Source: Health and Wellbeing subcommittee data.

The majority of displaced persons housed in emergency accommodation were renting prior to the flood events, with 70% of households self-reporting as such when they initially engaged with the HCC. The HCC also collected data at the time when households entered emergency accommodation about when they thought they might be able to return to their homes. At that time, 45% of householders reported that they would never be able to return to their homes, with another 44% of households uncertain on when they would be able to return home.

Due to the significant scale of the flooding and the impact it had on DCJ’s usual forms of emergency accommodation – hotels and motels – the HCC adapted its approach to arranging emergency accommodation. In addition to available hotels and motels, it also utilised camp style accommodation facilities and DCJ hired 124 motorhomes to be brought to the area.

In the two weeks following the initial flood event, DCJ accommodated people across four camp style accommodation facilities. At one point in March 2022, 356 people were housed in this type of accommodation. DCJ also established the hired motorhomes at three existing caravan park sites in the Northern Rivers, and provided a series of additional services to people housed in these. In the two weeks following the initial flood event, 40 motorhomes were located on these sites. By 22 March 2022, all 124 hired motorhomes were located on these sites.

The NSW Government tracked demand for temporary housing from April 2022 onwards

The HTF worked with the Department of Customer Service (DCS) to identify the demand for temporary housing in the Northern Rivers. From mid-April 2022 DCS provided data to the SRC regarding the demand for temporary housing broken down by council area and the number of people in each household.

DCS collected data from Service NSW registration forms and other Service NSW outreach data asking about whether individuals impacted by the Northern Rivers flood event would be interested in temporary housing. The first estimate from DCS on 14 April 2022, based on raw survey data, was that temporary housing for 1,642 households would be required, including 1, 2, 3 and 4+ person households. This was increased to 1,653 on 20 April 2022. The number of households seeking temporary housing fluctuated over the following months, eventually dropping below 1,000 in September 2022, though this number did not include those who were participants in the At-home Caravans program, discussed below. This decrease in demand followed an outreach campaign by Service NSW to contact those on the waitlist to confirm if they were still seeking temporary housing. Estimated demand started to consistently increase from late November 2022, rising to over 1,100. Exhibit 6 demonstrates changes in estimated demand over time.

Source: Audit Office analysis of Department of Customer Service data.

DCS analysed data about households in temporary housing, as well as those on the waitlist. As at 10 July 2023, 71% of individuals either in temporary housing or on the waitlist had been renting prior to the floods, 54% were single person households and 22% of households had three or more people in need of housing. This data was based on applicants self-reporting at the time of placing an expression of interest for temporary housing. The variety of household sizes increased the need for flexible housing that could house individuals and families.

All of the worst-impacted council areas were represented on the waitlist by a significant number of people. Thirty-six per cent of all people on the waitlist or in temporary housing were living in the Lismore Local Government Area (LGA) prior to the floods. This impact across the region meant that there was a need for temporary housing to be established across the Northern Rivers, but particularly in Lismore if displaced persons were to remain close to where they previously lived.

NSW Public Works considered a range of temporary housing options and rapidly conducted its procurement to align with demand

As part of the response to the Northern Rivers flood events, Resilience NSW tasked Public Works Advisory (now NSWPW) to lead the procurement and construction effort for the temporary housing. Before a formal registration of interest (ROI) process commenced in late March 2022, a number of businesses, not-for-profit organisations and government agencies had approached Resilience NSW with temporary housing options.

In late March 2022, NSWPW commenced a formal ROI process for the provision of temporary housing to people affected by the floods. The ROI called for registration from suppliers of granny flats, portable buildings, relocatable homes, kit homes, working camp style cabins or other portable structures that may be suitable to meet the need for short to medium-term accommodation. Organisations that had previously approached Resilience NSW with offers of assistance were invited to submit under the ROI. Respondents were asked to provide a description of the accommodation they could offer, the amount of stock available for immediate purchase, the amount of stock that would be available over the following 12 weeks, and the indicative price of each housing option. NSWPW also contacted suppliers that it thought may be able to provide temporary housing to encourage them to respond to the ROI process.

In addition to undertaking the ROI, NSWPW explored other options. This included the construction of mining style camps or tiny homes, and the purchase of temporary housing from the Queensland or Commonwealth governments’ quarantine facilities. These options were ultimately not considered appropriate for a variety of reasons including cost and suitability for community living on a medium-term basis.

