Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges

Emergency arrangements activated during the 2019–20 bushfire season were extended to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic up to, and including, the time of the Delta outbreak. The arrangements evolved to meet the needs of a pandemic emergency where restrictions on movement and gatherings were imposed. By June 2021, preparedness was improved by capability developments, although these changes were not documented in the relevant emergency management plans or supporting plans. These include:

• adaptation of key welfare services to provide support for those in quarantine where agencies developed a process (not reflected in the Welfare Services Functional Area Plan)
• development, during the 2020 outbreak, of whole-of-government communications mechanisms by the Department of Customer Service to support coordinated messaging, assessment of community sentiment, stakeholder engagement, and use of data to develop behaviourally-focused engagement plans
• implementation of mechanisms to improve community engagement and outreach by agencies, including NSW Health’s Local Health Districts and NSW Police Force area commands
• establishment of an intelligence capability within NSW Health to consolidate data across the health system and research global literature and insights into COVID-19 developments
• development of surge capacity in the health system, including intensive care units and the establishment of a central unit to manage capacity to coordinate patient flow during the Delta outbreak
• planning and engagement activities to prepare for potential impacts on Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) communities. This included scenario planning exercise informed by lessons learned from the Victorian Government's response to COVID-19 in 2020 and the establishment of a cross-agency CALD working group
• addressing gaps in Aboriginal representation in EM arrangements and improved Aboriginal communities' COVID-19 preparedness through the development of Community Action Plans.

Prior to Delta, the State Emergency Management Committee did not update emergency management arrangements to address gaps identified during the 2019–20 Bushfires or 2020 outbreak

Under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act), the SEMC is responsible for the development, monitoring and review of EM policy and practice at a statewide level. This includes the promotion of continuous improvement of EM policy through the consideration of reviews and inquiries.

In the period before Delta, an independent inquiry and a structured scenario exercise identified gaps in New South Wales's emergency management arrangements:

• The 2020 NSW Bushfire Inquiry recommended the SEMC undertake reviews of the State  Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) and functional area arrangements. The reviews were to consider the appropriate resourcing and support model for the SEOC and ensure that functional areas were aligned to the current Machinery of Government arrangements. The NSW Government accepted these recommendations in-principle in August 2020. It published quarterly reports from January 2021 to show progress in meeting the Bushfire Inquiry's recommendations. The SEMC approved the commencement of these reviews in June 2021. The review of the SEOC was completed in November 2021 and the review of the functional area arrangements was completed in early 2022.
• In July 2020, the State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) initiated a planning exercise to test the readiness of EM arrangements and identify planning and capability gaps in the context of four scenarios: public housing high-rise in inner Sydney, postcode lockdown in south west Sydney, lockdown of a regional town, and border closure. The exercise identified several areas for improvement:
  • implementing processes for closer integration between combat agencies, functional areas, local stakeholders and emergency services
  • developing guidelines to support all agencies undertaking shared responsibilities, including the development of a common operating picture relevant to all organisations where statewide implications were apparent.

There is some evidence of the findings and improvements being integrated into preparations for the response to COVID-19. This was particularly the case with communications planning and engagement with CALD communities. However, these improvements were, for the most part, not incorporated into emergency management plans or sufficiently implemented at regional or local levels prior to June 2021.

Additionally, under the arrangements of the SERM Act, Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMC) are responsible to the relevant Regional Emergency Management Committee (REMC), who are then responsible to the SEMC. These arrangements make the SEMC best placed to provide oversight of continuous improvement of EM policy and assess risks to capability, resourcing and readiness at local and regional levels.

The establishment of the Delta Microstrategy improved coordination between NSW Government agencies leading to more effective local responses

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) to better respond to the additional challenges presented by the pandemic, including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. The development of the Microstrategy approach was informed by recent evidence and lessons learned in other jurisdictions (UK, Canada, Victoria), alongside local data-driven insights into how best to support compliance. The Microstrategy was overseen by an Executive Committee (ExCo) co-chaired by the Secretary of NSW Health and the SEOCON (either the Commissioner, or Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Police Force).

The Microstrategy focused on the agile development of targeted responses in high-risk locations and was facilitated by effective partnerships across government agencies, communities and businesses. The Microstrategy leveraged data analytics and insights across several workstreams (also referred to as pillars):

• vaccination
• testing
• enabling compliance with Public Health Orders (PHOs)
• payment support to those impacted by restrictions and not covered by financial support packages
• empowering communities and community organisations
• local businesses
• public service resourcing and mobility
• protecting Aboriginal communities.

There was comprehensive representation from government agencies across Microstrategy workstreams, and multiple connections between Microstrategy workstreams and existing emergency management bodies. Coordination was improved as agency representatives were empowered to share information and make commitments that would be rapidly actioned.

At the ExCo meetings, each workstream reported insights, including the identification of key risks. The Co-Chairs of the Executive Committee (the Health Secretary and the SEOCON) were regular attendees to Crisis Policy Committee (CPC) of Cabinet meetings and, as such, able to provide government with risk information.

Emergency management plans did not enable agencies to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW at the scale required

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency management arrangements to support communities focused on welfare support for people in evacuation facilities as a result of natural disaster. These arrangements were not prepared for the broader scale or sustained duration of the Delta outbreak.

The use of social measures to restrict mobility and reduce transmission has been a key element of the response to COVID-19 since March 2020. These restrictions have an important public health benefit, but also entail a significant impact on businesses, livelihoods and the ability for households to support and care for each other. The NSW Human Influenza Pandemic Plan (HIPP) notes the importance of consideration for the social and economic impacts of these measures which may be disproportionately experienced by vulnerable communities.

Prior to June 2021, other jurisdictions determined that test and isolate payment mechanisms and household support care packages were necessary to support compliance with mobility restrictions. The emergency management plans and pandemic plans in New South Wales did not include pre-prepared models for payments or household care, meaning that it took time for support programs to be designed and implemented. While the Australian Government approved income support for some people on 23 June 2021, there were still significant numbers of people who were excluded from accessing income support due to their visa status. On 16 August 2021, the NSW Government deployed funding for the Test & Isolate Support Payment (TISP), a month after Fairfield was first subject to stricter mobility restrictions as an LGA of concern.

During Delta, the number of people who required food support increased from thousands of individuals mostly located in hotel quarantine to more than ten times that number of people distributed across households in multiple LGAs. Furthermore, previously established delivery arrangements focused on delivery of food support to metropolitan locations and were not immediately fit for purpose for regional New South Wales.

It took time to design and implement a coordinated response for the delivery of food and personal item hampers at the scale needed to support large numbers of people in the community. In south west Sydney, Regional Emergency Operations Centres (REOC) established well-being sub-committees to improve the coordination of logistics, distribution and delivery of food and personal care hampers to households in isolation on 2 August 2021, a fortnight after stricter restrictions on mobility were applied to Fairfield LGA.

The failure to plan meant that local councils in Fairfield and Dubbo met immediate needs by providing food hampers for residents, who were then supported by the NSW Police Force, NSW Health, the Australian Defence Force and other agencies and NGOs.

Overall, the emergency management arrangements supported coordination at the local level and information sharing to effectively identify and manage risk

There was recognition at statewide and local levels that effective communication and support was required for community compliance with Public Health Orders, and that implementing Public Health Orders needed to be more than 'boots on the ground' enforcement. Both the Emergency Management arrangements and the Microstrategy developed approaches centred on supporting communities to comply with Public Health Orders.

The recent use of the emergency management arrangements in the response to the 2019 bushfires, 2020 floods and 2020 response to COVID-19 meant that, at a local and regional level, key personnel involved in emergency responses had developed relationships and trust, which many interviewees advised was critical for an effective and efficient local emergency response.

