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Actions for Building regulation: combustible external cladding

Building regulation: combustible external cladding

Finance
Local Government
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

The report focuses on how effectively the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) led reforms addressing the unsafe use of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

Nine local councils were included in the audit because they have responsibilities and powers needed to implement the NSW Government’s reforms.

What we found

After the June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point action plan, which included establishing the NSW Cladding Taskforce, chaired by DCS, and with DPE as a key member. The Taskforce co-ordinates and oversees the implementation of the plan.

Depending on the original source of development approval, either individual local councils or DPE are responsible for ensuring that buildings are identified, assessed, and remediated. NSW Government-owned buildings are the responsibility of each department.

Identifying buildings potentially at risk was complex and resource intensive. However, on balance, it is likely that most affected buildings have now been identified.

By October 2021, around 40 per cent of assessed high-risk buildings that are the responsibility of local councils had either been remediated or found not to pose an unacceptable fire risk.

By February 2022, almost 50 per cent of affected NSW Government-owned buildings, and 90 per cent of buildings that are the responsibility of DPE, have either been cleared or are in the process of being remediated.

Earlier guidance on some key issues could have been provided by DCS and DPE in the two years after the Grenfell Tower fire. This may have reduced confusion and inconsistency across local councils we audited, and in some NSW Government departments. This especially relates to the application of the Fair Trading Commissioner's product use ban.

Given the inherent risks posed by combustible external cladding, buildings initially assessed as low-risk may also still warrant further action.

While most high-risk buildings have likely been identified, poor information handling makes it difficult to keep track of all buildings from identification, through to risk assessment and remediation.

What we recommended

DCS and DPE should:

  1. address the confusion surrounding the application of the Commissioner for Fair Trading's product use ban for aluminium composite panels with polyethylene content greater than 30 per cent
  2. develop an action plan to address buildings assessed as low-risk
  3. improve information systems to track all buildings from identification through to remediation.

Fast facts

Authority responsible for
ensuring that owners make
their buildings safe
Approximate number of
buildings referred for further
investigation*
Approximate percentage of
buildings remediated or
assessed to be safe
Local councils 1,200 40%
NSW Government owned 66 50%
DPE under delegation from
the Minister for Planning
137 90%
*After initial inspection by Fire and Rescue NSW, and/or preliminary inquiries by the consent authority, it was identified that the building may be at high-risk of
fire from combustible external cladding.

 

NSW Government's response to the risks posed by combustible external cladding

The NSW Government first became aware of the potential heightened risks posed by combustible external cladding on building exteriors after the 2014 Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne. However, it was the tragic loss of life from the Grenfell Tower fire in London, in June 2017, that gave added urgency to the need to address these risks.

Within six weeks of the London fire, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point plan of action for NSW to:

  • identify and remediate any buildings with combustible external cladding
  • ensure that regulation prevented the unsafe use of such cladding
  • ensure that experts involved in providing advice and certifying fire safety measures had the necessary skills and experience.

One of the actions in the ten-point plan was the creation of the NSW Government's Fire Safety and External Wall Cladding Taskforce (the Cladding Taskforce) chaired by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and with the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) as a key member.

The ten-point plan also specified that NSW Government departments would be responsible, in regard to buildings they owned to '…audit their buildings and determine if they have aluminium cladding'.

Local councils play a key role in implementing the Government's reforms, given their responsibilities and powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) and Local Government Act 1993 (Local Government Act) to approve building works (as 'consent authorities'), as well as to ensure fire safety standards are met. DPE plays an equivalent role for a smaller number of 'State Significant Developments' for which it is the consent authority under delegation from the Minister for Planning.

Commissioner for Fair Trading's building product use ban

On 18 December 2017, the Building Products (Safety) Act 2017 (BPS Act) came into effect in NSW, introducing new laws to prevent the use of unsafe building products. Notably, the BPS Act gave the Secretary of DCS and the Commissioner for Fair Trading the power to ban unsafe uses of building products.

After an extensive consultative process, the Commissioner for Fair Trading used these powers to issue a product use ban on 15 August 2018. This banned the use of external wall cladding of aluminium composite panels with a core comprised of more than 30 per cent polyethylene by mass on new buildings, unless the proposed use was subject to independent fire propagation testing of the specific product and method of application to a building in accordance with relevant Australian Standards.

Buildings occupied before the product use ban came into force are not automatically required to have the banned product removed. Under the BPS Act, consent authorities may determine necessary actions to eliminate or minimise the risk posed by the banned material on existing buildings.

Project Remediate

Project Remediate is a three-year NSW Government program announced in November 2020. The program was designed by the NSW Government to assist building owners of multi-storey apartments (two storeys or more) with high-risk combustible cladding to remediate their building to a high standard and for a fair price.

The scheme is voluntary and includes government paying for the interest on ten-year loans, as well as incorporating assurance and project management services to provide technical and practical support to owners’ corporations and strata managing agents. Building remediations under the program are expected to commence in 2022.

About this audit

This audit assessed whether DCS and DPE effectively led reforms to manage the fire safety risk of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

In making this assessment, we considered whether the expressed policy intent of the NSW Government's ten-point plan for fire safety reform had been achieved by asking:

  • are the fire safety risks of combustible external cladding on existing buildings identified and remediated?
  • is there a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products on existing buildings?
  • is fire safety certification for combustible external cladding on existing buildings carried out impartially, ethically and in the public interest by qualified experts?

Consistent with the focus of the Cladding Taskforce on multi-storey residential buildings and public buildings, the scope of our audit is limited to buildings categorised under the Building Code of Australia (BCA) as class 2, 3 and 9. These classes are defined in detail in section 1.2, but include: multi-unit residential apartments, hotels, motels, hostels, back-packers, and buildings of a public nature, including health care buildings, schools, and aged care buildings. The scope was also limited to existing buildings, which is defined as buildings occupied by 22 October 2018.

Auditees

The Department of Customer Service chairs the NSW Government's Cladding Taskforce, which is responsible for coordinating the combustible external cladding reforms. The Commissioner of Fair Trading sits within DCS and DCS regulates the industry accreditation scheme for fire safety practitioners, as well as administering the BPS Act.

The Department of Planning and Environment administers the EPA Act and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (EPA Regulation), which regulate the building development process. As well as being the delegated consent authority for State Significant Developments, DPE is also responsible for maintaining the mandatory cladding register requiring building owners of multi-storey (BCA class 2, 3 or 9) buildings to register buildings with combustible external cladding on an online portal.

Functions and responsibilities between DCS and DPE varied over time. For example, in October 2019, the DPE building policy team responsible for co-ordinating the DPE response to the combustible cladding issue was transferred to DCS, following changes to agency responsibilities resulting from machinery of government changes. DPE advised this resulted in a lessening of DPE's subsequent policy work on combustible cladding and its involvement in the Cladding Taskforce.

While the focus of the audit was on the oversight and coordination provided by DCS and DPE, nine councils were also auditees for this performance audit. Councils play an essential part as consent authorities for building development approvals in NSW, as well as having responsibilities and powers to ensure fire safety standards. To fully understand how well their activities were overseen and coordinated, a sample of councils was included as auditees.

Nine councils were selected to represent both metropolitan and regional areas, noting that there are very few in-scope buildings in rural areas. The audited councils were:

  • Bayside Council
  • City of Canterbury Bankstown Council
  • Cumberland City Council
  • Liverpool City Council
  • City of Newcastle Council
  • City of Parramatta Council
  • City of Ryde Council
  • City of Sydney Council
  • Wollongong City Council.

Terminology

The two NSW Government department auditees have, over time, been subject to machinery of government changes, which have changed some of their functions and what the departments are called.

Relevant to this audit, the effect of these changes has been:

  • the Department of Finance, Services, and Innovation (DFSI) became the Department of Customer Services (DCS) on 1 July 2019
  • on 1 July 2019, the Department of Planning and Environment became the Department of Planning, Industry, and Environment (DPIE)
  • on 21 December 2021, DPIE became the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE).

To avoid confusion, we use the titles by which these departments are known at the date of this report: the Department of Customer Service and the Department of Planning and Environment.

Conclusion

At July 2017, immediately after the Grenfell Tower fire, there was no reliable source to identify buildings that may have had combustible external cladding. However, it is now likely that most high-risk buildings have been identified.

Following the 2014 Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne, the NSW Government recognised that there was a need to be able to identify buildings in NSW that could have combustible external cladding.

The process of identifying buildings that could have combustible external cladding has been complex, resource-intensive, and inefficient principally due to the lack of centralised and coordinated building records in NSW. In total, approximately 1,200 BCA class 2, 3 and 9 buildings have been brought to the attention of councils by either Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW), the Cladding Taskforce, or through councils' own inspection for possible further action. In addition, approximately 2,000 more buildings were inspected by FRNSW but not referred to local councils because they either had no combustible external cladding or had combustible external cladding not assessed as being high-risk.

A multi-pronged approach to identifying buildings has been used by the DCS and DPE, through the Cladding Taskforce. While it is impossible to know the full scope of potentially affected buildings, the approach appears thorough in having identified most relevant buildings.

The process of clearing buildings with combustible external cladding has been inconsistent.

In the more than four years since the NSW Government's ten-point plan was announced, around 40 per cent of the buildings brought to the attention of councils have been cleared by either rectification or being found not to pose an unacceptable fire risk. Also, around 50 per cent of NSW Government-owned buildings identified with combustible external cladding and almost 90 per cent of identified buildings for which DPE is consent authority have been cleared or remediation is underway.

While DCS and DPE did seek to work cooperatively with councils and provided high-level guidance on the NSW Government’s fire safety reforms, it took until September 2019 before a model process and other detailed advice was provided to councils to encourage consistent processes. DCS and DPE advice to councils and NSW Government-building owners should have been more timely on two key issues:

  • the use of experts in the process of assessing and remediating existing buildings, and
  • the implementation of the product use ban on aluminium composite panels with polyethylene content 30 per cent or greater.

Clarifying the application of the product use ban may require consent authorities and building owners to revisit how some buildings have been cleared.

The management of buildings assessed as low-risk by FRNSW, estimated to be over 500, has not been a priority of the Cladding Taskforce to date, despite those buildings potentially posing unacceptable fire risks.

Information management by the Cladding Taskforce is inadequate to provide a high-level of assurance that all known affected buildings have been given proper attention.

While most high-risk buildings have likely been identified, information management is not sufficiently robust to reliably track all buildings through the process from identification, through to risk assessment and, where necessary, remediation.

Reforms to certifier registration schemes are limited to new buildings and do not apply to the existing buildings covered by this audit.

While reforms are limited in application to new buildings, some consent authorities took steps to obtain greater assurance on the quality of the work done by fire safety experts regarding combustible external cladding on existing buildings. For example, by requiring fire safety experts to be appropriately qualified and requiring peer review of cladding risk assessments and proposed remediation plans.

 

This chapter considers the part played by DCS and DPE as key members of the Cladding Taskforce in ensuring that buildings with combustible external cladding were effectively identified and remediated through processes implemented by:

  • local councils or DPE, where those bodies were consent authorities under the EPA Act for the relevant buildings
  • in the case of NSW Government buildings, the departments that owned those buildings.

This chapter considers what has been done to deliver a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products.

 

This chapter considers whether reforms have ensured that only people with the necessary skills and experience are certifying buildings and signing off on fire-safety.

Inspections of existing buildings and development of any subsequent action plans to address combustible external cladding are not activities covered by accreditation or registration schemes for building certifiers

Almost all the risk assessment and remediation work done on buildings in the scope of this audit have been undertaken under fire safety orders issued by consent authorities using their powers under the EPA Act. This has been the recommended approach by DPE and DCS since at least 2016 (that is, before the Grenfell Tower fire in London).

While there have been reforms to certifier registrations scheme, these were not intended to ensure that combustible cladding-remediation on existing buildings is supported by people with the necessary skills and experience in fire safety under the fire safety order process. Instead, they are focused on offering better assurance for work done in respect to new building projects where accredited experts certify that building work is carried out in accordance with BCA under the DCS managed certifier registration schemes.

No steps have been taken to ensure the quality of the work done by experts inspecting, assessing the fire risk and developing action plans to address combustible external cladding on existing buildings, other than where consent authorities have chosen to exercise their discretion. This includes requiring fire safety experts to be appropriately qualified and requiring peer review of some cladding risk assessments and remediation plans.

Consent authorities determine whether individuals with accreditation are required for combustible cladding inspection, risk assessments and remediation on existing buildings

Whether an individual with certifier accreditation participates in a cladding inspection, risk assessment, or remediation for an existing building will be determined by what councils as consent authorities specify in their fire safety orders unless building owners opt to use such experts without being directed to do so by the consent authority.

As discussed earlier, councils acting as consent authorities vary in whether they require building owners to engage individuals with certifier accreditation. In most of the councils we audited, A1 or C10 accredited experts were either required, or recommended, to perform functions such as auditing suspected combustible cladding, or conducting fire safety risk assessments and developing plans to rectify combustible cladding.

However, these types of work are not functions covered by the accreditation or registration schemes that apply to building and development certifiers.

Certifier accreditation schemes do not cover cladding remediation work done under fire safety orders

While councils may require or recommend that independent accredited A1 or C10 certifiers be engaged by building owners for cladding risk assessment and remediation, they are not performing those functions as certifiers — they are, in effect, more akin to expert consultants. Accordingly, how they perform their functions and duties is not covered by the legislation supporting the accreditation scheme for certifiers that was operated until July 2020 by the Building Professional Board.

Instead, their use in this process is a convenient and practical way for consent authorities to ensure that building owners use appropriate experts who have the qualifications, skills and experience needed to investigate and identify combustible cladding, and then to formulate appropriate action to deal with such cladding. However, these individuals are not performing regulated or accredited work, are not subject to regulatory oversight, and are not accountable to any accreditation body for the quality of the work they perform.

