Reports
Actions for Customer Service 2021
Customer Service 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Customer Service cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the ‘Report on State Finances’ focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the ‘Report on State Finances’ has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Customer Service cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of Customer Service cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Customer Service cluster agencies.
The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 48 in 2019–20 to 46 in 2020–21.
Seven out of eight agencies did not complete all mandatory early close procedures.
What the key issues were
Upon the implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors', the Department of Customer Service (the department) recognised a service concession asset, the land titling database, totalling $845 million for the first time at 1 July 2019.
The department reported several retrospective corrections of prior period errors.
The 2020–21 audits identified three high-risk and 59 moderate risk issues across the cluster. The high-risk issues were related to:
- the Department of Customer Service – internal control qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect service providers
- the Department of Customer Service – significant control deficiencies in information technology change management controls
- Rental Bond Board – uncertainties in the accounting treatment of rental bonds.
The percentage of repeat issues we report to management and those charged with governance in management letters increased from 29 per cent in prior year to 42 per cent in 2020–21 while the number of items decreased from 94 to 93.
The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers increased resulting in additional audit procedures to address the risks of fraud and errors in the financial statements.
What we recommended
The department should improve the validation process of key valuation assumptions and inputs provided by the private operator NSW Land Registry Services. It should revisit its accounting treatment of new land titling records.
The department should ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise the remediation of control deficiencies in information technology services.
The department should continue to improve controls in cyber security management.
Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.
The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority should improve its fixed assets management and financial reporting process to accommodate its growing fixed assets profile.
Fast factsThe Customer Service cluster aims to plan, prioritise, fund and drive digital transformation and customer service across every cluster in the NSW Government.
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This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service.
Section highlights
|
Findings reported to management
Forty-two per cent of findings reported to management were repeat issues
Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.
In 2020–21, there were 93 findings raised across the cluster (94 in 2019–20). Forty-two per cent of all issues were repeat issues (29 per cent in 2019–20).
The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.
A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.
The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.
Risk rating | Issue |
Information technology | |
High3 1 new, 1 repeat |
The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:
High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter. |
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Internal control deficiencies or improvements | |
Moderate2 |
The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including:
|
Low1 |
|
Financial reporting | |
High3 |
The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:
High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter. |
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Governance and oversight | |
Moderate2 10 new, 3 repeat |
The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:
|
Low1 3 new |
|
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies | |
Moderate2 4 new, 4 repeat |
The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:
|
Low1 1 repeat |
2020–21 audits identified three high-risk findings
High-risk findings, including repeat findings, were reported at the following cluster agencies. One of the 2019–20 high-risk findings were not resolved.
Agency | Description |
2020–21 findings | |
Department of Customer Service Repeat finding: Qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect NSW controls assurance reports |
The GovConnect information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified in 2020–21. The key controls over user access, system changes and batch process failed in all ITGC reports. Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access. The control deficiencies in ITGC increase:
The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. It is leading a new IT operating model called ‘Service Integration and Application Management’ (SIAM) to strengthen governance and improve performance of GovConnect service providers. The Department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in the GovConnect environment. This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately addressed, it had the potential to result in material fraud and error in the department's financial statements and reputation damages. This issue is further discussed later in this chapter. |
2020–21 findings | |
Department of Customer Service New finding: Change management significant control deficiencies |
Revenue NSW, a division of the department has a key role in managing the State’s finances. It administers State taxes, manages fines, recovers State debt and administers grants and subsidies. The audit team found significant control deficiencies in change management controls:
We have included this matter as a high-risk management letter finding, as the audit team could not identify mitigating controls. The system activity of these developers was also not being independently logged and monitored. This increases the risk of unauthorised system change. This can significantly affect the integrity of tax calculation, business process approvals, invalid changes to bank accounts, unauthorised refunds and write-offs. The audit team conducted a risk analysis over the relevant business processes affected by this issue and performed additional audit procedures to address the audit risk. |
Rental Bond Board Repeat finding: Accounting treatment of rental bonds held in trust |
The Rental Bond Board (the Board) holds rental bonds totalling $1.7 billion at 30 June 2021. The Board treated the rental bonds off-balance sheet and disclosed the rental bonds as ‘trust funds’. This treatment is based on management’s judgement that the Board does not have control of these funds. Previously the Board obtained advices from the Crown Solicitors who stated that in their view the rental bond funds held in the rental bond account were not moneys held in trust and the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (the Act) should be reviewed and amended to better support its accounting treatment of rental bonds. The Board has initiated the need to amend the Act, however the implementation of the legislative amendments is still pending. This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately supported, it had the potential to result in material misstatements in the Board's financial statements. |
The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year
Fifty-nine moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, which was a 11.3 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 26 were repeat findings, and 33 were new issues.
Moderate risk findings include:
- weaknesses in user access management, such as untimely access removal for terminated staff, and a lack of periodic user access review
- accounting for leases such as the review of extension options, assessing indicators of impairment and reviewing the lease reports for completeness and accuracy
- formalising arrangements between agencies including corporate service arrangements, funding arrangements, leases, use of SAP system and computer assets
- use of purchasing cards where our data analytics performed indicated potential gaps and controls and non-compliance with government policies.
The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers have increased
In 2015, the NSW Government selected Unisys Australia Pty Limited’s (Unisys) as an information technology (IT) outsourced service provider and Infosys Limited (Infosys) as a business process outsourced service provider. The outsourced services arrangement was branded GovConnect NSW (GovConnect). The Department of Customer Service (the department) is the contract authority for the NSW Government. In 2019, the NSW Government transitioned a number of Unisys’ IT services progressively to the department and ceased all Unisys's IT services in May 2021. In 2020-21, Infosys, Unisys and the Department were co-providers of business processes and information technology services that constitute the GovConnect environment.
The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. The department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in GovConnect internal control environment.
The department leads the project management of GovConnect services, including the arrangement to provide internal control assurance reports to customers in 2020–21. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at GovConnect service providers in accordance with Australian Standard on Assurance Engagements 3402 'Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service Organisation' (ASAE 3402). The service auditor reports on the internal controls at a service organisation, which are relevant to a user entity's internal control environment.
The service auditor issued eight ASAE 3402 reports covering business processes controls and information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the service providers. Four out of eight reports were qualified, a significant increase from previous years.
The table below shows the service auditor's ASAE 3402 opinions issued in various business processes and information technology services provided by service providers for the last five years.
ASAE 3402 controls report# | 2015–16^ | 2016–17 | 2017–18 | 2018–19 | 2019–20 | 2020–21 |
Infosys Accounts receivable | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Qualified |
Infosys Accounts payable | Qualified | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified |
Infosys Fixed assets | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified |
Infosys General ledger | Qualified | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified |
Infosys Payroll | Adverse | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified |
Infosys ITGC | Qualified | Qualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Unqualified | Qualified |
Unisys ITGC | Qualified | Unqualified | Qualified | Qualified | Unqualified | Qualified |
The department ITGC* | -- | -- | -- | -- | Qualified | Qualified |
ServiceFirst** | Disclaimer | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
In 2020–21, the information technology services controls reports issued to the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified. Infosys' accounts receivable business process controls report was also qualified. The audit qualifications were because:
- the service auditor did not get access to the complete set of records processed during the financial year for several ITGC controls. The system that stored these records was hosted at Unisys. From December 2019 to 28 May 2021, the services at Unisys were progressively migrated to the department's IT environment but this system could not be migrated to the department in the required format, resulting in audit scope limitation for service auditors
- of the deviations identified during sample testing of ITGC controls
- the monthly follow up of outstanding receivables was not performed regularly, which was the only key control to address the timely collection of accounts receivable.
Internal control exceptions in GovConnect information and technology services require urgent remediations
The relevant controls over user access, system changes and password controls failed in all three ASAE 3402 GovConnect ITGC reports. These control failures can lead to unauthorised system access, system and configuration changes (workflow approvals, three-way match, etc.) and modifications to key reports. It increases the risk of:
- fraud and error in the financial statements
- ineffective segregation of duties controls
- accuracy and completeness of system generated reports for the agencies using the SAPConnect system.
The table shows the number of ITGC control deviations compared to prior year:
Year ended 30 June | 2021 | 2020 | ||
Total controls tested | Total number of control deviations and findings | Total controls tested | Total number of control deviations and findings | |
Infosys ITGC | 41 | 16 | 35 | 8 |
Unisys ITGC | 25 | 11 | 33 | 4 |
DCS ITGC | 31 | 9 | 10 | 5 |
Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.
The service auditor identified significant areas for remediation:
- governance arrangement of the IT services
- user access management controls
- SAP database controls
- logical access
- incident management.
In response to the internal control qualifications, the audit teams performed data analytics over payroll and accounts payable. The data analytics identified several terminated employees that were paid long after their termination dates which resulted in salary overpayments during 2020–21. While management had put processes in place to recover these overpayments, the payroll processing controls need to be improved to prevent such overpayments.
The Department of Customer Service advised that it established a ‘Control Reframe Project’ (the project) to address the internal control exceptions at GovConnect service providers. The objective of the project is to ensure the GovConnect assurance model is aligned with clear lines of responsibility and remediation actions are in place to support the delivery of services and achieve an improved outcome for future years.
Recommendation
We recommend the Department of Customer Service:
- improve governance and internal control environment over the information technology services
- ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise remediation actions to address internal control exceptions
- perform a post-implementation review of the transition of the Unisys arrangement to identify lessons learnt and continuous improvement
- develop data analytics to help analyse and identify high-risk patterns and anomalies in GovConnect key transaction systems, augmenting their existing monitoring and detective controls.
The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention
The 2020 'Central Agencies' Report to Parliament highlighted the need for Cyber Security NSW, a business unit within the Department of Customer Service, and NSW Government agencies to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency. A status update of the 2020 recommendation is included in Appendix five of this report.