The emergency management arrangements drove coordination for the implementation of Public Health Orders at the regional and local levels, especially through daily situation reports where all levels shared risks and followed up with updates. This daily connection between the three levels of emergency management (state, regional and local) effectively supported information sharing so that the SEOC had a complete view of issues relating to compliance and support. Furthermore, the DCS, Aboriginal Affairs NSW and Multicultural NSW were represented at the SEOC.

The daily SEOC situation reports included updates from the emergency management functional area coordinators and NSW Government agencies involved in the response. The SEOC provided a broad forum for sharing information including risks across regions and LGAs, and in agencies. This included risks relating to resource management, such as the ongoing logistics of providing supports to communities.

However, the audit identified minor issues regarding clarity of roles which exposed risks impacting on accountability and responsibility for required work: 

• Local council staff responsible for communications in both Dubbo and Fairfield council were not fully aware of the Department of Customer Service's role in coordinating communication to support compliance with Public Health Orders. This issue is heightened by proposed changes to the emergency management arrangements, in particular the recommendation arising from the 2022 Flood Inquiry that the Department of Customer Service be made accountable for the Public Information Functional Area Coordination (PIFAC) role in all emergencies. The proposed change to the leadership of the PIFAC further exposes the risk of less effective relationships between local councils and PIFAC during future emergencies.
• In Dubbo, some emergency management personnel mistakenly believed that NSW Health was the combat agency during Delta. The impact on outcome was minimal because of the effective coordination and leadership of the emergency management response. However, likely updates or revisions to emergency management plans and supporting plans arising from recommendations from recent bushfire and flood inquiries further expose the risk that agency staff may not fully understand emergency management roles and responsibilities.

NSW Health deployed resources to support Western NSW Local Health District

During the audit period, Western NSW Local Health District (WNSWLHD) employed one full-time staff member responsible for ongoing engagement with REMCs, REOCs and LEMCs. WNSWLHD is a geographically large LHD, covering three emergency management regions and 27 LGAs. In August 2021, in response to the outbreak of Delta in Dubbo LGA and concerns regarding the spread of COVID-19 into Aboriginal communities in western New South Wales, NSW Health deployed additional staff to support WNSWLHD’s emergency management capacity. This exposes the risk that in a future emergency event that acutely and simultaneously affects multiple regional LHDs, NSW Health may have insufficient capacity to support LHDs to meet their EM obligations in every REMC and LEMC.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation and up to date evidence and insights, but did not always consider operational impacts or other consequences

Section 7 of the Public Health Act 2010 provides the Minister for Health and Medical Research the ability to make Public Health Orders. However, during the audit period, some changes to Public Health Orders were the result of decisions taken by government, through CPC. The key leadership group for the New South Wales public sector, the Secretaries Board, coordinated the management of the NSW Government response to the pandemic, escalated complex and significant policy matters to the CPC and provided advice on these matters.

The SEOCON, responsible for the coordination of emergency operations during COVID-19, provided government with consultation and feedback arising from the emergency management response. The Chief Health Officer and the Secretary, NSW Health provided public health advice.

In March 2020, NSW Health established the COVID-19 Critical Intelligence Unit to consolidate local and global health data and evidence to support advice intended to inform decision-making. NSW Health also utilised data from other agencies, including the Department of Customer Service and Transport for NSW, to assess the effectiveness of restrictions and model impacts on the health system.

Where advice to government was led by other agencies, for example the Regional NSW led 'Roadmap to Recovery', NSW Health provided advice based on up-to-date evidence including modelling.

The imposition of stricter restrictions in LGAs of concern, which restricted movement into and out of the LGA, significantly impacted key industries including air traffic control, removalists and waste management services. Large proportions of the workforces of these industries live in south west Sydney, but agencies did not always provide advice to decision-makers on the implications of lockdowns in these areas with respect to the potential impact on food security or essential services. The Department of Premier and Cabinet had to make changes to the authorised worker list after Public Health Orders were issued, following feedback from industry or key government stakeholders.

Resilience NSW and the NSW Police Force advised the audit team that they were not always offered the opportunity to provide advice on matters to do with welfare or compliance arising from Public Health Orders. While agency staff noted the challenges of broad consultation during an emergency, they identified specific examples where Public Health Orders were unenforceable or where decisions to restrict movement or implement new COVID-19 testing requirements created avoidable logistical difficulties.

New South Wales could implement lessons from other jurisdictions in providing greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic

Public confidence in government decision-making is essential during times of emergency. The NSW Government held daily media conferences during the audit period which it used to regularly provide important information, such as case numbers, emerging risks and changes to Public Health Orders. On occasion, the NSW Government also publicly released information such as modelling commissioned by the National Cabinet regarding the impact of vaccination on infection rates. 

This audit identified several occasions where the NSW Government did not follow agency advice, or delayed following advice, which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations.

In 2021, the Victorian Government legislated a pandemic framework that requires the public release of advice and reasoning that informed the Premier and the Minister for Health’s decisions in relation to pandemic orders. Similar arrangements exist in the ACT. However, in New South Wales, public health advice is classified as Cabinet sensitive information and not routinely made public.

Transparency and oversight over the use of Public Health Orders, or similar orders issued during other types of emergencies, are fundamental to preserve the public’s trust.

Most agencies have undertaken exercises to capture lessons learned and develop recommendations for ongoing improvement

In the context of the emergency response to COVID-19, and in line with the emergency management arrangements, the following after-action reviews have been completed and collated by the SEOC:

• State Emergency Operations Centre (led by the SEOCON)
• South West Metropolitan Region and Western NSW Regional Emergency Operations Centres
• Fairfield Emergency Management Committee and Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller.

Alongside the SEOCON-led review of the SEOC, undertaken by the NSW Police Force in its role as combat agency, the NSW Police Force completed a separate after-action review to assess its distinct role in supporting compliance and enforcing Public Health Orders.

Pillar 5 of the Microstrategy, which focused on community support and empowerment, including engagement with CALD people, Aboriginal communities and communication strategies, completed an after-action review in December 2021.

South Western Sydney Local Health District conducted a review of its COVID-19 activities during Delta, which included a focus on vaccination.

NSW Health advised it is currently completing a System Response Debrief scheduled for completion in November 2022. At the same time, NSW Health is undertaking a parallel public health-focused Intra-Action Review with finalisation anticipated by end November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

These completed reviews identified several areas for improvement including information sharing, capability, representation of vulnerable communities in emergency management governance, relationships between state and local government, and the ongoing use of innovative practices developed during Delta.

The SEMC Capability & Development sub-committee have a Lessons Management Working Group which is intended to 'collate' after-action reviews and make recommendations where appropriate. However, none of the auditees have identified an intention to undertake a whole-of-government review of the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19, exposing the risk that cross-agency innovations and lessons will not be incorporated into the future emergency management plans.

By June 2023, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. improve transparency and accountability during an emergency by working with relevant agencies and Ministers to publish advice provided to decision-makers when emergency powers or Public Health Orders are used

By June 2023, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) should:

2. capture lessons learned from the new models of cross-government coordination developed during the response to Delta

3. include the Department of Customer Service, Aboriginal Affairs NSW and Multicultural NSW as members of the Committee

4. report on and continuously improve the preparedness of emergency management at local and regional levels including representation of and engagement with local and vulnerable communities

5. monitor risks from proposed changes to the governance arrangements of functional areas, including the impact on local level capability, relationships with local councils and representation of vulnerable communities

By June 2023, the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the SEMC should:

6. work with relevant agencies to develop financial support models suitable for rapid deployment during emergencies

By November 2023, NSW Health should:

7. publicly report on progress addressing recommendations of its COVID-19 Response Debrief.

The New South Wales response to the Delta variant (Delta) of the COVID-19 pandemic between June and November 2021 involved extensive preparation and coordination across and within NSW Government agencies, local councils and non-government organisations (NGOs) on a scale rarely seen.