While councils could (and sometimes do) choose to decline poor quality or incomplete cladding-related work prepared by A1 or C10 certifiers, the burden of resolving poor quality would fall on the building owner, who would have to seek amended or additional risk assessments or rectification plans.

In the absence of regulatory oversight, disincentives for poor quality cladding-related work, may include litigation being commenced by the property owner, harm to the expert's reputation in a small and competitive market, and the potential impact on whether the individual could retain their professional indemnity insurance at a reasonable cost (especially in an environment when many insurance providers withdrew coverage for cladding related work).

Reforms impact on regulated experts doing work on new buildings

The reforms that commenced on 1 July 2020, replaced categories of accreditation with classes of registration, and varied the classes such that:

  • accredited building surveyor category A1 became registered building surveyor-unrestricted
  • accredited certifier—fire safety engineer category C10 became registered certifiers-fire safety.

The legislation that introduced these reforms, the Building and Development Certifiers Act 2018, also repealed the pre-existing Building Professionals Act 2005 and abolished the Building Professionals Board. The new Act was accompanied by the Building and Development Certifiers Regulation 2020.

While the scope of this audit is limited to existing buildings, we note that there are buildings with combustible external cladding that are yet to be remediated. Just as these processes previously drew on the expertise of A1 and C10 category certifiers, it seems inevitable that the remediation of existing buildings will continue to draw on the expertise of the equivalent new classes of registered building surveyor-unrestricted and registered certifier-fire safety.

 

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #364 - released 13 April 2022.

Published

Actions for State Finances 2021

State Finances 2021

Whole of Government
Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The results of the consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2020–21 GGS and TSS financial statements was unqualified but contained an emphasis of matter. The resolution of significant issues delayed signing until 24 December 2021.

The emphasis of matter draws attention to significant uncertainties associated with key assumptions related to the recognition by the GGS of a $2.4 billion investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that it intended to issue a qualified audit opinion, but actions by the NSW Government avoided this outcome. All evidence provided prior to 14 December indicated that the GGS’s return on the $2.4 billion cash contributed to TAHE was insufficient to support accounting for it as an investment. Projected returns were below the long term inflation rate and were insufficient to recover:

  • TAHE's revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • an average rate of return of at least 2.5 per cent of equity invested in TAHE.

In these circumstances, the $2.4 billion contributed to TAHE should have been expensed. This could have impacted the GGS’s budget result.

The NSW Government’s actions to avoid a qualified audit opinion included:

  • a government decision made on 14 December approving TAHE’s shareholding ministers communicating that their expectation of a return had increased to 2.5 per cent
  • reflecting the revised shareholding ministers’ expectations in the 2021–22 ‘NSW Half-Yearly Review’ on 16 December. The NSW Government provided an additional $1.1 billion to fund increased access and license fees to TAHE from the public sector operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains)
  • signing a Heads of Agreement (HoA) on 18 December between Transport for NSW (TfNSW),TAHE and the public sector operators. The HoA reflected the parties’ intent to renegotiate contracts to increase TAHE’s licence and access fees by $5.2 billion.

The uncertainty raised in our emphasis of matter relates to:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which remain subject to re-negotiation and must meet or exceed the indicative future access and licence fees set out in the HoA
  • continued funding for TAHE's key customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to meet the price increases outlined in the HoA
  • the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review', which provides for $1.1 billion of the additional funding over the forward estimates period to 2024–25. A further $4.1 billion is required over the following six years (2026–31), which are outside the forward estimates period
  • further significant cash flows required to support the funding model are outside the 10-year contract period. That is, beyond 30 June 2031.

There remains a risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to re-contract with the rail operators for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future government's funding to TAHE’s key customers, the rail operators, may not be consistent with the current shareholding ministers’ expectations
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

The audit found a risk of undue reliance on consultants, a need to improve quality controls on materials submitted to audit and an extreme risk finding raised with respect to providing key information on a timely basis.

The GGS Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast budget deficit of $16 billion.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth target of 5.6 per cent. In 2020–21, the GGS expenditure grew by 6.9 per cent mainly due to grants and subsidies paid from the COVID-19 stimulus packages received from the Commonwealth.

What we recommended

Significant matters concerning TAHE

We recommend NSW Treasury:

  • implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
  • establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on its equity injections into public sector entities
  • report on the performance of investments in TAHE and all other public sector entities
  • ensure the revised commercial agreements between TAHE and NSW rail operators reflect access and licence fees set out in the Heads of Agreement
  • with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support returns beyond FY2031
  • liaise with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and reconfirm the sector classifications of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains
  • with TAHE, monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods
  • significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared on a timely basis
  • consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.

A number of other non-TAHE related recommendations have been raised in Section 6 ‘Key Audit Findings’.

Fast facts 

The Total State Sector comprises the General Government Sector, the Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) Sector and the Public Financial Corporation (PFC) Sector.

The 2020–21 consolidated financial statements of the General Government and Total State Sectors provide the financial performance and position of the NSW Government.

  • $391b government property, plant and equipment in the Total State Sector as at 30 June 2021
  • $3.3b government net contributions to other public sectors in 2020–21. $2.4 billion was contributed to TAHE
  • $19.3b net holding losses from the GGS's investment in other public sector entities recognised outside of the 2020–21 budget result
  • $7.1b budget deficit of the General Government Sector in 2021
  • 7 - six high risk and one extreme risk management letter findings related to the General Government Sector's investment into TAHE
  • 24 monetary misstatements exceeding $20 million were identified in agencies financial statements in 2020–21
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I present my report on State Finances 2021. My independent auditor’s opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements, albeit delayed, is unqualified. My independent auditor’s report however, does include an emphasis of matter drawing attention to significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the State’s equity investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The 2020–21 year was challenging from many perspectives, not least being the continuing impact of and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, NSW Treasury provided government agencies extensions of time to submit financial statements for audit. Finance staff and management right across government must be congratulated for their responsiveness in meeting their financial reporting obligations in such challenging circumstances.

The General Government’s 2020–21 budget result, reflected within the Total State Sector Accounts, was a deficit of $7.1 billion. This compares with the original budgeted deficit of $16 billion. The factors that contributed to this outcome are presented in this Report to Parliament along with other significant matters related to the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts.

One section of my report is dedicated to issues related to the accounting for TAHE. This year’s audit was significantly delayed by protracted disagreement over the treatment of the government’s cash contribution to TAHE. This matter was further frustrated by the fact that information was withheld and not shared with my Office on a timely basis. This has warranted an extreme risk finding for NSW Treasury to significantly improve governance processes to ensure complete and timely sharing of information. This is key to preserving trust, which is one of the foundations that underpins my Office’s engagement with agencies in the conduct of their audits.

The challenges encountered in completing this year’s audit were extraordinary and tested the constructive partnership between the Audit Office and NSW Treasury. I want to acknowledge the enormous efforts of staff of both agencies to correct material errors and ultimately achieve my unmodified audit opinion. I saw first-hand the professionalism, resilience and dedication of my staff. A commitment to accurate and transparent financial reporting is a key basis upon which confidence in the financial management of New South Wales’ resources can be assured.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

9 February 2022

The Independent Auditor's Report, which includes an emphasis of matter was issued on 24 December 2021

While the audit opinion on the State's 2020–21 financial statements was ultimately unmodified, NSW Treasury delayed signing the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sector's (GGS) investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) during 2020–21.

The Treasurer and NSW Treasury signed the consolidated financial statements on 24 December 2021, eleven weeks later than the 2018–19 pre-pandemic timetable.

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that the 2020–21 TSSA would be qualified with respect to TAHE

Our review of all evidence received prior to 14 December indicated the GGS's expected returns were below the long-term inflation rate and that there was no expectation it should recover a significant asset revaluation loss. The levels of projected returns did not support the accounting treatment of the GGS's cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE as an equity injection.

The TSSA are prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and particularly AASB 1049 ‘Whole-of-Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting’. This standard requires contributions from owners to comply with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Government Finance Statistics Manual 20151 (GFSM) where it would not conflict with Australian Accounting Standards.

The ABS GFSM states that an equity contribution is recognised unless there is no reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return can be generated by that investment, in which case the transfer is expensed. A realistic rate of return is defined in the ABS GFSM as the intention to earn a rate of return that is sufficient to generate dividends (including income tax equivalents) and holding gains or losses at a later date. Holding losses include the final asset revaluation decrement of $20.3 billion, which TAHE incurred on its property plant and equipment assets when it became a for-profit entity and was required to value its assets on the basis of the cash flows they are expected to generate. The lower the commercial returns (cashflows), the greater the potential valuation losses of a for-profit entity's assets. This $20.3 billion valuation loss is disclosed within notes 1 'Significant Accounting policies - TAHE Reform in 2020–21', Note 11 'Equity Investments in Other Public Sector Entities' and Note 14 'Property, Plant & Equipment of the Total State Sector and GGS' financial statements.

Multiple versions of models estimating the GGS's expected rate of return were submitted to the Audit Office by NSW Treasury attempting to demonstrate the commerciality of the GGS's investment in TAHE. Until 14 December 2021, our review of all calculations indicated the existing access and licence fees set up under commercial arrangements effective 1 July 2021 did not support a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return would be earned on the equity injections to TAHE. The existing revenue arrangements reflected a shareholders' expected rate of return of only 1.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity and did not include recovery of the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion incurred in 2020–21.

Having reviewed all evidence provided, the Audit Office communicated to NSW Treasury that unless corrected, the State's accounts would be qualified as the $2.4 billion transfer made by the GGS to TAHE should have been reported as a grant expense instead of an investment. The GGS's estimated rate of return was not sufficient to cover:

  • TAHE's final revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • a dollar value equal to, or exceeding a 2.5 per cent rate of return on the equity invested in TAHE (ie: at least equal to the long term inflation rate).

Action was required by the NSW Government to avoid a qualified audit opinion

NSW Government actions avoided a qualified audit opinion related to the GGS’s cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE. To support the TAHE structure as a commercial arrangement earning a sufficient rate of return, the NSW Government agreed to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

Shareholding ministers increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent

On 14 December 2021, a government decision was made resulting in the TAHE shareholding ministers requesting that TAHE re-negotiate the access fees and license fees payable under the Operating Agreements between TAHE and the public operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains). The renegotiation was to target an average return to the GGS of 2.5 per cent on the equity contributed. TAHE's existing ten year agreements with the operators provide a mechanism by which the parties meet annually and consult in order to determine the amount of the access fees and licence fees that will be payable in the following financial year.

The revised shareholder expectations for TAHE were published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' on 16 December 2021. The revised expectations changed the basis of the expected returns on equity from the 10-year Commonwealth bond rate of only 1.5 per cent, to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent. This is consistent with the Reserve Bank's target band and the Commonwealth's Department of Finance's expected return on government investments in other sectors.

The revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW), TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity. This revised return includes:

  • income earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE’s assets
  • recovery of the revaluation losses in 2020–21 on TAHE’s property, plant and equipment assets incurred when TAHE commenced operations as a for-profit entity, albeit the recovery of the revaluation loss is projected to take up to 2052.

The HoA reflects an intention between all parties to revise the contractual agreements to increase future access and license fees by $5.2 billion. This included $1.1 billion for the period FY2023–25, which is reflected in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review'. Further detail on the HoA is reported in Section 3 of this report ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’.

NSW Treasury revised its calculations to reflect the increased future returns

Following these changes, NSW Treasury revised its calculations of estimated returns to reflect a cumulative return equivalent to the expected long-term inflation rate, and recovery of the 2021 valuation loss by 2052. The rate of return period is consistent with the weighted average remaining useful life of TAHE's assets. The changes supported the financial reporting treatment of the $2.4 billion transfer from the GGS to TAHE as an investment rather than an expense, even though TAHE is currently heavily reliant on revenues from the public rail operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. If the cash contribution had to be treated as a capital grant expense, it would have reduced the GGS's budget result by $2.4 billion.

The Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE)

Despite the investment in TAHE being better supported, and the independent auditor's opinion being unqualified, the Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter, which draws attention to the significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the GGS’s equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty is associated with key assumptions that support the recognition by the GGS of its $2.4 billion investment in TAHE during 2020–21.

As at the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to judgements around the commerciality of TAHE's operations because:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which are critical to its ability to earn a realistic rate of return, remain subject to re-negotiation and re-signing of the current access agreements. The proposed indicative future access and licence fees, which are set out in the HoA are intended to form the basis of the re-negotiation.
  • $1.1 billion in additional funding for TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, was provided in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' consistent with the terms in the HoA. However, this funding only extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2024–25. There is an additional $4.1 billion required over the following six years, which falls outside of the forward estimates period (up to the end of the 10-year contract period). While this has been communicated to the government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be provided for in government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are currently highly dependent on its government customers, it is critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the GGS to support increases in the prices government customers will pay for access to TAHE's assets.
  • A further significant portion of the required returns is earned outside of the 10-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031). NSW Treasury has estimated $37.9 billion in returns from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2052, but has not identified the source or means of these returns beyond 2031. Currently, TAHE derives the majority of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW trains, who in turn are both funded by grants to Transport for NSW from the GGS. The projected returns calculated by NSW Treasury beyond 2031 are calculated by assuming a 2.5 per cent growth rate. About 87 per cent of these estimated returns are being earned beyond the ten years, with $32.9 billion estimated over the period 2032–52. There remains risk that:
    • TAHE will not be able to re-contract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

Significant accounting issues relating to TAHE are detailed in Section 3 to this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in section 6 to this report titled ‘Key Audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

The State extended the date for submission of agency financial statements for audit to provide relief to agencies impacted by the New South Wales' COVID-19 lockdowns

All agencies were given a one-week extension (two weeks in 2019–20) to prepare their financial statements and submit them for audit by 2 August 2021. Further extensions were subsequently approved for the following ten agencies and funds (11 in 2019–20) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

  • Department of Communities and Justice (9 August 2021 for disclosures related to cloud computing costs)
  • Investment NSW (13 August 2021)
  • Jobs for NSW (13 August 2021)
  • TCorp IM Funds (19 August 2021)
  • Lord Howe Island Board (22 October 2021)
  • Department of Customer Service (31 August 2021 for disclosures related to AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors')
  • Department of Transport (20 August 2021)
  • Sydney Olympic Park Authority (12 August 2021)
  • Planning Ministerial Corporation (12 August 2021)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (16 August 2021).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to resolve accounting issues relating to:

  • asset valuations
  • first time implementation of AASB 1059
  • asset transfers and treatment of software as service costs.