The Audit Office's Annual Work Program identifies cyber security as a focus area for the Audit Office in 2021–24. It outlines a three-pronged approach to auditing cyber security in this period:
- considering how agencies are responding to the risks associated with cyber security across our financial audits across the NSW public sector
- examining the effectiveness of cyber security planning and governance arrangements for large NSW state government agencies for our Internal Controls and Governance report
- conducting deep-dive performance audits of the effectiveness of specific agency activities in preparing for, and responding to cyber security risks.
A performance audit 'Managing cyber risks' was tabled in Parliament in July 2021. The audit made several recommendations to audited agencies to uplift their cyber security management. It also recommended the Department of Customer Service to:
- clarify the requirement of the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) reporting to all systems
- require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.
A compliance audit 'Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy' was tabled in October 2021. The audit examined whether agencies are complying with the NSW Cyber Security Policy to ensure all NSW Government departments and public service agencies are managing cyber security risks to their information and systems.
The report found that key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. There has been insufficient progress to improve cyber security safeguards across NSW Government agencies. The poor levels of cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires dedicated leadership and resourcing. To comply with some elements of the government’s policy agencies will have to invest in technical uplift and some measures may take time to implement. However, other elements of the policy do not require any investment in technology. They simply require leadership and management commitment to improve cyber literacy and culture. And they require accountability and transparency. Transparent reporting of performance is a key means to improve performance.
The report noted that the CSP was not achieving the objective of improved cyber governance, controls and culture. The compliance audit made several recommendations to Cyber Security NSW and other NSW Government agencies.
The 2021 maturity self-assessment results against the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 for the 25 largest NSW State Government agencies are reported in the 2021 'Internal Control and Governance' Report to Parliament.
Repeat recommendation
Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.
Management of cyber security risk
Our 2020-21 financial audit assessed whether cyber security risks represent a risk of material misstatement to the department's own financial statements. A request performance audit 'Service NSW's handling of personal information' was tabled on 18 December 2020. The audit followed two cyber security incidents that resulted in data breaches of customer information. As part of our audit procedures, we obtained an understanding of the controls the department has in place to address the risk of cyber security incidents and respond to any incidences which may have occurred during the year, including its impact on the audit.
Our assessment of the department’s own cyber risk management shows that:
- an approved security incident response plan was not in place during the reporting period. There was a lack of testing over incident detection and monitoring process
- a formal process over patch management that includes assessment, determining relevance and priority, timely rollout and escalation and reporting of long outstanding patches to senior management is being established.
The department provides information security services including cyber security management to cluster agencies. We found that there were insufficient communications within the Customer Service cluster over the controls and assurance over cyber security risk management. Some cluster agencies had put in place limited controls over cyber security risk management.
Recommendation
We recommend the Department of Customer Service:
- establish an approved security incident response plan and formal process over patch management
- improve communications with cluster agencies over the controls and assurance in cyber security management.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Appendix five – Status of 2020 recommendations
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Stronger Communities 2021
Stronger Communities 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Stronger Communities cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies.
Eleven of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadline. Five agencies did not perform all mandatory procedures.
The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the Department of Communities and Justice's (the department) 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively (relating to three correctional centres with private sector operators).
The department was, this year for the first time, able to reliably measure Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. The department recorded a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021. Liabilities for Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim continue to be not recorded on the basis they are unable to be reliably measured.
The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit of the financial statements for the cluster increased from 61 in 2019–20 to 72 in 2020–21.
What the key issues were
The number of issues reported to management decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21. However, 45 per cent were repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.
Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year. High risk issues related to deficiencies in IT access controls at Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust; a lack of a formal agreement between the Office of Sport and Planning Ministerial Corporation over the management of a sporting venue; asset revaluations at both Fire and Rescue NSW and the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building; and three issues related to revenue recognition control deficiencies at New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and two of its subsidiaries.
What we recommended
Cluster agencies should ensure all applicable mandatory early close procedures are completed and the outcomes provided to the audit team in accordance with the deadlines set by NSW Treasury.
We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.
Fast factsThe Stronger Communities cluster, consisting of 28 agencies, aims to deliver community services that support a safe and just New South Wales.
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This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.
Section highlights
|
Findings reported to management
The overall number of findings has decreased, but the level of repeat issues increased
Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.
In 2020–21, there were 172 findings raised across the cluster (191 in 2019–20). 45 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (32 per cent in 2019–20).
Repeat issues largely related to weaknesses in controls over information technology (IT), governance and oversight.
A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision‑making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.
2020–21 audits identified seven high risk findings
High risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies. Two high risk findings reported in 2019–20 were resolved.
Agency | Description |
2020–21 findings | |
Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (new finding) * | The audit of Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust's IT access controls identified:
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Fire and Rescue NSW (new finding) | Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) completed a comprehensive revaluation of its fire appliances in 2020–21. The audit of the revaluation found there was inadequate analysis and quality control by management over the valuation process prior to the outcomes being included in the financial statements. FRNSW had 57 fleet assets that have not been revalued due to problems with data supplied by the valuer. The written down value:
The review also found:
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New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) (new finding) | The audit of NSWALC's revenue identified there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements. This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions. |
NSWALC Employment and Training Limited (new finding) | The audit of NSWALC Employment and Training Limited's revenue found:
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NSWALC Housing Limited (new finding) | The audit of NSWALC Housing Limited's revenue identified it:
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Office of Sport (new finding) |
The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Dissolution Act 2002 transferred the assets, rights and liabilities relating to the Sydney International Regatta Centre (SIRC) to the Planning Ministerial Corporation (the Corporation) effective from 1 July 2002. The Corporation recognised the related land assets but did not recognise any of the built assets at the time of transfer. The total value of the land and built assets at 30 June 2021 was The SIRC has been managed by the Office of Sport (the Office) for many years in accordance with a not yet executed management agreement. It appears there was a clear intention in 2005 that the control of SIRC built assets was to be transferred from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation (a predecessor of the Office), through the exchange of letters between the relevant Ministers and an Administrative Order (the Order). The Order transferred the SIRC staff from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. However, it was silent on whether the relevant built assets were transferred. Currently, the Office recognises the SIRC built assets in the financial statements whilst the Corporation recognises the land assets as the legal owner of the property. This matter has been included as a high risk finding as the lack of a formal management agreement casts doubt over the accounting treatment of SIRC property. |
The Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building (new finding) |
The audit of the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building's property, plant and equipment identified:
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to property, plant and equipment. |
Recommendation (repeat issue)We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues. |
The table below describes issues commonly identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.
Risk rating | Issue |
Information technology | |
High3 |
The financial audits identified weaknesses in information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues with:
|
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 5 new, 6 repeat |
|
Internal control deficiencies or improvements | |
High3 |
The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across the following key business processes:
|
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Financial reporting | |
High3 |
The financial audits identified weaknesses in financial reporting processes, including:
|
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Governance and oversight | |
High3 1 new |
The financial audits identified areas where agencies could strengthen governance and oversight processes, including:
|
Moderate2 5 new, 11 repeat |
|
Low1 12 new, 8 repeat |
|
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies | |
Moderate2 7 new, 6 repeat |
The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve their compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies, including:
|
Low1 2 new, 8 repeat |
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.
The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year
Seventy‑eight moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 22 per cent decrease from 2019–20. Of these, 43 were repeat findings, and 35 were new issues.
Moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21 include:
- weaknesses in governance arrangements, including outdated policies and procedures and arrangements that do not align with NSW Government guidelines, such as the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework and NSW Cyber Security Policy
- weaknesses in user access administration including:
- user access reviews
- monitoring of privileged user access and activities
- password policy configuration
- cyber security improvements including:
- implementation and update of governance arrangements
- monitoring of third‑party system access
- patch management improvement
- outdated instruments of financial delegation and non‑compliance with established financial delegations
- weaknesses in supplier and employee masterfile maintenance.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Health 2021
Health 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Health cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Health cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements of all Health cluster agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic increased the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were pandemic related.
A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement. The basis of the qualification related to 19 instances (18 in 2018–19) of non-compliance relating to three of the 20 prudential requirements across five aged care facilities.
What the key issues were
The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster increased from 112 in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high risk (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate risk (47 in 2019–20). Nearly one half of the issues were repeat issues.
The three new high-risk issues identified were:
Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees
The absence of a tailored debt recovery strategy, data integrity issues and uncertainties around future HQ arrangements increased risks around the recoverability of HQ fees from travellers.
COVID-19 inventories
Data errors and anomalies in the impairment model and difficulties forecasting key factors impacting the management of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) increased uncertainty associated with the valuation and impairment of COVID-19 inventories.
COVID-19 vaccines
The Commonwealth did not provide information about the cost of vaccines provided to NSW free of charge, which required the performance of internal valuations to reflect the consumption of vaccines in the financial statements.
What we recommended
Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees
Develop a tailored assessment methodology to estimate recoverability of HQ fees and work with Revenue NSW to develop a tailored debt recovery strategy.
COVID-19 inventories
Review the current stocktaking and impairment methodology to incorporate validation of data key to the management of COVID-19 related PPE.
COVID-19 vaccines
Work with the Commonwealth to obtain primary price information on COVID-19 vaccines.
Fast facts
The Health cluster, comprising 15 local health districts, five pillars agencies, two specialty health networks and six shared state-wise services agencies, deliver health services to the people of New South Wales.
- 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
- 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
- 3 high risk management letter findings were identified
- 47.4% of reported issues were repeat issues
- $23.5b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
- $26.8b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making. This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.
Section highlights
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Findings reported to management
The number of findings reported to management has increased, with 47.4 per cent of all issues being repeat issues
Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of cluster agencies. The Audit Office does this through our management letters, which include observations, implications, recommendations and risk ratings.
