Attribute 9: Investigation Standards
The Need for Competent Fraud Handling and Investigation
An agency with a comprehensive fraud control strategy is more likely to detect fraud. However, evidence can be easily
spoilt and investigations damaged or hindered. Both investigative and operational staff at all levels need to be clear about how
to deal with fraud situations so that their actions are effective.
Room for improvement existed in terms of this attribute in 53% of agencies surveyed. A general lack of formal guidelines
and poor staff training was particularly apparent.
It is vital that once fraud has been detected it is handled and investigated competently.
Initial Investigations
There appears to be some misconception concerning when investigation of a fraud matter will be undertaken and when
Police involvement will be sought. Fraud is a criminal offence. It must be treated as such from the outset. Suspected fraud
must not be left unexplored nor should investigation be unreasonably deferred. Time lost may later prove to be critical. For
example, considerable damage may be done to the organisation by the perpetrator during any elapsed time.
All instances of suspected fraud must be promptly examined by the agency to establish whether a basis exists for further action.
It is very important that operational and line management officers in the agency are completely clear as to when and how to
proceed in any given fraud situation. Particular attention should be given to protocols, procedures and the dissemination of
sufficient knowledge of relevant legal/investigation issues to ensure that any form of evidence will not be lost or contaminated
during the preliminary phases. It must be completely clear how initial investigations will be undertaken, and by whom.
After initial investigation by the agency if a reasonable basis appears to have been established for believing that fraud may
indeed have occurred the situation must be reported to the Police. Likewise the Independent Commission Against Corruption
must be advised.
A record should be maintained of all fraud disclosures received. However, fraud investigations can easily become
complex and drawn out. Momentum can be lost. Ongoing damage could be being done to the agency. The effectiveness of
the investigation could be impaired. Systems and protocols should be established to monitor investigations and report upon
their status and results as they proceed.
All disclosures received and investigations initiated should be on record. This in turn should initiate an information control
structure for management to monitor the investigation. Senior management or the fraud control committee can then expect to
receive reports on the status and progress of the investigation on a regular scheduled basis. Instances where no further action
is required must be endorsed with the appropriate reasons. However, agencies should consider the form and detail of
information to be provided to management in the first instance, to protect the rights of individuals regarding personal
information. Reference to the NSW Privacy Committee's "Data Protection Principles" will be of assistance here.
Investigating Responsibilities
At the time of reporting to the Police and ICAC or shortly thereafter, the issue of further investigation of the alleged
offence should be discussed by the agency with each body with the goal of resolving a satisfactory approach to the matter. All
parties must know what is going on and how to proceed.
The Personnel Handbook suggests that (Division 3, Part 2, Section 2.3.6):
the department ought only to investigate sufficiently to form this view (i.e. that a criminal offence may have been
committed) leaving further investigation to the Police themselves.
However, this approach may not always be the most appropriate. Such matters should be discussed and resolved with the relevant external authorities. Aspects such as the size and nature of the alleged offence, expertise required and available resources may need to be considered. In a general sense, potential options to undertake investigations include:
Agency size may often be one of the significant factors here. For example, a medium to large agency may be more
likely to:
A small agency may be more likely to:
Investigation Plans
Where it has been discussed and agreed with the external authorities that further investigation of a suspected fraud
situation should be undertaken by the agency (at least up to some agreed point) the next step in the process is the
development of an investigation plan.
Management input or direction can be exceedingly helpful at this early stage. The investigating officer or team becomes
aware of management intentions and the direction that has to be taken from the outset of the investigation. Management input
at the commencement and at critical checkpoints during the investigation can result in a collaboration of ideas to streamline the
review process, identify new issues and prevent the investigation from detouring from the main objectives of the review.
Management should be aware that their role is one of guidance. Management should not become directly involved in the
investigation process nor should management attempt to unduly influence the report. There have been occasions when senior
managers have been involved in defrauding their organisation. Inquiries are specialised undertakings and require true
independence to operate efficiently and effectively.
Fraud investigations must be conducted without interference from management.
The investigation approach should be planned from the outset by the team leader and approved by senior management. Matters to be considered and confirmed by management as part of the planning process should include:
Senior management or the fraud committee in consultation with the investigators should also determine which officers will
be notified of impending investigations and when.
