from $79.8 million to $91.3 million.

Health Infrastructure’s analysis of lessons learned shows it worked actively to mitigate the impacts of the insolvency event across all affected projects. However, it also indicates a risk the lessons were mainly focused on mitigating the impacts after an insolvency event occurred rather than on prevention.

Although Health Infrastructure initially commissioned a financial assessment of the now insolvent early works contractor before engagement, it did not detect any risks of the impending insolvency and instead concluded the contractor was in a strong financial position. However, the contractor became insolvent shortly after commencement approximately seven months later. This indicates a risk of weaknesses in the assessment performed that was not explicitly addressed by the lessons learned.

Delivery of the main construction works were further impacted by disputes with the main works contractor over the scope of works for the renal unit resulting in Health Infrastructure terminating the contract in November 2016 following lengthy negotiations over several months.

The scope of works relating to the renal unit were ultimately transferred to Stages 3 and 4 and were delivered in December 2019, around five years later than originally planned in the business case.

Health Infrastructure advised the delay was ultimately beneficial to the project because the refurbishment works for the renal unit, initially scheduled for Stages 1 and 2, would have been demolished to accommodate the new Western Cancer Centre proposed after Stages 1 and 2 and currently being delivered in parallel with Stages 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the actual cost of Stages 1 and 2 was $84.7 million against the budget of $91.3 million. The residual $6.6 million relates to the renal works not delivered during Stage 1 and 2 and transferred to Stage 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the contractual provisions for mitigating insolvency events 'in-flight' are limited highlighting the importance of proactive and effective due diligence prior to engaging contractors for significant construction projects.

Need for a quality framework linked to staff training and capability development

Health Infrastructure's 2017-20 Corporate Plan identifies the development of a quality framework to support delivery of future-focused outcomes as a key organisational priority. Related initiatives within the Corporate Plan describe a framework underpinned by a Quality Committee providing advice on:

  • records management, to meet the requirements of the State Records Act 1998
  • project assurance, to ensure future focused outcomes and enhance Health Infrastructure's Standards, Policies, Procedures and Guidelines, Templates and Design Guidance Notes
  • knowledge management and library services, to promote and leverage from project learnings.

Although Health Infrastructure has some elements of a quality framework it is not yet fully in place. Health Infrastructure advised it had yet to establish the quality framework and related committee described in its Corporate Plan due in part to its focus on responding to the growth of its capital program.

Health Infrastructure's Development and Innovation team has been active in supporting continuous improvement in knowledge and project management including development of business cases. Although useful, these initiatives have relied heavily on leveraging and disseminating insights from Gateway reviews and have not formed part of a systematic quality and continuous improvement framework.

The limited focus on the quality of business cases is reflected in internal performance monitoring and reporting which focuses mainly on tracking the delivery of projects against internal benchmarks, often revised from the baselines in the business case, and expenditure against cashflow targets. There is no evident internal monitoring and/or reporting to the Chief Executive and Board on defined quality metrics linked to business case development and staff capability.

Performance reporting on balanced scorecard metrics has similarly focused mainly on process rather than quality and has been inconsistent in recent years.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Appendix four – Ministry of Health planning tools and guidelines

Appendix five – Streamlined investment decision process for Health Capital Projects

Appendix six – Timeline of business cases and relevant policy guidelines

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #338 - released 12 August 2020

Published

Actions for Their Futures Matter

Their Futures Matter

Justice
Community Services
Education
Health
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Communities and Justice had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to deliver ‘Their Futures Matter’.

Their Futures Matter was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services, and direct investment to where funding and programs deliver the greatest social and economic benefits. It was a four-year whole-of-government reform in response to the 2015 Tune Review of out-of-home care.

The Auditor-General found that while important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled, the key objective to establish an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW was not achieved.

Governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements to deliver Their Futures Matter were found to be ineffective. 'Their Futures Matter lacked mechanisms to secure cross portfolio buy‑in and did not have authority to drive reprioritisation of government investment', the Auditor-General said.

At the reform’s close, the majority of around $380 million in investment funding remains tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. The reform concluded on 30 June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to the Department of Communities and Justice, aimed at improving implementation of outstanding objectives, revising governance arrangements, and utilising the new human services data set to address the intent of the reform. However, these recommendations respond only in part to the findings of the audit.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘Cross-portfolio leadership and action is required to ensure a whole-of-government response to delivering the objectives of Their Futures Matter to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families in New South Wales.’