In 2020–21, there were 116 findings raised across the cluster (112 in 2019–20). 47.4 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (38.4 per cent in 2019–20).
A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.
The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.
Risk rating | Issue |
Information technology | |
Moderate2 |
We identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:
Repeat issues included:
|
Low1 |
|
Internal control deficiencies or improvements | |
High3 1 new, 0 repeat |
We identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including new issues relating to:
Repeat issues included:
|
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Financial reporting | |
High3 2 new, |
We identified weaknesses with respect to financial reporting in relation to the:
|
Moderate2 |
|
Low1 |
|
Governance and oversight | |
Moderate2 9 new, 5 repeat |
We identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:
Repeat issues include:
|
Low1 2 new, 2 repeat |
|
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies | |
Moderate2 1 new, 7 repeat |
We identified the need for agencies to improve compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, with new findings including:
Repeat issues include:
|
Low1 5 new, 13 repeat |
4Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.
Complexities arising from the COVID-19 response
The 2020–21 audit identified three new high-risk findings
COVID-19 has presented the cluster with several new accounting challenges. New and evolving matters arose from changes to operating conditions, which characterised the 2020–21 financial reporting period. Issues with a high degree of estimation uncertainty will require ongoing attention as the strategies employed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic evolve.
Expected rate of recovery of outstanding Hotel Quarantine invoices
The estimation of the amount likely to be recovered is complicated not only by the uncertainties that exist regarding the assumptions those estimations rely upon, but also the debt collection processes and strategies put into place to manage the accumulated debtors' balance. Debt collection is not administered by the cluster, but rather Revenue NSW. We observed an absence of a methodology to assess the likelihood of recovery. Instead, Sydney Local Health District was relying on Revenue NSW to develop and execute on a collection strategy. Sydney Local Health District was using the same approach to hotel quarantine debts as it did to other Health receivables. As the approach to managing international borders evolves over time, so too will the cluster's need to develop robust estimation models to assess the likely collectability of debtors.
Procurement, management and impairment of COVID-19 inventories
$656.2 million of COVID-19 inventories were procured in 2020–21, with $220.2 million consumed; $558.7 million impaired and a further $217.1 million written off. Estimates of the degree to which inventories are expired, not fit for purpose or are faulty is often based on management judgement at all stages in the procurement cycle.
With respect to the stocktaking methodology applied, the following issues were identified:
- discrepancies noted in the stock bin listing provided for audit
- discrepancies in the recount sheet generated
- inconsistent application of the stocktake methodology
- inconsistent labelling of quarantined stock
- a lack of an approach for validating stock expiry dates, which is a key input to the impairment calculations.
Although management had developed processes and a methodology to count as well as to assess the level of inventory that was not fit for purpose, ongoing attention to the operating environment that emerges post pandemic will be important in assessing the degree to which existing COVID-19 inventories can be integrated into a ‘business as usual’ model going forward. Further refinement of the key elements of the stocktaking methodology will also be required to ensure that key inputs upon which management relies to calculate the year-end inventory impairment provision can be appropriately validated.
Valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government
The 2020–21 financial reporting period saw the Commonwealth acquire COVID-19 vaccines and provide these to state jurisdictions to dispense to their communities. The vaccines, although provided free of charge require recognition. However, Health entities were not responsible for acquiring the vaccines and data on the vaccines' cost was not shared by the Commonwealth. Management undertook a valuation using publicly available data to estimate the value to attribute to the vaccine inventory; developed new systems and leveraged existing pharmacy systems to track physical quantities received from the Commonwealth and ultimately distributed to NSW citizens. As the response to the pandemic evolves, larger quantities, and new lines of vaccine stock will be dealt with, and policy settings will need to adapt when patterns of distribution of those vaccines (e.g., timing of third booster shots) emerge. The Ministry of Health will need to ensure that the valuations applied to the prices of inventory distributed and held in stock are as accurate as possible. This can be done through further refinement of the existing valuation methodology, obtaining price information from the Commonwealth and engaging specialist pharmaceutical valuers.
Emerging trends
Recognition of provisions without sufficient support
Several NSW Health entities raised accruals and provisions in 2020–21, which did not have an appropriate basis for recognition. Liabilities can only be recognised where there is a present obligation to make a payment arising from a past event. A number of these errors remain uncorrected in the financial statements of those entities as they are not material, individually or in aggregate to the financial statements as a whole. Increased training and guidance are required to ensure that treatment within the cluster is consistent and reflects events that have occurred and give rise to obligations.
Treatment of Commonwealth funding
In the 2020–21 and 2019–20 financial reporting periods, we observed prior period errors arising from the treatment of Commonwealth funding. These errors related to recognising revenue under funding agreements entered into with the Commonwealth in the incorrect period. The conditions of these funding arrangements, the transactional information requiring validation and the circumstances when revenue should be recognised are not always clear and can be complex. Early and continuous engagement with the Commonwealth is required to ensure that revenue recognition principles are consistently applied across the cluster.
Key repeat issues
Management of excessive annual leave
NSW Treasury guidelines stipulate annual leave balances exceeding 30 days are considered excess annual leave balances. Managing excess annual leave balances has been reported as an issue for the cluster for more than five years, with the average percentage of employees with excessive leave balances over the last five years being 36.1 per cent (35.5 per cent over five years covering 2015–16 to 2019–20).
The operational demands required to manage the COVID-19 pandemic have presented new challenges for the cluster in trying to manage its excessive leave balances. 39.2 per cent of employees now have excess leave balances at 30 June 2021 (35.4 per cent at 30 June 2020).
The state's leave policy C2020-12 Managing Accrued Recreation Leave Balances requires agencies to manage excessive leave balances to 30 days or less to maintain their workforces physical and mental health.
Accurate time recording
Forced-finalisation of time records by system administrators within HealthRoster remains an issue and we continue to observe time records forced-finalised by system administrators so pay runs can be finalised on a timely basis. During 2020–21, a total of two million (2.2 million in 2019–20) time records were force approved, which represents 5.7 per cent of total time records (6.9 per cent in 2019–20).
Existence, completeness and accuracy of key agreements
Delivery of major capital projects
Health Infrastructure (a division of the Health Administration Corporation) is responsible for the delivery of major capital projects with a budgeted spend of more than $10.0 million. Health Infrastructure oversee the planning, design, procurement, and construction phases. Capital works in progress are recognised in the financial statements of the health entity that intends to use those assets upon completion. The health entities recognise both the capital work in progress and the revenue associated with the capital funding from the Ministry for the construction of the assets. Capital funding is currently agreed with health entities as part of the annual Service Agreement. The assumption that the health entities control the assets during their construction is consistent with Health Infrastructure's role as an agent for the health entity and the Ministry's policy directive PD2020-033 'Management and control of Health Administration Corporation owned Real Property'.
We continued to observe a lack of clarity regarding agreements between Health Infrastructure, the Ministry and the cluster agency that will eventually receive the completed asset. This can lead to confusion and uncertainty around the rights and obligations of each party to the transaction.
Cross border patient funding arrangements
When patients require medical care in a jurisdiction where they are not generally domiciled, there are arrangements in place to provide funding to support cross border patient treatments. We have previously observed that agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions have not been finalised, and this continues to be the case. In the case of Victoria, no agreement has been finalised for the past seven years.
We continue to note that the cluster has long outstanding receivables and payables with other states. The absence of formal agreements between the states hampers the settlement of the debts relating to the treatment of cross border patients. The following table shows the status of Cross Border Agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions:
States | 2014–15 | 2015–16 | 2016–17 | 2017–18 | 2018–19 | 2019–20 | 2020–21 |
Queensland | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised | Not finalised |
Victoria | Not finalised | Not finalised | Not finalised | Not finalised | Not finalised | Not finalised | Not finalised |
Australian Capital Territory | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised |
South Australia | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised |
Tasmania | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised |
Northern Territory | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised |
Western Australia | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Signed | Not finalised |
Albury Base Hospital
Albury Base hospital is located on the border of NSW and Victoria and services residents of both states. Documentation supporting the extension of the expired Intergovernmental Agreement 2009–2017 between NSW and Victoria in relation to the integration of health services in Wodonga and Albury could not be located.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program
COVID Intensive Learning Support Program
What the report is about
This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.
The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.
What we found
The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020.
The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools.
Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.
The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.
Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools.
Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.
Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas.
Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.
There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress.
Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.
Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.
What we recommended
- Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods.
- Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
- Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
- Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
- Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
- Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
- Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.
The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
Fast facts
- $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
- 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury
- 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
- 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
- 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
- 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.
The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:
- $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
- $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):
- effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
- is effectively implementing the program.
This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.
Conclusion
The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.
Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.
The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.
The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.
The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.
The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.
The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.
This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.
This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).
Actions for Education 2021
Education 2021
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Education cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.
Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.
As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Education cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.
What the report is about
The results of the Education cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued on the Department of Education (the department), the NSW Education Standards Authority and the NSW Skills Board's financial statements.
An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) audit opinion drawing attention to legislative non-compliance concerning financial delegations during the reporting year.
The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 14 in 2019–20 to seven.
What the key issues were
The department and the TAFE Commission revalued their land assets this year, recognising collective increases of $863.8 million.
The department and the TAFE Commission are not scheduled to perform comprehensive revaluations of their buildings until 2022–23. Construction costs, which are a key input in their current replacement cost valuation methodologies for buildings, may have increased by an estimated nine per cent since the last comprehensive revaluation in 2017–18 based on broad based indices used by the department and the TAFE Commission. While the estimated index increase indicates the fair value of buildings may exceed the carrying values, the use of such high-level indicators has a degree of estimation uncertainty due to the specialised nature of the assets. Therefore, both agencies did not adjust the values of their buildings.