Conducting the ROI for a wide range of potential suppliers and considering existing solutions for providing temporary housing demonstrates that NSWPW considered a range of possible options for providing temporary housing before making a decision about the most suitable option for purchase.

Some local councils also provided alternative short and medium-term temporary housing options. However, there is no evidence that these options were explored further by the HTF for their viability. For example, Kyogle Council identified hotels and motels which could have been used as ongoing housing for displaced persons. The council also suggested a non-operational tourism accommodation facility with established housing and dining facilities which could have housed up to 50 people. Similarly, another tourist accommodation provider which housed displaced persons as a form of emergency accommodation contacted Resilience NSW with an offer for the accommodation to be used as a temporary housing facility. This may have provided some displaced persons a point of continuity if they had remained in this accommodation.

NSWPW received 38 responses to the ROI from potential suppliers. These covered a range of options including modular homes, relocatable buildings, caravans, granny flats, and tents. NSWPW collated the responses to the ROI and made a decision on which suppliers to engage based on their capacity to provide sufficient supply to meet demand. Based on the information from suppliers, the HTF made the decision that lower quality options, without a self-contained kitchen and bathroom amenities, would not be suitable. This focused the potential supplier options to those that could provide the required quality and amenity within the shortest possible timeframe.

NSWPW procured temporary housing solutions from six suppliers. NSWPW used direct negotiations to procure the dwellings. Direct negotiations pose a greater risk that value for money will not be achieved, and can also pose an increased risk of corrupt conduct. Nevertheless, direct negotiations may be appropriate in an emergency situation, as identified in the Public Works and Procurement Regulation 2019.

In line with this higher level of risk, NSWPW received approval from the then Secretary of the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) to conduct the procurement as direct negotiations. NSWPW implemented actions that aimed to mitigate the risks posed by direct negotiations, such as ensuring that the ROI ran for an extended period and was open. As part of this, NSWPW gathered relevant information from applicants that it could use to compare with other applicants, and NSWPW also sought to engage directly with other industry participants and jurisdictions.

Two organisations were engaged in early April 2022 to provide temporary housing pods because they could provide the pods immediately and the pods could be installed rapidly once sites were made available. The temporary housing pods procured from one of these suppliers were not used. Four additional suppliers who had responded to the ROI were engaged to provide modular housing or studio modules. Most of the providers engaged were private businesses, but there was also some procurement from the not-for-profit sector and through Corrective Services Industries and School Infrastructure NSW. In addition to this modular housing, Resilience NSW engaged a third party to assist with the hire of caravans as a temporary housing solution. NSWPW managed this contract on Resilience NSW's behalf. Two caravan providers were considered for this, with the chosen provider offering the best value for money.

Exhibit 7 shows the number of dwellings procured from each supplier, apart from caravans which are discussed separately below. NSWPW secured 664 pods or modular homes through its procurement. Short-term pods and modules were available and able to be constructed quickly. Studio pods were designed for one to two people to live in, and modular pods were able to be adapted to create a range of dwelling sizes to accommodate larger households. This allowed the construction to align with demand.

Source: NSW Public Works.

Throughout the procurement and site planning process, NSWPW regularly updated its forecast supply based on the forecast demand, which largely involved planning to scale up or down the procurement of pods and hiring of caravans depending on what the forecast need was. This demonstrated a flexibility in approach that was reactive to the needs of the community. While the number of temporary dwellings procured did not match demand, the number of dwellings procured exceeded the available land to put them on, indicating that unmet demand was not due to an inability to procure supply. The commercial arrangements in place with the suppliers also allowed for increased supply. The procurement of land for the use of temporary housing villages is discussed below.

DPE led a rapid assessment process for potential land for temporary housing villages

DPE led the assessment of sites where temporary housing villages could be created. DPE considered criteria that the HTF had determined as part of this process. Each site was assigned an overall score and ranked according to that score. The HTF had decided that sites should be identified that were available immediately, were not affected by natural hazards, were close to affected communities, and had access to utilities and services. Some sites that ranked highly were deemed not appropriate for a temporary housing site due to being in a location that had been less impacted by the floods, meaning that people could not be located close to their communities, or due to problems with slopes or other factors that would make construction difficult.

