What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

• coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
• emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
• operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

• The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
• NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
• Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
• The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
• The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

• government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
• agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

• up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
• up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
• weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
• the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

• South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
• Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
• Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
• a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

• the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
• issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
• the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
• issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
  • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
  • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
  • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
  • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
• the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
• compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
• improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
• deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
• the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

• governance
• engagement 
• innovation and technology 
• community impact 
• workforce impact
• system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022

What the report is about

The report focuses on how effectively the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) led reforms addressing the unsafe use of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

Nine local councils were included in the audit because they have responsibilities and powers needed to implement the NSW Government’s reforms.

What we found

After the June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point action plan, which included establishing the NSW Cladding Taskforce, chaired by DCS, and with DPE as a key member. The Taskforce co-ordinates and oversees the implementation of the plan.

Depending on the original source of development approval, either individual local councils or DPE are responsible for ensuring that buildings are identified, assessed, and remediated. NSW Government-owned buildings are the responsibility of each department.

Identifying buildings potentially at risk was complex and resource intensive. However, on balance, it is likely that most affected buildings have now been identified.

By October 2021, around 40 per cent of assessed high-risk buildings that are the responsibility of local councils had either been remediated or found not to pose an unacceptable fire risk.

By February 2022, almost 50 per cent of affected NSW Government-owned buildings, and 90 per cent of buildings that are the responsibility of DPE, have either been cleared or are in the process of being remediated.

Earlier guidance on some key issues could have been provided by DCS and DPE in the two years after the Grenfell Tower fire. This may have reduced confusion and inconsistency across local councils we audited, and in some NSW Government departments. This especially relates to the application of the Fair Trading Commissioner's product use ban.

Given the inherent risks posed by combustible external cladding, buildings initially assessed as low-risk may also still warrant further action.

While most high-risk buildings have likely been identified, poor information handling makes it difficult to keep track of all buildings from identification, through to risk assessment and remediation.

What we recommended

DCS and DPE should:

1. address the confusion surrounding the application of the Commissioner for Fair Trading's product use ban for aluminium composite panels with polyethylene content greater than 30 per cent
2. develop an action plan to address buildings assessed as low-risk
3. improve information systems to track all buildings from identification through to remediation.

NSW Government's response to the risks posed by combustible external cladding

The NSW Government first became aware of the potential heightened risks posed by combustible external cladding on building exteriors after the 2014 Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne. However, it was the tragic loss of life from the Grenfell Tower fire in London, in June 2017, that gave added urgency to the need to address these risks.

Within six weeks of the London fire, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point plan of action for NSW to:

• identify and remediate any buildings with combustible external cladding
• ensure that regulation prevented the unsafe use of such cladding
• ensure that experts involved in providing advice and certifying fire safety measures had the necessary skills and experience.

One of the actions in the ten-point plan was the creation of the NSW Government's Fire Safety and External Wall Cladding Taskforce (the Cladding Taskforce) chaired by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and with the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) as a key member.

The ten-point plan also specified that NSW Government departments would be responsible, in regard to buildings they owned to '…audit their buildings and determine if they have aluminium cladding'.

Local councils play a key role in implementing the Government's reforms, given their responsibilities and powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) and Local Government Act 1993 (Local Government Act) to approve building works (as 'consent authorities'), as well as to ensure fire safety standards are met. DPE plays an equivalent role for a smaller number of 'State Significant Developments' for which it is the consent authority under delegation from the Minister for Planning.

Commissioner for Fair Trading's building product use ban

On 18 December 2017, the Building Products (Safety) Act 2017 (BPS Act) came into effect in NSW, introducing new laws to prevent the use of unsafe building products. Notably, the BPS Act gave the Secretary of DCS and the Commissioner for Fair Trading the power to ban unsafe uses of building products.

After an extensive consultative process, the Commissioner for Fair Trading used these powers to issue a product use ban on 15 August 2018. This banned the use of external wall cladding of aluminium composite panels with a core comprised of more than 30 per cent polyethylene by mass on new buildings, unless the proposed use was subject to independent fire propagation testing of the specific product and method of application to a building in accordance with relevant Australian Standards.

Buildings occupied before the product use ban came into force are not automatically required to have the banned product removed. Under the BPS Act, consent authorities may determine necessary actions to eliminate or minimise the risk posed by the banned material on existing buildings.

Project Remediate

Project Remediate is a three-year NSW Government program announced in November 2020. The program was designed by the NSW Government to assist building owners of multi-storey apartments (two storeys or more) with high-risk combustible cladding to remediate their building to a high standard and for a fair price.