The number of issues we reported to management decreased. Fifty per cent of issues were repeated from prior years.
Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies, with six identified in procurement and payroll controls.
What we recommended
The department and the TAFE Commission reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.
Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.
Fast facts
The Education cluster, comprising four agencies, administers and delivers education and training services for NSW students, workers and industry.
- $38.6b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
- $21.2b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
- 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
- 22 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management
- 7 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
- 50% of reported issues were repeat issues
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2021.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.
Section highlights
|
Findings reported to management
The number of findings reported to management has decreased. Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues
Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.
In 2020–21, there were 28 findings raised across the cluster (33 in 2019–20). Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues (45 per cent in 2019–20).
The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology general controls, application controls, and identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.
A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.
The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.
Risk rating | Issue |
Information technology | |
Moderate2 |
The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
|
Low1 |
|
Internal control deficiencies or improvements | |
Moderate2 |
The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
|
Low1 |
|
Financial reporting | |
Moderate2 |
The financial audits identified:
|
Low1 |
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
The department continues to address recommendations to improve monitoring of privileged user access
Privileged users have higher levels of access to systems, and in some instances, may include access that can bypass segregation of duty controls. If reviews of access logs are not fully embedded in the control environment, the risk of unauthorised transactions occurring and not being detected in a timely manner is elevated.
In 2019–20 a high-risk issue was reported at the department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP. This year the department has largely addressed our findings by initiating a review of the identified instances of privileged user activity and establishing periodic oversight controls. There remains a need to improve the timeliness and completeness of these newly implemented controls.
Data analytics identified the root cause of internal control deficiencies in procurement and payroll
Our 2020–21 agency management letters identified seven new moderate risk internal control deficiency matters, of which six related to payroll and procurement.
To enhance our financial statement audit of the department we applied data analytics over elements of the department's procurement and payroll control processes. Our procedures, conducted over periods across the financial year, helped identify the following:
- a low level of compliance with procurement practices requiring the creation of purchase orders before invoices are received. The root cause was a lack of understanding by agency staff of the procurement processes
- transactions related to previous years being recorded in the current year. The root cause was a lack of understanding of the three-way matching process and the goods received/not invoiced facilities within SAP
- negative payments in fortnightly pay runs, predominantly representing deductions to recover salary payments made in error. The root cause was the lack of timeliness in notifying payroll for cessation of employment, or for employees undertaking secondments who should have been classified as being on leave without pay.
Recommendation
We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above.
Appendix one – Early close procedures
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Grants administration for disaster relief
Grants administration for disaster relief
What the report is about
The report examined whether NSW Treasury, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service effectively administered grants programs funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund, including:
- $10,000 Small Business Support Grant
- $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant.
What we found
The agencies effectively implemented the grants within required timeframes, reflecting the NSW Government’s decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.
Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service strengthened processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks, and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications.
Fraud security checks and investigations are ongoing, and the agencies will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been completed.
The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.
The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one off grant payments to eligible small businesses.
What we recommended
NSW Treasury should finalise and implement an evaluation of both grants programs, including obtaining feedback from businesses.
Service NSW should develop a framework that documents expected controls for how it administers grants, including business processes, fraud control and governance and probity requirements.
Service NSW should publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.
The Department of Customer Service should ensure its processes for managing conflicts of interest meets its policy requirements.
Upcoming performance audit
The Audit Office is conducting a further performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants. This is planned to complete in 2021-22.
Fast factsSmall Business Support Fund
Grant program administration
|
Further information
Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.
The NSW Government responded to the partial shutdown of the NSW economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 by, among other measures, announcing on 3 April 2020 that it would place $750 million into the Small Business Support Fund (the Fund).
Under the Fund, the NSW Government would pay one-off grants of up to $10,000 to small business impacted by the shutdown. The objectives of the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant) were to:
- ease the pressure on small businesses that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
- support the ongoing operations of small businesses highly impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions
- deliver cash-flow into small businesses as soon as possible so that small businesses could meet pressing financial needs.
Grant applications were assessed against eligibility criteria that were determined by the NSW Government. The eligibility criteria for the $10,000 Support Grant required an employing small business to demonstrate it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by self-declaring or demonstrating a significant decline of 75 per cent or more in turnover compared to 2019. Documentation requirements were relaxed for small businesses within highly impacted industries.
In June 2020, the NSW Government announced a second round of one-off grants of up to $3,000 to small businesses that were highly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic ($3,000 Recovery Grant). The objective of the $3,000 Recovery Grant was to help small businesses in 'highly impacted industries' — those directly impacted by the restrictions and closures put in place under the Public Health Orders — to meet the costs of safely reopening or scaling up operations.
The eligibility criteria for the $3,000 Recovery Grant required that a small business be in a highly impacted industry, demonstrate that it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring a significant decline in turnover, and had costs associated with reopening under the 'COVID-Safe' requirements.
NSW Treasury and Service NSW implemented both grants on behalf of the NSW Government. The process of applying for a grant was intended to be quick and easy, with Service NSW using automated assessments and simple online application forms to process applications. Applicants applied for the $10,000 Support Grant through the Service NSW website between 14 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 and applied for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant between 1 July 2020 and 31 August 2020.
At May 2021, around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applicants under the $10,000 Support Grant and around $109 million had been paid to around 36,700 grant applicants under the $3,000 Recovery Grant.
The Audit Office plans to undertake a performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants in 2021–22.
This audit assessed whether the grants funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund were effectively administered and implemented to provide disaster relief. It addressed the following questions:
- Were funded grants programs planned, designed and targeted effectively?
- Were funded grants programs implemented in line with the objectives and criteria and delivery requirements?
- Have agencies established measures to monitor intended benefits and outcomes?
This audit did not seek to assess the effectiveness of any other grant programs or stimulus measures. It also did not seek to assess the impact of the funding on applicants, or the future prospects of small businesses that received support.
ConclusionNSW Treasury and Service NSW effectively implemented two grants within required timeframes reflecting the NSW Government's decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one-off grant payments to eligible small businesses.NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to provide advice to the NSW Government on the grant design, proposed delivery partner, expected numbers of eligible businesses and the suitability of the proposed grant payment amount within the required timeframes. This was achieved within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Support Grant. In the context of the complex and changing pandemic and economic conditions between March and July 2020, NSW Treasury's advice to government outlined the risk, feasibility, expected demand estimates and assumptions for the grants. NSW Treasury's demand projections were limited by uncertainty as to the pandemic's economic impact. Estimated demand for the grants was not met, resulting in around $120 million from the Small Business Support Fund remaining unspent. Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. It met agreed delivery requirements and made timely payments to small businesses in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria. Over 65,000 businesses have received a payment under either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received both grants. Gaps in project and risk management processes were expected given the tight timeframe to implement the grants.The tight timeframe in which the agencies had to implement the grants contributed to gaps in project and risk management. The agencies advised that compromises were understood by both parties and were a necessary trade-off to ensure payments were made quickly. Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service have acted to strengthen their processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications since the grants commenced. Service NSW intends to further enhance fraud controls for grants applications and payments for future grants by implementing a fraud control framework by December 2021. The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.Service NSW and NSW Treasury established processes to monitor and report on the timeliness of payments to grant applicants. NSW Treasury has not yet measured all intended impacts of the grants, nor undertaken processes to obtain detailed feedback from grant recipients. Without these measures, there is limited insight into the extent to which the grants helped to support small businesses or ability to capture lessons which could be applied in future grants programs. NSW Treasury advises that an evaluation will commence from mid-2021. |
1. Key findings
Around $630 million in timely one-off grant payments have been made to small businesses
Service NSW and NSW Treasury have paid around $630 million in one-off grant payments to small businesses via two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. At May 2021:
- around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applications received for the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant)
- around $109 million has been paid to 36,700 grant applications received for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant ($3,000 Recovery Grant).
Across both grants, over 65,000 small businesses received a payment across either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received payments under both grants.
NSW Treasury advise that, while no data was collected on the time to pay applicants for the $10,000 Support Grant, from its monitoring of the grants' outputs it was satisfied that payment timeframes met its expectations. Service NSW met its targeted time to pay applicants with payments made within ten days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant.
Funds for both grants were not fully spent due to limitations in data and uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact. At May 2021, the final demand for the $10,000 Support Grant was around 30 per cent less than initially anticipated and the final demand for the $3,000 Recovery Grant was around 40 per cent less than initially anticipated.
NSW Treasury developed proposals establishing high level design and delivery expectations within rapid timeframes
NSW Treasury put forward proposals to the NSW Government for the two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. It met rapid timeframes for producing this advice: within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. NSW Treasury's advice to the NSW Government on how to best target the total funding, eligibility criteria and the feasibility of delivering the grants through Service NSW was based on comparable grants programs – including the $10,000 Small Business Bushfire Support Grant – which at that time were ongoing.
The proposals established, at a high-level, the rationale for the grants, expected financial costs, risks and analysis on budget impacts, and confirmation that Service NSW could deliver the grants applications platform. NSW Treasury's demand projections were uncertain due to limited data in the early stages of the pandemic regarding potential economic impact.
Given the tight timeframes, the proposals did not fully consider all planning and design aspects for both grants. For example, there was minimal identification of the costs and benefits of the programs, and a lack of detailed design and delivery requirements. The proposals outlined that arrangements to finalise the risk management, controls, and auditing plan would be agreed by Service NSW and NSW Treasury before implementation.
In future circumstances where urgent advice on program design is required, NSW Treasury could set clearer expectations for the delivery agency, including fully considering costs, benefits and delivery requirements that could be carried through to project governance and implementation.
Service NSW implemented both grants in line with delivery expectations
Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Delivery expectations for each grant were established under a grant project agreement (grant agreement). Service NSW delivered the online application platform, assessment of applications, payments and reporting of the grants' uptake as per the grant agreements.