DPE conducted desktop analysis of sites, including obtaining recent images of the sites. These images enabled DPE to determine previous use of sites to identify if further investigation was required. DPE also utilised previous site investigations which were conducted as part of existing development applications on sites. This provided rapid access to site characteristics such as location, land use and layout, expediting the assessment process.

Crown Lands, a branch of DPE, was engaged to assist with refining the list of sites, using its geographic information system to determine flood impact and topography of sites. DCS also assisted with site analysis by engaging the National Recovery and Resilience Agency to identify the flooding extent of locations. Impact assessments undertaken by the State Emergency Service were also used to determine the flood impact on sites.

Local councils were invited to provide a list of possible locations to be used for temporary housing villages within their LGAs. This was coordinated through the HTF and the General Managers of affected councils, who were not provided criteria to guide them in the site identification process. Impacted councils then provided the HTF with a list of potential sites for the villages.

As sites were identified, it was noted that some LGAs did not contain any sites which were located above the flood level, one of the required criteria used in the assessment process. DPE identified the need to consider using more flexible criteria in the selection of some sites, along with the implementation of mitigating processes to minimise the risk of future flooding. DPE then modified the criteria, allowing some sites to be selected below the flood level, with flood risk mitigations implemented in the sites' design and construction. These processes included the implementation of flood indicators, evacuation plans and different design responses to treat the flood risk present at these sites. A total of 143 sites were assessed, including sites identified by local councils and State government. Twenty of these sites were identified by DPE. The initial assessments included sites from all of the impacted LGAs in the Northern Rivers, as well as sites further south, including as far as Newcastle.

Following the assessment of sites, 17 sites were shortlisted for a temporary housing village. Some of the sites selected did not score highly in the initial assessment. However, several of the sites with higher scores were excluded for reasons including private ownership, topography, vegetation and natural disaster risk. This information was gathered as part of the site analysis, however it is unclear why this was not factored into the ranking of the sites.

The then Minister for Planning and Homes approved these 17 sites on 8 April 2022. They were initially assessed as being capable of holding a maximum estimated total of between 1,950 and 2,040 pods, which exceeded the estimated demand for temporary housing at that time. As site constraints became clear and more work was done to determine the number of dwellings which could be placed on each site, the maximum estimated total across these 17 sites reduced to 1,381.

The Government Architect NSW conducted preliminary feasibility studies for several of the shortlisted sites. These studies provided more detailed analysis on the topography of the sites, assessed the risk from natural disaster and identified other site constraints. NSWPW then conducted site visits to assess the ability of each site to accommodate the supporting ground works and temporary dwellings. The purpose of these visits was also to determine existing and required services for each of the sites such as roads, power, water and sewerage.

Three additional sites were added in May 2022 to bring the total to 20 sites, though one of the original 17 sites was already acknowledged as unlikely to be used due to its flood risk. These additional three sites were identified to provide greater flexibility on the design and layout of the temporary housing villages, and to provide certainty that the supply of pods would match demand. These 20 sites were located in the following LGAs:

• Ballina Shire Council – 3 sites
• Byron Shire Council – 3 sites
• Lismore City Council – 5 sites
• Richmond Valley Council – 4 sites
• Tweed Shire Council – 5 sites.

The lack of governance structures supporting the site identification process resulted in a lack of clarity over agencies' responsibilities

As noted above, there was no plan in place prior to the flood events to guide the temporary housing response. This led to some uncertainty about the involvement of agencies in the site selection process. NSWPW was not formally engaged during the initial site assessments, with this being conducted by DPE in conjunction with local councils. DCS also assisted with the provision of flood mapping data for sites. However, the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) engaged NSWPW directly to assist Lismore City Council with their site selection. This resulted in Lismore City Council being able to provide more detailed site analysis to DPE which other councils were unable to provide. Not all key DPE staff involved in the site identification were aware of NSWPW's involvement. Clearer governance structures would have allowed for clearer channels of communication and responsibility. After conducting some site assessments and some of the selection process without a formal plan, a clear process was developed to clarify the scope of each agency's involvement across the rest of the site selection process. The revised governance is outlined below in Exhibit 8.

Source: Department of Planning and Environment.