The extensions outlined above resulted in a two-week delay submitting the State’s draft consolidated financial statements for audit.

In 2020–21, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 24 errors exceeding $20 million (19 in 2019–20). The total value of these errors was $6.6 billion, a significant increase from the previous year ($1.4 billion in 2019–20)

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury Policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities
  • human error or lack of oversight.

The completion of the 2020–21 Total State Sector Accounts was significantly delayed as material accounting issues were resolved. These issues related to how the General Government Sector’s (GGS)2 investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity was accounted for. The key areas of audit concern, which required considerable effort to satisfactorily resolve, included our assessment of:

  • the accounting treatment of funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS, specifically:
    • whether funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS should be considered an equity investment or capital grant expense, with the latter having implication to the presentation of the NSW Government Budget positions. Funds are expensed unless, as an investment, there is a reasonable expectation to generate a sufficient rate of return
    • forming a view as to what a ‘reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return on investment3’ should be with respect to the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Government Finance Statistics Manual 2015 (GFSM)
    • the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment at 30 June 2021
  • whether TAHE was correctly classified as a Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entity
  • whether, under the agreements in place for the use and price of TAHE's assets, TAHE controlled its property, plant and equipment.

Our assessments were hindered by errors and omissions in information and models provided by NSW Treasury to demonstrate expected returns from TAHE, as well as a lack of timeliness and completeness in their responses to requests for documentation to support NSW Treasury's proposed accounting of government's contributions to TAHE.

Up until 13 December 2021, evidence provided by NSW Treasury to support the treatment of a $2.4 billion equity transfer from the GGS to TAHE did not demonstrate a sufficient rate of return on the State's investment. Instead, the evidence suggested the transfer was of the nature of a capital grant expense, which would impact the GGS budget result. Unless corrected, by either reversing the equity investment to a capital grant expense (impacting the GGS budget result) or providing additional resources to the rail operators to support additional TAHE access and licence fees (adding additional expenses to future GGS budget results), this matter would have caused the State's accounts to have been qualified.

After the Audit Office communicated the likely audit outcome to NSW Treasury, significant changes were made by government from 14 December 2021. Government decisions that avoided qualification of the TSSA included:

  • On 14 December, a government decision approved communicating revised shareholders' expectations of rate of return of 2.5 per cent being the long-term inflation rate, and increased grants to Transport for NSW for the rail operators to pay increased access and licence fees to TAHE to support of the new rate of return (previously 1.5 per cent).
  • On 16 December, the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' included an increase in expected returns to be derived through higher access and license fees charged by TAHE. To facilitate these returns, an increased allocation of funds of $1.1 billion was made to Transport for NSW (TfNSW) from 1 July 2022 as part of the forward estimates for the period 2022–25. This was to pay for the proposed increased access and licence fees the operators would be required to pay TAHE.
  • On 18 December, TfNSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains signed a Heads of Agreement (HoA) forming the basis of negotiations to revise annual operating agreements to facilitate the shareholders’ expected returns of 2.5 per cent of contributed equity. The HoA included indicative access and licence charges to be used as a basis of renegotiation, increasing access fees and licence fees to be paid by Sydney Trains and NSW Trains over the 10-year period from 2022–2031 by a further $5.2 billion. Most of this increase occurs outside the forward estimates. The majority of the additional funding may need to be funded by future governments.

NSW Treasury has projected returns to be earned to 2052 (a period covering the weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets) as sufficient to recover the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion which arose when TAHE revalued its assets under the income approach. These assets were valued on a discounted cash flow basis as at 30 June 2021.

These key decisions and the circumstances leading up to these changes are detailed later in this section.

Background

On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation of New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, was renamed the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) transitioning to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts. TAHE was not a newly created entity, nor was it the result of a change in administrative re-arrangements (such as Machinery of Government change).

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to TfNSW, a GGS agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result and in the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA).

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections, even though the business model was yet to be determined. NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets of 1 July 2019.

Contributions paid to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model eventually adopted was one whereby:

  • The GGS invests in TAHE with an expectation of a sufficient rate of return.
  • TAHE charges the operators (predominantly Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to use network and rolling stock to deliver services. The operators remain responsible for both the delivery of the services and the maintenance and safe operation of the assets. The operators are primarily funded by TfNSW through grants.
  • The GGS grants funds to operators, which allows them to pay access fees to TAHE. The amount of these grants impacts the budget result.
  • TAHE pays a return back to GGS by way of dividends and tax equivalents. The return may also include holding gains and losses on the fair value of the net assets of TAHE.

TAHE earns relatively small amounts of income from transactions with the private sector. While the TAHE Board envisages that, over time, they will enhance the commerciality of TAHE’s operations, it is currently highly dependent on revenues from government contracts (over 80 per cent). The circularity in flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below:

The government continues to respond to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. Over 2020–21, the government allocated an additional $5.6 billion to agencies as part of its economic stimulus and pandemic response. Measures included:

  • $1.8 billion in health measures including essential medical equipment purchases, vaccine distribution, quarantine, contract tracing and maintaining clinical health capacity (such as intensive care units)
  • $508 million in additional cleaning services primarily to the Department of Education and Transport for NSW
  • $500 million as part of the ‘Dine & Discovery NSW’ voucher program to the Department of Customer Service
  • $350 million in combined land tax relief and small business recovery grants to Department of Customer Service and NSW Treasury respectively.

Around $4.5 billion of this package was spent in 2020–21, leaving $1.1 billion unspent and carried forward into 2021–22. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2021 compared to their target spend.

Deficit of $7.1 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $16 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 204 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 204 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 98 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $16 billion.

Revenues increased $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion

In 2020–21, the State’s total revenues increased by $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion, 6.5 per cent higher than previous year. A decrease of 0.3 per cent was recorded in 2019–20. The main contributors to the increase in the State's revenues were an increase in taxation revenue of $4.6 billion and an increase in grants and subsidies of $1.4 billion when compared to the prior financial year.

Taxation revenue increased by 15.3 per cent

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to:

  • $2.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by:
    • $2.7 billion increase in contracts and conveyance duties (transfer duties) from both higher transaction volumes and strong property price growth during 2020–21
    • $200 million increase in motor vehicle registration duty driven by increases in new vehicle sales
  • $520 million higher Gambling and Betting Taxes was earned as 2019–20. The previous year's revenues were impacted by club and hotel closures due to COVID-19. The operation of these venues in 2020–21 returned to normal for most of the year resulting in higher club gaming tax revenue of $216 million and hotel gaming taxes of $265 million
  • $439 million higher collections of payroll taxes. The previous year's revenues were impacted by tax relief measures implemented by the government in response to COVID-19. Lower payroll tax was collected in 2019–20 as employment levels dropped during the State’s first lock down
  • $416 million higher land tax revenues, driven by an average 3.2 per cent increase in valuer general land values, which are the basis for determining land tax values.

Stamp duties of $11.7 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $2.9 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.8 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Expenses increased $4.1 billion to $101 billion

The State’s expenses increased 4.3 per cent compared with 2019–20. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, depreciation and amortisation, other operating costs and grants and subsidies expense.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 3.6 per cent to $44.1 billion

Salaries and wages increased to $36.3 billion ($34.8 billion in 2019–20). This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and an average increase of approximately three per cent in the cost of NSW's employees across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $511 million and $619 million respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 4,893 full time staff in 2020–21 (2,763 in 2019–20) and incurred an extra $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 2,418 full time equivalents in 2020–21 (4,866 in 2019–20). This year, the health and education sectors received a 0.3 per cent award increase in pay rates.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) noted in the ‘State of the NSW Public Sector Report, 2021’ that the government sector senior executive headcount increased by 347 to 3,680 (3,333 in 2019–20). The Transport cluster represented the majority of the increase in the government sector's senior executive headcount, with an increase of 182. The PSC report noted the increase was due to the growing portfolio of major transport infrastructure projects.

Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Depreciation and amortisation expense increased 7.6 per cent to $10.3 billion

Depreciation and amortisation increased to $10.3 billion in 2020–21 ($9.6 billion in 2019–20). This increase was mainly driven by the depreciation of completed infrastructure projects including the State’s WestConnex M8 and M5 East Motorways, and other road projects such as Woolgoolga to Ballina project. This year also includes twelve months of depreciation relating to the CBD and South-East Light Rail versus six months in the previous financial year.

Furthermore, the first time adoption of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements’ resulted in the State recognising $45.4 billion of service concession assets in its capacity as grantor under arrangements with operators. More than 87 per cent of this balance was recognised by the Transport cluster. These assets are valued at current replacement cost and are depreciated on an annual basis. A service concession arrangement is an arrangement whereby the government as grantor, contracts with an operator to develop (or upgrade), operate and maintain the grantor's public service assets such as roads, bridges or hospitals. The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide using the assets, to whom, and at what price. The grantor also retains any significant residual interest in the assets at the end of the arrangement. Further details about AASB 1059 are included in the ‘Implementation of new accounting standards’ section of this report.

Grants and subsidies increased $1.5 billion to $15.6 billion

The increase in grants and subsidies is due to payments made by the State in supporting businesses and local communities in response to COVID-19. These mainly included $240 million in Dine & Discover voucher payments, $156 million in land tax relief assistance, $160 million increase in grants to non-government schools (including $31 million to support Covid intensive learning support programs), and $109 million relating to small business grant payments.

The State also transferred $592 million in newly constructed assets to local councils. These mainly related to $378 million in assets transferred following completion of WestConnex stage 2 and $180 million from Northern Roads.

Other operating expenses increased two per cent to $27.5 billion

Operating expenses increased to $27.5 billion in 2020–21 ($26.9 billion in 2019–20) due to higher operating activities as agencies responded to the pandemic.

Supplies and Other Services increased by $1.7 billion. This was mainly due to funding of $533 million in hotel quarantine and associated services, and $495 million in medical equipment for the health sector.

Inventories consumed increased by $266 million. This included $217 million in COVID-19 medical equipment that was written off because it had expired or did not meet the TGA regulatory standards. Contractor expenses increased by $306 million because of increased capital works activity, primarily in the Transport sector.

The increase was offset by $1.6 billion in lower insurance claims expense. In 2019–20 financial year, higher claims were made in respect to natural disaster events, including bush fires.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense

Total expenses of the State were $101 billion ($96.4 billion in 2019–20). In 2020–21, Health remains the highest contributor of expenses for the State with $25.7 billion ($24.2 billion in 2019–20). Education remains the second highest contributor of expenses reporting $18.4 billion in 2020–21 ($17.5 billion in 2019–20).

The following sectors have the highest expenses as a percentage of total State expenses:

  • Health – 25.6 per cent (25.1 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Education – 18.3 per cent (18.2 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Transport – 14.5 per cent (13.3 per cent in 2019–20).

Assets grew by $12.3 billion to $526 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $12.3 billion to $526 billion. This was a 2.4 per cent increase compared with 2019–20, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $391 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $1.7 billion to $391 billion in 2020–21 ($37.9 billion increase in 2019–20). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($172 billion), infrastructure systems ($202 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Liabilities increased $16.4 billion to $291 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to COVID-19

The State’s borrowings rose by $15.8 billion to $134 billion at 30 June 2021. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $16.8 billion to $114 billion, which largely funded the State's capital expenditure and response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

TCorp bonds are traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2020–21, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

The State’s fiscal objective published in the 2021–22 Budget Papers is to repair the operating position by returning the budget to surplus by 2024–25 and rebuilding balance sheet capacity by bringing net debt down towards seven per cent of Gross State Product (GSP) over the medium-term. The State measures net debt as the sum of deposits held, government securities, loans payable and other borrowings, less the sum of cash and deposits, advances paid and investments, loans receivable and placements.

The chart below shows the actual net debt to GSP for NSW compared to the Commonwealth net debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the past six years. The trend shows an increase in net debt, particularly in the past two years, which is mainly driven by additional borrowings needed to fund stimulus measures when responding to COVID-19 and natural disaster relief.

GSF Act and GSF Regulation

Financial reporting provisions in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) have now commenced

From 1 July 2021, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act) financial reporting provisions were repealed. Agencies prepared their 2020–21 financial statements under Part 7 of the GSF Act. They were audited under the Government Sector Audit Act (GSA Act). The GSF Act requires the timeframe for annual financial statement submission be specified in the Treasurer’s Directions.

Under the GSF Act, all reporting GSF agencies are required to prepare annual financial statements, unless exempt from the definition of a reporting agency under the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018 (GSF Regulation). Those agencies exempt from preparing financial statements include certain small agencies, Crown Land Managers, special purpose staff agencies and retained State interests. These agencies must meet prescribed requirements or thresholds and self-assess each year to determine whether they remain exempt against the criteria in the GSF Regulation.

Most of the financial reporting provisions of the GSF Act have now commenced except for requirements concerning special deposit accounts (SDA) and special purpose financial reports, which are scheduled to commence on 1 July 2023, subject to approval from the Governor.