The scheme is voluntary and includes government paying for the interest on ten-year loans, as well as incorporating assurance and project management services to provide technical and practical support to owners’ corporations and strata managing agents. Building remediations under the program are expected to commence in 2022.

About this audit

This audit assessed whether DCS and DPE effectively led reforms to manage the fire safety risk of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

In making this assessment, we considered whether the expressed policy intent of the NSW Government's ten-point plan for fire safety reform had been achieved by asking:

• are the fire safety risks of combustible external cladding on existing buildings identified and remediated?
• is there a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products on existing buildings?
• is fire safety certification for combustible external cladding on existing buildings carried out impartially, ethically and in the public interest by qualified experts?

Consistent with the focus of the Cladding Taskforce on multi-storey residential buildings and public buildings, the scope of our audit is limited to buildings categorised under the Building Code of Australia (BCA) as class 2, 3 and 9. These classes are defined in detail in section 1.2, but include: multi-unit residential apartments, hotels, motels, hostels, back-packers, and buildings of a public nature, including health care buildings, schools, and aged care buildings. The scope was also limited to existing buildings, which is defined as buildings occupied by 22 October 2018.

Auditees

The Department of Customer Service chairs the NSW Government's Cladding Taskforce, which is responsible for coordinating the combustible external cladding reforms. The Commissioner of Fair Trading sits within DCS and DCS regulates the industry accreditation scheme for fire safety practitioners, as well as administering the BPS Act.

The Department of Planning and Environment administers the EPA Act and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (EPA Regulation), which regulate the building development process. As well as being the delegated consent authority for State Significant Developments, DPE is also responsible for maintaining the mandatory cladding register requiring building owners of multi-storey (BCA class 2, 3 or 9) buildings to register buildings with combustible external cladding on an online portal.

Functions and responsibilities between DCS and DPE varied over time. For example, in October 2019, the DPE building policy team responsible for co-ordinating the DPE response to the combustible cladding issue was transferred to DCS, following changes to agency responsibilities resulting from machinery of government changes. DPE advised this resulted in a lessening of DPE's subsequent policy work on combustible cladding and its involvement in the Cladding Taskforce.

While the focus of the audit was on the oversight and coordination provided by DCS and DPE, nine councils were also auditees for this performance audit. Councils play an essential part as consent authorities for building development approvals in NSW, as well as having responsibilities and powers to ensure fire safety standards. To fully understand how well their activities were overseen and coordinated, a sample of councils was included as auditees.

Nine councils were selected to represent both metropolitan and regional areas, noting that there are very few in-scope buildings in rural areas. The audited councils were:

• Bayside Council
• City of Canterbury Bankstown Council
• Cumberland City Council
• Liverpool City Council
• City of Newcastle Council
• City of Parramatta Council
• City of Ryde Council
• City of Sydney Council
• Wollongong City Council.

Terminology

The two NSW Government department auditees have, over time, been subject to machinery of government changes, which have changed some of their functions and what the departments are called.

Relevant to this audit, the effect of these changes has been:

• the Department of Finance, Services, and Innovation (DFSI) became the Department of Customer Services (DCS) on 1 July 2019
• on 1 July 2019, the Department of Planning and Environment became the Department of Planning, Industry, and Environment (DPIE)
• on 21 December 2021, DPIE became the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE).

To avoid confusion, we use the titles by which these departments are known at the date of this report: the Department of Customer Service and the Department of Planning and Environment.

This chapter considers the part played by DCS and DPE as key members of the Cladding Taskforce in ensuring that buildings with combustible external cladding were effectively identified and remediated through processes implemented by:

• local councils or DPE, where those bodies were consent authorities under the EPA Act for the relevant buildings
• in the case of NSW Government buildings, the departments that owned those buildings.

This chapter considers what has been done to deliver a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products.

This chapter considers whether reforms have ensured that only people with the necessary skills and experience are certifying buildings and signing off on fire-safety.

Inspections of existing buildings and development of any subsequent action plans to address combustible external cladding are not activities covered by accreditation or registration schemes for building certifiers

Almost all the risk assessment and remediation work done on buildings in the scope of this audit have been undertaken under fire safety orders issued by consent authorities using their powers under the EPA Act. This has been the recommended approach by DPE and DCS since at least 2016 (that is, before the Grenfell Tower fire in London).