In addition to providing its potential temporary housing sites to DPE, Ballina Shire Council also provided NSWPW directly with information on three potential temporary housing sites. NSWPW reviewed this and determined them to be appropriate for temporary housing villages and communicated this to DPE. None of these sites had been shortlisted by DPE, although one of the sites was eventually utilised as a temporary housing village. This site had been initially discounted by DPE as infrastructure data provided by the council and DCS did not show the site as being serviced by water or sewerage. However, the NSWPW assessment determined that it was connected to both these services.

Further analysis was performed as part of the site assessments, reducing the shortlist from 20 to 14 sites, however the record keeping is incomplete

Once the shortlist of 20 sites was determined, further work was performed to progress these including further analysis by NSWPW and the Government Architect NSW, landowner negotiation and the involvement of the legal team from Resilience NSW to formalise agreements. As the process continued, sites were excluded from the shortlist as issues were identified.

There were a variety of reasons for the shortlisted sites not being available, including:

• there was a native title claim on the site
• the land was affected by the 2022 floods and potential, future flood events could not be managed
• there was a lack of council support
• the NSW Government was unable to obtain landholder permission
• the land was bushfire-prone.

The impact of these other pieces of research and negotiations was to reduce the list to 14. Not all sites that were excluded had a documented reason and as such it is unclear why some sites were excluded. Approval processes were not well documented as the site list was reduced and it is unclear who exercised authority in excluding these sites. The reasons for excluding these sites were not recorded in the centralised spreadsheet tracking the site analysis process, and were not recorded in the minutes of the HTF meetings.

Only 11 housing sites were constructed, which was not sufficient to meet demand

Only 11 of the 14 shortlisted sites were ultimately constructed as a temporary housing village. The final breakdown of sites in each Council area is:

• Ballina Shire Council – 3 sites
• Byron Shire Council – 3 sites
• Lismore City Council – 1 site
• Richmond Valley Council – 2 sites
• Tweed Shire Council – 2 sites.

Constructing only 11 sites had a significant impact on the NSW Government’s ability to meet the demand for temporary housing. These 11 sites had a total capacity for 546 temporary housing dwellings. NSWPW had already secured 741 temporary dwellings, a mixture of pods and caravans, by the time the number of sites was finally determined, and there was insufficient space to place all these dwellings. These excess dwellings were temporarily placed in a storage site on the Northern Rivers before being used as part of the response to the Central West flood event, discussed below. The 11 sites constructed were not sufficient to meet the demand for temporary housing.

Securing only one site in the Lismore LGA also impacted the NSW Government’s ability to house people in the area with the greatest need for temporary housing. By June 2022, DCS was forecasting that there would be demand for over 600 dwellings in Lismore City Council. The site that was secured hosted 52 dwellings, significantly short of the estimated demand. Due to the high level of need in the Lismore LGA, the allocation of tenants at the Wollongbar site in the Ballina Shire LGA prioritises residents of Lismore due to its close proximity to Lismore.

The temporary housing program did not meet the estimated demand and there continues to be a waitlist for temporary housing

Five hundred and forty-six dwellings were placed on the 11 sites in the Northern Rivers for the temporary housing villages. This included both pods and caravans. These progressively became available throughout late 2022 and were all established by the end of March 2023. The 546 dwellings did not meet the demand for temporary housing which exceeded 1,100 households by November 2022.

The number of people housed in the temporary dwellings fluctuates depending on the size of families, but is consistently over 900 people. As at 10 July 2023, 1,021 people were in the temporary housing villages and 257 caravans were on people’s property.

As at 27 November 2023, 724 households remained on the waitlist for temporary housing, though the Reconstruction Authority has not reviewed this list to confirm its accuracy. This indicates that while the temporary housing was able to meet some of the Northern Rivers’ demand for housing, it was unable to fully meet the needs of the Northern Rivers community. These households were in a variety of housing situations when they applied for temporary housing. For example, 156 were staying with family and friends, 24 were in emergency accommodation, and 136 had no accommodation.