The GSF Act now includes most of the provisions applicable to GSF agencies, as requirements for appropriations, expenditure, financial services, and other matters were enacted on 1 December 2018 and 1 July 2019.

Once fully commenced, the GSF Act will consolidate and replace reporting provisions of four Acts:

  • PF&A Act
  • Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987
  • Annual Reports (Departments) Act 1985
  • Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Act 1984.

GSA Act and GSA Regulation

The PF&A Act was renamed the GSA Act on 1 July 2021 and now only contains provisions relating to the Auditor-General and the Audit Office, the audit of government sector finances and governance of the Public Accounts Committee.

Of note in the renamed GSA Act is that:

  • a new principal object was added that specifically provides the Auditor-General is an independent and accountable statutory officer
  • the previous financial reporting provisions in the PF&A Act were repealed as the financial reporting provisions are contained in Part 7 of the GSF Act. As a result, there are no longer financial reporting provisions in the GSA Act
  • a new section 34 was added, which contains the requirements for the audit of State sector agencies’ financial statements. These were previously contained in two separate sections.

The GSA Regulation commenced on 1 July 2021, replacing the Public Finance and Audit Regulation 2015 (PF & A Regulation). The GSA Regulation contains the list of entities, funds and accounts prescribed for the purpose of audits under the GSA Act.

Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes

There are inconsistencies between key statutory timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General in the GSF Act and GSA Act which has been brought to the attention of NSW Treasury. The inconsistencies identified include:

  • Section 34(3)(a) of the GSA Act defines the audit period for the Statements be as soon as practicable after the Auditor-General is given the Statements. This appears to be inconsistent with section 49(3) of the GSA Act, which requires that the Auditor-General, on or before 22 October transmit the Statements and audit report to the Treasurer. Neither provision is a paramount provision.
  • Section 49(3) of the GSA Act also appears to be inconsistent with section 52(1) of the GSA Act which provides that the Statements are to be given to the Auditor-General in accordance with section 7.17 of the GSF Act. Section 7.17 of the GSF Act requires that the Statements are to be prepared and given to the Auditor-General by an agreed date to enable the audit of the Statements. Part 7 of the GSF Act is a paramount provision under section 1.8 of the GSF Act, which means the requirements in section 7.17 of the GSF Act prevail.

There are also inconsistencies in key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer under the GSF Act.

The audited Statements are a key accountability mechanism that provides information on the State’s financial performance and position. Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. As noted at the beginning of this report, the delay in issuing the audit report for the 30 June 2021 Statements was due to NSW Treasury’s resolution of accounting issues that were material to the Statements, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sectors investment in TAHE during 2020–21. NSW Treasury's management letter will include a high risk finding with regards to the inconsistencies between the GSF Act and GSA Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve the inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to key statutory reporting time frames.

Appropriations framework

NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority

The GSF Act requires that money not be paid out of the Consolidated Fund except under the authority of an Act, such as the annual Appropriation Act or GSF Act. This means a minister is only authorised to spend out of the Consolidated Fund the amount they have been appropriated by the relevant Act(s).

Generally, money is authorised to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund either through:

  • The Annual Appropriation Act - this is an act to appropriate out of the Consolidated Fund sums for the services of the government for the relevant financial year. These appropriations are made to the responsible ministers of principal departments, Special Offices and certain SDAs.
  • The GSF Act - this act allows the responsible minister of a GSF agency to be given an appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund, at the time the agency receives or recovers any deemed appropriation money. Deemed appropriation money is defined in section 4.7(3) of the GSF Act.

Ministers can delegate and sub-delegate appropriation expenditure functions to accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies. Any spending by accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies in excess of the amount appropriated to their relevant minister would be made contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act.

The Budget Papers are an additional mechanism by which the government controls the level of expenditure by agencies both at the individual and departmental administrative cluster level. The Budget Papers set an administrative limit imposed by the government. Separately, the Treasurer can issue a Budget control authority under section 5.1 of the GSF Act. A Budget control authority can regulate expenditure of money by GSF agencies in a variety of ways, as set out in section 5.1(2) of the GSF Act.

In July 2021, NSW Treasury advised the Audit Office that it had received advice from the Crown Solicitor's Office, in January 2021, that payments between agencies in different administrative clusters would not meet the definition of a 'deemed appropriation' under the GSF Act by the receiving agency. This applies to money paid and received by two agencies across different administrative clusters that continue to hold the money in the Consolidated Fund. These intra-government receipts increase the amount an agency has available to spend, without there being a corresponding increase in the responsible minister’s appropriated expenditure limits, thus increasing the risk an agency’s expenditure could cause a minister to exceed their appropriated expenditure authority.

After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office worked with NSW Treasury officers to clarify potential implications. The Audit Office also obtained further advice from the Crown Solicitor’s Office to clarify certain aspects of the appropriations framework more broadly. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. The advice also confirmed:

  • a deemed appropriation for the services of an agency would ordinarily be available for the services of other agencies, if the officers of the other agencies had a delegation from the minister(s) to expend the deemed appropriation and funds remained available under those deemed appropriations
  • that the ‘exhaustion’ of a minister’s appropriation may be precipitated by one agency’s level of expenditure in the financial year, but the effect is that the relevant appropriation is exhausted for all agencies (and their officers) that may otherwise rely on it
  • whether expenditure by an agency occurred beyond the scope of its authority would require a progressive examination of the total amounts expended from the minister’s appropriation
  • amounts expended from the Consolidated Fund without the authority of an appropriation are spent contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act
  • a minister is responsible to Parliament for (i) the manner in which appropriations are expended, and (ii) any ‘overspends’ (that is, expenditure without authority) by agencies for which they are responsible.

Determining whether expenditure has occurred without the authority of an appropriation is complex and it is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority. As noted earlier, there are mechanisms in place to manage agencies' administrative expenditure limits set by the Budget Papers, but there is no mechanism in place to ensure expenditure by agencies does not exceed a minister’s appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and GSF Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister’s coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriation Act and the GSF Act.

In addition, principal departments and agencies that hold money in the Consolidated Fund are required by Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and NSW Treasury Circular TC20/08 'Mandates of options and major policy decisions under Australian Accounting Standards' to prepare a Summary of Compliance in their financial statements. The Summary of Compliance applies to agencies that obtain part or all of their spending authority from a Parliamentary appropriation. It is intended to provide information on the amounts appropriated or authorised for an agency’s use and whether those expenditures were authorised. There remains uncertainty around how the Crown Solicitor’s Office advice received by the Audit Office impacts these disclosures, as the total spending authority given by Parliamentary appropriations and expenditure against these appropriations cannot generally be attributed to an individual agency. Such a scenario is not contemplated by the relevant Australian Accounting Standard. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk findings about improving mechanisms in place to manage agencies administrative expenditure limits, uncertainties related to appropriation spending authority on agencies summary of compliance disclosures.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and agencies' financial statement disclosures.

Delegations to incur expenditure

Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation

The delegation to incur expenditure is an important accountability mechanism of responsible government.

Last year’s Report on State Finances reported instances where government agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act for deemed appropriations, resulting in some agencies spending deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

This year’s financial audits identified that further agencies: TAFE Commission, Multicultural NSW and the Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner spent money received from an annual Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk issues about improving mechanisms in place to ensure agencies have appropriate delegations in place to spend Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money.

In addition, the audit of the Jobs for NSW Fund (the Fund) special purpose statements identified that five payments from the Fund were authorised by an officer without the necessary delegation from the minister as required by section 14 of the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 and sections 5.5(2) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Recommendation

Given the continued instances of non-compliance, NSW Treasury needs to promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations.

Implementation of new accounting standards

This year, the State implemented the requirements of AASB 1059

AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’

AASB 1059 is an Australian Accounting Standard that requires public sector entities (grantors) that enter service concession arrangements with private sector operators for the delivery of public services recognise service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements. The standard was effective from 1 July 2020.

AASB 1059 requires a grantor to:

  • recognise an asset provided by the operator as a service concession asset if the grantor controls the asset
  • initially measure the service concession asset at current replacement cost (CRC) in accordance with AASB 13 ‘Fair Value Measurement’
  • recognise a corresponding liability measured initially at the fair value (CRC) of the service concession asset, adjusted for any consideration between the grantor and the operator
  • make sufficient disclosure in the financial statements so that users can understand the nature, amount and timing of assets, liabilities, revenue and cash flows arising from these.

The adoption of AASB 1059 increased the State’s total assets and liabilities by $19.5 billion and $19.6 billion respectively, with net worth reducing by $131 million at 1 July 2019

The State adopted a modified retrospective approach when adopting AASB 1059 and recognised and measured service concession assets and liabilities at the date of initial application of 1 July 2019, with any net adjustments recognised in accumulated funds at that date. This means comparatives were restated to reflect the impact of AASB 1059.

Most of the service concession assets recognised by the State related to Property, Plant & Equipment, in particular infrastructure assets.

Agencies had to devote significant effort to implement AASB 1059 and ensure their 2020–21 financial statements materially complied with the standard's requirements. Last year, the Audit Office highlighted advance preparation was key to ensuring agencies effectively transitioning to this new standard. Despite the new standard being issued well in advance of its commencement date, Sydney Water Corporation, Department of Customer Service, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and TAHE did not prepare sufficiently for their respective implementations.

Whilst most agencies in 2019–20 had commenced assessing their existing commercial arrangements to determine whether they were within the scope of AASB 1059, calculating and posting the accounting entries to support the implementation of this standard was delayed for TfNSW. TfNSW had not finalised its opening balance adjustments in time for the Audit Office’s early close review. Critical assessments of AASB 1059 to identify the accounting implications for the Transport sector, in particular TfNSW and TAHE were still being considered as late as 30 September 2021.

Restart NSW

Restart NSW was established in 2011 to fund the State’s major infrastructure projects

Restart NSW funds Rebuilding NSW, the government’s 10-year plan to invest $23 billion in new infrastructure. Its infrastructure projects, including Sydney Metro West and Parramatta Light Rail, are primarily funded by proceeds from the government’s asset recycling program. The Restart Fund had a balance of $12.4 billion at 30 June 2021 ($15 billion in 2019–20).

The Fund paid $3.8 billion for infrastructure projects in 2020–21 ($4.3 billion in 2020–21). The largest payments were for transport projects, including Sydney Metro West, Parramatta Light Rail, and contributed $319 million of the $2.4 billion equity contribution to the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The funds are invested in the NSW Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF), which is allowed under the Restart NSW Fund Act 2011 (Restart Act). The NIFF is an investment vehicle for the fund to help the NSW Government meet its infrastructure objectives and this fund is managed by TCorp. In 2020–21, the fund earned a net return of 7.9 per cent, higher than its annual benchmark return of 4.2 per cent, benefiting from improved returns in financial markets over 2020–21.

The fund directed 30.1 per cent of its payments towards rural and regional infrastructure projects in 2020–21

The Restart Act requires the fund to report on the percentage of payments directed to rural and regional infrastructure projects and whether this represents at least 30 per cent of the total payments from the fund. The Restart NSW Fund Amendment (Rural and Regional Infrastructure Funding) Bill 2020 introduced in Parliament in 2020 would amend the Restart Act by requiring at least 30 per cent of the total payments each financial year and for the life of the Restart NSW Fund be made on infrastructure projects in rural and regional areas.

This year the fund exceeded its target of directing at least 30 per cent of funding towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. However, since the funds’ commencement, only 23 per cent of total payments went towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. Current projections for the life of the fund indicate only 27.5 per cent of funding will be spent on rural and regional projects, which is below the funds target of 30 per cent target for the life of the fund.

Audit Office’s work plan for 2021–22

The Audit Office’s 2021–22 work plan focuses on the State’s response, recovery and impact from the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disaster emergencies

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the public sector of New South Wales. Government continues to assist communities in their recovery from the 2019–20 bushfires and subsequent flooding. The scale of government responses to these events has been significant and has required a wide-ranging response involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

Significant resources have been directed toward these responses, and in assisting rebuilding and economic recovery. Some systems and processes have changed to reflect the need for quick responses to immediate needs. The increasing and changing risk environment presented by these events has meant that we have recalibrated and focused our efforts on providing assurance on how effectively aspects of these emergency responses have been delivered. This includes financial and governance risks arising from the scale and complexity of government responses to these events.

While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. We will take a phased approach to ensuring that our work addresses the following elements of the emergencies and government responses:

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities
 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Customer Service 2021

Customer Service 2021

Finance
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Shared services and collaboration

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Customer Service cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the ‘Report on State Finances’ focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the ‘Report on State Finances’ has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Customer Service cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of Customer Service cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Customer Service cluster agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 48 in 2019–20 to 46 in 2020–21.

Seven out of eight agencies did not complete all mandatory early close procedures.

What the key issues were

Upon the implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors', the Department of Customer Service (the department) recognised a service concession asset, the land titling database, totalling $845 million for the first time at 1 July 2019.

The department reported several retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

The 2020–21 audits identified three high-risk and 59 moderate risk issues across the cluster. The high-risk issues were related to:

  • the Department of Customer Service – internal control qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect service providers
  • the Department of Customer Service – significant control deficiencies in information technology change management controls
  • Rental Bond Board – uncertainties in the accounting treatment of rental bonds.

The percentage of repeat issues we report to management and those charged with governance in management letters increased from 29 per cent in prior year to 42 per cent in 2020–21 while the number of items decreased from 94 to 93.

The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers increased resulting in additional audit procedures to address the risks of fraud and errors in the financial statements.

What we recommended

The department should improve the validation process of key valuation assumptions and inputs provided by the private operator NSW Land Registry Services. It should revisit its accounting treatment of new land titling records.

The department should ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise the remediation of control deficiencies in information technology services.

The department should continue to improve controls in cyber security management.

Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority should improve its fixed assets management and financial reporting process to accommodate its growing fixed assets profile.