While there have been reforms to certifier registrations scheme, these were not intended to ensure that combustible cladding-remediation on existing buildings is supported by people with the necessary skills and experience in fire safety under the fire safety order process. Instead, they are focused on offering better assurance for work done in respect to new building projects where accredited experts certify that building work is carried out in accordance with BCA under the DCS managed certifier registration schemes.

No steps have been taken to ensure the quality of the work done by experts inspecting, assessing the fire risk and developing action plans to address combustible external cladding on existing buildings, other than where consent authorities have chosen to exercise their discretion. This includes requiring fire safety experts to be appropriately qualified and requiring peer review of some cladding risk assessments and remediation plans.

Consent authorities determine whether individuals with accreditation are required for combustible cladding inspection, risk assessments and remediation on existing buildings

Whether an individual with certifier accreditation participates in a cladding inspection, risk assessment, or remediation for an existing building will be determined by what councils as consent authorities specify in their fire safety orders unless building owners opt to use such experts without being directed to do so by the consent authority.

As discussed earlier, councils acting as consent authorities vary in whether they require building owners to engage individuals with certifier accreditation. In most of the councils we audited, A1 or C10 accredited experts were either required, or recommended, to perform functions such as auditing suspected combustible cladding, or conducting fire safety risk assessments and developing plans to rectify combustible cladding.

However, these types of work are not functions covered by the accreditation or registration schemes that apply to building and development certifiers.

Certifier accreditation schemes do not cover cladding remediation work done under fire safety orders

While councils may require or recommend that independent accredited A1 or C10 certifiers be engaged by building owners for cladding risk assessment and remediation, they are not performing those functions as certifiers — they are, in effect, more akin to expert consultants. Accordingly, how they perform their functions and duties is not covered by the legislation supporting the accreditation scheme for certifiers that was operated until July 2020 by the Building Professional Board.

Instead, their use in this process is a convenient and practical way for consent authorities to ensure that building owners use appropriate experts who have the qualifications, skills and experience needed to investigate and identify combustible cladding, and then to formulate appropriate action to deal with such cladding. However, these individuals are not performing regulated or accredited work, are not subject to regulatory oversight, and are not accountable to any accreditation body for the quality of the work they perform.

While councils could (and sometimes do) choose to decline poor quality or incomplete cladding-related work prepared by A1 or C10 certifiers, the burden of resolving poor quality would fall on the building owner, who would have to seek amended or additional risk assessments or rectification plans.

In the absence of regulatory oversight, disincentives for poor quality cladding-related work, may include litigation being commenced by the property owner, harm to the expert's reputation in a small and competitive market, and the potential impact on whether the individual could retain their professional indemnity insurance at a reasonable cost (especially in an environment when many insurance providers withdrew coverage for cladding related work).

Reforms impact on regulated experts doing work on new buildings

The reforms that commenced on 1 July 2020, replaced categories of accreditation with classes of registration, and varied the classes such that:

• accredited building surveyor category A1 became registered building surveyor-unrestricted
• accredited certifier—fire safety engineer category C10 became registered certifiers-fire safety.

The legislation that introduced these reforms, the Building and Development Certifiers Act 2018, also repealed the pre-existing Building Professionals Act 2005 and abolished the Building Professionals Board. The new Act was accompanied by the Building and Development Certifiers Regulation 2020.

While the scope of this audit is limited to existing buildings, we note that there are buildings with combustible external cladding that are yet to be remediated. Just as these processes previously drew on the expertise of A1 and C10 category certifiers, it seems inevitable that the remediation of existing buildings will continue to draw on the expertise of the equivalent new classes of registered building surveyor-unrestricted and registered certifier-fire safety.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #364 - released 13 April 2022.

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017

Schools and the community would benefit if school facilities were shared more often. 

The Department of Education’s ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ encourages but does not require schools to share facilities. Sharing depends heavily on the willingness of school principals and there are few incentives. There are many challenges in developing agreements with community users and there is only limited support available from the Department.

There are strategies and plans to support the sharing of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with budgets, specific plans or timeframes.

Governments should strive for the best use of assets. This is particularly important in the context of a growing New South Wales population, fiscal constraints and increasing demand for services. 

Lack of available land, rising land costs and population growth highlighted in our April 2017 'Planning for school infrastructure' performance audit report mean that new and existing schools will need to share their facilities with communities more than is currently the case.

This audit assessed how effectively schools share facilities with each other, local councils and community groups. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department of Education (Department):

• has a clear policy to encourage and support facilities sharing
• is implementing evidence-based strategies and procedures for facilities sharing
• can show it is realising an increasing proportion of sharing opportunities.