Read full report (PDF)

In 2016, the NSW Government launched 'Their Futures Matter' (TFM) - a whole-of-government reform aimed at delivering improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families. TFM was the government's key response to the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales (known as 'the Tune Review').

The Tune Review found that, despite previous child protection reforms, the out of home care system was ineffective and unsustainable. It highlighted that the system was not client-centred and was failing to improve the long-term outcomes for vulnerable children and families. The review found that the greatest proportion of relevant expenditure was made in out of home care service delivery rather than in evidence-based early intervention strategies to support children and families when vulnerabilities first become evident to government services (such as missed school days or presentations to health services).

The then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) designed the TFM reform initiatives, in consultation with central and human services agencies. A cross-agency board, senior officers group, and a new unit in the FACS cluster were established to drive the implementation of TFM. In the 2016–17 Budget, the government allocated $190 million over four years (2016–17 to 2019–20) to the reform. This resourced the design and commissioning of evidence-based pilots, data analytics work, staffing for the implementation unit and secretariat support for the board and cross-agency collaboration.

As part of the TFM reform, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury and partnering agencies (NSW Health, Department of Education and Department of Justice) identified various existing programs that targeted vulnerable children and families (such as the preceding whole-of-government ‘Keep Them Safe’ reform coming to an end in June 2020). Funding for these programs, totalling $381 million in 2019–20, was combined to form a nominal ‘investment pool’. The government intended that the TFM Implementation Board would use this pool to direct and prioritise resource allocation to evidence-based interventions for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

This audit assessed whether TFM had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to enable an evidence-based early intervention investment approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Was the TFM reform driven by effective governance arrangements?
  • Was the TFM reform supported by effective cross-agency collaboration?
  • Has the TFM reform generated an evidence base to inform a cross-agency investment approach in the future?

The audit did not seek to assess the outcomes for children, young people and families achieved by TFM programs and projects.

Conclusion

The governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements used to deliver the Their Futures Matter reform were ineffective. Important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled over the reform's four years. However, an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW − the key objective of the reform − was not established. The reform concluded in June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The governance arrangements established for the Their Futures Matter (TFM) reform did not provide sufficient independence, authority and cross-agency clout to deliver on the reform’s intent. This hindered delivery of the reform's key elements, particularly the redirection of funding to evidence-based earlier intervention supports, and limited the impact that TFM could have on driving system change.

TFM increased focus on the contribution that other agencies outside of the former Family and Community Services portfolio could make in responding to the needs of vulnerable children and families, and in reducing the demand costs of related government service delivery. Despite being a whole-of-government reform, TFM lacked mechanisms to secure cross-portfolio buy-in and lacked the powers to drive reprioritisation of government investment in evidence-based and earlier intervention supports across agencies. At the reform’s close, the majority of the reform's investment pool funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives.

TFM began building an evidence base about ‘what works’, including piloting programs and creating a new dataset to identify risk factors for vulnerability and future costs to government. However, this evidence base does not yet comprehensively map how existing services meet needs, identify system duplications or gaps, nor demonstrate which government funded supports and interventions are most effective to make a difference to life outcomes for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
Despite these issues, the need, intent and vision for Their Futures Matter remains relevant and urgent, as issues identified in the Tune Review remain pertinent.

Their Futures Matter (TFM) is a whole-of-government reform to deliver improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families.

Supported by a cross-agency TFM Board, and the TFM Unit in the then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), the reform aimed to develop whole-of-government evidence-based early intervention investment approaches for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

Governance refers to the structures, systems and practices that an organisation has in place to:

  • assign decision-making authorities and establish the organisation's strategic direction
  • oversee the delivery of its services, the implementation of its policies, and the monitoring and mitigation of its key risks
  • report on its performance in achieving intended results, and drive ongoing improvements.

We examined whether the TFM reform was driven by effective governance arrangements and cross-agency collaboration.

The reform agenda and timeframe set down for Their Futures Matter (TFM) were ambitious. This chapter assesses whether the TFM Board and TFM Unit had the capability, capacity and clout within government to deliver the reform agenda.