NSW Health’s role focused on providing clinical services for people infected with COVID-19 and the public health response. This included COVID-19 testing and vaccination services, the collection of epidemiological data, and the provision of public health advice to government and the community.

The NSW Police Force through the State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) led the coordination of the emergency management response while also fulfilling its role with regards to the enforcement of Public Health Orders.

Other government agencies supported NSW Health and the NSW Police Force by focusing on the broader emergency response, which included the:

• logistical support for implementation of testing and vaccination services
• provision of welfare and well-being services to support compliance with Public Health Orders
• communication and engagement with affected communities and the general public
• delivery of income and food support to people required to isolate and quarantine.

The response to the Delta variant represented six months of heightened challenges, and the response to COVID-19 is ongoing, with New South Wales now in its third year of pandemic management. It is also important to acknowledge that New South Wales experienced significant bushfire and flooding events in the months immediately prior to the emergence of COVID-19 in Australia and flooding events during 2021–22. A timeline of key events is included in Appendix two.

In August 2022, the NSW Government released the Independent Report of the NSW Floods Inquiry. Some of the recommendations in the Independent Report relate to the functional areas, agencies and emergency management arrangements discussed in this report.

This section provides context to the arrangements that supported the coordination of the response across NSW Government agencies. In providing this context, this section describes the:

• roles and responsibilities of entities involved
• legislative context
• planning framework
• governance arrangements.

This audit included five auditees:

• Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC)
• NSW Health
• NSW Police Force
• Resilience NSW
• Department of Customer Service (DCS).

Stakeholders who have supported this audit included:

• Multicultural NSW
• Aboriginal Affairs NSW (part of the Community Engagement Group of DPC)
• Fairfield City Council
• Dubbo Regional Council.

Each of the auditees and stakeholders played specific roles in supporting and coordinating the response to COVID-19 as shown at Exhibit 1:

The arrangements to support and enable coordination of the response were supported by three pieces of legislation. The legislative arrangements were used to coordinate the response to COVID-19 from the first outbreak in March 2020 through to December 2021. The enactments:

• describe the emergency management planning frameworks, governance and oversight, and the structures for use in any emergency in New South Wales
• provide the powers to the Minister for Health and Medical Research to make orders to support the public health response
• enable further powers to the Minister for Health and Medical Research to address matters relating to COVID-19.

The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) established the emergency management arrangements in New South Wales including:

• coordinating arrangements at statewide and regional levels
• the development and operations of the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN).

Administration of the SERM Act sits with the Minister for Emergency Services and Resilience and Minister for Regional NSW since December 2021. During the period in the scope of this audit, the SERM Act sat with the Minister for Police and Emergency Services.

The Public Health Act 2010 has a number of objectives. Of relevance to this audit are objectives to:

• promote the control of, and prevent spread of, infectious diseases
• monitor diseases and conditions affecting public health.

The Public Health Act 2010 empowers the Minister for Health to issue Public Health Orders if a situation has arisen that is, or is likely to be, a risk to public health, to deal with the risk and its possible consequences.

The Public Health Act 2010 allows for the order to ‘declare any part of the State to be a public health risk area and… to reduce or remove any risk to public health in the area, to segregate or isolate inhabitants of the area, and… prevent, or conditionally permit, access to the area’. The Public Health Act 2010 also recognises the role of local government in protecting public health.

The COVID-19 Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures) Act 2020 No 1 (COVID-19 Act No 1) provided emergency powers for the use of Public Health Orders to manage the response to the pandemic. This included temporarily amending sections in the Public Health Act relating to the duration of Public Health Orders, restrictions of the ability to appeal Public Health Order decisions to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) and providing police powers such as arrest, directions to take name and address, and penalty notices.

The SERM Act articulates an emergency planning framework to govern and guide the operational aspects of the response. The framework includes the requirement for local, regional and statewide plans for emergencies for all hazards.

The SERM Act requires a State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN). The objectives of the EMPLAN are to:

a) provide clarity as to command and control, roles and coordination of functions in emergency management across all levels
b) emphasise risk management across the full spectrum of prevention, preparation, response and recovery
c) emphasise community engagement in the development and exercise of plans as well as in their operational employment
d) ensure that the capability and resourcing requirements of these responsibilities are understood.

EMPLAN is a broad plan, intended for application across all hazards, but it provides for hazard-specific sub-plans and functional area supporting plans. Of particular relevance to this audit are: 

• Health Services Functional Area Supporting Plan (HEALTHPLAN) which details the role of a Health Services Functional Area Coordinator who is responsible for establishing a State Health Emergency Operations Centre
• Public Health Services Supporting Plan to HEALTHPLAN which articulates the public health emergency management arrangements in support of HEALTHPLAN and the effective coordination of public health resources during an emergency response
• NSW Human Influenza Pandemic Plan (HIPP) which provides guidance to agencies on how to effectively prepare for, and respond to, an influenza pandemic. The plan is intended to be flexible enough to provide guidance on the response to a large outbreak of any highly transmissible respiratory pathogen with a significant morbidity and mortality. NSW Health also reported it used a nationally developed plan (the Communicable Disease Network of Australia Series of National Guidelines) for public health measures. This was also developed and refined over the two years and remains operational to date.

Other mechanisms outside of the standard emergency management arrangements were used to support the response. This included:

• NSW Health established a Strategic Project Management Office (PMO) in March 2020 to support the Secretary of NSW Health lead a health system-wide response
• The Department of Premier and Cabinet established and led a taskforce in April 2020 to coordinate the non-health responses to the first wave of COVID-19 (which included workstreams for economic impacts, industry, social services, disability services, support for people experiencing hardship, Aboriginal communities and employee relations)
• The NSW Government established the Delta Microstrategy in July 2021.

Exhibit 2 depicts the governance bodies that were used to coordinate and/or support coordination of the response at strategic and tactical levels.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the COVID-19 response in selected LGAs (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

• government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
• agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to this period.

While this audit does not specifically assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support, it does make reference to the preparedness and planning of these activities in the context of the broader coordinated response. This audit complements our performance audit on the New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine roll-out, which was tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022.

For further detail on our audit procedures see Appendix 3.

Between March 2020 and June 2021, NSW Government agencies refined and developed their responses to COVID-19

During the period March 2020 to June 2021, NSW Government agencies adapted and refined their approaches to meet the evolving challenges presented by COVID-19 and the imposition of restrictions on community movement and gatherings. Key developments included:

• Resilience NSW expanded the remit of the welfare service functional area to include the provision of food and grocery support for those in quarantine and hampers to those in home isolation. Prior to COVID-19, welfare services functional area responses largely focused on supporting people displaced by emergencies, such as those in evacuation centres
• the Department of Customer Service developed COVID-19-related whole-of-government communications mechanisms to support coordinated messaging, including the assessment of community sentiment and use of data to develop behaviourally-focused engagement plans. In April 2020, the Department of Customer Service also established a cross-government communications group that met regularly and has continued to meet through other emergencies such as the 2022 floods
• NSW Police Force and NSW Health Local Health Districts (LHD) enhanced community engagement with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) communities
• NSW Health established the COVID-19 Critical Intelligence Unit to consolidate local and global health data and evidence to inform decision-making
• NSW Health increased surge capacity in the health system, including intensive care unit capacity and response framework with a focus on dramatic increase (quadrupling in 2020) in capacity and providing guidelines and strategies to support this process
• NSW Health established a system flow centre to manage health system capacity and coordinate patient flow
• NSW Police Force's Police Operations Centre (POC) evolved to provide a coordinating function across area commands, in particular supporting operations relating to hotel quarantine, border control, and the coordinated enforcement of Public Health Orders
• the Public Service Commission convened regular meetings of Chief People Officers (CPOs) across the NSW Public Service throughout the pandemic. The meetings provided a forum for public sector workforce related information to be shared across NSW Government agencies, including changes to Public Health Orders as well as emerging risks.