The Reconstruction Authority has advised that it is planning to perform an outreach campaign with households on the waitlist to determine how many households on the waitlist are still seeking temporary housing, and to prioritise eligible households using a revised program prioritisation model. This model prioritises those on the waitlist who are currently homeless or at imminent risk of homelessness, living in crisis or emergency accommodation or living in a flood-damaged property that is deemed unsafe, as well as other considerations. Lower priority will be assigned to those who have access to stable temporary housing for up to six months. Although the Reconstruction Authority estimates that some households will withdraw from the waitlist as a result of this campaign, it is unable to make an accurate assessment of demand until this work is undertaken.

Resilience NSW used caravans as an alternative way to house people on a temporary basis

In addition to housing people through the temporary housing villages, Resilience NSW and the HTF commenced the At-home Caravans program. This involved renting caravans through a third-party provider and putting these caravans on people’s private property so that they could live on their own property while rebuilding or waiting for longer-term options to become available. Caravans are not fully appropriate as a replacement for temporary housing pods, as caravans only serve to house a maximum of two people, and can only be placed on property where the owner of the property agrees. Given the number of rental tenants who were impacted by the flood, this was not always an option.

The At-home Caravans program was first launched in June 2022 for the town of Woodburn, where an appropriate site for temporary housing pods could not be identified due to the low-lying nature of the town. It was decided to use caravans as an alternative to temporary housing pods in this case. The program was broadened out in October 2022 to house people from across the entire Northern Rivers.

The initial estimated demand for this program was 300 caravans, but the number of applications had exceeded this by the end of December 2022. The program continued to attract applications throughout 2023, eventually exceeding 400 applications. Given that caravans were hired on a temporary basis, their availability fluctuated, but from January 2023 onwards, Resilience NSW consistently had over 250 caravans on properties under this program. In late 2022, Resilience NSW was authorised to expand the At-home Caravans program to 500 households. While the program was expanded, this target was not met.

Few people are exiting temporary housing and a lack of long-term housing in the Northern Rivers means that this is unlikely to change

One way in which the dwellings could be made available to households on the waitlist is if people exit the temporary housing into more permanent options. By 10 July 2023, 75 households had exited temporary housing. Of these, only 30 had either moved into a longer-term housing solution or moved out of the area, with the remaining 45 either not having a known reason or leaving for other reasons, such as through being evicted from the temporary dwelling. This means that the number of households leaving to enter longer-term accommodation is relatively low, and it is unlikely that turnover alone will accommodate households on the waitlist in the near future.

External pressures including broader housing stress in the region which existed prior to the floods, and the limited viability of existing social and affordable housing options, have placed additional demand on the program, and limit options for residents to secure long-term housing.

Given that the number of temporary dwellings constructed did not meet the demand for temporary housing in the Northern Rivers, it was important to implement alternative measures for housing people on the waitlist and to assist people moving from temporary to permanent housing. However, alternative measures for addressing unmet demand were not implemented. The NSW Government does not have a strategy for meeting the outstanding demand for temporary housing.

A key option for transitioning people into longer-term accommodation is through providing incentives for people to move into private rental accommodation. Rental subsidies were made available to individuals affected by the floods to encourage people to identify private rental options. However, while subsidies have been made available, it is clear that these are not sufficient for addressing the waitlist for temporary housing. Vacancy rates of rental properties in the Northern Rivers have remained low since the flood event and as such subsidies are unlikely to be sufficient to move people into rental properties.

People housed in temporary housing do not pay rent. This poses a key disincentive for people in temporary housing to move to other accommodation where they would be expected to pay, including moving into social housing. Planning the temporary housing response prior to the flood event and undertaking strategic risk management may have allowed for this disincentive to be identified and acted upon.

The Reconstruction Authority advised that at this stage of the program, a high number of exits was not expected. It expects that as residents approach the end of their three-year occupancy agreements, the number of exits will start to increase. This is due to external factors including the acute shortage of housing in the region, impacting ability of temporary housing tenants to secure long-term housing. The current housing supply gap in the Northern Rivers is estimated to be upwards of 24,000 dwellings.

The temporary housing program did not meet the needs of mobility impaired people

In addition to overall demand for pods, it was necessary for pods to be constructed to meet the needs of mobility impaired people. It was identified early that two types of accessible construction could be made available: ambulant pods with a ramp, and pods that were compliant with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (DDA). Demographic analysis in April 2022 indicated that approximately 18% of the pods constructed would need to be able to provide access to mobility impaired people. NSWPW agreed that it could arrange for this specification to be met through its contractors.