The urgent timeframes to deliver the grants contributed to gaps in Service NSW's project and risk management processes throughout the lifecycle of both grants. For example, the requirement to meet pressing timeframes for the $10,000 Support Grant launch meant agencies had reduced time to achieve sign-off on key documentation. As a result, important documents and processes – including the grant agreement, risk documentation and key business process and quality assurance processes – were not finalised ahead of launch.
Quality assurance and compliance processes for detecting fraud were not settled until after the conclusion of the applications for the $10,000 Support Grant, and were not completed until late 2020. Some project documents, including risk registers, communication plans and project briefs are still not finalised.
The longer timeframe to develop the $3,000 Recovery Grant meant that agencies were able to build on their understanding of the implementation requirements from the $10,000 Support Grant, and better document these expectations and understanding while ensuring that key documents and sign-offs were in place prior to launch.
Service NSW tightened its risk management and controls in response to evidence of fraudulent applications
In May 2020, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service (DCS) were alerted to suspected fraudulent activity within grants administered by Service NSW. Initially, Service NSW anticipated that up to $8.8 million of the $10,000 Support Grant was at risk of exposure to fraudulent applications. However, Service NSW reported that, at April 2021, $1.9 million for the $10,000 Support Grant and $254,000 for the $3,000 Recovery Grant from paid applications were at risk of fraud exposure.
Following an internal review of the potential exposure to fraudulent or ineligible applications, Service NSW implemented additional automated security checks on applications, increased manual assessments of grant applications, established a dedicated taskforce for grants administration and engaged a unit within DCS to manage high-risk investigations.
Service NSW and DCS's increased governance and oversight has resulted in an established case management function, increased referrals to law enforcement, prioritised investigations of suspicious applications and the development of a 'Fraud Control Framework' aimed at addressing external fraud risks. Given Service NSW had limited experience in these processes in context of administering grant payments, such actions were an appropriate response.
Security checks and investigations of suspicious applications are ongoing. Service NSW will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been fully completed.
Service NSW and Department of Customer Service can improve how conflicts of interest are managed for future programs
Compliance with agency policies and processes to manage conflicts of interest and financial subdelegations demonstrates that investment decisions are being made by appropriately skilled and experienced staff, allowing agencies to operate efficiently, and reducing the risk of internal fraud.
DCS was unable to produce employee conflicts of interest declarations for the $10,000 Support Grant. Therefore, it is not known how many employees had completed conflicts of interest declarations for this round.
DCS provided information on conflicts of interest declarations for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Twenty-nine per cent of declarations provided for employees undertaking grant assessments for the $3,000 Recovery Grant were incomplete at March 2021, and a further nine per cent were not finalised even though they indicated a real, potential or perceived conflict.
For future grants programs, ensuring compliance with conflicts of interest policies would help DCS and Service NSW to have greater confidence that conflicts of interest are appropriately identified and managed.
NSW Treasury has not yet measured all benefits or outcomes of the grants
In April 2021, NSW Treasury updated its evaluation plan for the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant in support of an economic evaluation to commence from mid-2021. The updated evaluation plan outlines inputs, activities, and outputs as well as immediate, short term and medium term outcomes for both grants.
The evaluation will consider the extent to which both grants achieved their intended outcomes, and whether the economic benefits exceeded the costs to help inform decisions about the nature and design of any future small business support programs. This will complement, and feed into a broader review of all NSW Government COVID-19 stimulus measures.
Service NSW rapidly developed an approach to administer the grants
Over recent disasters, such as the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic, Service NSW has been responsible for administering grant programs on behalf of other government agencies.
Service NSW implemented both grants under its Project Management Framework and under each grant agreement with NSW Treasury as it does not have its own grants administration framework. To address the risks that emerged during delivery, Service NSW developed an approach to standardise and monitor the administration of the grants while they were being implemented.
Service NSW now has an opportunity to establish a grants administration framework, based on the processes, lessons and outcomes captured under the grants administration taskforce and in developing its fraud control framework. Embedding these processes into business as usual for grants administration will enable Service NSW to have a consistent set of expectations for controls, business processes and governance and probity requirements for future grants it implements.
2. Recommendations
By December 2021, NSW Treasury should:
1. finalise and implement an evaluation of the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant, including obtaining direct feedback from businesses on how grant funds achieved the grant objectives.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:
2. develop a grants administration framework, which documents expected controls – including fraud controls – business processes and governance and probity requirements
3. publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.
By December 2021, the Department of Customer Service should:
4. ensure its process for managing conflicts of interest meets policy requirements by:
- ensuring employees promptly declare any real, potential or perceived conflicts of interest
- annually producing a list of conflicts of interest for records retention purposes
- requiring a separate register of conflicts of interest declarations where a grant program is deemed as high risk.
3. Lessons for grants administered within urgent timeframes
The two grants this audit examined were administered within a context of urgent timeframes, and increased complexity and uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following lessons are shared to assist sponsor and delivery agencies in administering future grants where rapid implementation is required.
Sponsor agencies should consider the following lessons:
1. develop an approach to define and measure benefits for rapidly developed programs and projects where a full business case and cost-benefit analysis is not feasible
2. establish common processes and expectations for co-administered grants:
- periodically assure agencies' capability to deliver grants programs
- agree and establish risk appetite statements with administering agencies
- clearly establish expected performance levels and targets under any agreement
3. review the processes and outcomes of rapidly developed programs, capture lessons learned, and apply these in planning and delivering future programs.
Delivery agencies should consider the following lessons:
1. risk management and risk appetite:
- perform robust assessment procedures to ensure risks associated with delivery of the project are identified
- ensure the controls implemented adequately address identified risks
- agree and document the acceptable risk appetite at the outset
- review risk management processes after the grants are issued when unable to finalise risk management processes ahead of launch
2. grant agreements between NSW public sector agencies:
- ensure agreements are finalised in a timely manner
- ensure agreements clearly outline:
- roles and responsibilities of both parties,
- changes in scope of services provided
- fees and charges applicable
3. frameworks for grants administration:
- ensure that there is a common set of expectations in place to guide grants administration including standard controls and processes for managing risk, capturing lessons learned and reporting on outcomes.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix three – Public Health Orders
Appendix four – Highly impacted industries
Appendix five – About the audit
Appendix six – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #352 - released (24 June 2021).
Actions for Responses to homelessness
Responses to homelessness
What the report is about
The report assessed how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice is responding to homelessness through the NSW Government’s Homelessness Strategy.
It also assessed the effectiveness of the department’s efforts to address street homelessness in its COVID-19 response.
What we found
The strategy was designed to build evidence to inform future state-wide action rather than to end homelessness.
The department received significantly less funding than it sought for the strategy.
Actions delivered under the strategy have a narrow reach in terms of locations and number of people targeted for assistance.
The strategy will have limited short-term impact on homelessness across NSW, but it is building evidence on what works to prevent and reduce homelessness.
The department effectively implemented a crisis response to assist over 4,350 people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during the pandemic.
While there was an effective crisis response to assist people sleeping rough during the pandemic, more will need to be done to ensure a sustainable response which prevents people returning to homelessness.
What we recommend
The department should:
- provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
- commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s 10-year plan for social housing and 20-year housing strategy
- enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people, and people with lived experience of homelessness
- partner with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities to design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
- evaluate the homelessness response to COVID-19, integrate the lessons learned into future practice, and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies or disasters
- regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.
Fast factsHomelessness Strategy
COVID-19 response 1 April 2020 to 31 January 2021
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Further information
Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.
Homelessness exists when a person does not have suitable accommodation alternatives. A person is considered to be experiencing homelessness if their current living arrangement:
- is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or
- has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or
- does not allow them to have control of, and access to space for social relations.
The number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales increased by 37 per cent between the last two censuses, from 27,479 in 2011, to 37,715 in 2016. New South Wales recorded the largest increase of all the states and territories in both the number of people experiencing homelessness and in the homeless rate (from 40.8 to 50.4 persons per 10,000).
The NSW Government's primary service response to homelessness is crisis, temporary and transitional accommodation, and support services, funded at more than $1.0 billion over four years from 2018–19. These are ‘commissioned services’ delivered by non‑government organisations under contracts with the Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) and out of scope for this audit. We assessed how the Department manages contracts for specialist homelessness services in our 2019 audit 'Contracting non‑government organisations'.
The policy framework for the NSW Government's response to homelessness is the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23 (the Strategy), which is examined in this audit. The Department is responsible for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy. The Strategy comprises 21 actions, ten of which directly target people at risk of, or already experiencing, homelessness through measures such as:
- screening high school students for the risk of homelessness and providing supports
- assisting vulnerable people to maintain their tenancies in social housing or the private rental market
- providing purpose‑built social housing.
These ten actions comprise $160 million of the Strategy's $169 million funding.
In December 2019, the first evidence of the COVID‑19 virus emerged. People sleeping without shelter or in public places (sleeping rough) typically live in communal arrangements, with some having limited access to basic hygiene supplies or showering facilities. These factors may increase the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 amongst this population.
In response to the pandemic, the NSW Government provided additional funding for the Department to institute a range of actions aimed at preventing vulnerable people from becoming homeless, and people sleeping rough from contracting or transmitting the virus. These were informed by, but separate to, actions under the Homelessness Strategy.
This audit focused on the temporary accommodation provided to individuals experiencing street homelessness during the pandemic, and the new 'Together Home' program established in 2020 to transition people with experience or history sleeping rough from temporary accommodation into more sustainable longer‑term housing.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department is implementing the Homelessness Strategy and addressing street homelessness in its COVID‑19 response. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department:
- has effectively developed an evidence‑based Strategy and established supporting arrangements to implement it
- is ensuring the Strategy is achieving its objectives and outcomes
- is effectively supporting people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during COVID‑19 and to transition into more sustainable longer‑term housing.