Other changes were initiated that were in place before Delta to improve preparedness. This included:

• physical co-location of NSW Health and the NSW Police Force in the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) with remote attendance from functional areas, emergency services and other agencies
• provision of additional resources to the Public Information Function Area Coordinator (PIFAC) function which led to the use of a PIFAC in the South West Metropolitan Regional Emergency Operations Centre (REOC) in the early phases of the response to Delta
• changes to the Welfare Services Functional Area Coordinator (WelFAC) function to deal with the requirements of providing hampers to people directly rather than previous practice where the focus of support was on evacuation centres.

Agencies included planning and engagement activities to prepare for potential impacts on CALD communities

Plans for pandemics highlight the need to protect vulnerable communities in the two LGAs which are the focus of this audit. Fairfield City Council has a high proportion of CALD residents, with 61.4% of the population born outside of Australia. 79.4% of households use a language other than English.

A range of planning work took place that was either ‘business as usual’ or specially implemented during the 2020 pandemic to focus on vulnerable communities. This work included:

• identifying and developing key relationships and drivers of community behaviour, including experience from previous infectious disease outbreaks
• establishment of a cross-agency CALD working group which included representatives from the Department of Customer Service, Multicultural NSW, NSW Health (Multicultural Health and Communication Service, Ministry of Health, South Western Sydney Local Health District) and the NSW Police Force. The working group met weekly to share information and community insights, and provide updates on the activity each agency was undertaking at statewide and local levels
• preparatory work in understanding the lessons learned from Victoria's mid-2020 COVID-19 experience, in particular the prevention and management of COVID-19 in CALD communities. This was later used in the development of a CALD Operating Model 
• scenario planning and other preparations for at-risk communities led by the Department of Customer Service in the lead up to the Delta outbreak. As a result, the Department of Customer Service developed an escalation matrix that provided guidance for messaging, outlets and volumes according to the level of risk
• Fairfield City Council developed a Mayoral Register which contained the details of vulnerable and at-risk residents and assisted in identifying people in need of food or grocery hampers. This included people aged over 65 and people who lived by themselves. 

Following the findings of the 2020 Bushfire Inquiry, Aboriginal Affairs NSW became more involved in emergency management

The 2020 Bushfire Inquiry found that 'Aboriginal communities should be included in emergency planning and preparation to form good working relationships ahead of a disaster occurring, and ensure processes incorporate the needs of Aboriginal communities' and made recommendations to this effect. During the pre-Delta period, Aboriginal Affairs NSW worked with the State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) to address:

• gaps in Aboriginal representation in emergency management arrangements and develop effective 'on the ground' local-level arrangements with relevant stakeholders such as councils and other community organisations
• the need for coordinated communication to Aboriginal communities around health emergencies
• local level community ownership for pandemic responses through the development of Community Action Plans (CAP). These plans supported communities to control their responses to the pandemic. The CAPs provided actions that could be used when the pandemic reached certain thresholds. The CAPs were used as early as April 2020 and during the Delta outbreak were used as an engagement and reporting mechanism for regional and local emergency management bodies.

Aboriginal Affairs NSW also established a COVID-19 Aboriginal Community Response Group, chaired by the Executive Director of Aboriginal Affairs NSW. The group included representation from:

• the NSW Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council
• NSW Health's Centre for Aboriginal Health
• peak Aboriginal organisations such as the NSW Aboriginal Land Council
• the NSW Coalition of Aboriginal Peak Organisations 
• representatives from NSW Government agencies with frontline engagement with Aboriginal customers, including the Department of Customer Service.

The Group worked as a forum to discuss government messaging for Aboriginal people, bringing together insights collected from data and Aboriginal communities to tailor messaging for local needs.

Prior to June 2021, agencies did not adequately address all issues raised during the 2020 Bushfire Inquiry or as a result of a July 2020 planning exercise

The 2019 bushfires, scenario tests and exercises conducted in 2020 and early 2021, and experiences from other jurisdictions provided opportunities for NSW Government agencies to observe, reorient and prepare for the events that transpired after June 2021.

However, implementation of some recommendations was delayed or not instituted.

New South Wales Bushfire Inquiry (2020)

The final report of the New South Wales Bushfire Inquiry recommended reviews of the SEOC and functional areas. These recommendations were accepted in principle by the NSW Government in August 2020.

The reviews were intended to consider the appropriate resourcing and support model for the SEOC and ensure that functional areas were aligned to the current Machinery of Government arrangements. 

The report made recommendations relating to the emergency management arrangements including:

• a review of the SEOC’s current arrangements, location and responsibilities for resourcing and maintenance
• a review of existing functional area arrangements to ensure alignment with agencies responsible for direct service delivery
• arrangements for greater co-location of partner agencies 
• enhancing the Public Information Functional Area by expanding the pool of trained personnel across agencies involved in the emergency response
• improvements in the scaling up of evacuation arrangements which were applicable to provision of welfare and well-being services.

In June 2021, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) approved the commencement of reviews of the SEOC and functional areas. The original completion date for both reviews was September 2021, however due to Delta, completion of these reviews was delayed.

• The review of SEOC arrangements was completed in late November 2021 and presented to the December 2021 SEMC meeting.
• The review of functional areas was completed in early 2022. Due to the impact of operational activity in early 2022, it was presented to and endorsed at the June 2022 SEMC meeting instead of the March 2022 meeting.

Such reviews were an opportunity to improve arrangements based on lessons from the last significant disaster. The opportunity cost of this delay was the ability to reorient and adapt before Delta emerged. Resilience NSW noted that the necessary resources required to address the recommendations of the Bushfire Inquiry were the same resources that participated in emergency operations between October 2019 and November 2021.

In its August 2022 report, the Select Committee on the Response to Major Flooding across New South Wales recommended that the NSW Government ensure that all emergency and recovery plans, including state plans, local emergency management plans and functional area plans, are reviewed and updated regularly.

Whole-of-government COVID-19 Scenario Exercise (20 – 31 July 2020)

In July 2020, a scenario planning exercise identified gaps in emergency management arrangements. The exercise was initiated by the SEOCON and run at the regional emergency management level. These gaps were, for the most part, not incorporated in emergency management plans and with the few improvements discussed below:

The exercises involved a desktop/discussion environment with selected emergency management regions testing the readiness of their communities to identify planning and capability gaps.

The four scenarios were:

• public housing high-rise block lockdown in the Sydney LGA
• postcode lockdown in south west Sydney
• lockdown of a regional part of New South Wales (Wagga)
• border closure between ACT and New South Wales.

Insights and lessons from these exercises included:

• the need for close integration between combat agencies, functional areas, local stakeholders and emergency services
• the need for guidelines to support all agencies undertaking shared responsibilities
• the development of a common operating picture relevant to all organisations where statewide implications were apparent.

The exercise also highlighted the importance of information and communications management. The public housing scenario reinforced, for CALD groups, the importance of mixed methods of communication, including in-person, printed leaflets, online and phone communication, alongside the translation of messages into relevant languages. Exercise participants suggested embedding liaison officers into the Public Information Functional Area to better connect local networks and ‘pre-existing communication pathways’. The Department of Customer Service was also involved in this exercise.

The regional New South Wales lockdown scenario identified that residents, businesses and communities in the adjacent and more distant areas would be significantly affected by a lockdown. As it happens, this was seen when metropolitan LGAs were subject to greater restrictions which impacted supply chains and industries such as waste management and air traffic control.

There is some evidence of the findings and improvements being integrated into preparations for the response. This was particularly the case with communications planning and engagement with CALD communities.

There were a few improvements that resulted:

• An overview of roles and responsibilities in South West Metropolitan emergency operations region was created to provide a common operating picture. However, this did not include the required level of detail to support agencies delivering shared responsibilities which was a recommendation from the exercise.
• A regional PIFAC was set up in the South West Metropolitan REOC. This improvement was aligned to findings on communications with CALD communities.