Creating a robust evidence base was important for Their Futures Matter, in order to:

  • identify effective intervention strategies to improve supports and outcomes for vulnerable children and families
  • make efficient use of taxpayer money to assist the maximum number of vulnerable children and families
  • inform the investment-based approach for future funding allocation.

This chapter assesses whether the TFM reform has developed an evidence base to inform cross-agency investment decisions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – TFM governance entities

Appendix three – TFM Human Services Data Set

Appendix four – TFM pilot programs

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #337 - released 24 July 2020

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Funding enhancements for police technology

Funding enhancements for police technology

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report focuses on how the NSW Police Force managed a $100 million program to acquire new technology. The program invested in technologies intended to make police work safer and quicker. These included body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices, mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices.

The audit found that while the NSW Police Force mostly managed the ‘Policing for Tomorrow’ program effectively, investment decision making could be improved in the future. The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to identify capability gaps and target the acquired technologies to plug these.

The NSW Police Force has processes in place to monitor the benefits of some of the larger technology, but it does not do this consistently for all procured technology. It could not demonstrate that smaller projects are improving the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.

The audit also found that the NSW Police Force does not routinely engage with external stakeholders on the use or impacts of new technology that changes how officers interact with the public, noting that this will not always be possible for particularly sensitive procurements that involve covert technologies or methodologies.

The Auditor-General made three recommendations to guide improvement of NSW Police Force ICT procurement, benefits management and stakeholder engagement processes.

Read full report (PDF)

Ahead of the March 2015 election, the NSW Government announced a $100 million Policing for Tomorrow fund for the NSW Police Force to acquire technology intended to make police work safer and quicker. The announcement committed the NSW Police Force to several investment priorities, including body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices (MobiPOL), mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices. Otherwise, the NSW Police Force was allowed flexibility in identifying and resourcing suitable projects.

This audit assessed whether the Policing for Tomorrow fund was effectively managed to improve policing in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Did the NSW Police Force efficiently and effectively identify, acquire, implement and maintain technology resourced by the fund?
  • Did the NSW Police Force establish effective governance arrangements for administering the fund, and for monitoring expected benefits and unintended consequences?
  • Did technology implemented under the fund improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in New South Wales?

Conclusion

The NSW Police Force's management of the Policing for Tomorrow fund was mostly effective. There are measures in place to assess the impact of the technologies on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in NSW. However, these measures are not in place for all technologies funded by Policing for Tomorrow. A strategic whole-of-organisation approach to identifying and filling technology capability gaps may have assisted in better targeting funds and managing expected benefits.

The NSW Police Force identified, acquired, implemented and maintained a range of technologies resourced by the fund in an efficient and effective way. The election announcement committed the NSW Police Force to four specific projects which made up over three quarters of the fund value. Investment decisions for remaining funds were driven by the availability of funding and individual technology requirements rather than targeting improved policing outcomes and the capability necessary to achieve these.

The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to selecting technology projects for the remainder of the funds where it had discretion. This may have included considering less obvious back office technology or making different investment decisions driven by gaps in the agency's technology capabilities.

The NSW Police Force used effective governance arrangements for administering the Policing for Tomorrow fund, including using its existing ICT Executive Board. The NSW Police Force has adequate processes in place to drive benefits and monitor the impact of technology on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing for the larger projects funded by Policing for Tomorrow. Further work is required to ensure this for smaller projects.

The NSW Police Force tends to consider only impacts on the organisation in managing benefits and identifying unintended consequences. It does not routinely engage proactively with stakeholders, including partner criminal justice agencies and members of the community, on new technology that changes how police interact with the public.

We examined how effectively the NSW Police Force governed the Policing for Tomorrow fund, to ensure that key accountability and decision-making arrangements were in place to direct the $100 million spend to appropriate technologies. We also assessed how the NSW Police Force acquired, implemented and maintained technology funded by Policing for Tomorrow to determine the effectiveness of the relevant asset management.

The Policing for Tomorrow election commitment aimed to invest in technology to ‘make police work safer and quicker – meaning more time on the street combatting crime’. We assessed whether the NSW Police Force ensured that funded technologies have improved policing efficiency and effectiveness. We did not seek to independently assure the benefits or outcomes resulting from the technologies.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Policing for Tomorrow projects and expenditure

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #334 - released 2 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Destination NSW's support for major events

Destination NSW's support for major events

Treasury
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.

The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.

DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.

Read full report (PDF)

Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.