In total, 14.9% of pods provided are either DDA compliant or have a ramp. Only three temporary housing village sites have met this 18% target: Coraki, Ballina and Wardell. This number also excludes the caravans that have been placed on these sites, which are not accessible for mobility impaired people. If caravans are included, only 12.5% of the 546 available housing options in the temporary housing villages are accessible for mobility impaired people. This does not meet the demand estimated at the outset of the program.

NSWPW did not include the proportion of housing that should meet the needs of mobility impaired people in the contract with its main supplier of modular housing. Including this in the contract would have made it easier for the contractor to anticipate the supply required and for NSWPW to ensure that demand was met.

The temporary housing program is forecast to cost $88 million more than the initial budget

In April 2022, the NSW Government announced a $350 million funding package for the procurement and construction of temporary housing, which was based on Resilience NSW's initial estimate for temporary housing demand. This funding covered site construction, maintenance and demobilisation (the return of sites to their pre-construction condition), site leases and licences, site management and support services, and program administration. Resilience NSW estimated the cost of a single prefabricated building, refurbished demountable or manufactured tiny home and developed a funding estimate on the assumption that it would need to procure enough of these units to meet its initial estimate of demand. This initial estimate of demand was developed prior to the calculation of demand data by DCS. Resilience NSW overestimated the number of units it needed to meet demand, and significantly underestimated the cost per unit. The number of units used in the budget calculations was approximately four times the number that were ultimately built.

An additional $88 million in funding was added to the program as it was forecast to cost a total of $438 million compared to the initial budget of $350 million. This included the production and installation of the pods, as well as the cost of managing the pod villages, the administration of the temporary housing program, and an estimated $63 million for demobilisation. The final forecast cost of $438 million is for the 546 temporary dwellings that were finally completed, as well as the procurement of the additional pods that were not placed in the Northern Rivers. This represents a substantial overspend compared to the initial budget, while also delivering significantly fewer temporary dwellings for the cost.

As at 30 June 2023, $302.3 million had been spent on the temporary housing program, with additional money likely to be spent by the Reconstruction Authority to run the temporary housing villages, and NSWPW to demobilise the sites. As noted in the 'Planning and Environment 2023' financial audit report, the total carrying amount of the temporary housing assets is $269.2 million (after depreciation expenses) as at 30 June 2023. The estimated make-good liability to demobilise the temporary housing sites as at 30 June 2023 is $42.2 million. The primary reason for the overspend compared to the initial budget was the additional costs incurred for site preparation and module installation, which cost $171.6 million compared to an initial program budget of $140.4 million.

Each of the sites selected had construction difficulties that caused budget overspends and delays

The cost of site works was significantly higher than forecast. The forecast budget for site preparation, module installation and electrical works at the start of the 2022–23 financial year was $120.2 million. The total cost of this work was $171.6 million. A significant portion of this variation can be attributed to the additional costs incurred in the site preparation phase. Given that the sites chosen had issues that needed to be resolved, the expenditure on the sites exceeded the forecast budget. The construction of these sites involved the delivery of additional supporting infrastructure, including road networks, pumping and sewerage treatment, and new power supplies.

The highest overspend was at the Wollongbar Sports Complex, which was constructed for $18 million over the planned budget. Additional site facilities contributed to this overspend, including the construction of a car park to service the site. This was the first site to have pods constructed on it, however these pods were added to the site in phases, including some being placed on site before the design work had been completed. Some of the Minderoo Foundation pods which had been procured early had been placed on the Wollongbar site. These pods were eventually replaced with other pods, meaning that work had to be repeated, leading to higher costs. The Wardell site also had significant unforeseen costs associated with its construction. This included building a school and health centre which were not allowed for in the initial cost estimates. This site is discussed further below.

Other sites had a variety of issues that had to be worked through. Several of the sites identified were on contaminated land, which had to be resolved prior to construction. Despite the fact that not selecting flood prone sites was part of the selection criteria, two selected sites were flood impacted or flood prone and required additional work. Two sites had issues with the slope of the land, impacting the construction. All of these issues had been identified as part of the initial site assessment process, but the decision was made to proceed with these sites in spite of these limitations as few sites were available which did not have any sort of limitation. In addition, other unforeseen issues arose, such as one site being occupied by an endangered species, which halted work while protective measures were put in place. Construction was also impacted by rain throughout 2022. NSWPW resolved these construction issues, with the HTF and other stakeholder agencies providing input on issues as they arose.