Resilience NSW stated that the work from the SEOC scenario needed to be considered in the context of tactical agency implementation of broader EM arrangements. It was not a matter of updating formal EM arrangements as covered in the EMPLAN.

Regardless of who was accountable for these changes, the opportunities to improve emergency management arrangements identified in this exercise were not addressed. The scenarios anticipated some events that occurred in the Delta outbreak such as strict restrictions on movement, the spread of COVID-19 into regional areas and impacts on CALD communities. Despite this, the opportunity to increase preparedness for Delta was not fully taken.

Agencies did not update emergency and supporting plans to reflect insights from lessons learned in the pre-Delta period

Under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act), the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) is responsible for the review, monitoring and development of emergency management policy and practice at a statewide level.

This includes the promotion of continuous improvement of emergency management policy through the consideration of reviews and inquiries. However, the various emergency management plans were not updated after the first emergence of COVID-19 in early 2020.

The most recent revisions for key emergency management plans are:

• NSW State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN): December 2018
• Health Services Functional Area Plan (HEALTHPLAN): December 2013
• NSW Human Influenza Pandemic Plan (HIPP): June 2018
• NSW Health Human Influenza Pandemic Plan: May 2016 (next revision May 2023)
• NSW Public Health Services Supporting Plan to HEALTHPLAN: January 2015
• Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan: December 2019
• Welfare Services Functional Area Supporting Plan: June 2018 with a COVID-19 focused Evacuation Management Guideline issued in August 2020. 

Resilience NSW notes that some of the above plans require review after five years. Since the last EMPLAN update, there have been major bushfires, floods and a long-duration pandemic. A fixed period of five years may be too long to reflect the lessons and challenges faced that occur in the intervening period.

Throughout COVID-19, agencies updated operational plans and guidelines

In the absence of updates to high-level emergency management plans and supporting plans, which support the coordinated management of emergency responses, there is evidence of continual update to operational plans owned by key agencies. For the most part, these updates were specific to key tasks under the control and direction of a single agency. NSW Health updated operational plans including surge planning for public health responses including Test, Trace, Isolate and Quarantine, and vaccination.

NSW Health continuously updated the Communicable Disease Network Australia National Guidelines for Public Health Units. Other parts of NSW Health also updated operating procedures and response plans for clinics and intensive care units including the flow of operations between the Ministry of Health and Local Health Districts.

The NSW Police Force undertook similar updates to plans at an operational level including development of concepts of operations and updates to standard operating procedures for undertaking compliance checks of households with positive cases.

Examples of cross-agency plans including incident action plans for responses in specific settings, such as social housing. 

Section 7 of the Public Health Act (2010) provides the responsible Minister (in this instance, the Minister of Health and Medical Research) the ability to make Orders as considered necessary to deal with a risk to public health (Public Health Order). Although all Public Health Orders are directions of the Minister for Health and Medical Research, some changes to Public Health Orders were the result of decisions taken in Crisis Policy Committee (CPC) meetings.

Where possible, agencies provided feedback on advice to government in relation to the Public Health Orders

Between the period 16 June to 23 July, NSW Health provided public health and health system focused advice on a daily basis. There is evidence demonstrating that NSW Health provided detailed documentary evidence to some of these deliberations with government. Additionally, the State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON), either the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Police Force, the Chief Health Officer and the Secretary, NSW Health were frequent attendees at CPC meetings. These officers provided verbal advice on issues raised at these meetings.

The secretaries board met five times per week from 26 July 2021. The audit team was advised that these meetings provided opportunity for cluster secretaries to discuss potential changes to Public Health Orders and consider the broader operational impacts of proposed orders. The audit team was advised that there were no minutes kept of these particular meetings.

NSW Health consulted with other agencies and jurisdictions in developing advice. This included consultation with Victorian and Australian Government counterparts with regards to the decision to pause the construction industry on 17 July 2021. NSW Health also consulted with Infrastructure NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet before this decision. Other changes to the Public Health Orders were the result of decisions made by the Minister for Health and Medical Research (without formal endorsement of Cabinet, which was not required). NSW Health advised that it provided feedback on any changes recommended directly to the Minister for Health and Medical Research that originated from outside NSW Health.

Resilience NSW and the NSW Police Force advised the audit team that they were not always offered the opportunity to provide advice on matters to do with welfare or compliance arising from Public Health Orders. While agency staff noted the challenges of broad consultation during an emergency, they identified specific examples where Public Health Orders were unenforceable or where decisions to restrict movement or implement new COVID-19 testing requirements created avoidable logistical difficulties.

Public health advice to government was supported by up to date evidence, and supplemented by information and insights provided by other agencies and jurisdictions

In March 2020, NSW Health established the COVID-19 Critical Intelligence Unit to consolidate local and global health data and evidence to support advice intended to inform decision-making. NSW Health also utilised data from other agencies, including the Department of Customer Service and Transport for NSW, to assess the effectiveness of restrictions and model impacts on the health system. Health collected data from a variety of sources in the evidence provided to decision-makers.

These data include:

• case numbers over time and by locality
• growth trends
• impact of Public Health Orders on mobility
• epidemiological modelling to predict numbers (including external modelling such as the Burnet Institute)
• other modelling to show impacts on the health system, including ICU and testing capacity 
• vaccination rates.

Since 2020, the Department of Customer Service collected data regarding public sentiment and trust in government decision-making relating to the New South Wales response to COVID-19. This data was shared with NSW Health and included sentiment data on:

• the fairness of stay-at-home restrictions in different LGAs
• attitudes towards vaccination (which showed a growth in likelihood of vaccination between the fortnight leading to 2 August 2021 and the fortnight leading to 16 August 2021
• behavioural drivers and attitudes across different community segments.

Additionally, NSW Health consulted with other agencies and jurisdictions when it provided advice to decision-makers. This included consultation with Victorian and Australian Government counterparts.

NSW Health tracked risks relating to emerging variants of concern

Before 6 June 2021, NSW Health was aware that Delta was significantly more infectious than predecessor variants. NSW Health identified the risk that due to the local levels of vaccination, community transmission was unlikely to be controlled with Test, Trace, Isolate and Quarantine alone, and social measures such as mask wearing and density restrictions in public places would be required.

The NSW Government did not always act on advice

Public confidence in government decision-making is essential during times of emergency. The NSW Government held daily media conferences during the audit period which it used to regularly provide important information, such as case numbers, emerging risks and changes to Public Health Orders. On occasion, the NSW Government also publicly released information such as modelling commissioned by National Cabinet regarding the impact of vaccination on infection rates.

This audit identified several occasions where there were delays in decision-making by government after receiving advice from agencies. We have not detailed these instances due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations.

In 2021, the Victorian Government legislated a pandemic framework that requires the public release of advice and reasoning that informed the Premier and the Minister for Health’s decisions in relation to pandemic orders. Similar arrangements exist in the Australian Capital Territory. However, in New South Wales, public health advice is classified as Cabinet sensitive information and not routinely made public.

Transparency and oversight over the use of Public Health Orders, or similar orders issued during other types of emergencies, are fundamental to preserve the public’s trust.

Advice to decision-makers did not always contain information on potential operational impacts or advice on strategies to manage potential consequences

The imposition orders which significantly restricted movement into and out of LGAs of concern impacted key industries including air traffic control, removalists and waste management services. Large proportions of the workforces of these industries live in south west Sydney, but advice to decision-makers did not provide details on the potential consequences to industries and broader impacts on issues, such as food security and transportation, that a Public Health Order might cause. As a result, the Department of Premier and Cabinet had to make changes to the authorised worker list after Public Health Orders were issued, following feedback from industry or key government stakeholders.

Emergency management plans do not require consideration of such impacts, including preparation of alternative mechanisms to address gaps. As a result, agencies sometimes had to reactively problem solve issues caused by these impacts.