This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
  • DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.

This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.

Conclusion

Destination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions.

DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these.

DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money.

Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Supporting the District Criminal Court

Supporting the District Criminal Court

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on whether the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system.

The audit found that in the provision of data and technology services, the department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The department has insufficient controls in place to ensure that data in the system is always accurate.

The department is also using outdated technology and could improve its delivery of technical support to courts.

The audit also assessed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. This reform aims to improve court efficiency by having more cases resolved earlier with a guilty plea in the Local Court. The audit found that the department effectively governed the implementation of the reform but is not measuring achievement of expected benefits, placing the objectives of the reform at risk.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the controls around courts data, reporting on key performance indicators, improving regional technical support and measuring the success of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. 

The District Court is the intermediate court in the New South Wales court system. It hears most serious criminal matters, except murder, treason and piracy. The Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) provides support to the District Court in a variety of ways. For example, it provides security services, library services and front-desk services. This audit examined three forms of support that the Department provides to the District Court:

  • data collection, reporting and analysis - the Department collects data from cases in its case management system, JusticeLink, based on the orders Judges make in court and court papers
  • technology - the Department provides technology to courts across New South Wales, as well as technical support for this technology
  • policy - the Department is responsible for proposing and implementing policy reforms.

Recent years have seen a worsening of District Court efficiency, as measured in the Productivity Commission's Report on Government Services (RoGS). Efficiency in the court system is typically measured through timeliness of case completion. There is evidence that timeliness has worsened. For example, the median time from arrest to finalisation of a case in the District Court increased from 420 days in 2012–13 to 541 days in 2017–18.

As a result, the government has announced a range of measures to improve court performance, particularly in the District Court. These measures included the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform. One of the objectives of EAGP is to improve court efficiency, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve with a guilty plea in the Local Court.

This audit assessed whether the Department of Communities and Justice effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. We assessed this with the following lines of inquiry:

  • Does the Department effectively collect, analyse and report performance information relevant to court efficiency?
  • Does the Department effectively provide technology to support the efficient working of the courts?
  • Does the Department have effective plans, governance and monitoring for the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform?

The audit did not consider other support functions provided by the Department. Further information on the audit, including detailed audit criteria, may be found in Appendix two.

Conclusion
In the provision of data and technology services, the Department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The Department has insufficient controls in place to ensure accurate data in the District Criminal Court system. The Department is also using outdated technology in significant numbers and could improve its delivery of technical support to meet agreed targets.
The Department effectively governed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. However, it is not ensuring that the benefits stated in the business case are being achieved, placing its objectives at risk.
The impact of inaccurate court data can be severe, and the Department does not have sufficient controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate. Recent Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research reviews have identified data inaccuracies, and this demonstrates the Department needs strong controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate.
The Department does not have a policy for data quality and has not formally assigned responsibility for data quality to any individual or branch. The Department also does not have a data dictionary outlining all the fields in its case management system. While the Department validates the highest risk items, such as warrants, to ensure that they are accurate, most data is not validated. The Department has recently commenced setting up a data unit for the Courts, Tribunals and Service Delivery branch. It is proposed that this unit will address most of the identified shortcomings.
The Department did not provide timely technical support to the court system in 2017 and is using outdated technology in significant numbers. The Digital and Technology Services branch of the Department had agreed a Service Level Agreement with the rest of the Department, outlining the expected speed of technical support responses. The branch did not meet response times in 2017. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Critical incidents are particularly important to deal with in a timely manner as they include incidents which may delay a court sitting.
Requests for technical support rose significantly in 2018 compared to 2017, which may be related to the number of outdated pieces of technology. As at April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers outside their warranty period. The Department was also using other outdated technology. Outdated technology is more prone to failure and continuing to use it poses a risk of court delays.
The Department is not measuring all the expected benefits from the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform, placing the objectives of the program at risk. The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas business case outlined nine expected benefits from the reform. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits of a further five business case benefits. Not measuring the impact of the reform means that the Department does not know if it is achieving its objectives and if the reform had the desired impact.

The Department is responsible for providing technology to the courts, which can improve the efficiency of court operations by making them faster and cheaper. The Department is also responsible for providing technical support to courtrooms and registries. It is important that technical support is provided in a timely manner because some technical incidents can delay court sittings and thus impact on court efficiency. A 2013 Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development report emphasised the importance of technology and digitisation for reducing trial length.