Facilities sharing is the use of a physical asset, such as a building, rooms, or open spaces, by more than one group for a range of activities at the same time or at different times. For the purposes of this audit, we have divided sharing arrangements into two types: shared use and joint use.

Shared use refers to arrangements where existing school assets are hired out for non-school purposes, usually for a limited time. The assets remain under the control of the school. Generally, there is little alteration or enhancement to the asset required to enable shared use. Shared use can also refer to schools using external facilities, such as council pools, but these arrangements are not included within the scope of this audit. 

Joint use refers to arrangements where new or upgraded school and non-school facilities or community hubs are planned, funded, built and jointly shared between a school and other parties, usually involving significant investment. 

Both shared use and joint use agreements are governed by contractual obligations.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Victoria's 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy

Appendix four - Not-for-profit hire changes

Appendix five - Performance Auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #293 - released 1 November 2017

In an audit of medical equipment in NSW hospitals, the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford found that the management of PET-CT scanners could be enhanced by better performance reporting and replacement planning, and that biomedical equipment needed more timely testing and maintenance.

The NSW Auditor-General examined the management of:

Parliamentary reference - Report number #286 - released 25 May 2017

The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the non-government sector and investing in provider capability.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a major reform that aims to change the way disability support is provided and received. Responsibility for overseeing the system to support people with disability in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. Eligible people with disability will receive individual funding from the NDIA and purchase support from their chosen service providers, rather than being referred to services funded or provided by government. The NSW Government will transfer all disability services it currently provides to the non-government sector.

Approximately 78,000 people received NSW Government-funded disability support in 2015–16 at a cost of around $3.3 billion. An estimated 142,000 people will have an individual NDIS support plan in New South Wales, with total funding rising to around $6.8 billion in 2018–19. NDIS trials began in New South Wales in 2013. The full scheme was introduced in July 2016 and is scheduled to be operating across the state by July 2018.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services' (the Department's) management of the risks of the NDIS transition in New South Wales. It focused on the Department's work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS. To make this assessment, we asked whether:

1. the Department supported the non-government sector to build capacity to meet the expected increase in demand under the NDIS
2. the Department supported disability service providers in NSW to improve their capability to deliver NDIS services
3. the Department's work to prepare for the NDIS has been coordinated with the Australian Government's NDIS readiness work.

In addition to the audit questions above, this audit identified principles governments should consider when building the capacity and capability of the non-government sector to deliver human services.

Building the capacity of the non-government sector

The Department supported an increase in the capacity of non-government providers

The Department started building the capacity of the non-government sector before the NDIS was developed. This included moving services provided by government into the non‑government sector, funding early intervention and community-based disability support, and introducing some individual support packages. The Department checks that the business and operational systems of non-government disability providers are adequate. However, its understanding of the outcomes for people using the services is limited.

Service gaps are possible for people with more complex support or access needs

There are risks to the supply of services to people who have more complex support or access needs, including people who need specialist clinical support, people in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The Department has supported the NDIA's initial market development work and funded some programs to help providers build their capacity to support these groups.  However, there is a risk the market will not expand quickly enough to meet the increase in demand for services.

Sector sustainability depends on support from outside the disability services sector

The sustainability of funded disability services provided by the non-government sector depends on support from outside the sector. Most people with disability receive significant unpaid support from family members, so carers will play a key role in the sustainability of the NDIS. There are opportunities for organisations that do not provide specific disability services to contribute to sector sustainability by providing some NDIS services. To do this, many will need help to make their services more accessible and inclusive to people with disability.

Helping non-government providers develop their capability

The Department invested in capability building programs for providers

The Department has spent more than $30 million over six years on programs that aim to improve the capability of disability support providers. This work began before the NDIS was established and was adjusted to focus on NDIS readiness from December 2012. It was guided by an industry development strategy that was developed after consultation with the sector and delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. This approach gave the sector some responsibility for developing its own capability, which is important because the sector will not receive support from the NSW Government after the transition to the NDIS.

The overall impact of the programs on the capability of providers is not clear

The overall effectiveness of the Department's spending on provider capability is not clear. The Department had some information on the general financial health and organisational capability of providers from previous industry development work. However, baseline information on provider capability was not collected before programs commenced and targets for improvements in provider capability were not set. Without this information, the Department cannot demonstrate clearly that the capability building programs it funded represent good value for money.