In addition to the construction being more expensive than initially forecast, the above issues led to delays in the sites being available as temporary housing sites. Most of the sites were due to commence progressively from October 2022 onwards, with the final site at Mullumbimby due to accept residents from January 2023. Five sites were delayed, with the delay in accepting the first residents ranging from two weeks to three months later than originally planned. Some sites also had significant time gaps between the first residents entering the sites and the sites being completed.

The Reconstruction Authority provides oversight of the allocation of temporary housing

Given that demand exceeded supply, rules were needed to allocate the temporary housing. Community Housing Providers (CHP) are contracted to run the temporary housing villages, and are responsible for allocating dwellings to individuals who have expressed an interest in them. When they applied, a number of these people were in DCJ’s emergency accommodation but others were housed in some other way, such as living with families and friends.

To help manage the allocation process for temporary housing, the HTF created the Allocations Working Group (AWG) in October 2022. The AWG was set up to provide oversight of allocations and escalated cases across all temporary housing pathways, including temporary housing sites. The Reconstruction Authority chairs the AWG, and it is also attended by DCJ, DCS and relevant CHPs.

In November 2022, the AWG determined categories of people that would be prioritised for placement in a dwelling. This guidance was included as an appendix in the contracts with the CHPs. Further detailed guidance was developed to guide the allocation at the sites. This is captured in a ‘Handbook for Housing’, which was issued to the CHPs.

As noted, one of the roles of the AWG is to provide oversight of the allocation process. The Reconstruction Authority receives monthly and quarterly reporting on allocations, and discusses these with the CHPs during monthly meetings. More complex issues are then escalated to the AWG for resolution.

DPC developed a communications strategy to coordinate the approach to communication in relation to the flood events

In March 2022, DPC developed a media and communications plan which outlined the communications strategy, key messages and stakeholder engagement in relation to the flood events. A stakeholder communications toolkit was also developed containing links, newsletter copies and social tiles and posters for agencies to share. A coordinated approach to communication was needed due to the number of agencies with different responsibilities.

In August 2022, DPC developed a communication strategy related to the temporary housing response which provided individuals and agencies with specific responsibilities and aimed to coordinate the communications response. This included the avenues that should be used to engage with communities and local councils. As outlined in this strategy, DPC was responsible for the media, communications, website updates and most engagement related to temporary housing.

The Crisis Communications Executive Committee (CCEC) was also established by DPC to facilitate high-frequency, cross-agency meetings to share data and insights, discuss emerging challenges, centralise messages and amplify messaging across government channels. DCS and Resilience NSW co-chaired this committee, with DPC, NSW Police, Aboriginal Affairs and other combat agencies all included as participants.

Engagement with key stakeholders occurred through other means as well. As part of the selection of sites, DPE and the HTF engaged with local councils. Councils were able to propose sites for inclusion and assessment as a temporary housing site. Many of the sites assessed were proposed by local councils, including some that were ultimately used for temporary housing. In addition, local councils were involved in the HTF meetings from April to June 2022, the period in which the initial sites were being selected. This provided an opportunity for councils to be informed of developments in the program, as well as provide input as appropriate.

Once the sites were chosen, Resilience NSW led community consultation about those sites. As part of this, the agency ran drop-in sessions, sent letters to nearby community members, and used a variety of other communication methods to alert the community about the upcoming construction. While the audit team heard that there were some issues with communities opposing the construction of some villages, the complaints that the Reconstruction Authority has received about the villages largely related to construction issues rather than the chosen sites themselves, and instances of anti-social behaviour from individuals placed in the dwellings.

The SRC and relevant agencies consulted with Aboriginal communities about the temporary housing

The Northern Rivers floods had a particularly stark impact on the Bundjalung Nation communities. In particular, the Aboriginal community on Cabbage Tree Island was heavily impacted. The NSW Government needed to consider the particular needs of this community to maintain connection to Country and to stay together as a community.