While the Department may provide technology to the courts, they are not responsible for deciding when, how or if the technology is used in the courtroom.

The Department is using a significant amount of outdated technology, risking court delays

As of April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers out of warranty, 56.0 per cent of the court system's fleet. The court system also had 786 printing devices out of their normal warranty period, 75.1 per cent of all printers in use. The Department also advised that many of its court audio transcription machines are out of date. These machines must be running for the court to sit and thus it is critical that they are maintained to a high degree. The then Department of Justice estimated the cost of aligning its hardware across the whole Department with desired levels at $14.0 million per year for three years. Figures for the court system were not calculated but they are likely to be a significant portion of this figure.

Using outdated technology poses a risk to the court system as older equipment may be more likely to break down, potentially delaying courts or slowing down court services. In the court system throughout 2018, hardware made up 30.8 per cent of all critical incidents reported to technical support and 41.9 per cent of all high priority incidents. In addition, 16.2 per cent of all reported issues related to printing devices or printing.

From 2017 to 2018, technical support incidents from courts or court services increased. There were 4,379 technical support incidents in 2017, which increased significantly to 9,186 in 2018. The Department advised that some outside factors may have contributed to this increase. The Department was rolling out its new incident recording system throughout 2017, meaning that there would be an under‑reporting of incidents in that year. The Department also advised that throughout 2018 there was a greater focus on ensuring that every issue was logged, which had not previously been the case. Despite these factors, the use of outdated technology has likely increased the risk of technology breakages and may have contributed to the increase in requests for technical support.

Refreshing technology on a regular basis would reduce the risk of hardware failures and ensure that equipment is covered by warranty.

The Department did not meet all court technical support targets in 2017 and 2018

The Digital and Technology Services branch (DTS) was responsible for providing technical support to the courts and the Courts and Tribunal Services branch prior to July 2019. DTS provided technical support in line with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Department. In 2017, DTS did not provide this support in a timely manner. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Exhibit 7 outlines DTS' targets under the SLA.

Exhibit 7: Digital and Technology Services' Service Level Agreement
Priority Target resolution time Target percentage in time (%)
1. Critical 4 hours 80
2. High 1 day 80
3. Moderate 3 days 85
4. Low 5 days 85
Source: Department of Communities and Justice, 2019.

Critical incidents are particularly important for the Department to deal with in a timely manner because these include incidents which may delay a court sitting until resolved or incidents which impact on large numbers of staff. Some of the critical incidents raised with DTS specifically stated that they were delaying a court sitting, often due to transcription machines not working. High priority incidents include those where there is some impact on the functions of the business, which may in turn affect the efficiency of the court system. High priority incidents also include those directly impacting on members of the Judiciary. 

This audit examined DTS' performance against its SLA in the 2017 and 2018 calendar years across the whole court system, not just the District Court. The total number of incidents, as well as critical and high priority incidents, can be seen in Exhibit 8.

Exhibit 8: Number of incidents in 2017 and 2018
Priority 2017 2018
All 4,379 9,186
1. Critical 48 91
2. High 128 315
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis of Department of Communities and Justice data, 2019.

The Department's results against its SLA in 2017 and 2018 are shown in Exhibit 9.

The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform consists of five main elements:

  • early disclosure of evidence from NSW Police Force to the prosecution and defence
  • early certification of what the accused is going to be charged with to minimise changes
  • mandatory criminal case conferencing between the prosecutor and accused's representation
  • changes to Local Court case management
  • more structured sentence discounts.

More detailed descriptions of each of these changes can be found in the Introduction. These reform elements are anticipated to have three key effects:

  • accelerate the timing of guilty pleas
  • increase the overall proportion of guilty pleas
  • decrease the average length of contested trials.

Improving District Court efficiency is one of the stated aims of EAGP, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve in the Local Court and having fewer defendants plead guilty on the day of their trial in the District Court. The reform commenced in April 2018 and it is too early to state the impact of this reform on District Court efficiency.

The Department is responsible for delivering EAGP in conjunction with other justice sector agencies. They participated in the Steering Committee and the Working Groups, as well as providing the Project Management Office (PMO).

The Department is not measuring the economic benefits stated in the EAGP business case

The business case for EAGP listed nine quantifiable benefits which were expected to be derived from the achievement of the three key effects listed above. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits for five more, as shown in Exhibit 12.