Most providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS effectively

In late 2015, the Department assessed the transition progress of providers in New South Wales. This assessment indicates almost one third of providers are highly likely to need additional assistance to transition to the NDIS successfully, with only 14 per cent unlikely to need further assistance. We conducted a survey of 299 providers in New South Wales in August 2016. Most reported that they feel they are on track to transition to the NDIS successfully. Sixty-two per cent said the Department-funded programs and resources they had used had improved their readiness for the NDIS. Fifty-four per cent said the changes made because of using these programs and resources had a lasting impact on their organisation.

Coordinating sector development

Governance systems and planning processes for the NDIS transition were established

The Department developed governance arrangements for the transition in New South Wales. It contributed actively to the development of national policy and strategy documents including a strategy for national market development.

The Department shared sector readiness lessons with the Australian Government

Two NDIS sector readiness programs funded by the NSW Government were later expanded to national programs through funding from the Australian Government. New South Wales only received around five per cent of the total Australian Government funding for NDIS sector readiness initiatives. A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2016 found there was limited evidence of a strategic approach by the Australian Government when allocating this funding to states and territories.

The Department has monitored transition issues and mitigated these where possible

The Department has monitored administrative issues for providers, which have included the changes in funding arrangements and registering for the NDIS. It has taken action to mitigate these where possible, although some issues, such as the operation of NDIA administrative systems, are beyond its control.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)

The NDIS is a fundamental change to the disability support system

The NDIS is a major reform that aims to make significant changes to the way disability support is provided and received. Under the NDIS, the administration of funding for disability support in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. The NSW and Australian Governments will both contribute to funding the NDIS. The size of the disability services sector in New South Wales is expected to more than double when the NDIS is fully operational (Exhibit 1).

One of the main objectives of the NDIS is to increase the choice and control that people with disability have over the support they receive. Under the NDIS, people with disability receive individual funding packages which they can use to pay their chosen providers for the support they need, instead of being referred to services that are deemed appropriate for their needs. This is a fundamental change to the nature of disability support. Before the NDIS, people with disability were moved around the system according to decisions made by government or other organisations providing disability support. Under the NDIS, the funding will move around the system based on the choices people with disability make. The development of the new market for NDIS disability services is expected to take up to ten years because the changes to the system are so extensive.

In addition to increasing choice and control for participants, the NDIS aims to:

• improve outcomes for people with disability by intervening early to help reduce the need for support later in life
• increase integration by helping people with disability access mainstream government services such as health and education
• increase the involvement of people with disability in the community by making it easier to access community services such as sports clubs and community groups.

The transition to the NDIS is underway

The transition to the NDIS is underway in most Australian states and territories, following trials over the last three years. In New South Wales, a trial site was established in the Hunter area in July 2013. Early roll out of the NDIS began in July 2015 for people aged under 18 in the Nepean Blue Mountains area. On 30 June 2016, about 7,800 people had an NDIS plan in the Hunter trial site and around 1,800 people had a plan in the Nepean Blue Mountains area.

The full roll out of the NDIS began in about half of New South Wales in July 2016. The NDIS will start operating in the rest of the state from July 2017 and the transition is scheduled to be completed by July 2018 (Exhibit 2).

For the rest of the transition, the Department of Family and Community Services should:

1. Work with the Australian Government, NDIA and other NSW Government agencies to identify gaps and develop the capacity of specialist clinical services, focusing on regional and rural areas.
2. Continue to implement projects to increase the number of organisations that can support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
3. Target remaining capability building assistance to less prepared providers, including via one-to-one support and mentoring in identified areas of weakness.
4. Continue working with the Australian Government and the NDIA to ensure lessons from sector capability programs are shared.

Principles for developing the non-government sector

1. Commence work to increase the capacity of the non-government sector early to allow time for service capacity to be built in a sustainable way.
2. Decide whether to increase the capacity of the sector by supporting existing providers to expand their operations, attracting new organisations from outside the existing provider group, or some combination of these.
3. Tailor approaches to supporting groups that have additional support or access needs because of cultural or geographic factors.
4. Define the desired outcomes for people using services and, where possible, include outcomes in service delivery contracts.
5. Invest in the sector by partnering with sector peak bodies to deliver capability programs.
6. Include one-to-one support and mentoring in capability building programs where possible to improve the targeting of support to the specific needs of providers.
7. Collect baseline information on provider capability before commencing programs and build robust tracking and evaluation into their design.
8. Establish whole-of-government governance arrangements to ensure roles, responsibilities and accountability for delivery are clear.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #280 - released 23 February 2017