ConclusionThe $169 million Homelessness Strategy will have a limited short‑term impact on homelessness across New South Wales.The Department designed the Strategy to build evidence to inform future state‑wide action rather than to end homelessness. The Department also received significantly less funding than it sought, and as a result, the Strategy's actions have a narrow reach in terms of the locations and the number of people targeted for assistance. The Department has clearly communicated its aims to intervene early to prevent people from experiencing homelessness; to provide effective supports to people experiencing homelessness; and to create an integrated person‑centred system. While these objectives are clear, they are not being pursued state‑wide. The Department recognised in its advice to government on Strategy resourcing that growing demand could not be met within current funding and housing supply, and that there was limited proof on effective preventative and early interventions in the available evidence base. Given the evidence threshold for new funding, the Department designed the Strategy to pilot approaches which help to identify the best prevention and early intervention measures for state‑wide roll out after the Strategy's five‑year term, subject to budget approval. The Department received significantly less funding than it sought for the Strategy. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. While seeking to demonstrate what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier, the Department directed 95 per cent of the final Strategy funding to concrete actions supporting people at risk of, or experiencing, homelessness. The Department has put in place governance and operational arrangements which are supporting the implementation and evaluation of the Strategy, and it is broadly on track with reaching the target number of clients expected. The Department’s data shows that more than 4,100 people have received direct supports under Strategy actions. However, the reach of the Strategy remains constrained. Once fully implemented, most Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's local government areas, supporting around 8,200 people ‑ what equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales at the last census in 2016. There is a risk that future funding will not be secured – and Strategy actions not continued or scaled up – if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt. The Department effectively planned and implemented a crisis response to assist people sleeping on the streets during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The Department will need to do more to ensure a sustainable longer‑term response which prevents people returning to street homelessness.The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group. Of the approximately 32,500 people provided with temporary accommodation between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, 4,355 were sleeping rough. As at 13 May 2021, only one case of COVID‑19 had been detected to date among the individuals who received assistance. The Department advises that around one‑quarter of all those placed in temporary accommodation were assisted into social housing or private rental accommodation. Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a dedicated team and contracted provider to connect people sleeping rough placed in hotels with support services, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing. The Department’s data suggests that almost 38 per cent of the approximately 1,800 people who received this support were able to move to social housing or private rental accommodation. However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who were not engaged with housing or funded support services. The Department offers supports to people in temporary accommodation to assist them in finding longer term housing, and it has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. The Department cannot precisely identify how many people sleeping rough assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people sleeping rough assisted with temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 who exited left with an unknown housing outcome. The Department intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance. The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches. The Department extended an existing initiative for community housing providers to head lease properties in the private rental market and ensure support services for people who were sleeping rough before being assisted into enhanced temporary accommodation. As at April 2021, the Together Home program has assisted 400 people to obtain accommodation and supports for two years. However, the number of Together Home places is significantly less than what is required to provide housing for the more than 4,350 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation. The Department advises it is using a combination of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation where Together Home places are not available, including social and affordable housing and supported transitional accommodation. It also intends to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year support ends. But it is not clear how it will overcome longstanding housing challenges to do so, given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing in New South Wales. |
1. Key findings: the Homelessness Strategy
The Strategy's geographical and client reach is limited because it is building the evidence base on what works
The Department's objectives to intervene early, provide effective supports and create an integrated person‑centred system to address homelessness are clear, but are not being pursued state‑wide.
There were existing gaps in the available evidence which made it difficult for the Department to develop a holistic, state‑wide, long‑term solution to homelessness. Some of the actions under the Strategy have a degree of supporting evidence. Other actions are intended to generate evidence through pilots and by evaluating existing programs more robustly.
At least one Strategy action is available in each of the Department's 16 districts, and there are examples of the Department rolling out practice changes from Strategy pilots across the state. However, progress towards the Strategy aims is confined to pockets where actions are being trialled.
Once fully implemented, Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's 128 local government areas and will support approximately 8,200 people ‑ which equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people who were experiencing homelessness at the time of the last census in New South Wales in 2016 more than 37,000 people. This does not include the number of people at risk of homelessness.
A key gap in Strategy actions is addressing Aboriginal homelessness.
The Department received significantly less funding than sought and designed the Strategy to build the evidence base rather than eliminate homelessness
The Department could not meet the evidence threshold for a cost benefit analysis required by a Treasury business case, given the limited evidence available locally and internationally on what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier. The Department sought new, targeted investment to extend a small number of initiatives with proven effect, and to build the evidence base about other measures that work, rather than the quantum of funding required to end homelessness in New South Wales.
Even so, approved funding was significantly less than that sought by the Department. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. It directed 95 per cent of the total Strategy funding to supports and accommodation for people at risk of or experiencing homelessness.
The Department intends to use the gathered data from implementation of the Strategy to expand effective prevention and early intervention measures after it concludes, subject to budget approval. It expects that, over time, these initiatives will reduce the demand for crisis services.
Actions may not be scaled up at the end of the Strategy's term, perpetuating the Strategy's limited reach and narrow impact on homelessness
The Department's approach of testing interventions and building the evidence base through the Strategy was well described and provided a clear rationale in its original advice to government. An evaluation framework has been designed to generate sufficient evidence on the overall Strategy and its individual actions for a cost benefit analysis to support a future budget bid.
The Department intends to use the findings from interim evaluation reports, due by September 2021, to determine the programs and pilots with promising evidence that should continue to the end of the Strategy term. It expects this to enable more qualitative and quantitative data to be available to the evaluations, as well as to support service continuity.
However, delays in delivery of some actions under the Strategy, and the time taken for outcomes to be achieved and show up in the data, will impact on the strength of the evidence available at the mid‑term and final Strategy evaluation points. This raises a risk that future funding for a comprehensive Strategy will not be secured ‑ and prevention and early intervention activities not continued or scaled up beyond pilot sites ‑ if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes.
Given its limited reach, even if the existing Strategy actions were retained, and no expansion occurred, it would continue to have a narrow impact on homelessness in New South Wales. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt.
2. Key findings: the COVID‑19 response to homelessness
The Department effectively planned and implemented its homelessness response to the pandemic and reduced the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 for people sleeping rough
The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group.
The Department engaged with the specialist homelessness services sector from mid‑March 2020 to modify service delivery, advise on infection control and plan extra supports. It explored options with temporary accommodation providers to support self‑isolation for clients, and scaled up its assertive outreach patrols by staff, specialist caseworkers and health professionals to support people sleeping rough into crisis or temporary accommodation for safety.
The Minister directed the Department to address street homelessness in the COVID‑19 response using the Government’s second stage of stimulus funding. The Department procured hotel, motel or serviced apartment accommodation for 400 people who were sleeping rough, or unable to physically distance in large crisis accommodation centres, within a week of the ministerial direction, building on existing programs. The Department provided advice to the Minister on the need to adjust existing policy settings to meet the forecast demand for temporary accommodation services.
The Department secured additional temporary accommodation when and where it was required, to accommodate the number of people sleeping rough who wanted support. Between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, the Department provided temporary accommodation to 32,158 individuals, of which 4,355 people were sleeping rough, totalling more than 70,000 nights of temporary accommodation and services.
The Department met regularly with NSW homelessness peak organisations and established a Taskforce involving other government agencies, peak organisations, and service providers, to assist in quickly executing the measure and resolving issues arising. The Taskforce built on existing collaborative arrangements in place to support cross‑sectoral coordination, enabling it to respond quickly to COVID‑19.
The Department worked with NSW Health and health providers to ensure its COVID‑19 response to homelessness was in line with health guidelines. As of May 2021, just one participant in the Department's enhanced temporary accommodation program had contracted COVID‑19.
The Department does not know how many people sleeping rough who were assisted with enhanced temporary accommodation have returned to homelessness
Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a specialist housing team, and contracted a non‑government provider, to connect people placed in hotels with support services, provide tailored support, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing.
The Department’s data indicates that between May 2020 and 31 January 2021, over 1,800 people who had previously been sleeping rough had been engaged in this program, more than four times the expected client numbers. Almost half moved into further accommodation when they left the program, including people supported with longer‑term housing such as social housing, community leasing under the Together Home program, and private rental arrangements.
However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who disengaged from services. The Department advises that this would have required additional resourcing to do so.
The Department offers assistance to people in temporary accommodation to find longer term options, and has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. It intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance from the Department.
The Department cannot identify precisely how many people sleeping rough who were assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people formerly sleeping rough who left temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 left with an unknown housing outcome. This includes people who were not eligible for social housing, were stranded due to border closures, or who disengaged from the Department or funded support services.
The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches.
The Together Home program was established quickly to assist people into more permanent accommodation but will not meet demand as a standalone response
The Department established the Together Home program in September 2020 to provide longer‑term accommodation to people who were sleeping rough during the pandemic. Community housing providers head‑lease properties in the private rental market for two years and sub‑lease these to clients, while ensuring they receive additional support, such as health services, to help them maintain the lease.
Under the initial tranche of funding, the Together Home program aimed to support 400 people sleeping rough. This target was met by April 2021. Due to increased rental demand in many areas of the state, there were some delays in securing properties in certain areas. In addition, people on temporary visas, or with existing public housing debt, are ineligible for this program.
A further $29.0 million was provided to this program through the 2020–21 NSW Budget, creating 400 additional program places. However, the total number of 800 Together Home places will not be sufficient to provide housing for the more than 4,000 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation.
The Department advises it is using a range of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation outside of the Together Home program. These options include social housing, supported transitional accommodation, subsidised private rental, boarding houses, and referral to mental health and substance addiction rehabilitation facilities.