Fast facts

The Customer Service cluster aims to plan, prioritise, fund and drive digital transformation and customer service across every cluster in the NSW Government.

  • $3.9b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21 
  • $34.1b total administered income managed on behalf of the NSW Government in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements 
  • 3 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 46 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 42% of reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
  • The number of reported misstatements has decreased from 48 in 2019–20 to 46 in 2020–21.
  • Agencies could do more work to improve the quality and timeliness of completing mandatory early close procedures.
  • The Department of Customer Service implemented the new accounting standard AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors', which resulted in recognition of a service concession asset of $845 million at 1 July 2019. The valuation of land titling database requires significant judgements and estimations.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified three high-risk and 59 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Twenty-six moderate risk issues were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • The magnitude and number of internal control qualification issues from GovConnect service providers have increased. Ineffective controls at service providers increase the risk of fraud, error and security to data. Urgent attention is required to remediate the internal control exceptions in information and technology services.
  • The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

Findings reported to management

Forty-two per cent of findings reported to management were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 93 findings raised across the cluster (94 in 2019–20). Forty-two per cent of all issues were repeat issues (29 per cent in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
High3
1 new,
1 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • internal control exceptions in information and technology services provided by GovConnect service providers
  • inadequate change management controls
  • poor user access administration and no monitoring of privileged user activities
  • insufficient cybersecurity controls and processes.

High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter.

Moderate2
5 new,
8 repeat

Low1
7 new,
5 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

Moderate2
5 new,
3 repeat

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including:

  • lack of documentation support for payroll transactions
  • untimely removal of unused transaction negotiation authority facility and old bank signatories
  • inadequate fixed asset management controls including timely capitalisation of project overhead costs.

 Low1
3 new,
2 repeat

Financial reporting

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • uncertainties in legislation to support accounting of rental bonds as funds held in trust
  • improvements required in lease accounting including the review of extension options, assessing indicators of impairment and reviewing the lease reports for completeness and accuracy 
  • the removal of fully depreciated assets in the fixed asset register was not timely
  • the quality and timeliness of completing early close procedures required improvement.

High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter.

Moderate2
9 new,
8 repeat

Low1
7 new,
3 repeat

Governance and oversight
Moderate2
10 new,
3 repeat

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • renewing or finalising service arrangement agreements between agencies were required 
  • lack of formalised documentation regarding arrangements with external providers for leasing and use of assets.
Low1
3 new
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
4 new,
4 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • non-compliance with contract and procurement management policy, including the use of purchasing cards
  • non-compliance with TC 21-02 'Statutory Act of Grace Payments'
  • annual leave in excess of 30 days where Circular 2020-12 requires agency heads to reduce employee recreation leave balances to 30 days or less.
Low1
1 repeat

4 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based on management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified three high-risk findings

High-risk findings, including repeat findings, were reported at the following cluster agencies. One of the 2019–20 high-risk findings were not resolved.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings  
Department of Customer Service
Repeat finding:
Qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect NSW controls assurance reports

The GovConnect information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified in 2020–21. The key controls over user access, system changes and batch process failed in all ITGC reports. Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

The control deficiencies in ITGC increase:

  • the risk of unauthorised transactions, system and configuration changes (workflow approvals, three-way match etc.) and modifications to the system reports
  • incomplete, invalid and inappropriate system access, segregation of duties controls and system reports for the customers using the SAPConnect.

The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. It is leading a new IT operating model called ‘Service Integration and Application Management’ (SIAM) to strengthen governance and improve performance of GovConnect service providers. The Department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in the GovConnect environment.

This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately addressed, it had the potential to result in material fraud and error in the department's financial statements and reputation damages.

This issue is further discussed later in this chapter.

2020–21 findings  
Department of Customer Service
New finding:
Change management significant control deficiencies

Revenue NSW, a division of the department has a key role in managing the State’s finances. It administers State taxes, manages fines, recovers State debt and administers grants and subsidies.

The audit team found significant control deficiencies in change management controls:

  •  appropriate system controls were not in place to restrict developers from releasing changes to the live business systems
  • 8 developers had direct access to the business application servers used for calculating and administering State taxes.

We have included this matter as a high-risk management letter finding, as the audit team could not identify mitigating controls. The system activity of these developers was also not being independently logged and monitored. This increases the risk of unauthorised system change. This can significantly affect the integrity of tax calculation, business process approvals, invalid changes to bank accounts, unauthorised refunds and write-offs. The audit team conducted a risk analysis over the relevant business processes affected by this issue and performed additional audit procedures to address the audit risk.

Rental Bond Board
Repeat finding: Accounting treatment of rental bonds held in trust

The Rental Bond Board (the Board) holds rental bonds totalling $1.7 billion at 30 June 2021. The Board treated the rental bonds off-balance sheet and disclosed the rental bonds as ‘trust funds’. This treatment is based on management’s judgement that the Board does not have control of these funds.

Previously the Board obtained advices from the Crown Solicitors who stated that in their view the rental bond funds held in the rental bond account were not moneys held in trust and the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (the Act) should be reviewed and amended to better support its accounting treatment of rental bonds. The Board has initiated the need to amend the Act, however the implementation of the legislative amendments is still pending.

This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately supported, it had the potential to result in material misstatements in the Board's financial statements.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Fifty-nine moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, which was a 11.3 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 26 were repeat findings, and 33 were new issues.

Moderate risk findings include:

  • weaknesses in user access management, such as untimely access removal for terminated staff, and a lack of periodic user access review
  • accounting for leases such as the review of extension options, assessing indicators of impairment and reviewing the lease reports for completeness and accuracy
  • formalising arrangements between agencies including corporate service arrangements, funding arrangements, leases, use of SAP system and computer assets
  • use of purchasing cards where our data analytics performed indicated potential gaps and controls and non-compliance with government policies.

The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers have increased

In 2015, the NSW Government selected Unisys Australia Pty Limited’s (Unisys) as an information technology (IT) outsourced service provider and Infosys Limited (Infosys) as a business process outsourced service provider. The outsourced services arrangement was branded GovConnect NSW (GovConnect). The Department of Customer Service (the department) is the contract authority for the NSW Government. In 2019, the NSW Government transitioned a number of Unisys’ IT services progressively to the department and ceased all Unisys's IT services in May 2021. In 2020-21, Infosys, Unisys and the Department were co-providers of business processes and information technology services that constitute the GovConnect environment.

The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. The department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in GovConnect internal control environment.

The department leads the project management of GovConnect services, including the arrangement to provide internal control assurance reports to customers in 2020–21. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at GovConnect service providers in accordance with Australian Standard on Assurance Engagements 3402 'Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service Organisation' (ASAE 3402). The service auditor reports on the internal controls at a service organisation, which are relevant to a user entity's internal control environment.

The service auditor issued eight ASAE 3402 reports covering business processes controls and information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the service providers. Four out of eight reports were qualified, a significant increase from previous years.

The table below shows the service auditor's ASAE 3402 opinions issued in various business processes and information technology services provided by service providers for the last five years.

ASAE 3402 controls report# 2015–16^ 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
Infosys Accounts receivable Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Qualified
Infosys Accounts payable Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys Fixed assets Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys General ledger Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys Payroll Adverse Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys ITGC Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Qualified
Unisys ITGC Qualified Unqualified Qualified Qualified Unqualified Qualified
The department ITGC* -- -- -- -- Qualified Qualified
ServiceFirst** Disclaimer -- -- -- -- --

# The ASAE 3402 controls reports were issued by an independent private sector service auditor appointed by the Department of Customer Service.
* Information technology services were transitioned from Unisys to the department in phases from 2019–20 to 2020–21.
** ServiceFirst was the shared service centre and its last reporting period was from 1 July 2015 to 13 December 2015.
^ GovConnect first reporting period from 14 December 2015 to 30 June 2016.

In 2020–21, the information technology services controls reports issued to the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified. Infosys' accounts receivable business process controls report was also qualified. The audit qualifications were because:

  • the service auditor did not get access to the complete set of records processed during the financial year for several ITGC controls. The system that stored these records was hosted at Unisys. From December 2019 to 28 May 2021, the services at Unisys were progressively migrated to the department's IT environment but this system could not be migrated to the department in the required format, resulting in audit scope limitation for service auditors
  • of the deviations identified during sample testing of ITGC controls
  • the monthly follow up of outstanding receivables was not performed regularly, which was the only key control to address the timely collection of accounts receivable.

Internal control exceptions in GovConnect information and technology services require urgent remediations

The relevant controls over user access, system changes and password controls failed in all three ASAE 3402 GovConnect ITGC reports. These control failures can lead to unauthorised system access, system and configuration changes (workflow approvals, three-way match, etc.) and modifications to key reports. It increases the risk of:

  • fraud and error in the financial statements
  • ineffective segregation of duties controls
  • accuracy and completeness of system generated reports for the agencies using the SAPConnect system.

The table shows the number of ITGC control deviations compared to prior year:

Year ended 30 June 2021 2020
  Total controls tested Total number of control deviations and findings Total controls tested Total number of control deviations and findings
Infosys ITGC 41 16 35 8
Unisys ITGC 25 11 33 4
DCS ITGC 31 9 10 5

Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

The service auditor identified significant areas for remediation:

  • governance arrangement of the IT services
  • user access management controls
  • SAP database controls
  • logical access
  • incident management.

In response to the internal control qualifications, the audit teams performed data analytics over payroll and accounts payable. The data analytics identified several terminated employees that were paid long after their termination dates which resulted in salary overpayments during 2020–21. While management had put processes in place to recover these overpayments, the payroll processing controls need to be improved to prevent such overpayments.

The Department of Customer Service advised that it established a ‘Control Reframe Project’ (the project) to address the internal control exceptions at GovConnect service providers. The objective of the project is to ensure the GovConnect assurance model is aligned with clear lines of responsibility and remediation actions are in place to support the delivery of services and achieve an improved outcome for future years.

Recommendation

We recommend the Department of Customer Service:

  • improve governance and internal control environment over the information technology services
  • ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise remediation actions to address internal control exceptions
  • perform a post-implementation review of the transition of the Unisys arrangement to identify lessons learnt and continuous improvement
  • develop data analytics to help analyse and identify high-risk patterns and anomalies in GovConnect key transaction systems, augmenting their existing monitoring and detective controls.

The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention

The 2020 'Central Agencies' Report to Parliament highlighted the need for Cyber Security NSW, a business unit within the Department of Customer Service, and NSW Government agencies to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency. A status update of the 2020 recommendation is included in Appendix five of this report.

The Audit Office's Annual Work Program identifies cyber security as a focus area for the Audit Office in 2021–24. It outlines a three-pronged approach to auditing cyber security in this period:

  • considering how agencies are responding to the risks associated with cyber security across our financial audits across the NSW public sector
  • examining the effectiveness of cyber security planning and governance arrangements for large NSW state government agencies for our Internal Controls and Governance report
  • conducting deep-dive performance audits of the effectiveness of specific agency activities in preparing for, and responding to cyber security risks.

A performance audit 'Managing cyber risks' was tabled in Parliament in July 2021. The audit made several recommendations to audited agencies to uplift their cyber security management. It also recommended the Department of Customer Service to:

  • clarify the requirement of the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) reporting to all systems
  • require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

A compliance audit 'Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy' was tabled in October 2021. The audit examined whether agencies are complying with the NSW Cyber Security Policy to ensure all NSW Government departments and public service agencies are managing cyber security risks to their information and systems.

The report found that key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. There has been insufficient progress to improve cyber security safeguards across NSW Government agencies. The poor levels of cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires dedicated leadership and resourcing. To comply with some elements of the government’s policy agencies will have to invest in technical uplift and some measures may take time to implement. However, other elements of the policy do not require any investment in technology. They simply require leadership and management commitment to improve cyber literacy and culture. And they require accountability and transparency. Transparent reporting of performance is a key means to improve performance.

The report noted that the CSP was not achieving the objective of improved cyber governance, controls and culture. The compliance audit made several recommendations to Cyber Security NSW and other NSW Government agencies.

The 2021 maturity self-assessment results against the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 for the 25 largest NSW State Government agencies are reported in the 2021 'Internal Control and Governance' Report to Parliament.

Repeat recommendation

Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

Management of cyber security risk

Our 2020-21 financial audit assessed whether cyber security risks represent a risk of material misstatement to the department's own financial statements. A request performance audit 'Service NSW's handling of personal information' was tabled on 18 December 2020. The audit followed two cyber security incidents that resulted in data breaches of customer information. As part of our audit procedures, we obtained an understanding of the controls the department has in place to address the risk of cyber security incidents and respond to any incidences which may have occurred during the year, including its impact on the audit.

Our assessment of the department’s own cyber risk management shows that:

  • an approved security incident response plan was not in place during the reporting period. There was a lack of testing over incident detection and monitoring process
  • a formal process over patch management that includes assessment, determining relevance and priority, timely rollout and escalation and reporting of long outstanding patches to senior management is being established.

The department provides information security services including cyber security management to cluster agencies. We found that there were insufficient communications within the Customer Service cluster over the controls and assurance over cyber security risk management. Some cluster agencies had put in place limited controls over cyber security risk management.

Recommendation

We recommend the Department of Customer Service:

  • establish an approved security incident response plan and formal process over patch management
  • improve communications with cluster agencies over the controls and assurance in cyber security management.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Status of 2020 recommendations

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.

The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.

What we found

The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020. 

The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools. 

Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.

The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.

Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools. 

Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.

Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas. 

Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.

There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress. 

Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.

Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.

What we recommended

  1. Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods. 
  2. Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
  3. Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
  4. Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
  5. Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
  6. Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
  7. Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.

The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
 

Fast facts

  • $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
  • 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury 
  • 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
  • 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
  • 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
  • 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.

The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:

  • $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
  • $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):

  • effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
  • is effectively implementing the program.