On 17 July 2021, the Public Service Commission provided the Department of Premier and Cabinet with public sector workforce profile data. The data included analysis of the impact of restrictions on New South Wales public sector employees who resided and/or worked in LGAs of concern and potential impacts to government services.

Agencies were not provided enough time to prepare for the NSW Government’s decision to implement mandatory testing in Fairfield

On 14 July, the Minister for Health and Medical Research issued a Public Health Order which imposed a requirement for mandatory testing for authorised workers in LGAs of concern who had to leave their LGA in order to work. This requirement increased demand on COVID-19 testing capacity. NSW Health tracked turnaround time results for PCR testing and the impact of applying similar requirements to other LGAs.

On 18 July, four days after issuing a mandatory testing requirement in Fairfield, NSW Health advised the NSW Government that extending the requirement to other LGAs of concern may exceed likely testing capability and recommended that alternatives such as Rapid Antigen Testing (RAT) be used. NSW Health had already commenced pilots on the use of RAT in schools and employment settings. This analysis helped to align the demand created by the mandatory testing requirement with the PCR testing capacity available.

The NSW Government’s announcement to impose mandatory testing in Fairfield was made without providing prior notice to the LEMC, functional areas, the NSW Police Force and council. Although provision had been made for testing facilities to be in place, insufficient notification was provided to enable traffic management and flow solutions to cope with the demand. This led to delays for those seeking to comply with Public Health Orders and caused frustration for those involved in local emergency management and the broader community.

Data sharing and quality issues disrupted the coordination of compliance activities in Fairfield and Dubbo and impacted communities

During Delta, the NSW Police Force (sometimes supported by the Australian Defence Force) conducted compliance activities, including door-checks to ensure that people were complying with isolation or quarantine requirements.

NSW Health developed the protocols and requirements by which data was shared with the NSW Police Force. This included transfer of daily list of cases and close contacts to the NSW Police Force for compliance and welfare checks. Other pathways included direct contact and/or further provision of intelligence to the NSW Police Force regarding areas for compliance activities. NSW Health also stated that, in the local health districts, senior NSW Police Force personnel would also discuss case and situation management with health personnel directly. This data was then used in the NSW Police Force’s People Management System (PMS) to manage quarantine operations.

During interviews, senior officers in the NSW Police Force identified issues with the timeliness and accuracy of some of the information provided by NSW Health. This resulted in compliance checks at the incorrect addresses, delays in tracking positive cases with addresses that were out of date, and checking households where cases had been hospitalised, moved to secure health accommodation, passed away or whose isolation period had concluded. There were issues with the timeliness of case data from testing providers that was acknowledged by the NSW Police Force as a factor outside the control of NSW Health.

These issues were also raised in an after-action review by the Fairfield LEMC. These issues persisted into August and September 2021. It was raised in an after-action review by the Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), and a separate issue regionally where the Western NSW Regional Emergency Operations Centre (REOC) used data analysts from the NSW Police Force and NSW Health to address the need for validation of the accuracy of addresses.

The existing emergency management plans did not enable agencies to respond immediately to the scale of Delta and support large populations in high-risk LGAs

The recent use of the emergency management arrangements in the response to the 2019 bushfires, 2020 floods and 2020 response to COVID-19 meant that, at a local and regional level, key personnel involved in emergency responses had developed relationships and trust. Many of the people interviewed as part of this audit advised that these relationships were critical for an effective and efficient local emergency response. There was recognition at statewide and local levels that effective communication and support was required for community compliance with Public Health Orders, and that implementing Public Health Orders needed to be more than 'boots on the ground' enforcement.

However, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency management arrangements to support communities focused on welfare support for people in evacuation facilities as a result of natural disasters. These arrangements were not prepared for the broader scale or sustained duration of the Delta outbreak.

The use of social measures to restrict mobility and reduce transmission has been a key element of the response to COVID-19 since March 2020. These restrictions have an important public health benefit, but also entail a significant impact on businesses, livelihoods and the ability for households to support and care for each other. The NSW Human Influenza Pandemic Plan notes the importance of consideration for the social and economic impacts of these measures which may be disproportionately experienced by vulnerable communities.

There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and business impacted by such restrictions. This includes information from agencies associated with the welfare services functional area about funding arrangements for councils and non-government organisations (NGOs) and charities impacting their service provision continuity. These gaps impacted the preparedness for Delta. Examples of such gaps are income support and food security.

Financial support

Rapid and targeted financial/income support was needed for some people required to isolate due to the requirements of Public Health Orders. This included people who had tested positive to COVID-19 as well as those classified as a close contact, and people waiting for COVID-19 testing results. Income support was beyond the scope of the funding provided by the Australian Government because of eligibility requirements for those holding visas that did not permit working. During the outbreak of mid to late 2020 in Victoria, the Victorian Government implemented a support payment for to support compliance with health orders.

The emergency management arrangements and pandemic plans did not include provision for such payments. While payments from the Australian Government were in place from 23 June 2021, there were still gaps in income support arrangements for some people, particularly people ineligible for Australian Government income support due to visa status.

The Test & Isolate Support Payment (TISP) commenced on 16 August 2021, a month after the LGAs of Fairfield, Liverpool and Canterbury-Bankstown were subject to additional restrictions and requirements to test. The Department of Premier and Cabinet notes that other payments may have been made by agencies before TISP was approved.

In its August 2022 report, the Select Committee on the Response to Major Flooding across New South Wales in 2022 found that the processes surrounding financial grants and support programs following the February to March 2022 floods were confusing and cumbersome for applicants. This often prevented assistance reaching people in a timely manner. The committee recommended that the NSW Government overhaul the way in which it conducts its grant process during emergency events.

Food Security

Emergency management plans did not include provisions for food and other grocery support for households placed in isolation during the Delta outbreak. Prior to COVID-19, the Welfare Services Functional Area Coordinator (WelFAC's) main role focused on providing support in settings such as evacuations centres. In the absence of such plans, councils and NGOs needed to seek information on available support services and funding. Fairfield City Council advised the audit team that there were sometimes delays in getting responses from NSW Government agencies, particularly during the early weeks of Delta.

Furthermore, previously established delivery arrangements focused on delivery of food support to metropolitan locations and were not immediately fit for purpose for regional New South Wales.

At the same time, traditional providers of support, such as NGOs and charities, moved to remote operations which left few offices staffed. Some NGOs, including many that provided food, relied on volunteers and donations to provide services. One stakeholder stated that during this time such ‘services largely collapsed.’ The restrictions impacted food transportation arrangements, which created additional challenges for NGOs who also reported a lack of supply to create food hampers.

It took time for the implementation of a more coordinated response to be delivered at the scale needed to support these communities. On 23 July 2021, a grant program to support community groups was approved. REOCs established well-being sub-committees to provide a more coordinated approach to the logistics, distribution and delivery of food and personal care hampers to households in isolation. This did not occur until 2 August in south west Sydney.

The lack of planning also meant that the early stages of the response required an ad hoc approach. Local councils met immediate needs by preparing meals in council owned facilities, such as childcare centres, and providing these meals to residents in need. Later in the Delta wave, councils coordinated the delivery of food hampers for some residents. Different levels of capability and capacity in parts of regional New South Wales also meant that councils, such as Dubbo Regional Council, played roles as pre-staging areas for broader parts of the State while supporting its own impacted communities.

The Department of Customer Service led the development of strategic communications at the state, regional and community levels

Staff from the Department of Customer Service described its role in the pandemic as the owner of strategic communications – the provision of information to the public regarding changes to Public Health Orders. This included the creation and dissemination of messages to encourage the community to engage in specific actions (such as getting tested, staying at home and getting vaccinated) to halt the spread of COVID-19.