Benefit Economic benefit (over ten years) Being measured?
Accelerated timing of guilty pleas $54.6m yellow circle with minus in the center
Increased guilty plea rate $90.7m yellow circle with minus in the center
Decreased average trial length $27.5m yellow circle with minus in the center
A reduction in the delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial N/A check circle mauve
Increase the number of finalised matters per annum N/A check circle mauve
Reduction of the current backlog of criminal trials in the District Court N/A check circle mauve
Reduction in bed pressure on the correction system due to reduced
average time in custody
$13.7m Exclamation circle red
Productivity improvements due to reduction in wasted effort $53.3m yellow circle with minus in the center
Bankable cost savings due to jury empanelment avoided $2.5m yellow circle with minus in the center

 

Exhibit 12: The Department's measurement of quantifiable benefits
Key check circle mauve Measuring yellow circle with minus in the center Not measuring economic benefit Exclamation circle red Not measuring
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis.

While it is too early to comment on the overall impact of EAGP, better practice in benefits realisation involves an ongoing effort to monitor benefits to ensure that the reform is on target and determine whether any corrective action is needed.

The Department is measuring the number of finalised matters per annum and while the Department is not measuring the reduction in the backlog as part of this program, this measure is reported as part of the Department's internal reporting framework. The Department is not monitoring the reduction in delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial directly as part of this reform, but this does form part of the monthly Operational Performance Report which the Department sends to the EAGP Steering Committee.

The Department is not monitoring any of the economic benefits stated in the business case. These economic benefits are a mixture of bankable savings and productivity improvements. This amounts to a total of $242.3 million over ten years which was listed in the business case as potential economic benefits from the implementation of this reform against the total cost of $206.9 million over ten years. The Department is collecting proxy indicators which would assist in these calculations for several indicators, but it is not actively monitoring these savings. For example, the Department is monitoring average trial length, but is not using this information to calculate economic benefits derived from changes in trial length.

The Department is also not collecting information related to the average length of custody as part of this program. This means that it is unable to determine if EAGP is putting less pressure on the correctives system and it is not possible for the Department to calculate the savings from this particular benefit.

While stakeholders are optimistic about the impact of EAGP, not measuring the expected benefits stated in the business case means that the Department does not know if the reform is achieving what it was designed to achieve. Further, the Department does not know if it must take corrective action to ensure that the program achieves the stated benefits. These two things put the overall program benefits at risk.

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit, potentially risking the success of the program

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit stated in the business case. The Department holds the Steering Committee responsible for the realisation of all benefits. Benefits realisation is the process which ensures that the agency reaches benefits as stated in the business case. Assigning responsibility for benefits realisation to the Steering Committee rather than individuals is not in line with good practice.

Good practice benefits realisation involves assigning responsibility for the realisation of each benefit to an individual at the business unit level. This ensures there is a single point of accountability for each part of the program with knowledge of the benefit and the ability to take corrective action if it looks like that benefit will not be realised. This responsibility should sit at the operational level where detailed action can most easily be undertaken. The role of a Steering Committee in benefits realisation is to ensure that responsible parties are monitoring their benefits and taking appropriate corrective action.

The Department advised that it believes the Steering Committee should have responsibility for the realisation of benefits due to the difficulty of attributing the achievement of each benefit to one part of the reform alone. Given the Steering Committee meets only quarterly, it is not well placed to take action in response to variances in performance.

A BOCSAR evaluation is planned, however data errors make some of the information unreliable

BOCSAR are planning to undertake an overall evaluation of EAGP which is planned for release in 2021. Undertaking this evaluation will require high quality data to gain an understanding of the drivers of the reform. However, data captured throughout the first year of EAGP has proven unreliable, which may reduce the usefulness of BOCSAR's evaluation. These data issues were discussed in Exhibit 5 in Chapter 2, above. Access to accurate data is vital for conducting any program evaluation and inaccurate data raises the risk that the BOCSAR evaluation will not be able to provide an accurate evaluation of the impact of EAGP.

In addition to the BOCSAR evaluation, the Department had plans for a series of 'snapshot' evaluations for some of the key elements of the reform to ensure that they were operating effectively. These were initially delayed due to an efficiency dividend which affected EAGP. In August 2019, the Department commissioned a review of the implementation of several key success factors for EAGP.