The Department’s latest annual state‑wide street count suggested that the number of people sleeping rough across New South Wales decreased by 13 per cent between February 2020 and February 2021. The Department has acknowledged that it could do more to monitor and support the housing outcomes for people in temporary accommodation after they exit.
The Department has plans to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year program, through commissioned community housing and private rental assistance. However, it is not clear how this will overcome existing housing challenges given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing.
3. Recommendations
By July 2022, the Department of Communities and Justice should:
-
use data and analysis identified through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 and provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
-
use the evidence obtained through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 to commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s ten‑year plan for social housing and 20‑year housing strategy
-
establish and sustain governance arrangements that enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people and people with lived experience of homelessness
-
in partnership with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities, design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
-
evaluate the homelessness response to COVID‑19 and integrate the lessons learned into future practice; and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies/disasters
-
establish and sustain a means to regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback; and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.
This chapter considers how effectively the NSW Homelessness Strategy was developed and is currently being implemented by the Department of Communities and Justice.
This chapter examines how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice addressed homelessness in its response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, and how well it is applying lessons learned from the pandemic to future policy and service development.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Actions within the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23
Appendix three – Reported progress on Homelessness Strategy actions to date (unaudited)
Appendix four – Key homelessness data collections
Appendix six – Key measures in the COVID 19 response to homelessness
Appendix seven – About the audit
Appendix eight – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #350 - released (4 June 2021).
Actions for Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies
Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining how effectively NSW emergency response agencies address public inquiry recommendations.
The audit found that agencies’ governance arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps.
The agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had implemented accepted recommendations as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This creates a risk that issues with disaster prevention or responses highlighted by public inquiries are not addressed in a complete or timely way and may persist or recur in the future.
The audit also found that agencies did not always nominate milestone dates or priority rankings for accepted recommendations, and so could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.
The audit examined how five emergency response agencies – Fire and Rescue NSW, National Parks and Wildlife Service, NSW Rural Fire Service, NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW – have addressed accepted recommendations from public inquiries over the last ten years. The audit assessed the effectiveness of governance arrangements to track recommendation implementation.
The report makes six recommendations to improve disaster response agency arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations.
While the focus of this audit was agencies that responded to natural disasters, the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.
Major disasters and emergencies often trigger public post-event inquiries and reviews. The purpose of these reviews is to identify the causes of disaster or emergency events and areas for future improvement in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Areas identified for future improvement are then the subject of recommendations to government or government agencies and, when accepted, become public commitments to action.
Responses to the bushfires of 2019–20 followed this pattern, producing both NSW and Australian Government commissioned inquiries: the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both highlighted the significant volume of inquiries in recent years. Both asked whether agency responses to previous inquiries were improving Australia's capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters. The inquiries reflected on the difficulty of answering this question due to insufficient clarity and transparency on whether the improvements and risks that inquiries identified have been addressed in practice.
This audit stems from similar questions about how effectively government agencies in NSW are delivering on public inquiry recommendations. It assessed how five emergency response agencies have addressed accepted recommendations from 17 public inquiries over the last ten years. For this audit, we considered inquiries and reviews that affected agencies' operational capacity to respond to and recover from bushfire, floods and storms. The in scope public inquiries for this audit relate to:
- the 2013–14, the 2016–17 and the 2017–18 bushfire seasons
- severe storms and floods in 2015, 2016 and 2017
- workforce issues affecting the ability of agencies to respond to natural disasters.
The public inquiries we reviewed included coronial inquiries and inquests, parliamentary inquiries, independent reports and reviews, performance audits and recovery coordinator reports. In total, we looked at the processes that agencies used to implement 191 recommendations from these 17 public inquiries.
The objective of this audit was to determine how effective emergency response agencies are in addressing accepted recommendations from public inquiries. To answer our audit objective, we asked two questions:
- Do agencies have effective governance arrangements in place to respond to, monitor and implement accepted recommendations from public reviews and inquiries?
- Do agencies provide timely and accurate information on the implementation of accepted inquiry recommendations to senior decision makers and the public?
The agencies reviewed were:
- Fire and Rescue NSW
- NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (now a division of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment)
- NSW Rural Fire Service
- NSW State Emergency Service
- Resilience NSW (formerly the Ministry for Police and Emergency Services; and the Office of Emergency Management).
While the focus of this audit was agencies that respond to natural disasters (flood, bushfire and storms), the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.
Conclusion
The arrangements used by NSW emergency response agencies to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps.
For two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit, the agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had been implemented as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This exposes risks that gaps in disaster responses are not addressed in a complete or timely way and persist or recur in the future.
Two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit had also not been allocated milestone dates or priority rankings, and as such the audited agencies are less accountable and could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.
None of the agencies publicly report the status of actions taken to address public inquiry recommendations, limiting accountability and transparency.
The agencies subject to this audit all address accepted recommendations from public inquiries with varying degrees of formality and transparency. No agency maintained a central and comprehensive approach – such as a register – to track recommendations for all public inquiries.
The agencies do not consistently review evidence that recommendations have been implemented effectively, and in line with the intention of the inquiry. The agencies also often failed to set milestone dates or test that recommendations had been actioned as committed. This increases the risk that recommendations are overlooked or not addressed in line with the intent, priority and risk of the recommendation. In turn, this raises the possibility that gaps and issues identified by public inquiries are not adequately resolved and could persist or recur in future disasters.
None of the audited agencies published a summary of progress made in implementing accepted recommendations to update the public. There are transparency and accountability benefits in doing so. This echoes the findings of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both inquiries noted that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine the implementation status for many recommendations by publicly available information.
One factor hindering agencies from publishing this information is the lack of a consistent means of tracking public inquiry recommendation implementation. Adopting a consistent approach, within and across agencies, should help to overcome this barrier in the future.
This chapter reviews the way agencies have responded to, monitored and ensured they have implemented accepted recommendations from public inquiries.
This chapter reviews how agencies provided information to senior decision makers, agency Audit and Risk Committees and the public on the implementation of accepted recommendations from public inquiries.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Identifying in scope inquiries
Appendix three – In scope inquiries
Appendix four – Recommendations reported by agencies as still in progress (detail)
Appendix five – Agency reported recommendation implementation status (unaudited)
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #348 - released (22 April 2021).
Actions for Delivering school infrastructure
Delivering school infrastructure
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the planning and delivery of new, redeveloped and upgraded public schools.
School Infrastructure NSW has identified the need to accommodate an additional 180,000 enrolments in public schools by 2039 with a large portion of this growth expected in metropolitan Sydney. It has also identified that around 34,000 teaching spaces will require upgrading to be fit-for-purpose.
Although School Infrastructure NSW has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet those needs. Developing a longer-term list of priorities would help signal the areas of greatest need and allow more time to develop the best options to meet those needs.
The audit found that School Infrastructure NSW has focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future needs.
The report makes eight recommendations to improve long-term planning for future needs, strengthen the quality of estimated project costs and benefits, and embed a continuous improvement program.
In 2016, the Department of Education prepared a School Assets Strategic Plan (2016 SASP) which outlined long-term funding needs to support the expected growth in enrolments to 2031. Following the release of the 2016 SASP, the NSW Government substantially increased funding for new and upgraded schools from $2.4 billion in the 2016–17 State Budget to $4.2 billion in 2017–18.
In 2017, the Department of Education established School Infrastructure NSW (SINSW) to lead the delivery of the 2016 SASP and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. This significantly larger program of work required rapid development of internal capacity, governance arrangements, and project management systems. This needed to be done at the same time as scoping and planning for the list of announced projects.
As there are limited funds available to meet growing needs across the State, it is important that SINSW has effective methods to prioritise projects to communities with the greatest need. To ensure that projects deliver value for money, business cases need to have robust estimates of project costs and benefits. Business cases also need to account for the inherent risks in delivering infrastructure projects. Unplanned cost escalations can reduce the number of new or modernised classrooms SINSW can deliver. Unforeseen delays may also impact families who make significant life choices based on their expectations that a school will open at the beginning of the school year.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of new, upgraded and redeveloped schools to meet demand for public school education in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether the Department:
- has effective procedures for planning and prioritising school capital works to meet present and future demands
- develops robust business cases for school capital works that reliably inform decision-making
- has effective program/project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.
The audit examined business cases for 12 projects as case studies. These include a mix of projects initiated before and after the establishment of SINSW.
This audit commenced in June 2020 and examined strategies and demographic projections developed prior to the emergence of COVID-19. This audit did not examine potential longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on future demands for public school education.