As noted above, there was no plan in place prior to the flood events setting out how temporary housing would be planned and constructed. This includes there being no plan for ensuring culturally appropriate management of a temporary housing response and that there would be a way for Aboriginal communities to maintain connection to Country. During the Northern Rivers flood event, the SRC and relevant agencies needed to develop an understanding of the local Aboriginal communities and their needs while the event was unfolding and rapidly develop and implement a culturally appropriate response.

Given the particularly severe impact of the floods on the Cabbage Tree Island community, it was necessary to engage the community in the temporary housing response to ensure that an appropriate solution could be found. Through the HTF, this engagement occurred to determine the site where the temporary housing would be built, and to determine what adjustments could be made to the temporary housing village to make it more appropriate.

The Jali Local Aboriginal Land Council (Jali LALC) was engaged through the SRC in March 2022 to identify an appropriate location, which ended up being a site in the town of Wardell, close to Cabbage Tree Island. Jali LALC identified the site owned by Crown Lands, which is subject to an ongoing native title claim related to the Cabbage Tree Island community. In addition to identifying the location of this temporary housing village, Jali LALC was engaged in the design of the village. The Wardell temporary housing village is distinct from the other villages as it has the Cabbage Tree Island primary school on site, a medical service run by the Aboriginal Health Service, and a number of other modifications made at the request of the community.

The Reconstruction Authority has also led consultation with the significant Aboriginal population at the Coraki temporary housing village. While this site was not specifically identified to house the local Aboriginal community, the majority of residents at this time are Aboriginal. There has been some consultation with this community specifically to identify potential improvements in the management of the Coraki site. Several changes were made to the ongoing management of the Coraki village as a result of this engagement, including the relocation of six pods to land owned by the Bogal Local Aboriginal Land Council.

Some Aboriginal stakeholders have expressed concerns about the cultural competency of key agencies and organisations involved in the response

Resilience NSW identified during the delivery of the temporary housing response that a risk to the program was inappropriate or ineffective engagement with Aboriginal communities. One aspect of appropriate communication is cultural competency. Cultural competency is important when engaging with Aboriginal communities to understand the specific needs and vulnerabilities affecting that community.

While there has been engagement with the affected Aboriginal communities, concerns have been raised about the cultural competency of some of the agencies and organisations involved in the temporary housing response. This view was expressed to the audit team and has also been expressed in the 2022 Flood Inquiry in regards to evacuation centres. The Reconstruction Authority also identified culturally inappropriate behaviours from one of the CHPs. The NSW Bushfire Inquiry made a recommendation to Resilience NSW to ensure that all staff involved in evacuation centres and support services are culturally competent. The Reconstruction Authority advised that it has engaged more Aboriginal staff to assist with this community engagement in future.

There are no long-term plans in place for the transition of tenants out of the temporary housing villages, increasing the risk that individuals may not be able to be rehomed

The budget for the construction and ongoing management of the temporary housing villages includes funds for demobilisation. The initial anticipated timeframe for the temporary housing program was two years, however tenants were engaged on three-year leases. The NSW Government does not have a clear plan around how long the temporary housing villages are intended to remain in place. The temporary housing villages need to be demobilised within a five-year period, as required by the State Environmental Planning Policy (Housing) 2021.

NSWPW’s contractors developed demobilisation plans for each temporary housing village, which are held by NSWPW as the primary contract holder. These plans only consider the physical demobilisation of the site, and do not include plans for longer term considerations such as rehousing people in other appropriate housing.

With no strategy in place to guide the transition of all tenants out of temporary housing prior to the end of the anticipated two-year timeframe, and no clear timeline for when the temporary housing villages will be demobilised, the Reconstruction Authority faces the risk of hundreds of households being unable to be rehomed by the end of this period. This risk is exacerbated by the waitlist for temporary housing and the slow pace of transition of current temporary housing occupants from the villages. The current housing supply gap in the Northern Rivers is estimated to be upwards of 24,000 dwellings, with rental vacancy rates remaining low, contributing to this issue.

The lack of planning for temporary housing prior to the flood events means that Resilience NSW and the Reconstruction Authority did not have a clear idea when constructing the temporary housing about how long people would be using the temporary dwellings, nor what would be done with the temporary housing pods when they were no longer required. Development of a plan for temporary housing may have allowed for these considerations when procuring and installing the temporary housing rather than having to consider timeframes whilst in the recovery phase.