Other agencies assisted with communications assets for public use. the Department of Premier and Cabinet assisted with the creation of social media content for distribution by members of Parliament and assisted with translations.

During the development of communication materials, NSW Health provided input to ensure messages accurately reflected health advice. NSW Health also translated health information into key community languages. The NSW Health Facebook channel was one of the more frequented resources of public information regarding COVID-19.

Stakeholders in a range of agencies based in Fairfield highlighted the importance of translated material that dealt with cultural context and issues affecting attitudes to vaccination.

At the strategic level, translated communication activity had been occurring before the Delta outbreak and in the early stages of the outbreak:

• from April 2020, communications translated into 17 languages across a range of media channels
• a partnership with SBS led to live reads from 29 June 2021 (initially in 19 languages) and live interpreting of the daily 11am press conference (from 23 July initially in 10 languages)
• community radio segments from 11 July 2021 (initially in 11 languages)
• weekly multicultural media forums commenced on 14 July 2021 with up to 100 outlets/stakeholders in attendance.

The emergency management arrangements led the coordination of tactical and operational communications

As part of the emergency management arrangements, the Public Information Functional Area Coordinator (PIFAC) is responsible to the SEOCON for the coordination of the government’s public information response between the different NSW Government agencies during natural disasters and other crises. Under the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN), the SEOCON may direct the PIFAC to assist with, or coordinate public information, where the impact of the emergency goes beyond the responsibility of the responding agency, or where there is a requirement for a significant and co-ordinated multi-agency approach to public information. The EMPLAN notes that it is the responsibility of all involved agencies to ensure that the information they intend to release is not in conflict with messages being generated by the PIFAC.

The PIFAC for the COVID-19 response was established in March 2020, a role which remained active until December 2021. The PIFAC brought together media officers from across NSW Government agencies (including the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW, Transport and the Department of Customer Service). During Delta, there was a PIFAC operating in the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC).

On 18 July 2021, the South West Metropolitan Regional Emergency Operations Controller (REOCON) activated the Regional Emergency Operations Centre (REOC) to respond to the Delta variant in south west Sydney. As part of the establishment of the South West Metropolitan REOC, the REOCON engaged an additional regional level PIFAC to support the regional level response. This additional PIFAC resource operated out of the REOC.

The Department of Customer Service worked with PIFAC and NSW Health to ensure that strategic communications aligned with approved messaging. This arrangement continued after the establishment of the Delta Microstrategy.

The emergency management response did not always coordinate local level communication

There is evidence of different agencies and organisations undertaking their own local communications. In some areas, councils used NSW Government social media assets provided by NSW Health and the NSW Police Force which were originally created by the Department of Customer Service. Neither Dubbo Regional Council nor Fairfield City Council were aware of the Department of Customer Service's role in the creation of this type of content.

Further, Dubbo Regional Council’s media team developed its own communications without similar coordination or support from NSW Government agencies. The audit team was advised that similar issues existed in Fairfield, where Fairfield City Council sometimes developed communications and messaging independent of the broader emergency response.

Regardless of the origin of the messaging, Dubbo Regional Council highlighted the importance of using local feedback to adapt and tailor centralised messaging. Further to this point, Dubbo Regional Council noted that material sent to councils was not specific enough to answer local communities' questions. Dubbo Regional Council noted that the PIFAC needed to be able to empower local application of the statewide messaging.

Agency staff and stakeholders also advised the audit team of instances where local elected representatives distributed messages that provided conflicting information to that issued by the PIFAC. During a pandemic, conflicting communication exposes the risk that the community may lose trust in essential communications from government sources.

While local councils are represented on LEMCs, there is no requirement for local government representation at the regional level. Further, the Public Information Services Functional Area Plan (a supporting plan of the EMPLAN) notes that while

…all agencies involved in an emergency response may release ‘agency specific information’ without reference to the PIFAC, it is the responsibility of all involved agencies to ensure that the information they … release is not in conflict with … the PIFAC.

Agencies incorporated lessons learned about how best to communicate with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) communities

Staff from the Department of Customer Service and Multicultural NSW considered lessons learned from the 2020–21 Victorian pandemic with regards communicating with CALD populations. This was incorporated into a new CALD Communications Operating Model that was approved on 25 July 2021. However, there was other activity used in the development of communications to CALD communities much of which had commenced in the earlier phases of COVID-19.

For example, a weekly cross-agency CALD working group was established and included the Department of Customer Service, the NSW Police Force, Multicultural NSW and NSW Health. The objective of the group was to share information and community insights, and provide updates on the activity each agency was undertaking.

South Western Sydney Local Health District established an advisory group that included representation from Fairfield City Council for the provision of up-to-date information to local stakeholders.

There was also a focus on media for CALD communities that included:

• advertising for CALD audiences in south west Sydney
• updated advertisements in-language for CALD including masks on social media
• animation series for CALD social adapted from Victoria (27 June to 4 September 2021) 
• live reads in 60 languages on all SBS in-language radio stations (29 June to 12 August 2021)
• live reads in 11 languages on community radio stations starts (11 July to 2 October 2021)
• daily live interpreting of 11am press conference starts (23 July to 8 October 2021) 
• use of statements in seven languages in Woolworths stores in the Fairfield, Canterbury-Bankstown, Liverpool, Cumberland, Blacktown, Parramatta, Campbelltown and Georges River LGAs.

The Delta Microstrategy complemented the existing agency and emergency management arrangements to enhance local responses and support in high-risk LGAs

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) to better respond to the additional challenges presented by the pandemic including the need to support communities most affected by restrictions to movement and gathering in the Local Government Areas (LGA) of concern. The development of the Microstrategy approach was informed by recent evidence and lessons learned in other jurisdictions (UK, Canada, Victoria), alongside local data-driven insights into how best to support compliance. The Microstrategy was overseen by an Executive Committee (ExCo) co-chaired by the Secretary, NSW Health and the State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) (either the Commissioner, or Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Police Force). The first meeting of the Microstrategy Executive Committee was held on 26 July 2021.

The Microstrategy focused on the agile development of targeted responses in high-risk locations and was facilitated by partnerships across government agencies, communities and businesses. There was comprehensive representation from government agencies across Microstrategy workstreams, and multiple connections between Microstrategy workstreams and existing emergency management bodies. Agencies ensured that they provided representation while maintaining their own internal communication. This enabled effective coordination by allowing agency representatives in inter-agency groups to share information about activities and make commitments that were actioned.

The Co-Chairs of the Executive Committee were regular attendees at the Crisis Policy Committee (CPC) and, as such, able to provide government with information reflecting all aspects of the response.

The Microstrategy leveraged data analytics and insights to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations (such as LGAs of concern) across several workstreams: 

• vaccination
• testing
• enabling compliance with Public Health Orders
• payment support to those impacted by restrictions and not covered by financial support packages
• empowering communities and community organisations
• local businesses • public service resourcing and mobility
• protecting Aboriginal communities.

The Microstrategy utilised a range of data sources across the health system and from the Department of Customer Service and the NSW Data Analytics Centre to predict/anticipate future areas of concern. The Department of Customer Service provided data on communications and analysis of community sentiment towards vaccination, testing and compliance with Public Health Order restrictions. The Department of Customer Service, through the NSW Data Analytics Centre, provided sources of data on mobility to NSW Health, which was shared with decision-makers. As part of the Microstrategy, the Department of Customer Service worked with Health and Multicultural NSW to provide community-specific insights through the use of combined datasets.

The Microstrategy and State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) teams shared information, including data and feedback. Both groups had daily visibility of activities and plans as well as connections from the state level to the local level. This level of coordination and sharing was considered early in the development of the Microstrategy and leveraged by SEOC to enhance regional reporting.