Officers to be notified can be broken into three groups:
The issues of "the need to know" and of access to personal information need to be carefully addressed here, so that the
conduct of investigations is not unnecessarily hindered or the rights of individuals breached. Reference to the NSW Privacy
Committee's "Data Protection Principles" and to the ICAC external reporting guide will be of assistance here.
Conducting Investigations
It is absolute folly to believe that investigating fraud is a simple matter. Despite continuing indications of this many
organisations still approach fraud investigation in a casual manner.
The head of a major Police corporate crime group in one State recently publicly stated that traditional Police investigative
resources were no longer equipped to handle the growing complexities of fraud situations. It was proposed that the best way
to tackle fraud investigation is with multidisciplinary teams incorporating such disciplines as information technology,
accountancy and law together with Police in the one investigation team. Such teams were highly trained and equipped with
modern technology to support their efforts.
Obviously such arrangements are directed towards the most major and complex frauds and agencies will not face such
situations every day. However, fraud investigation should not be underrated or approached lightly.
The agency's investigation standards and/or the plan for a particular investigation should specify procedures to be followed for determining/approving:
If it is likely or intended that investigations will be undertaken in-house (even if only on some occasions or to a certain
point) the agency should decide who will be involved in the investigation process. It is then imperative that the section, group
or individual officers nominated possess and maintain the requisite skills and knowledge. Ongoing training and professional
development is essential. However, evidence suggests that many officers involved in investigations are not adequately skilled
and trained.
Investigations must be undertaken by skilled officers.
Where considerable investigation in-house is likely over time compilation of an investigation procedures manual is considered
desirable to provide consistency and maintain standards. There are a great many topics, issues, techniques and processes
which could be contained within such a manual. There are many experts and sources of guidance in this field which agencies
can make use of if required. This Guide does not serve such a purpose.
However, as a minimum it would be expected that such a manual would specify an agency's investigation standards in terms of such matters as:
It is imperative that responsibility has been clearly assigned and relevant systems developed to ensure that full and
complete records are maintained of all fraud reports and situations. In addition to suitable normal physical security
arrangements an agency may wish to address the possibility of tampering with or unauthorised removal of material from official
records either now or at some time in the future. Measures in this respect can range from very simple ones (such as minute
numbering all pages and parts of all documents, and numbering all items of evidence) to quite sophisticated means (usually
technological).
Records of Investigations
Agencies need to become aware of the issues surrounding the retention and disposal of records and to give particular
thought to records relating to unproved or minor matters.
The question of what retention period should be applicable to internal investigation-related personal information is
expected to be the subject of further consultation between the ICAC and the NSW Privacy Committee. However, at present
the Personnel Handbook states that all information on unproven allegations should be destroyed. For proven allegations,
Section 16.6.3 of the Handbook states that staff records should be disposed of in accordance with the General Records
Disposal Schedule - Personnel Records issued by the Archives Office of NSW. Based on that schedule, counselling/discipline
files should be disposed of five years after the last action on the file for officers who are paid below Common Salary Point 75,
or retained offsite for officers above that point.
Interim and Final Reports from Investigations
In addition to routine status reporting, where possible it is suggested that a good practice is for an interim report to be
submitted to the fraud control committee at a suitable point during the course of each investigation. This provides the
committee with a fuller picture of the situation and provides a useful opportunity for management to provide advice on the
direction and/or form of the investigation.
Care should be taken to ensure that any interim reporting practices introduced do not cause delays in the process or
cause premature conclusions to be reached. Verbal interim reporting arrangements may be suitable in some situations.
The final report from each investigation should initially be presented to senior management or the fraud control committee.
It should subsequently be forwarded with their endorsements and/or recommendations to the chief executive for appropriate
action. The agency should formally set a standard for the maximum period which may elapse between the committee's receipt
and on-forwarding of such reports. It is recognised that a realistic standard in this regard may depend on a number of factors.
However, where practicable a standard of no more than a week is suggested.
The reporting format for interim and final reports is a matter for the investigator and for each agency to determine. However, it is suggested that information to be provided in interim reports should include:
In terms of final reports, it is suggested that information to be provided should include:
It is also imperative that a follow up review at some future point in time is conducted to ensure recommendations have
been implemented and are working effectively to prevent any reoccurrence of fraud. A standard should be set in this regard.
A period of 6-12 months is suggested.
An important but sometimes neglected process is following up the recommendations of fraud investigation reports.
A Few Investigation Tips