This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.

Conclusion

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.

Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.

The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.

The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.

The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Education 2021

Education 2021

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Education cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Education cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Education cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on the Department of Education (the department), the NSW Education Standards Authority and the NSW Skills Board's financial statements.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) audit opinion drawing attention to legislative non-compliance concerning financial delegations during the reporting year.

The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 14 in 2019–20 to seven.

What the key issues were

The department and the TAFE Commission revalued their land assets this year, recognising collective increases of $863.8 million.

The department and the TAFE Commission are not scheduled to perform comprehensive revaluations of their buildings until 2022–23. Construction costs, which are a key input in their current replacement cost valuation methodologies for buildings, may have increased by an estimated nine per cent since the last comprehensive revaluation in 2017–18 based on broad based indices used by the department and the TAFE Commission. While the estimated index increase indicates the fair value of buildings may exceed the carrying values, the use of such high-level indicators has a degree of estimation uncertainty due to the specialised nature of the assets. Therefore, both agencies did not adjust the values of their buildings.

The number of issues we reported to management decreased. Fifty per cent of issues were repeated from prior years.

Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies, with six identified in procurement and payroll controls.

What we recommended

The department and the TAFE Commission reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

Fast facts

The Education cluster, comprising four agencies, administers and delivers education and training services for NSW students, workers and industry.

  • $38.6b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $21.2b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 22 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management
  • monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 50% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.

  • Comprehensive revaluations of the Department of Education (the department) and the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) land assets resulted in collective net increases of $863.8 million to the carrying values of these entities' land assets.

  • Fair value assessments, based on broad indices, of the department and the TAFE Commission's buildings, indicated that replacement costs may have increased by an estimated nine per cent. Whilst the next comprehensive valuation is not scheduled until 2022–23, the department and the TAFE Commission will need to consider the outcomes of their annual assessments to ensure that the carrying amounts continue to reflect the fair value of these specialised assets in their financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 22 moderate issues across the cluster. Eleven moderate risk issues were repeat issues and related to general and application information technology controls and deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.
  • Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies and improvements, with identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll accounting for six.
  • A high-risk issue identified in 2019–20 relating to the Department of Education's (the department) monitoring of privileged user activity has largely been addressed.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has decreased. Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 28 findings raised across the cluster (33 in 2019–20). Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues (45 per cent in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology general controls, application controls, and identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
2 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • agencies' user access administration and change management procedures, notably in the timing and frequency of managerial reviews over the granting and revocation of access to key systems relevant to financial reporting
  • application controls and segregation of duties in payroll systems, allowing certain users to access or modify employee records as well as process payroll
  • system configurations whereby preparers of manual journals can also post without a secondary review
  • password reviews undertaken that align with approved password guidelines
  • the monitoring of privileged user activities.

Low1
2 new,
1 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

Moderate2
7 new,
4 repeat

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • the adequacy of monitoring and oversight activities over the use of multiple financial delegation configurations in finance systems for specific users
  • the timely recording and approval of overtime claims and higher duties allowances
  • the timely finalisation of policies and procedures
  • procurement practices including a high proportion of retrospective purchase orders and the timely receipting of goods and services
  • the timely notification of employee resignations or employees applying for leave without pay, leading to salary overpayments
  • the management of excessive annual leave balances
  • the extent of review or approval of changes to lease information.

 Low1
1 new,
2 repeat

Financial reporting

Moderate2
2 new,
1 repeat

The financial audits identified:
  • opportunities for agencies to strengthen their financial preparation processes to facilitate a timelier and more efficient year-end audit
  • the need for agencies with non-financial assets subject to fair value to reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and to refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Low1
0 new,
0 repeat


3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

 
Note: Management letter findings are based on final management letters issued to agencies.

The department continues to address recommendations to improve monitoring of privileged user access

Privileged users have higher levels of access to systems, and in some instances, may include access that can bypass segregation of duty controls. If reviews of access logs are not fully embedded in the control environment, the risk of unauthorised transactions occurring and not being detected in a timely manner is elevated.

In 2019–20 a high-risk issue was reported at the department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP. This year the department has largely addressed our findings by initiating a review of the identified instances of privileged user activity and establishing periodic oversight controls. There remains a need to improve the timeliness and completeness of these newly implemented controls.

Data analytics identified the root cause of internal control deficiencies in procurement and payroll

Our 2020–21 agency management letters identified seven new moderate risk internal control deficiency matters, of which six related to payroll and procurement.

To enhance our financial statement audit of the department we applied data analytics over elements of the department's procurement and payroll control processes. Our procedures, conducted over periods across the financial year, helped identify the following:

  • a low level of compliance with procurement practices requiring the creation of purchase orders before invoices are received. The root cause was a lack of understanding by agency staff of the procurement processes
  • transactions related to previous years being recorded in the current year. The root cause was a lack of understanding of the three-way matching process and the goods received/not invoiced facilities within SAP
  • negative payments in fortnightly pay runs, predominantly representing deductions to recover salary payments made in error. The root cause was the lack of timeliness in notifying payroll for cessation of employment, or for employees undertaking secondments who should have been classified as being on leave without pay.
 
 

Recommendation

We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above. 

Appendix one – Early close procedures

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Grants administration for disaster relief

Grants administration for disaster relief

Treasury
Finance
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Project management

What the report is about

The report examined whether NSW Treasury, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service effectively administered grants programs funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund, including:

  • $10,000 Small Business Support Grant
  • $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant.

What we found

The agencies effectively implemented the grants within required timeframes, reflecting the NSW Government’s decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service strengthened processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks, and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications.

Fraud security checks and investigations are ongoing, and the agencies will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been completed.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one off grant payments to eligible small businesses.

What we recommended

NSW Treasury should finalise and implement an evaluation of both grants programs, including obtaining feedback from businesses.

Service NSW should develop a framework that documents expected controls for how it administers grants, including business processes, fraud control and governance and probity requirements.

Service NSW should publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

The Department of Customer Service should ensure its processes for managing conflicts of interest meets its policy requirements.

Upcoming performance audit

The Audit Office is conducting a further performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants. This is planned to complete in 2021-22.

Fast facts

Small Business Support Fund
  • $630m Grant payments made to small businesses under two grants administered
  • Over 52,500 Applications received a $10,000 Grant payment
  • Over 23,000 Businesses paid both $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant
  • 36,700 Applications received a $3,000 grant payment
Grant program administration
  • 11 Days taken to deliver the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant application website
  • 26 Days taken to deliver the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant application website

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

The NSW Government responded to the partial shutdown of the NSW economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 by, among other measures, announcing on 3 April 2020 that it would place $750 million into the Small Business Support Fund (the Fund).

Under the Fund, the NSW Government would pay one-off grants of up to $10,000 to small business impacted by the shutdown. The objectives of the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant) were to:

  • ease the pressure on small businesses that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
  • support the ongoing operations of small businesses highly impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions
  • deliver cash-flow into small businesses as soon as possible so that small businesses could meet pressing financial needs.

Grant applications were assessed against eligibility criteria that were determined by the NSW Government. The eligibility criteria for the $10,000 Support Grant required an employing small business to demonstrate it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by self-declaring or demonstrating a significant decline of 75 per cent or more in turnover compared to 2019. Documentation requirements were relaxed for small businesses within highly impacted industries.

In June 2020, the NSW Government announced a second round of one-off grants of up to $3,000 to small businesses that were highly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic ($3,000 Recovery Grant). The objective of the $3,000 Recovery Grant was to help small businesses in 'highly impacted industries' — those directly impacted by the restrictions and closures put in place under the Public Health Orders — to meet the costs of safely reopening or scaling up operations.

The eligibility criteria for the $3,000 Recovery Grant required that a small business be in a highly impacted industry, demonstrate that it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring a significant decline in turnover, and had costs associated with reopening under the 'COVID-Safe' requirements.

NSW Treasury and Service NSW implemented both grants on behalf of the NSW Government. The process of applying for a grant was intended to be quick and easy, with Service NSW using automated assessments and simple online application forms to process applications. Applicants applied for the $10,000 Support Grant through the Service NSW website between 14 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 and applied for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant between 1 July 2020 and 31 August 2020.

At May 2021, around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applicants under the $10,000 Support Grant and around $109 million had been paid to around 36,700 grant applicants under the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

The Audit Office plans to undertake a performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants in 2021–22.

This audit assessed whether the grants funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund were effectively administered and implemented to provide disaster relief. It addressed the following questions:

  • Were funded grants programs planned, designed and targeted effectively?
  • Were funded grants programs implemented in line with the objectives and criteria and delivery requirements?
  • Have agencies established measures to monitor intended benefits and outcomes?

This audit did not seek to assess the effectiveness of any other grant programs or stimulus measures. It also did not seek to assess the impact of the funding on applicants, or the future prospects of small businesses that received support.

Conclusion

NSW Treasury and Service NSW effectively implemented two grants within required timeframes reflecting the NSW Government's decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one-off grant payments to eligible small businesses.
NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to provide advice to the NSW Government on the grant design, proposed delivery partner, expected numbers of eligible businesses and the suitability of the proposed grant payment amount within the required timeframes. This was achieved within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Support Grant. In the context of the complex and changing pandemic and economic conditions between March and July 2020, NSW Treasury's advice to government outlined the risk, feasibility, expected demand estimates and assumptions for the grants.

NSW Treasury's demand projections were limited by uncertainty as to the pandemic's economic impact. Estimated demand for the grants was not met, resulting in around $120 million from the Small Business Support Fund remaining unspent.

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. It met agreed delivery requirements and made timely payments to small businesses in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria. Over 65,000 businesses have received a payment under either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received both grants.

Gaps in project and risk management processes were expected given the tight timeframe to implement the grants.

The tight timeframe in which the agencies had to implement the grants contributed to gaps in project and risk management. The agencies advised that compromises were understood by both parties and were a necessary trade-off to ensure payments were made quickly.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service have acted to strengthen their processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications since the grants commenced. Service NSW intends to further enhance fraud controls for grants applications and payments for future grants by implementing a fraud control framework by December 2021.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

Service NSW and NSW Treasury established processes to monitor and report on the timeliness of payments to grant applicants.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all intended impacts of the grants, nor undertaken processes to obtain detailed feedback from grant recipients. Without these measures, there is limited insight into the extent to which the grants helped to support small businesses or ability to capture lessons which could be applied in future grants programs. NSW Treasury advises that an evaluation will commence from mid-2021.

1. Key findings

Around $630 million in timely one-off grant payments have been made to small businesses

Service NSW and NSW Treasury have paid around $630 million in one-off grant payments to small businesses via two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. At May 2021:

  • around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applications received for the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant)
  • around $109 million has been paid to 36,700 grant applications received for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant ($3,000 Recovery Grant).

Across both grants, over 65,000 small businesses received a payment across either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received payments under both grants.

NSW Treasury advise that, while no data was collected on the time to pay applicants for the $10,000 Support Grant, from its monitoring of the grants' outputs it was satisfied that payment timeframes met its expectations. Service NSW met its targeted time to pay applicants with payments made within ten days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

Funds for both grants were not fully spent due to limitations in data and uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact. At May 2021, the final demand for the $10,000 Support Grant was around 30 per cent less than initially anticipated and the final demand for the $3,000 Recovery Grant was around 40 per cent less than initially anticipated.

NSW Treasury developed proposals establishing high level design and delivery expectations within rapid timeframes

NSW Treasury put forward proposals to the NSW Government for the two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. It met rapid timeframes for producing this advice: within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. NSW Treasury's advice to the NSW Government on how to best target the total funding, eligibility criteria and the feasibility of delivering the grants through Service NSW was based on comparable grants programs – including the $10,000 Small Business Bushfire Support Grant – which at that time were ongoing.

The proposals established, at a high-level, the rationale for the grants, expected financial costs, risks and analysis on budget impacts, and confirmation that Service NSW could deliver the grants applications platform. NSW Treasury's demand projections were uncertain due to limited data in the early stages of the pandemic regarding potential economic impact.

Given the tight timeframes, the proposals did not fully consider all planning and design aspects for both grants. For example, there was minimal identification of the costs and benefits of the programs, and a lack of detailed design and delivery requirements. The proposals outlined that arrangements to finalise the risk management, controls, and auditing plan would be agreed by Service NSW and NSW Treasury before implementation.

In future circumstances where urgent advice on program design is required, NSW Treasury could set clearer expectations for the delivery agency, including fully considering costs, benefits and delivery requirements that could be carried through to project governance and implementation.

Service NSW implemented both grants in line with delivery expectations

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Delivery expectations for each grant were established under a grant project agreement (grant agreement). Service NSW delivered the online application platform, assessment of applications, payments and reporting of the grants' uptake as per the grant agreements.

The urgent timeframes to deliver the grants contributed to gaps in Service NSW's project and risk management processes throughout the lifecycle of both grants. For example, the requirement to meet pressing timeframes for the $10,000 Support Grant launch meant agencies had reduced time to achieve sign-off on key documentation. As a result, important documents and processes – including the grant agreement, risk documentation and key business process and quality assurance processes – were not finalised ahead of launch.

Quality assurance and compliance processes for detecting fraud were not settled until after the conclusion of the applications for the $10,000 Support Grant, and were not completed until late 2020. Some project documents, including risk registers, communication plans and project briefs are still not finalised.

The longer timeframe to develop the $3,000 Recovery Grant meant that agencies were able to build on their understanding of the implementation requirements from the $10,000 Support Grant, and better document these expectations and understanding while ensuring that key documents and sign-offs were in place prior to launch.