ConclusionSchool Infrastructure NSW has been focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future student and classroom needs. While it has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet these needs. In its first years of operation, SINSW has focused on delivering existing projects and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. In early 2020, SINSW advised the NSW Government that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. The School Asset Strategic Plan 2020 estimates the annual level of investment needed over the next 20 years to meet growth, update and upgrade facilities to meet compliance obligations. However, SINSW’s ten-year Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21 only identified priorities over a two-year horizon. Developing a longer-term pipeline of priorities would signal the areas of greatest need and allow greater scope to consider a range of options to best meet those needs. SINSW has made progress in planning across geographic areas but needs to better prioritise which projects move forward. Given the current and projected needs for new classrooms, it is vital that SINSW provides long-term advice based on thorough state-wide analysis to help prioritise projects that best meet this demand. SINSW has improved its capabilities, processes, and systems to support planning in ‘School Community Groups’, which are clusters of between 5 to 15 schools in a geographic area. This addresses a key direction identified in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. It has developed a planning tool which allows it to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also developed an approach to identify potential projects within School Community Groups but has not yet put in place a structured process to prioritise which projects move to the business case stage to seek funding for delivery. Business cases we examined established service needs, but several had shortcomings in scope definition, cost estimation and risk identification. Most business cases we examined demonstrated the service need and consultation with stakeholders helped to incorporate educational requirements. Common templates and specific cost-benefit guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury has helped to promote consistency across business cases. However, there were shortcomings in several business cases we reviewed. Business cases for projects already announced by government presented a limited number of options, and the process for eliminating other options was not transparent. Cost increases and contingency drawdowns for several projects indicate that scoping, costing and risk assessments could be improved, especially for complex projects. Standard program management systems and governance arrangements support project delivery, however, there is scope for better ongoing oversight of benefits. SINSW applies standard governance arrangements to projects based on their size. Higher value projects have executive oversight while lower value projects are overseen on a regional basis. SINSW has improved its project management systems to provide more consistent data and greater transparency to senior management over project status, cost and use of contingencies. SINSW has worked with NSW Treasury to define a consistent set of benefits for new and redeveloped schools. Estimated benefits are currently based on international contexts but SINSW advises it is undertaking further research to improve the evidence base in this area. The current approach to ongoing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of project benefits places responsibility on the infrastructure delivery team. This team is not the most appropriate area to monitor ongoing benefits, which are expected to accrue many years after delivery and depend on actions in other areas of the Department. |
1. Key findings
SINSW delivered projects against an established program of works in its first years of operation
At establishment, SINSW inherited a portfolio of existing projects and 123 new projects announced as part of the 2017–18 Budget (to commence over 2017–18 and 2018–19). It has progressively worked through individual project planning to deliver against these projects.
The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. The 2018–19 Budget also allocated funding for 'planning' 22 new projects. Seventeen of the 22 projects had been identified by SINSW as a priority.
SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. Thirteen of these projects were funded in that year with a further 27 projects included as election commitments. SINSW identified 20 new projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2020–21 but only two of these were funded. SINSW advised this was due to a constrained budget environment.
There is an anticipated shortfall of classrooms based on the current funded program
Despite increased funding since 2017–18, SINSW advised the NSW Government in early 2020 that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. Accordingly, it is vital that new funding is prioritised to projects which best meet demand.
SINSW only identified specific priorities over a two-year horizon in its Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21. The School Assets Strategic Plan 2016 and the 2020 update make the case for sustained funding for school building and redevelopment. These plans estimate annual funding requirements and show geographic areas with increasing forecast enrolments. Detailing how priorities over a ten-year timeframe fit within a ten-year capital planning limit would create more certainty about meeting growth demands.
There has been progress in formalising prioritisation frameworks, data tools and supporting governance arrangements
SINSW committed to planning for new and redeveloped schools in 'School Community Groups' in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. This is a new way of planning which considers the educational needs over a defined geographical area. It has developed a planning tool to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also established governance frameworks to improve transparency over decisions to reprioritise this list.
SINSW has refined its approach to planning in School Community Groups over the past four years. It now prepares Service Needs Reports to investigate needs, identify projects, prioritise, determine scope and timing, and assess non-capital options. SINSW has yet to finalise arrangements for how needs identified in Service Needs Reports progress to the strategic business case stage.
Projects announced prior to developing a business case have less opportunity to consider a range of options to meet the service needs
Business cases for projects already announced by government (or announced for planning) go through the same process of determining the service need and impacts on surrounding schools. However, for some announced projects, the range of options considered in the business case is influenced by the parameters of the announcement. This makes it more difficult to genuinely pursue alternate options that could better meet the identified service need.
Projects identified by SINSW have a more rigorous process of considering options. Service Needs Reports explore a wide range of asset and non-asset interventions across the School Community Group. Options are narrowed as the projects move through the strategic and final business case stages. SINSW uses its Investment Review Committee to engage key stakeholders early in the process so that they are informed about how non-asset solutions have been considered and why SINSW is progressing the business case for a capital solution for particular projects.
Several business cases underestimated project costs and risks, leading to scope and budget increases
Several business cases we reviewed did not adequately identify the initial scope requirements, project-specific risks or the likely project cost. For two business cases, this appeared to be due to an attempt to fit the project within a predetermined amount. Announcing a project’s scope, budget and timeframe before proper planning increases risks to successful delivery against expectations.
Several of the projects we examined required drawdowns on contingency funds due to inadequate consideration of scope, costs and project risks at the planning stage. Contingency funds are intended for unanticipated extra costs rather than those that could have or should have been identified at the planning stage.
Guidance on benefit calculations has provided a consistent framework for business cases
Business cases we examined presented a consistent set of benefits based on guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury. Following this guidance helps to compare cost-benefit analyses across business cases. However, the evidence for the estimated benefits is based on contexts outside of NSW. SINSW has the tools and data sources to calculate benefits more suited to the context of particular schools. Doing so would improve the accuracy of cost-benefit analyses. SINSW advised that it is currently updating the guidance in partnership with NSW Treasury.
SINSW involves school principals, executives and teaching staff in developing education rationales when commencing projects. These documents help align projects with education outcomes. They also provide a baseline for post-occupancy evaluation, which is important to determine whether the new school infrastructure is being used in the ways that were anticipated in the business case.
SINSW could elevate its existing assurance review process to consolidate lessons learned
SINSW engages external peer reviewers to conduct assurance reviews on its projects at multiple stages of planning and delivery. It has established a Community of Practice for external reviewers to keep them up to date on new developments and requirements. Higher value projects are also subject to review by Infrastructure NSW under the Investor Assurance Framework.
By looking at all projects at all stages, assurance reviews can identify systematic issues across the full portfolio of projects. A recent assurance review analysed common findings from reviews of strategic and final business cases. This provides a helpful way to improve internal processes. SINSW advised that it is implementing a continuous improvement program, which will be able to take findings from assurance reviews to build organisational capabilities.
2. Recommendations
By September 2021, the Department of Education should:
- finalise the investment prioritisation approach with agreement from key stakeholders
- finalise and update on an ongoing basis a ten-year list of priorities to meet the forecast demand for new classrooms and contemporary fit for purpose learning environments, which identifies individual projects and programs in the short-term and priority geographic areas and programs in the medium-term
- seek a ten-year Capital Planning Limit from NSW Treasury to ensure the needs identified in the ten-year list of priorities are met and are coordinated with the forward capital programs of other agencies
- improve the quality of data on cost benchmarks that underpin the annual ten-year Capital Investment Plan and updates to the School Assets Strategic Plan
- embed an evidence-based cost benefit analysis framework for school investment, in consultation with NSW Treasury, by:
- validating benefits estimated in previous business cases with actual results
- building the evidence base in relation to contemporary learning environments
- regularly share data on forecast needs with relevant planning agencies to promote strategic opportunities for servicing education needs
- implement the continuous improvement program for service planning, options assessment, business case development, project delivery and handover. The program should be informed by findings from assurance reviews, post-occupancy evaluations and project lessons learned
- establish benefits realisation processes and practices that:
- ensure business cases set baselines and targets for benefits
- review benefits during delivery, prior to handover and as part of Post Occupancy Evaluations
- identify which part(s) of the Department are best placed to develop, manage and evaluate benefits on an ongoing basis.
Note: The Department's formal response to this report at Appendix one states that while it 'supports the recommendations, it considers the proposed six-month timeframe to be an unreasonably short period for a large and complex organisation to effectively implement many of these recommendations'. It suggests 12 months would be needed to implement the recommendations. The recommendations stemming from this audit are core business for SINSW. The Audit Office considers it important for SINSW to place priority on implementing the recommendations in time to inform the 2022–23 budget cycle. Extending the deadline to April 2022 would place action outside of that budget cycle. |
There have been significant increases in funding for education infrastructure since the 2017–18 Budget and further growth in demand for places in schools is forecast. SINSW has the challenge, not only of meeting the need for new classrooms due to population growth, but also upgrading facilities to enable modern teaching techniques. In addition, community expectations of what constitutes a vibrant and successful school community continues to increase.
Given growing demand and budget constraints, projects must be selected to best meet the needs of the community and planning and prioritisation are vital. SINSW has been progressing planning for announced projects as well as implementing a new type of strategic state-wide planning and prioritisation, cluster planning, where options are developed for School Community Groups.
The primary role of a business case is to reliably inform an investment and/or policy decision. Over the period of review, the NSW Government's guidelines for business cases have established this requires recommendations based on convincing arguments, sufficient evidence, and accurate costing of alternatives and expected benefits. Business case guidelines are underpinned by guides for economic appraisal and cost-benefit analysis.
As SINSW moves to prioritise business cases for interventions in School Community Groups, it will increasingly need to demonstrate rigour in its assessment of all options. It will also need to ensure that scope identification, cost and risk planning and the setting of contingencies are accurate. This will help decision-makers better understand, plan for and manage the investment required to meet the demand for school infrastructure.
For this audit, we examined business cases and related documentation for 12 projects. Several of these projects were developed before School Infrastructure NSW was established in mid-2017.
Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.
SINSW's guidance similarly highlight the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by SINSW that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of school infrastructure projects.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #347 - released (8 April 2021).
Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure
This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within my Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure, dated 8 April 2021.
On page two, the original text was as follows:
Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget and election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW.
The original text has now been changed to
Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW.
On page three, the original text was as follows:
The 2018–19 Budget funded three new projects that had not already been announced. One of the three projects was identified by SINSW as a priority.
The original text has now been changed to:
The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority.
On page three the original text was as follows:
SINSW identified 33 priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.
The original text has now been changed to
SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.
On page eleven, in Exhibit 4, the original text was as follows:
The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 43 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 43 projects:
• 1 was identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for one new project)
• 40 had already been announced
• 2 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).
The original text has now been changed to:
The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 42 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 42 projects:
• 2 were identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for two new projects)
• 40 had already been announced.
On page eleven, the original text was as follows:
The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects:
• 13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 33 new projects)
• 27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).
The original text has now been changed to:
The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects:
• 13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 31 new projects)
• 27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).
The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.