For the most part, agencies understood their roles and responsibilities, however some agency staff mistakenly believed that NSW Health was the combat agency during Delta

In a rapidly changing environment, with a complex set of governance arrangements involving multiple agencies contributing at various levels to activities such as communication and welfare support, there was a risk that agencies may not understand their roles and responsibilities. The audit team looked for evidence of this risk and found that, for the most part, agencies understood their roles and responsibilities. The audit team found that those in regional and local EM roles from the NSW Police Force and councils had many years of experience (on average over ten years, in most cases more) in responding to emergencies. Alongside the contribution of experienced leadership of the emergency management bodies at the state, regional and local levels, there were the following controls that helped to reinforce the roles, responsibilities and actions required from representatives:

• a regular cadence of meetings connected local, regional and State bodies
• at regional levels, emergency management bodies such as regional emergency operations centres (REOC), local emergency operations centres (LEOCs) and local emergency management committees (LEMCs) interacted daily with NSW Health Local Health Districts (LHD) to discuss problem-solving and tracking of issues 
• the NSW Police Force updated guidance and procedures to support key operations such as joint activity with the Australian Defence Force.

The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) describes a combat agency as the agency identified in the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN) as the agency primarily responsible for controlling the response to a particular emergency. Under the EMPLAN, NSW Health is the combat agency responsible for pandemic response. The role of the combat agency is to control response operations and the overall direction of activities being undertaken by participating agencies and individuals.

The SERM Act and EMPLAN describe the relationship between the SEOCON and the combat agency, including the ability of the SEOCON to assume control of the response to an emergency or to coordinate support for the combat agency who can focus on the actual response. On 29 March 2020, in order to allow NSW Health to focus on the health aspects of the response, the NSW Government directed the SEOCON take on the role of designated controller/combat agency from NSW Health. The combat agency role was handed back to NSW Health on 1 December 2021.

However, in Dubbo, some emergency management personnel mistakenly believed that NSW Health was the combat agency during Delta. This led to heightened expectations regarding NSW Health's capability in supporting community supports such as deploying health accommodation facilities for those found to be positive or close contacts. The impact on outcome was minimal because of the effective coordination and leadership of the emergency management response. The escalation resulted in further support and used accommodation guidelines used in a neighbouring region. This may have impacted relationships between agencies.

Overall, the emergency management arrangements supported coordination at the local level and information sharing to effectively identify and manage risk

The emergency management arrangements drove coordination for the implementation of Public Health Orders at the regional and local levels, especially through daily situation reports where all levels shared risks and followed up with updates. This daily connection between the three levels of emergency management (state, regional and local) effectively supported information sharing so that the SEOC had a complete view of issues relating to compliance and support. Furthermore, other agencies (the Department of Customer Service, Aboriginal Affairs NSW and Multicultural NSW) were represented at the SEOC.

Daily SEOC situation reports collected local and regional insights that included risks. The daily situation reports also included updates from the emergency management functional area coordinators and NSW Government agencies involved in the response. The SEOC provided a broad forum for sharing risk-related information across regions and agencies. This included risks relating to resource management, such as the ongoing logistics of providing supports to communities.

The Microstrategy used a risk-based approach in convening daily meetings across all pillars and many agencies. It focused on identification of potential new areas of concern based on the data and insights collected from the agencies working across the different workstreams. Pillar 3 of the Microstrategy focused on the risks and obstacles to compliance with Public Health Orders.

The Microstrategy addressed key issues in providing support to affected communities, including income support and access to food and other essentials

The NSW Government approved over $50 million of funding under the Microstrategy to address gaps that emerged in the LGAs of concern. The funding supported engagement and communication with vulnerable communities by providing funding for individuals and community organisations most in need, and included:

• $25 million Trace and Isolate Support Payment
• $20 million additional emergency support for NGOs
• $4 million for businesses being COVID-safe
• $2-3 million for community empowerment (including communications/messaging, testing, grocery collection/delivery).

Funding was intended to mitigate potential disincentives to comply with Public Health Order requirements to isolate after testing, for those not eligible for funding from programs set up by the Australian Government. Its focus on community organisations who faced extra demand and had been impacted by loss of usual sources of funding or access to its volunteer base.

By 11 October 2021, a further $30 million was designed and delivered through the Microstrategy and Multicultural NSW covering:

• Community Support Grant Program $748,000
• Crisis and Essential Services Support for Temporary Visa Holders Grant Program $750,000
• Multicultural Media COVID-19 Support Grants $2,000,000
• Emergency Relief and NGO Support Grant Program $5,500,000
• Empowering and Supporting Local Communities Grant (Round 1) $3,400,000
• Empowering and Supporting Local Communities Grant (Round 2) $3,600,000
• Partnership Grants to the NGO and Community Sector $10,000,000
• Office of Local Government Partnership Grants $3,000,000
• COVID-19 Innovation Grants $1,150,000.

The State Welfare Services Committee enabled a coordination mechanism between food distributors, Department of Communities and Justice and other agencies to address food security issues. However, a more targeted mechanism was required to address the impacts on supply and distribution that occurred due to the restrictions on movement.

The REOCON for South West Metropolitan region established a region-specific well-being sub-committee. This model extended into other regions including central and far Western NSW. The sub-committees were a forum for councils, agencies and NGOs to discuss logistics and practical solutions to food security issues. Lessons from the early phase, such as use of Fairfield Council facilities to serve as pre-staging facilities and distribution/storage centres for large NGOs to provide food to local charities was replicated in other regions.

Despite the lessons from the early stages of the Delta outbreak, it took time to address concerns relating to supporting Aboriginal communities in remote parts of regional New South Wales

There were nuances in the provision of support to Aboriginal communities that were missed in Pillar 5 of the Microstrategy. For example, Aboriginal Affairs NSW noted the challenges of creating specific place-based responses which focused on the specific needs of small communities who were at risk due to low vaccination rates. For these communities, the approach to vaccination utilised mobile, smaller clinics with culturally appropriate messages and targeted community engagement.

Aboriginal Affairs NSW also noted that grant programs created in a multiculturally focused workstream had limited reach into Aboriginal communities.

On 31 August 2021, the Microstrategy established an additional workstream (Pillar 8), dedicated to supporting Aboriginal communities. However, Pillar 8 was established 42 days after several LGAs in regional New South Wales (Blayney, Cabonne and Orange) were subject to stay-at-home orders and 20 days after stay-at-home orders were applied to Dubbo Regional Council.

Community Action Plans (CAPs) were used to support Aboriginal community engagement with emergency management arrangements. In April 2020, Nanima Village (an Aboriginal Community in Dubbo Regional Council), established its first CAP. Between April 2020 and September 2021, the CAP was updated regularly. In Nanima, the CAP was the subject of discussion in twice-weekly community meetings between local community and the LEOCON, where COVID-19 related action items were identified and tracked.

Access to data, particularly data on vaccination rates, was another gap for Aboriginal communities. According to Aboriginal Affairs NSW, Pillar 8 improved how agencies shared data to better understand vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities, which it then shared with community leaders to enable engagement with the vaccination roll-out. The REOC in central and far Western NSW also used utilised this data to track performance, and identify emerging risks, in Aboriginal communities.

NSW Health deployed resources to support Western NSW Local Health District

During the audit period, Western NSW Local Health District (WNSWLHD) employed one full-time staff member responsible for ongoing engagement with REMCs, REOCs and LEMCs. WNSWLHD is a geographically large LHD, covering three emergency management regions and 27 LGAs. In August 2021, in response to the outbreak of Delta in Dubbo LGA and concerns regarding the spread of COVID-19 into Aboriginal communities in Western NSW, NSW Health deployed additional staff to support WNSWLHD’s emergency management capacity including representation on the Dubbo LEMC and in the REOC for the central west and far western NSW region.

This level of resourcing exposes the risk that in a future emergency event that acutely and simultaneously affects multiple regional LHDs, NSW Health may have insufficient capacity to support LHDs to meet their emergency management obligations in every REMC and LEMC.