Service NSW tightened its risk management and controls in response to evidence of fraudulent applications

In May 2020, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service (DCS) were alerted to suspected fraudulent activity within grants administered by Service NSW. Initially, Service NSW anticipated that up to $8.8 million of the $10,000 Support Grant was at risk of exposure to fraudulent applications. However, Service NSW reported that, at April 2021, $1.9 million for the $10,000 Support Grant and $254,000 for the $3,000 Recovery Grant from paid applications were at risk of fraud exposure.

Following an internal review of the potential exposure to fraudulent or ineligible applications, Service NSW implemented additional automated security checks on applications, increased manual assessments of grant applications, established a dedicated taskforce for grants administration and engaged a unit within DCS to manage high-risk investigations.

Service NSW and DCS's increased governance and oversight has resulted in an established case management function, increased referrals to law enforcement, prioritised investigations of suspicious applications and the development of a 'Fraud Control Framework' aimed at addressing external fraud risks. Given Service NSW had limited experience in these processes in context of administering grant payments, such actions were an appropriate response.

Security checks and investigations of suspicious applications are ongoing. Service NSW will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been fully completed.

Service NSW and Department of Customer Service can improve how conflicts of interest are managed for future programs

Compliance with agency policies and processes to manage conflicts of interest and financial subdelegations demonstrates that investment decisions are being made by appropriately skilled and experienced staff, allowing agencies to operate efficiently, and reducing the risk of internal fraud.

DCS was unable to produce employee conflicts of interest declarations for the $10,000 Support Grant. Therefore, it is not known how many employees had completed conflicts of interest declarations for this round.

DCS provided information on conflicts of interest declarations for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Twenty-nine per cent of declarations provided for employees undertaking grant assessments for the $3,000 Recovery Grant were incomplete at March 2021, and a further nine per cent were not finalised even though they indicated a real, potential or perceived conflict.

For future grants programs, ensuring compliance with conflicts of interest policies would help DCS and Service NSW to have greater confidence that conflicts of interest are appropriately identified and managed.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all benefits or outcomes of the grants

In April 2021, NSW Treasury updated its evaluation plan for the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant in support of an economic evaluation to commence from mid-2021. The updated evaluation plan outlines inputs, activities, and outputs as well as immediate, short term and medium term outcomes for both grants.

The evaluation will consider the extent to which both grants achieved their intended outcomes, and whether the economic benefits exceeded the costs to help inform decisions about the nature and design of any future small business support programs. This will complement, and feed into a broader review of all NSW Government COVID-19 stimulus measures.

Service NSW rapidly developed an approach to administer the grants

Over recent disasters, such as the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic, Service NSW has been responsible for administering grant programs on behalf of other government agencies.

Service NSW implemented both grants under its Project Management Framework and under each grant agreement with NSW Treasury as it does not have its own grants administration framework. To address the risks that emerged during delivery, Service NSW developed an approach to standardise and monitor the administration of the grants while they were being implemented.

Service NSW now has an opportunity to establish a grants administration framework, based on the processes, lessons and outcomes captured under the grants administration taskforce and in developing its fraud control framework. Embedding these processes into business as usual for grants administration will enable Service NSW to have a consistent set of expectations for controls, business processes and governance and probity requirements for future grants it implements.

2. Recommendations

By December 2021, NSW Treasury should:

1. finalise and implement an evaluation of the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant, including obtaining direct feedback from businesses on how grant funds achieved the grant objectives.

By December 2021, Service NSW should:

2. develop a grants administration framework, which documents expected controls – including fraud controls – business processes and governance and probity requirements

3. publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

By December 2021, the Department of Customer Service should:

4. ensure its process for managing conflicts of interest meets policy requirements by:

  • ensuring employees promptly declare any real, potential or perceived conflicts of interest
  • annually producing a list of conflicts of interest for records retention purposes
  • requiring a separate register of conflicts of interest declarations where a grant program is deemed as high risk.

3. Lessons for grants administered within urgent timeframes

The two grants this audit examined were administered within a context of urgent timeframes, and increased complexity and uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following lessons are shared to assist sponsor and delivery agencies in administering future grants where rapid implementation is required.

Sponsor agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. develop an approach to define and measure benefits for rapidly developed programs and projects where a full business case and cost-benefit analysis is not feasible

2. establish common processes and expectations for co-administered grants:

  • periodically assure agencies' capability to deliver grants programs
  • agree and establish risk appetite statements with administering agencies
  • clearly establish expected performance levels and targets under any agreement

3. review the processes and outcomes of rapidly developed programs, capture lessons learned, and apply these in planning and delivering future programs.

Delivery agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. risk management and risk appetite:

  • perform robust assessment procedures to ensure risks associated with delivery of the project are identified
  • ensure the controls implemented adequately address identified risks
  • agree and document the acceptable risk appetite at the outset
  • review risk management processes after the grants are issued when unable to finalise risk management processes ahead of launch

2. grant agreements between NSW public sector agencies:

  • ensure agreements are finalised in a timely manner
  • ensure agreements clearly outline:
    • roles and responsibilities of both parties,
    • changes in scope of services provided
    • fees and charges applicable

3. frameworks for grants administration:

  • ensure that there is a common set of expectations in place to guide grants administration including standard controls and processes for managing risk, capturing lessons learned and reporting on outcomes.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Summary of other COVID‑19 Stimulus and Support for small businesses in NSW in April 2020

Appendix three – Public Health Orders

Appendix four – Highly impacted industries

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #352 - released (24 June 2021).

 

Published

Actions for Delivering school infrastructure

Delivering school infrastructure

Education
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the planning and delivery of new, redeveloped and upgraded public schools.

School Infrastructure NSW has identified the need to accommodate an additional 180,000 enrolments in public schools by 2039 with a large portion of this growth expected in metropolitan Sydney. It has also identified that around 34,000 teaching spaces will require upgrading to be fit-for-purpose.

Although School Infrastructure NSW has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet those needs. Developing a longer-term list of priorities would help signal the areas of greatest need and allow more time to develop the best options to meet those needs.

The audit found that School Infrastructure NSW has focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future needs. 

The report makes eight recommendations to improve long-term planning for future needs, strengthen the quality of estimated project costs and benefits, and embed a continuous improvement program. 

In 2016, the Department of Education prepared a School Assets Strategic Plan (2016 SASP) which outlined long-term funding needs to support the expected growth in enrolments to 2031. Following the release of the 2016 SASP, the NSW Government substantially increased funding for new and upgraded schools from $2.4 billion in the 2016–17 State Budget to $4.2 billion in 2017–18.

In 2017, the Department of Education established School Infrastructure NSW (SINSW) to lead the delivery of the 2016 SASP and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. This significantly larger program of work required rapid development of internal capacity, governance arrangements, and project management systems. This needed to be done at the same time as scoping and planning for the list of announced projects.

As there are limited funds available to meet growing needs across the State, it is important that SINSW has effective methods to prioritise projects to communities with the greatest need. To ensure that projects deliver value for money, business cases need to have robust estimates of project costs and benefits. Business cases also need to account for the inherent risks in delivering infrastructure projects. Unplanned cost escalations can reduce the number of new or modernised classrooms SINSW can deliver. Unforeseen delays may also impact families who make significant life choices based on their expectations that a school will open at the beginning of the school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of new, upgraded and redeveloped schools to meet demand for public school education in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether the Department:

  • has effective procedures for planning and prioritising school capital works to meet present and future demands
  • develops robust business cases for school capital works that reliably inform decision-making
  • has effective program/project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit examined business cases for 12 projects as case studies. These include a mix of projects initiated before and after the establishment of SINSW.

This audit commenced in June 2020 and examined strategies and demographic projections developed prior to the emergence of COVID-19. This audit did not examine potential longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on future demands for public school education.

Conclusion

School Infrastructure NSW has been focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future student and classroom needs. While it has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet these needs.

In its first years of operation, SINSW has focused on delivering existing projects and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

In early 2020, SINSW advised the NSW Government that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. The School Asset Strategic Plan 2020 estimates the annual level of investment needed over the next 20 years to meet growth, update and upgrade facilities to meet compliance obligations. However, SINSW’s ten-year Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21 only identified priorities over a two-year horizon.

Developing a longer-term pipeline of priorities would signal the areas of greatest need and allow greater scope to consider a range of options to best meet those needs.

SINSW has made progress in planning across geographic areas but needs to better prioritise which projects move forward.

Given the current and projected needs for new classrooms, it is vital that SINSW provides long-term advice based on thorough state-wide analysis to help prioritise projects that best meet this demand.

SINSW has improved its capabilities, processes, and systems to support planning in ‘School Community Groups’, which are clusters of between 5 to 15 schools in a geographic area. This addresses a key direction identified in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. It has developed a planning tool which allows it to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also developed an approach to identify potential projects within School Community Groups but has not yet put in place a structured process to prioritise which projects move to the business case stage to seek funding for delivery.

Business cases we examined established service needs, but several had shortcomings in scope definition, cost estimation and risk identification.

Most business cases we examined demonstrated the service need and consultation with stakeholders helped to incorporate educational requirements. Common templates and specific cost-benefit guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury has helped to promote consistency across business cases.

However, there were shortcomings in several business cases we reviewed. Business cases for projects already announced by government presented a limited number of options, and the process for eliminating other options was not transparent. Cost increases and contingency drawdowns for several projects indicate that scoping, costing and risk assessments could be improved, especially for complex projects.

Standard program management systems and governance arrangements support project delivery, however, there is scope for better ongoing oversight of benefits.

SINSW applies standard governance arrangements to projects based on their size. Higher value projects have executive oversight while lower value projects are overseen on a regional basis. SINSW has improved its project management systems to provide more consistent data and greater transparency to senior management over project status, cost and use of contingencies.

SINSW has worked with NSW Treasury to define a consistent set of benefits for new and redeveloped schools. Estimated benefits are currently based on international contexts but SINSW advises it is undertaking further research to improve the evidence base in this area. The current approach to ongoing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of project benefits places responsibility on the infrastructure delivery team. This team is not the most appropriate area to monitor ongoing benefits, which are expected to accrue many years after delivery and depend on actions in other areas of the Department.

1. Key findings

SINSW delivered projects against an established program of works in its first years of operation

At establishment, SINSW inherited a portfolio of existing projects and 123 new projects announced as part of the 2017–18 Budget (to commence over 2017–18 and 2018–19). It has progressively worked through individual project planning to deliver against these projects.

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. The 2018–19 Budget also allocated funding for 'planning' 22 new projects. Seventeen of the 22 projects had been identified by SINSW as a priority.

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. Thirteen of these projects were funded in that year with a further 27 projects included as election commitments. SINSW identified 20 new projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2020–21 but only two of these were funded. SINSW advised this was due to a constrained budget environment.

There is an anticipated shortfall of classrooms based on the current funded program

Despite increased funding since 2017–18, SINSW advised the NSW Government in early 2020 that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. Accordingly, it is vital that new funding is prioritised to projects which best meet demand.

SINSW only identified specific priorities over a two-year horizon in its Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21. The School Assets Strategic Plan 2016 and the 2020 update make the case for sustained funding for school building and redevelopment. These plans estimate annual funding requirements and show geographic areas with increasing forecast enrolments. Detailing how priorities over a ten-year timeframe fit within a ten-year capital planning limit would create more certainty about meeting growth demands.

There has been progress in formalising prioritisation frameworks, data tools and supporting governance arrangements

SINSW committed to planning for new and redeveloped schools in 'School Community Groups' in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. This is a new way of planning which considers the educational needs over a defined geographical area. It has developed a planning tool to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also established governance frameworks to improve transparency over decisions to reprioritise this list.

SINSW has refined its approach to planning in School Community Groups over the past four years. It now prepares Service Needs Reports to investigate needs, identify projects, prioritise, determine scope and timing, and assess non-capital options. SINSW has yet to finalise arrangements for how needs identified in Service Needs Reports progress to the strategic business case stage.

Projects announced prior to developing a business case have less opportunity to consider a range of options to meet the service needs

Business cases for projects already announced by government (or announced for planning) go through the same process of determining the service need and impacts on surrounding schools. However, for some announced projects, the range of options considered in the business case is influenced by the parameters of the announcement. This makes it more difficult to genuinely pursue alternate options that could better meet the identified service need.

Projects identified by SINSW have a more rigorous process of considering options. Service Needs Reports explore a wide range of asset and non-asset interventions across the School Community Group. Options are narrowed as the projects move through the strategic and final business case stages. SINSW uses its Investment Review Committee to engage key stakeholders early in the process so that they are informed about how non-asset solutions have been considered and why SINSW is progressing the business case for a capital solution for particular projects.

Several business cases underestimated project costs and risks, leading to scope and budget increases

Several business cases we reviewed did not adequately identify the initial scope requirements, project-specific risks or the likely project cost. For two business cases, this appeared to be due to an attempt to fit the project within a predetermined amount. Announcing a project’s scope, budget and timeframe before proper planning increases risks to successful delivery against expectations.

Several of the projects we examined required drawdowns on contingency funds due to inadequate consideration of scope, costs and project risks at the planning stage. Contingency funds are intended for unanticipated extra costs rather than those that could have or should have been identified at the planning stage.

Guidance on benefit calculations has provided a consistent framework for business cases

Business cases we examined presented a consistent set of benefits based on guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury. Following this guidance helps to compare cost-benefit analyses across business cases. However, the evidence for the estimated benefits is based on contexts outside of NSW. SINSW has the tools and data sources to calculate benefits more suited to the context of particular schools. Doing so would improve the accuracy of cost-benefit analyses. SINSW advised that it is currently updating the guidance in partnership with NSW Treasury.

SINSW involves school principals, executives and teaching staff in developing education rationales when commencing projects. These documents help align projects with education outcomes. They also provide a baseline for post-occupancy evaluation, which is important to determine whether the new school infrastructure is being used in the ways that were anticipated in the business case.