There was clear governance throughout the implementation of EAGP

The implementation stage of EAGP had clear governance, lines of authority and communication. The Steering Committee, each Working Group and each agency had clear roles and responsibilities, and these were organised through a Project Management Office (PMO) provided by the former Department of Justice. The governance structure throughout the implementation phase can be seen at Exhibit 13.

The Steering Committee was established in December 2016 and met regularly from March 2017. It comprised senior members of key government agencies, as well as the Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate for most of the duration of the implementation period. The Steering Committee met at least monthly throughout the life of the program. The Steering Committee was responsible for overseeing the delivery of EAGP and making key decisions relating to implementation, including spending decisions. The Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate abstained from financial decisions. The Steering Committee updated the governance and membership of the Steering Committee as appropriate throughout the life of the reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #329 - released 18 December 2019

Published

Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Health
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report examined whether HealthShare NSW, a part of NSW Health, has the required contract management capability to effectively manage goods and services contracts valued over $250,000. 

The report found that HealthShare has a procurement framework that should support effective contract management, but it is not applying it consistently. In particular, the audit found that HealthShare was not applying key contract management elements to over 80 per cent of the high-value contracts it manages. The audit also found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.

'Effective contract management is essential to ensure the contracts HealthShare enters into are delivering as expected and ensuring value for money,' said the Auditor-General. 'Without this, the value for money or savings HealthShare achieves when it negotiates these contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of the contract.'

The report recommends that NSW Health develop a performance improvement plan to ensure HealthShare is fully compliant with procurement policies and that NSW Health meets its obligations under the Government's Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement.

HealthShare is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

NSW Government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, agencies achieve value for money, and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability (such as staff knowledge, skills and experience) as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for overseeing the Government's procurement system, setting policy and ensuring compliance. It has accredited the Health Administration Corporation (HAC) to procure goods and services with no upper financial limit. Under the terms of this accreditation, the Secretary, NSW Health (as head of HAC) has delegated the procurement of high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts within NSW Health to only the Ministry of Health and HealthShare NSW (HealthShare).

HealthShare NSW (HealthShare) is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high-value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

HealthShare’s Contract Management Guide states that, without rigorous contract management, 75 per cent of projected sourcing savings can disappear within 18 months of the contract starting.

This audit examined whether HealthShare has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts. Contracts we examined included critical items such as food services in hospitals, patient transport services, intravenous equipment and kidney dialysis services, where risks include patient safety as well as value for money. We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We also did not examine HealthShare’s sourcing processes, including identifying business needs, tendering and contract award.

We assessed HealthShare against the following criteria:

  1. HealthShare's systems, policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. HealthShare has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

We included the NSW Public Service Commission and NSW Treasury, through NSW Procurement, as auditees because they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability. These include:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework
  • Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement
  • the NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

NSW Procurement was transferred to NSW Treasury from the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements.

Conclusion
HealthShare is not applying the capability needed to effectively manage high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts. HealthShare's procurement framework includes elements that should support effective contract management, and it has a systematic approach to managing staff contract management capability. That said, HealthShare is not implementing key contract management elements of its own framework. As such, the value for money or savings it achieves when it negotiates contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of these contracts.
Effective contract management is essential for HealthShare to ensure contracts it enters into are delivering the goods and services expected and achieving value for money, safety and quality. The Ministry of Health and HealthShare have invested in developing and implementing systems and tools to support effective contract management. In line with its obligations under the Agency Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement (accreditation program), the Ministry of Health mandates the use of contract management plans for high-value contracts. The Ministry of Health also requires that all health entities use the PROcure contract management system for ongoing management of contracts with a value over $150,000. HealthShare is not complying with these directions for over 80 per cent of the contracts it manages.
In the absence of HealthShare following its framework, and the Ministry of Health’s directions, we looked for other evidence that HealthShare was effectively managing high-value contracts. We found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.
When Local Health Districts (LHDs) need to procure high-value goods and services, the Ministry of Health’s procurement policy requires that they use HealthShare to source and manage the procurement. This is to manage risk and provide oversight of procurement and contracts across the NSW health system. Despite this policy, HealthShare was only managing the sourcing stage of the procurement and transferring responsibility for contract management to the relevant LHD.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Contract performance management summary

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #328 - released 31 October 2019