SINSW could elevate its existing assurance review process to consolidate lessons learned

SINSW engages external peer reviewers to conduct assurance reviews on its projects at multiple stages of planning and delivery. It has established a Community of Practice for external reviewers to keep them up to date on new developments and requirements. Higher value projects are also subject to review by Infrastructure NSW under the Investor Assurance Framework.

By looking at all projects at all stages, assurance reviews can identify systematic issues across the full portfolio of projects. A recent assurance review analysed common findings from reviews of strategic and final business cases. This provides a helpful way to improve internal processes. SINSW advised that it is implementing a continuous improvement program, which will be able to take findings from assurance reviews to build organisational capabilities.

2. Recommendations

By September 2021, the Department of Education should:

  1. finalise the investment prioritisation approach with agreement from key stakeholders
  2. finalise and update on an ongoing basis a ten-year list of priorities to meet the forecast demand for new classrooms and contemporary fit for purpose learning environments, which identifies individual projects and programs in the short-term and priority geographic areas and programs in the medium-term
  3. seek a ten-year Capital Planning Limit from NSW Treasury to ensure the needs identified in the ten-year list of priorities are met and are coordinated with the forward capital programs of other agencies
  4. improve the quality of data on cost benchmarks that underpin the annual ten-year Capital Investment Plan and updates to the School Assets Strategic Plan
  5. embed an evidence-based cost benefit analysis framework for school investment, in consultation with NSW Treasury, by:
    • validating benefits estimated in previous business cases with actual results
    • building the evidence base in relation to contemporary learning environments
  6. regularly share data on forecast needs with relevant planning agencies to promote strategic opportunities for servicing education needs
  7. implement the continuous improvement program for service planning, options assessment, business case development, project delivery and handover. The program should be informed by findings from assurance reviews, post-occupancy evaluations and project lessons learned
  8. establish benefits realisation processes and practices that:
    • ensure business cases set baselines and targets for benefits
    • review benefits during delivery, prior to handover and as part of Post Occupancy Evaluations
    • identify which part(s) of the Department are best placed to develop, manage and evaluate benefits on an ongoing basis.

Note:

The Department's formal response to this report at Appendix one states that while it 'supports the recommendations, it considers the proposed six-month timeframe to be an unreasonably short period for a large and complex organisation to effectively implement many of these recommendations'. It suggests 12 months would be needed to implement the recommendations.

The recommendations stemming from this audit are core business for SINSW. The Audit Office considers it important for SINSW to place priority on implementing the recommendations in time to inform the 2022–23 budget cycle. Extending the deadline to April 2022 would place action outside of that budget cycle.

There have been significant increases in funding for education infrastructure since the 2017–18 Budget and further growth in demand for places in schools is forecast. SINSW has the challenge, not only of meeting the need for new classrooms due to population growth, but also upgrading facilities to enable modern teaching techniques. In addition, community expectations of what constitutes a vibrant and successful school community continues to increase.

Given growing demand and budget constraints, projects must be selected to best meet the needs of the community and planning and prioritisation are vital. SINSW has been progressing planning for announced projects as well as implementing a new type of strategic state-wide planning and prioritisation, cluster planning, where options are developed for School Community Groups.

The primary role of a business case is to reliably inform an investment and/or policy decision. Over the period of review, the NSW Government's guidelines for business cases have established this requires recommendations based on convincing arguments, sufficient evidence, and accurate costing of alternatives and expected benefits. Business case guidelines are underpinned by guides for economic appraisal and cost-benefit analysis.

As SINSW moves to prioritise business cases for interventions in School Community Groups, it will increasingly need to demonstrate rigour in its assessment of all options. It will also need to ensure that scope identification, cost and risk planning and the setting of contingencies are accurate. This will help decision-makers better understand, plan for and manage the investment required to meet the demand for school infrastructure.

For this audit, we examined business cases and related documentation for 12 projects. Several of these projects were developed before School Infrastructure NSW was established in mid-2017.

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

SINSW's guidance similarly highlight the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by SINSW that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of school infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 


Copyright Notice

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #347 - released (8 April 2021).

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure 

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within my Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure, dated 8 April 2021. 

On page two, the original text was as follows: 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget and election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

The original text has now been changed to 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

On page three, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded three new projects that had not already been announced. One of the three projects was identified by SINSW as a priority. 

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. 

On page three the original text was as follows: 

SINSW identified 33 priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.

The original text has now been changed to  

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. 

On page eleven, in Exhibit 4, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 43 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 43 projects: 

•    1 was identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for one new project)
•    40 had already been announced
•    2 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 42 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 42 projects: 

•    2 were identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for two new projects)
•    40 had already been announced.

On page eleven, the original text was as follows: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 33 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 31 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.  

 

Published

Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information

Service NSW's handling of personal information

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

  • Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
  • Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
  • Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

Conclusion

Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring.

Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies.

The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.

Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.

Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents.

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

  • to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
  • to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
  • to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
  • to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

  • ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
  • ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

  • establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
  • enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
  • provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
  • enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

  • are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
  • have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for One TAFE NSW modernisation program

One TAFE NSW modernisation program

Education
Finance
Management and administration
Project management
Shared services and collaboration

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the management of the One TAFE NSW modernisation program.

In 2016, the Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW' which stated that TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out the need to progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from separate institutes to a single institute model. TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision.

The Auditor General found that the One TAFE NSW modernisation program did not deliver against its key objectives within planned timeframes. The modernisation program originally aimed to realise $250 million in annual savings from 2018–19. Because of project delays and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW did not meet the original savings target. TAFE NSW has made progress on key elements of the program and anticipates that savings will be realised in coming years.

The report makes two recommendations to improve governance arrangements for delivering on commercial objectives and increasing transparency of non commercial activities. 

The report also identifies a series of lessons for future government transformation programs.

TAFE NSW is the public provider of Vocational Education and Training (VET) in New South Wales. In 2018, TAFE NSW enrolled 436,000 students in more than 1,200 courses at around 130 locations across the State.

There have been major policy changes impacting TAFE NSW over the past decade. Under the Smart and Skilled reform, TAFE NSW started to compete with other Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) for a share of the student market.

In 2016, the NSW Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW'. The Vision stated that a failure to adapt to market circumstances had left TAFE NSW with unsustainable costs and inefficiencies. To address this, TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out that TAFE NSW must progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from a model of separate institutes to a One  TAFE NSW model. The NSW Government set TAFE NSW a target to achieve savings through implementing the Vision.

TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision. The program initially aimed to deliver savings of $250 million per year from 2018–19, but this target was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered.

This audit assessed whether TAFE NSW effectively managed the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • delivery of the program was well planned
  • the program was driven by sound governance arrangements
  • TAFE NSW is making progress against the intended outcomes of the program.

The audit focused on the effectiveness of planning, governance and reporting arrangements. It examined five projects within the overall modernisation program as case studies.

Conclusion

The One TAFE NSW modernisation program was an ambitious plan to deliver on the NSW Government’s vision for TAFE NSW, while achieving ongoing savings. Several factors contributed to TAFE NSW not effectively managing the program to deliver on planned timeframes and objectives. These factors include unclear expectations of the primary role of TAFE NSW, unrealistic timeframes, undertaking a large number of complex projects concurrently, governance arrangements that were not fit-for-purpose and poor-quality data.

Planning for the modernisation program and its projects was driven by top-down savings targets and pre-determined timeframes. This led to TAFE NSW attempting to deliver a large number of programs concurrently within tight timeframes. Program management capability was underdeveloped at the commencement of the program and this affected the quality of planning for delivery.

There was a lack of clarity around TAFE NSW's primary purpose. Part of the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW was for it to be more commercial, competitive and efficient. These objectives were not fully supported by existing legislation. The commercial objectives of the modernisation program conflicted with legislated social objectives for TAFE NSW. TAFE NSW did not have the autonomy to operate like a government-owned business in a market environment. And while TAFE NSW received separate funding to support students facing disadvantage this did not cover the costs of other non-commercial activities undertaken for social purposes, such as delivering uneconomic courses. The role of the TAFE Commission Board was ambiguous during the initial years of the program, which increased reporting requirements and blurred accountabilities for decision-making.

TAFE NSW's Strategic Plan 2016-22 nominated ten key milestones for delivery by January 2019. TAFE NSW has made progress against several important milestones, including that TAFE ‘is a single TAFE NSW brand’ and has 'industry specific TAFE NSW SkillsPoints'. Other key elements have yet to be delivered, including that TAFE NSW achieves 'integrated enterprise-wide business systems'. Because of delays to projects and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW reported that it did not meet the originally targeted $250 million in annual savings for 2018–19 (which was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered). 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #346 - released 17 December 2020

Published

Actions for Education 2020

Education 2020

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today titled Education 2020. This report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies’ financial statements. However, internal control deficiencies were identified across the cluster agencies, including deficiencies in the management of purchasing cards and 15 internal control issues that were repeated from the previous year.

The 2019–20 natural disasters caused widespread damage in both Northern and Southern NSW. The COVID‑19 pandemic further challenged agencies, requiring social distancing and other infection control measures which disrupted the traditional means of teaching students. Agencies have adjusted their operations to respond to these emergency events.

The TAFE Commission’s revenues 2019–20 were impacted by the pandemic. Lower enrolments and an increase in fee-free short courses offered during the year contributed to the result.

Read the PDF report

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of entities within the Education cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations and recommendations.

1. Financial reporting 

Audit opinions Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements audits.
New accounting standards

Agencies implemented three new accounting standards during the year.

Our financial statement audits of the Department of Education (the Department) and NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) identified issues with the leasing information provided by Property NSW (PNSW). Despite the outsourcing arrangement, both the Department and NESA remain ultimately responsible for the completeness and accuracy of this information, which would have benefited from a more thorough quality assurance, validation and review process before they placed reliance upon it.

Recommendation:

We recommend the Department and NESA:

  • quality assure and validate the information provided by PNSW
  • ensure changes made by PNSW to lease data are supported and that assumptions and judgements applied are appropriate
  • document their review of the data supplied.
Changes were made to the financial reporting requirements this year to account for the impact of the pandemic

Emergency legislation was enacted during the year in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The legislation revised the statutory reporting deadlines for agencies to submit their financial statements and allowed the Treasurer to continue authorising payments from the consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget.

All cluster agencies prepared their financial statements on a going concern basis and submitted their financial statements within the revised statutory deadlines.

The State provided $159.0 million in stimulus funding to support the operations of cluster agencies during emergency events. Nearly half of this funding was to support cleaning activities by the Department and the Technical and Further Education Commission (the TAFE Commission) during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Quality and timeliness of financial reporting

The number of monetary misstatements identified in agencies' financial statements decreased to 14 (23 in 2018–19).

While the number of corrections made to the financial statements after the submission date increased to eight (two in 2018–19), it is important to note these corrections provide parliament and other users of the financial statements increased confidence in the accuracy and presentation of agencies' performance and financial position.

Sustainability of cluster agencies The TAFE Commission's enrolments declined, and operating margins reduced, both being impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

We identified 33 internal control issues, including 15 findings that were repeated from previous years.

A high-risk issue was reported at the Department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP.

Repeat findings relate to ongoing deficiencies in information technology controls and management policies, practices and procedures.

Recommendation:

Cluster agencies should:

  • prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies
  • review and confirm the appropriateness of existing privileged user access accounts
  • implement a rigorous monitoring regime to ensure that any improper use of privileged user accounts can be detected in a timely manner.
Agency responses to emergency events

The Department established a separate bushfire relief directorate and COVID-19 Taskforce to assist and support school communities in response to recent emergencies.

Other cluster agencies have established committees or response teams to oversee and address all aspects of the impact of COVID-19.

Schools review 2019 We continue to identify instances of non-compliance in relation to cash management and procurement at schools.
Use of purchasing cards at the Department of Education

Since 2015, the NSW Government has encouraged the use of purchasing cards by public sector agencies. Purchasing cards are efficient to transact low value, high volume procurement of goods and services, but the use must be effectively monitored.

Our review of the Department's purchasing cards identified weaknesses in its oversight and monitoring controls, including the issue and cancellation of purchasing cards

Opportunities exist for the Department to better monitor card use. Tools such as data analytics are an efficient and effective detective control to identify irregular activity or misuse by cardholders.

Recommendation:

The Department should:

  • improve the accuracy and completeness of exit procedures for terminated employees to ensure cards are returned and cancelled
  • perform periodic reviews to ensure active cards are held only by current employees
  • set transaction limits that do not exceed the limits of the user’s financial delegation
  • establish a data analytics regime to help analyse and identify high risk patterns and anomalies in their purchasing card usage, augmenting their existing monitoring and detective controls.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • the impact of emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

The COVID-19 Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures–Treasurer) Act 2020 amended legislation administered by the Treasurer to implement further emergency measures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These amendments:

  • allowed the Treasurer to authorise payments from the consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget – supporting the going concern assessments of cluster agencies
  • revised budgetary, financial and annual reporting time frames – impacting the timeliness of financial reporting
  • exempted certain statutory bodies and departments from preparing financial statements.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights 

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.

All cluster agencies met the revised statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting their financial statements.
 
Emergency legislation allowing the Treasurer to continue authorising payments from the consolidated fund under the existing Appropriations Act enabled cluster agencies to prepare financial statements on a going concern basis.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster. It also comments on our review of elements of the financial control framework applied by schools in NSW whose financial results form part of the Department of Education's (the Department) financial statements.
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • A high-risk issue regarding inadequate monitoring of privileged user access was identified at the Department.
  • We continue to observe issues by schools in relation to cash management and non-compliance with procurement guidelines and purchasing card use.
  • Opportunities exist for the Department and cluster agencies to enhance their monitoring and review of purchasing card activities. Tools such as data analytics procedures provide an efficient and effective detective control, particularly when used in conjunction with independent spot-checks.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2019 and 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.